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Abstract. 
The thesis is concerned with an examination of Islam in Sri Lanka. 
It argues that while Sri Lankan Islam shares an ideology with the 
Islamic world, it has a specificity which may only be understood with 
reference to its particular historical and cultural context. As an 
Islamic community on the periphery of the Islamic world, Sri Lankan 
Muslims find their ideology, enduringly problematic. They must 
continually assert their egalitarian ideology, within the 
hierarchically ordered cosmological universe, that they share with 
Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus. They must further assert their 
egalitarianism in the face of constant forces of stratification, 
internal to the Muslim community itself. Islamic ideology, given this 
particular cultural context, is both determining and constitutive of 
the community. The consolidation of the varied histories of the 
diverse Muslim community in the late colonial period is shown to be 
an aspect of hegemonic domination of the community by a fraction of 
it. 
The structure and force of Islamic ideology as revealed in Sri Lanka 
is discussed through an examination of religious understanding and 
ritual practice. The significance of the myths behind, and practices 
associated with, the shrines of the saints are explored and 
contrasted with those elsewhere in the Muslim world. Critical 
distinctions in the practice of Muslim saint 'worship' are discussed. 
The centrality of the mosque and the male religious community are 
examined, and the articulation of the mosque with the domestic order 
is clearly outlined. Sri Lankan Muslims elaborate, through their 
calendrical ritual, a constant regeneration of the Islamic community 
- Umnah. At its most fundamental level this regeneration requires the 
unification of male and female, mosque and house. This practice is 
a constant metaphor of the original basis, and current practice, of 
the Sri Lankan Muslim community, founded by the marriages of Arab 
Muslims to indigenous women, in whose houses they took up residence. 
Regenerative symbols in this context are those of food and hearth, 
and feast practices reveal the constant constitution of the community 
through its rituals of communal commensality. The calendrical aspects 
of the regeneration are most readily determined through a discussion 
of the ritual complex surrounding Ramazan and culminating in the 
Feast of Sacrifice at the end of the Hajj. The ideological 
constitution of the ummah, at its various levels of incorporation, 
is examined from the perspective of the Sri Lankan Muslims. A 
perspective in which they as one of a multitude of specific, 
culturally and historically diverse communities of the Muslim world, 
participate in a calendrical ritual cycle, which they perceive at the 
ideological level, to embrace them all. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The initial research period during which this study was undertaken was from 
June 1984 to April 1986. I returned for a further five weeks in April/May 1987. 
I spent my first year in the town of Weligama and subsequently moved to a 
nearby village (see also p16 ff1). 
The research method used was participant-observation and I endeavoured to 
gather information as widely as I could. I used both pre-arranged directed 
interviews and a non-directive approach. Initially I sought to gain knowledge 
about the culture, the religion and the town by interviewing religious and town 
officials. Each formal interview turned up new social opportunities and each 
new social meeting provided further introductions and leads for further 
research. When people inquired about what I was doing I initially replied that I 
had come to study the culture and religion. This was somewhat puzzling to 
most and I modified this to say that I had come to study their history - the story 
of the Moors in Sri Lanka, and with this everyone was happy. The Muslims are 
known in Sri Lanka as a community who had never placed much stock in 
formal education and scholarship in and about the community has been 
minimal. In general people expressed their pleasure about my interest in their 
history and many stated explicitly that they felt obliged to assist me. Given the 
current ethnic struggle and the renewed stress on historical origins this is not 
surprising. Once news of my presence and purpose got around I was constantly 
invited to household and religious rituals and feasts. I followed up all leads 
until I reached a point where I had established firm social relationships with a 
number of families and from then on I felt I had both a domestic social life and 
a research life. Although my learning remained constant throughout my time 
there I then tended to explore customary attitudes and understandings in my 
varied social domains and histories and variation in religious practices in the 
wider arena. 
The fact that I went to the field with a two year old son and the fact that I chose 
to live in an independent household undoubtedly shaped my research 
experience. My status as a `married woman' meant that I was free to be on the 
streets, the fact that I was foreign meant that I remained respectable despite 
keeping the company of men in my public research. My independence meant 
that I was free to mix with both high and low caste members of both the 
Muslim and the Sinhalese communities. The research area has a Sinhalese 
majority with whom the Muslims constantly interact and I sought to gain 
information about this community also. To this end I visited temples as well as 
mosques, interviewed both Sinhalese business people and Muslims traders and 
attended Sinhalese rituals (exorcisms, weddings, puberty ceremonies) along 
with Muslim ones. 
In order to examine more closely the increasingly obvious diversity (in both 
historical and class terms) between different villages in the research area I 
undertook extensive surveys in three of them (an agriculturalist village, an `out- 
caste' village and a village that had a strong identification with a Sufi order). 
After compilation of village registers in each village a random sample of 25% 
of the households was administered a detailed survey concerning household 
income, land holdings, employment patterns, household wealth, education 
levels, marriage and residence patterns, dowries, ethnicity, religious practices 
and any other information that respondents chose to reveal. The survey was 
carried out with the help of a small team of research assistants and is discussed 
in Appendix A. I have used survey material to highlight different issues of 
significance to different villages. The village surveys allowed me to construct a 
more detailed picture of the nature of historical settlement and current diversity 
of Muslims in the research area. This I drew into contrast with the information 
I was gathering in the town although I did not administer the survey there. 
I conducted a survey of all the businesses in the town (Sinhalese and Muslim) 
in order gain an understanding of economic practice and participation. Since 
the Sri Lankan Muslim community is consistently portrayed as a trading 
community I felt that I required empirical evidence of the degree of local 
investment. The town is a business centre and the trade that takes place in 
villages is minuscule by contrast so comparative surveys were unwarranted in 
this instance. 
One of my early concerns in the thesis is to discuss the history of the Sri 
Lankan Moors. This was not part of my original research project but became 
increasingly obvious as a fundamental requirement. I could not discuss the 
realities of much of Southern Sri Lankan Moor life without detailing the 
historical background upon which so much of its meaning is constructed. My 
original interest in the Rifai tariqa led me to a point where I understood that its 
establishment in one of the villages had as much to do with contesting a present 
reality as it had to do with theological distinctions between different Sufi 
traditions. Of critical importance was the fact that this tariqa was new to the 
area and its establishment allowed a village to stand in a new relation to the 
current religious and political order. (This early work remains excluded from 
the thesis). The Muslims in the research area consistently reinforced my focus 
on history. Indeed it appeared to me that this was what made my work 
meaningful to them. 
The sources I used were primarily secondary and those written by Sinhalese 
historians for the most part (but see also Mohan, 1985,1987). I completed 
some archival work in Colombo on both the Dutch and British periods and I 
regard further archival research as warranted in the future, particularly on the 
Portuguese period. I also made extensive use of an edited collection of 
historical articles that was published in 1986 (Shukri, ibid) and which contained 
the recent work of a number of Muslim scholars as well. Apart from two brief 
texts by Mohan (ibid) the historical work in this thesis is the first attempt to 
interpret the complex history of the Moors in the light of its current and recent 
ideological and political significance. 
Chapter One: 
Introduction. 
1.1 Islam on the Periphery. ) 
Islam is rendered acutely problematic for those Muslims located on 
the periphery of the Islamic world. Nevertheless it has been 
systematically ignored in most studies of Islamic communities which 
have taken the religious ideology for granted. As a consequence 
'Islamic ideology' has been taken universally as little more than a 
"blue-print of a social order" (Gellner, 1981: 1). Further the entire 
cosmological dimension of the religion has been either, largely 
excluded from analysis, or subsumed within a number of dualist 
paradigms; folk/orthodox, textual/normative, adat/Islam. 2 Islam on 
the periphery is no less Islamic than Islam at the centre. In the 
context and dialectics of counter-interpretations of reality, it has 
simply taken a different form. This is the general implication of 
Geertz in Islam Observed (1971), an important point, and one I take 
up in this study. 
There are more recent scholars who firmly reject the analysis of 
Islamic societies using Islam as an analytical blueprint (Banks 1976, 
el-Zein 1977, Eickelman 1981, Denny 1985, Kipp et al 1987, Van 
Bruinessan 1987, Ahmed 1991) the most succinct being Kessler who 
insists that Islam presents a vision of an ideal society, not a 
theory of an existent one (1972: 39). 3 Islam as a given ideology is 
1 The use of the term "peripheral" has been sharply criticized 
by Dale (1986) who argues that "apart from the size and vitality of 
the South Asian Muslim population, South Asian Muslims are weary of 
being classed as peripheral merely because they do not have Arab 
ancestors"(ibid: 624). My usage here reflects accurately the 
perceptions of this particular Muslim community which does claim Arab 
ancestry and which exists as a minority group in a multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious society. 
2 The dichotomy between adat (custom) and Islam was first 
applied to society in Dutch colonial Indonesia by Snouck Hurgronje 
and has remained a consistent, albeit increasingly honed feature of 
Indonesian studies (see also Hooker 1974, Harahap 1987, Abdullah 1966 
and Roff 1985). 
3 Kessler argues that the classically inspired approach, based 
on "an implicit Quranic theory of society" has been "nominalist, 
prescriptive, anti-empirical and deductive" and has led to "an 
idealist political science which is inadequately historical and 
totally unsociological"(ibid: 34). 
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generally understood by Muslims to reflect an ideal society (the 
ummah) , which is prefigured in the shariat (laws), but which has 
never been implemented. ' For an analyst to take Islam 
unproblematically, as a "blue-print" or "theory" of society, creates 
a dualist conception which denies the tension/dynamic internal to 
Muslim societies. This tension, emergent from the contradictions 
between the ideal ummah of the shariat, and the reality of any 
particular Muslim cultural context is instead located between 
'Islam' (the blue-print) and the cultural reality. As a result much 
of the analysis of Muslim societies details their 'folk' or customary 
practices and defines them as less than Islamic. 
1.2 Syncretism or Dualism: Research on Islam in South and S. E. Asia. 
Research on Islam in the Islamic communities of this region has been 
dominated by a dualist approach, exemplified in the dichotomy between 
adat (custom) and Islam, developed in Indonesia (Hooker, ibid 
Harahap, ibid, Abdullah, ibid and Roff, ibid) and later imported to 
Indian studies (Barth 1960, Ahmad, 1976,1978,1981, Mines 1975,1978). 
This analytical construct which emerged in Indonesia was formulated 
as a "systematic opposition held to distinguish - culturally, 
socially and politically - the domains of "adat" (custom, Ar ada) and 
"hukum" (Islamic law, formally conceived; figh). This construct later 
became adat/Islam (Roff, ibid: l0). 
Although the adat/Islam dichotomy has been a constant conceptual 
feature in Indonesian studies; one which Roff attributes to "the 
over-determination of adat carried out by the Dutch for purposes of 
colonial rule, " (ibid, op cit) the nature of the relationship between 
the two is by no means agreed, or held to be historically constant, 
and has been the subject of continuing debate. Hurgronje himself, 
expressed a certain ambivalence concerning the relationship between 
the two, at one point asserting their "indissoluble union" and later 
positing them as "mistress" (adat) and her "obedient slave" 
(Islam)(ibid, op cit). Later studies by Abdullah (ibid) and Siegel 
(1969) sought to overcome the simplistic, reductionist view produced 
"Further "the social theory of Islam is sociologically 
deficient". (This) "untested Islamic theory of society is 
sociologically inadequate primarily because it is so overwhelmingly 
ethical and individualistic" (ibid: 38). 
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through colonial rule and concomitant ethnographic pursuits. ' 
Abdullah argues that 
to construct systematic oppositions between adat and Islam, 
largely irrespective of social and cultural complexities means 
a loss of subtlety in analysis (ibid: l). 
Thus Siegel argues that Achenese society was (at that time) divided 
into four groups; 
uleebalang (secular chiefs), ulama, peasants and the sultan 
and his group - each of which has its own view of the nature 
of Islam and adat (1969: 11). 
This view is shared by Geertz (ibid) in his conception of Javanese 
Islam with priyaji, santri, and abangan variants, borne of different 
historical experiences and the pre-dispositions of variant social 
groups. Abdullah (who worked in Minangkabau) instructs us that adat 
itself is an ambiguous term referring to both 
local custom which regulates the interaction of members of a 
society .. (and)... the whole structural system of society, of 
which local custom is only a component (cited Roff, ibid op 
cit). 
According to Roff 
Abdullah sees the intermittent eruption of social conflict in 
Minangkabau, consequent upon successive attempts by one or 
other element of the ulama to assert a stronger voice for 
Islam within the culture, as strengthening the Islamic 
component in the overall "adat Minangkabau" without destroying 
the notion that adat and Islam are the twin pillars of 
society, each in its own way necessary and justifiable, but 
with conflict over their precise relationship an endemic and 
indeed integrating feature (because of the recognition it 
affords both sides) of the Minangkabau world (Roff, ibid: 11). 
Adat then is clearly a problematic term, one whose meaning and force 
is to be determined in each and every specific historical 
circumstance, and whose meaning at a higher level is subject to 
change. Nevertheless, the conceptual dualism remains a fundamental 
component in analysis, opposed to an Islam which itself takes various 
5 It was in Dutch interests to present nineteenth century Acheh 
"not as a hierarchical, vertically integrated society - but as one 
composed of four encapsulated groups existing side by side -meeting 
only at the boundaries"(Seigel, 1969: 69). Roff attributes a central 
role to Achenese studies within a wider ethnographic exercise which 
itself saw Java as the Netherlands' India (1985b: 22). Acheh was the 
scene of major Dutch wars in the face of constant local rebellions 
against colonial rule. 
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forms and expressions in variant social groups which make up 
Achenese/Javanese /Indonesian society. 
In Malaysia, Banks (1976) striving towards an actual "unity of 
Islamic Malay culture" (with specific ethnographic reference to 
inheritance systems) notes the original justification for a theory 
of conflicting value systems emerging in the context of Dutch 
colonial government. 
(I)f Islam appeared to imply a society based upon patrilineal 
clans, like those of the Middle East, a model of society 
composed of conflicting value systems made sense when one 
found Islam in societies without clans or with matriclans 
(Banks, ibid: 582). 
Islam in Indonesia was seen by the Dutch "as a doctrine of 
duties"(Roff, ibid: 13) so local custom, thought to be culturally 
prior, pre-eminent, and sui juris was regarded as embodying 
codifiable rules for the regulation of social behaviour. This 
resulted in the discovery and enshrinement in a vast 
literature that set its face against any tendency towards more 
uniform systems of law for indigenes, whether engendered by 
the Dutch colonial system itself or by Islam(Roff, ibid: 13). 
The Dutch favoured traditional authority structures linked to the 
particulars of customary law (adatrecht) in contrast to Islam. Islam 
which "as an ideology and source of political power", had 
increasingly during the protest movements and development of 
twentieth century nationalism been associated 
with appeals to the common identity (... ) transcending local 
loyalties and opposed to the imposition and perpetuation of 
alien rule (ibid: 14). 
A contrasting situation which developed in Malaysia, under British 
colonial control, is described by De Jong (1960b) who observed that 
here, where they were spared the "discovery of customary law" during 
the Dutch colonial period, the formal position of Islam was stronger 
than in Indonesia. In this case the conflict was 
between two systems of ideas and practices, both of which were 
considered by the society concerned as being an integral 
(part) of its culture, both applicable to the entire society, 
and both perceived as a system by inhabitants of that 
society(1960b: 199 cited Roff, ibid: 12). 
1.3 Problems and Paradigms 
The adat/Islam distinction has been overused, attempts at ensuring 
its analytical complexity notwithstanding. There is always for 
10 
Muslims a dynamic borne of the distinction between the ummah as 
actualized ideal, the society structured according to the dictates 
of the shariat (nowhere existent in concrete terms, though the Muslim 
theocratic states are emergent from 
.a 
desire to establish it), and 
the prevailing inegalitarian social situation, in the cultural 
context of Muslims (anywhere in the world). This inherent dynamic 
makes such dichotomous analytical constructs inevitable, both in the 
work of ethnographers and in Muslim communities themselves. This 
dichotomy, is arguably more evident in the periphery of the Islamic 
world where Islam is less embedded and where both historical 
circumstances and prevailing social and cultural norms are at odds 
with an Arabic culture which always couches Islamic doctrine. More 
widely it is reflected in the continual emergence of reform movements 
within all Islamic communities peripheral or central. ' 
This inherent dichotomy however takes distinct social and cultural 
form in each situation and its inherent nature should not be 
determining of a particular oppositional structure. What we are 
alerted to is the complexity of such contrasts. If we accept that the 
dichotomy is a feature of embedded Islam itself then we may begin to 
explore its particular content and the creative articulation of Islam 
into peripheral (or central) Islamic worlds. In the Indonesian 
context there is no doubt that Dutch "over-determination of adat" was 
a crucial factor in giving a certain oppositional structure to the 
relationship between the two. A general picture emerges of the Dutch 
enshrinement of distinct adat systems leaving Islam as the only 
ideology with "appeals to the existence of a common identity" and one 
employed in increasingly anti-colonial contexts. 7 Syncretism and 
analytic dualisms - regardless of minute observation of 
dialectical 
relations, or changing historical complexities - nevertheless, fail 
to successfully come to grips with Islam as a totality in this 
regional context. 
6 This is noted by (Gellner, 1985: 1-7) and Kessler (ibid) takes 
it up in a discussiom of Islam used as a political weapon in the 
service of Malayan political movements. 
The interpretation of Islam as the remaining universal 
ideology is arguably a further extension of colonial rhetoric and 
Western analytic paradigms. Far from explaining the situation in 
total, it itself, cements an original and erroneous interpretation 
of a rigid dichotomy between Islam and adat. One factor which appears 
consistently overlooked is the ideological role of the Hindu-Javanese 
hierarchical state and its appropriation and subsequent 
transformation of Islam. This is an issue I address in Chapter Four. 
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A second set of major paradigms employed in Islamic studies are those 
which pose an opposition between a "mystical" and "orthodox" Islam 
(Indonesia), "folk" and "orthodox", (North Africa) or "great 
tradition" and "little tradition" (India). These oppositions though 
long prevalent have been condemned by many scholars (Tapper and 
Tapper 1987, el-Zein ibid, Eickelman ibid, and Minault 1984) . In each 
case analysts have taken a normative, often textual Islam and 
contrasted it with the divergent customary practices found throughout 
the Islamic world. In this contrast, they have argued that customary 
practices are deviations from a true Islam, and are superstitious 
cultural hangovers. In further cases explicit links are drawn between 
women and superstitious practices. These dichotomies are readily 
applied, not only in the peripheral regions of Islam but constantly 
in the heartland communities where Islam is embedded in cultural 
practices to a far greater degree. However, in contrast to the 
dichotomy as parlayed in Indonesia, between Islam and local custom 
(which stand as twin pillars of society), in other contexts the folk 
practices are considered as low Islam, a pollution of the pure Islam 
by a set of cultural practices which are essentially hangovers; 
hopefully to be eventually reformed out of existence. This 
distinction between folk and orthodox is also found in the regions 
where the adat/Islam paradigm has already been applied but here they 
both sit within the Islamic side of the paradigm, a reflection of 
diverse Islamic practices. Thus there are constant battles among the 
local ulama about differing doctrinal interpretations and constant 
reformist movements which attempt to purify the religion of Islam by 
obliterating for instance, Hindu practices. Part of this is due to 
the fact that Islam itself, in its historical path, has long provided 
the context for differing interpretations and by extension, 
practices. Thus particularly during the post thirteenth century 
"fluorescence of Sufism and the Sufi orders" (Roff, ibid: 20) which had 
a direct influence in India and Indonesia at the time of the regions' 
initial conversion to Islam, arose the idea that there were as many 
paths to God as men. 
1.4 Islamisation. 
If we accept the existence of the ideal/actual conception for most 
Muslims, we may conclude that Islamic societies are always societies 
in becoming. This is what I would term Islamisation - an inherent 
12 
dynamic in Islam, a dynamic which is universal. e Islamisation is a 
movement towards Islam - becoming more Islamic, but not simply as a 
shedding of non-Islamic customary practices, rather an active 
reproduction of what is locally defined as 'orthodox' Islam. All 
Islamic societies have a somewhat reformist character, reflected in 
the dynamic tension between the Islam that is the possibility of the 
texts, and the reality that constitutes Islam in its 'local context' 
(Eickelman, ibid). The dynamic is universal but we can attribute no 
inherent universality to its content or processual structure, 
embedded as it always is, in historical and cultural particularity. 
It is an historically contingent process not a given Western category 
of analysis (and a process often sharpened by colonial experience). 
As Van Bruinessan argues 
A general theory of Islamization will either have to be so 
abstract as to be almost empty of content, or it will have to 
accommodate itself to a virtually unlimited number of 
exceptions (1987: 526). 
Others have sought to overcome the stark simplicity of this dualism 
and to assert a complexity to the relationship between idealized and 
lived Islam, which takes account of historical and cultural shifts 
within particular contexts (Geertz ibid, Johns 1975, Van Bruinessan 
ibid, Harahap ibid, Kipp et al ibid, Tapper & Tapper ibid, Delaney 
ibid, Combs-Schilling ibid). Few (if any) attempts have been made 
to grasp Islam as a totality within a peripheral environment; Islam 
as it is lived in a particular geographical, cultural and historical 
context, which nonetheless shares a religious ideology with Muslim 
countries of the Middle East. 
Islam itself becomes problematic in this regard and the difficulty 
facing researchers is to discuss Islam in particular contexts without 
representing it as "a seamless web on the one hand and a plastic 
congeries of beliefs and practices on the other" (Eickelman, 1982: 1) . 
When discussing local meanings of Islam, moves beyond syncretistic 
and dualistic conceptions are rarely seen. What is required is 
ethnographic documentation which takes full account of local context. 
a The concept of Islamization (Islamisation) has been a loosely 
used feature of many studies (Ahmad 1978, Momin 1978, Aggarwal 1978, 
Mines 1975,1978). At its broadest it may be seen as a "shedding" of 
non-Islamic beliefs, customs and rituals (Momin, ibid: 133). It has 
"been used extensively (in Indian studies) while describing efforts 
of social mobility of Muslim social or caste groups" (Ahmad ibid: 191) 
but rarely, if ever applied to the Muslim community and its daily 
ideological practice. 
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The renewed study of Islam in local contexts involves greater 
attention to how religious tradition and religious 
organization specifically shape and in turn are shaped by the 
wider political and economic contexts in which they occur 
(Eickelman, ibid: 13). 
We need to examine the process of religious transformation, through 
cultural re-interpretations and re-workings of Islamic ideology. This 
is an approach which recognizes local cultures as active 
appropriators rather than passive recipients of a new religion. 
Following Geertz (ibid) it is essential to examine the world as they 
create it. This thesis examines the world of Muslims in Southern Sri 
Lanka and attempts to address the challenges of Islam in a local 
context. 
1.5 Islam in Sri Lanka. 
The Sri Lankan Muslim community has as its enduring problematic the 
fact that it must assert its egalitarian religious ideology in the 
context of the avowedly hierarchical cultures of the Sinhalese 
Buddhists and Tamil Hindus. A hierarchy whose force is reflected in 
the internal fragmentation of the Muslim community into ranked 
groups. These internal forces of fragmentation are further compounded 
by class divisions which were sharpened in the more recent periods 
of capitalist development. 
To penetrate the particular world of Sri Lankan Islam, I focus on the 
symbolic and ritual structures which are constantly engaged in daily 
life. ' These rituals essay for the analyst and participant alike, a 
view of the given cultural universe and the horizons of experience. 
It is impossible to understand the structure of much Islamic 
religious and social practice without attending to the cosmological 
schema in which Muslims are constantly engaged, and which imbue their 
actions with particular meaning. This study of Muslims in Sri Lanka 
is primarily concerned with the religion of Islam and with the force 
of religious ideology in a particular regional context which is 
filled with cosmological import. I explore the historical, ritual and 
symbolic processes of an Islamic community that is both marginally 
9 There c-ou\6 \ , more study of Islamic ritual by 
anthropologists, a point also made by Gilsenan (1993: 280). This is 
surprising, for as Denny points out "Islam itself places great 
emphasis on ritual activities" (1985: 63). Fruzetti & Ostor (1984) 
Bowen (1987,1993), Combs-Schilling (1989) and Delaney (1991) have 
been recent exceptions. 
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located and a minority population. The processes which shape its 
religious practice reflect both the community's historical 
particularity and the relation of the community to the wider Islamic 
world. A major concern is to emphasise the creative dynamic between 
Islamic ideology and peripheral cultural context, without reducing 
it to syncretism. Syncretism denies a great deal of the complexity 
of historical transformation, by conceptually treating new religious 
ideas as simply the result of an "additive process" or a 
"layering". 10 The result is something distinct or less valued than 
religion proper; an adaptation rather than an entirely valid and 
ideologically creative transformation. 
Islam in Sri Lanka presents a particular cosmological schema, a 
schema which itself, incorporates Islam, as a way of life, into the 
mythology and history of the Sri Lankan context, and further 
incorporates the island of Sri Lanka itself into a wider Islamic 
world. The Sri Lankan Muslim community traces its origins to the 
arrival of Arab traders on the island in the pre-Islamic' period. 
These traders married local women and established the first Moor 
communities on the coast. Their patterns of settlement and 
articulation with the colonial regimes are discussed in Chapter Two. 
During the late British colonial period a Muslim revival engaged the 
community in a re-assertion of their particular Ceylon Moor identity 
(Chapter Three). Sri Lankan Muslims live in a world of Hindus and 
Buddhists who constantly assert, through frequent and public ritual 
practice, that the world is not an Islamic one; it is poly-theistic 
and hierarchical, not monotheistic and egalitarian. In the face of 
this Muslims must continually establish their ideology as having 
real force in this particular world. Their Islam is "imported" and 
must be constantly renewed. Thus their Islamic practice (and that of 
peripheral communities generally) is arguably more reflexive in 
contrast to those followers of Islam, closer to the Islamic 
heartlands, who may take their Islamic ideology for granted due to 
its totally embedded character. The second section of the thesis 
examines ritual ideology and practice in the community. The island 
is replete with the tombs of Middle Eastern saints, and shrine 
practices and myths are examined in Chapter Four. I discuss the 
symbolic and social significance of the mosque as the heart of the 
Muslim community, and the articulation of the mosque with the 
io This process is the opposite of that usually understood as 
'Islamisation' -a shedding of beliefs or practices. 
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domestic order in Chapter Five. The mosque feast is an egalitarian 
ritual par excellence which, in this cultural context, signs Muslim 
commensality in radical contradiction to the hierarchical norms of 
the Sinhalese and Tamil communities (Chapter Six). The calendrical 
basis of the constant Muslim reproduction of the egalitarian world 
is my focus in Chapter Seven. The issue of gender and Islamic 
cosmology is also taken up, both generally and in relation to this 
particular community, which has a gender/religion problematic of its 
own. In Chapter Eight I discuss the Muslim marriage ritual which is 
best understood as "a rite of conversion". The marriage ritual 
recapitulates for the community, the original birth of the community 
through the. conversion of local women by Arab men. 
1.6 The Research Area, 
I have not undertaken the usual ethnographic study based in a single 
village, and primarily concerned to depict that village. As I have 
outlined, my concerns are with the multiple interpretations that 
inform the specificity of Islamic religious practice for Muslims in 
Sri Lanka. Thus I have set out to elaborate the cultural dimensions 
of being a Muslim in this context. All my research however was 
conducted in a small area, made up. of a number of discrete villages 
associated with a larger urban area and I briefly describe the 
research area here. 
Weligama, a town on the South-western coast was chosen as the area 
of research. " Weligama stands between the major towns of Galle (17 
miles) and Matara (10 miles), and is 90 miles from the capital, 
Colombo (Figure l. a). Administratively it falls within the Matara 
District of the island's Southern Province and ecologically it is 
11 My choice of a research area was determined by my initial 
research interest in the ecstatic dimensions of religious experience, 
in particular the performance of the Rifai Rathib by members of the 
Sri Lankan Rifai (Rifai'iyya) Tariqa. The village of Kapuwatta near 
Weligama was the only site of this Tariqa, outside Colombo, that was 
referred to in the literature (Thawfeeq, n. d.: 121). I spent a total 
of 22 months in the research area, living first in Weligama town for 
almost a year and then moving to Kapuwatta. My research was 
supported by an Adelaide University Research Grant and Wenner Gren 
Grant # 4762. 
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located in the island's Wet Zone. 12 Within the Matara District as a 
whole the Muslims constitute a small minority. At the 1981 Census 
there were 19,457 Moors and 61 Malays, a total of 2.58$ of the 
District's population. Of these however, 48% were located in the 
Weligama area making it an area of dense Muslim settlement. 13 
Figure l. a : Location of Research Area in Southern Sri Lanka. 
Weligama is located beside a beautiful bay that looks South over the 
international shipping lanes of the route through the Indian ocean 
from Africa and the Persian Gulf to Indonesia and the South China 
Seas. It was this location on the trade routes of the ancient world 
that led to the original settlement of Arab traders on the island's 
Southern and Western littorals. Weligama is widely regarded as one 
of the earliest sites of Arab settlement on the island, a town whose 
Muslims have always been traders. The location of Weligama beside 
a bay is critical in the symbolic determination of its Arab trading 
connections, a determination which renders the Bay itself an icon of 
Arab settlement. Weligama Bay is relatively secure and was formerly 
12 The island is broadly divided into two ecological zones, the 
Wet and the Dry. The Wet Zone with an average annual rainfall of 80 
inches is subject to two annual monsoons which govern the 
agricultural seasons. There are two seasons , April to August - 
Yala 
and September to January - Maha. 
13 In 1981 there were 4159 Muslims in the Weligama Urban Council 
area and 3742 Muslims in the Weligama and Malipada rural areas 
combined (1981 Census). 
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the site of a busy port for foreign vessels. The bay only has a depth 
of six fathoms and while it was suitable for older boats with shallow 
draft, these days it cannot take boats of more than forty tons. As 
a consequence of this and the establishment of the island's major 
port in Colombo it has lapsed in importance . 
14 Today the bay is only 
used by the local Sinhalese fishermen whose small out-rigger canoes 
are pulled from the water to rest all along the beach, while the 
larger boats of the fishing fleet ride at anchor in its Western, 
deeper and more sheltered end. 
In 1981 the town had a total population of 18,000 within the Urban 
Council area and of these 23.24% were Muslim, while the majority 
(74.96%) of people were Sinhalese and predominantly Buddhist. The 
Muslims are virtually all Ceylon Moors with a few cases of recently 
converted Tamil Hindus or Sinhalese women who have converted to Islam 
and married Moor men. There are also small numbers of both Sinhalese 
Christians and Tamils. In 1981 Sri Lankan Tamils constituted 1.14% 
of the population and many of them had business interests in the 
town. They left after their shops were burnt during the island-wide 
ethnic riots in July 1983. 
The town of Weligama (Sinhala - sandy village) some 500 yards from 
the beach, is slightly below sea-level in a region which contains 
black fertile soil suitable for paddy cultivation. All the villages 
in this belt surrounding Weligama are inhabited by Sinhalese 
cultivators, with the exception of Horagoda. The land near the sea- 
shore is a salty white sandy soil where coconuts are cultivated and 
further inland behind the town the land rises gradually to the 
highlands which are clay-red soils used for the estate cultivation 
of rubber, cinnamon and tea. All the major estate and plantation 
areas are located well North of the coast towards the central 
highlands and the estates in this area are comparatively small. The 
Polwatha Ganga (Polwatha River) which rises in the Southern part of 
the central hill-country passes through the Weligama area for a 
distance of some twenty miles and runs through the Eastern side of 
14 It would appear that Galle was always the premier port of the 
Southern Province and the Galle Fort area today remains a 
predominantly Muslim area of settlement and host to many Muslim Gem 
Traders., During the Dutch period however Weligama increased in 
importance as a site where traders could avoid the customs duties 
imposed by the Dutch and policed through their forts at Galle and 
Matara. 
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the Weligama town area to the sea. The river is used for washing and 
bathing by people in those villages located along its, banks. It is 
also used by a number of copra and coir industries in the Sinhalese 
Pelena and Polwatta areas for the rotting of coconut husks to produce 
coir fibre which is later made into rope. This is achieved by the use 
of coir pits constructed near the river banks where the husks are 
is left to rot. 
Sinhalese and Muslims live in inter-spersed, yet largely ethnically 
discrete areas throughout the town. In the surrounding district, 
villages are ethnically discrete, though Sinhalese villages far 
outnumber those of Muslims who are a predominantly urban population. 16 
There were also several families of Indian Tamil Hindus living in the 
town, some of whom lived in the unused stalls of one of the markets. 
Most of them depended on street-sweeping and poorly paid casual 
labour for a living, with a couple of the women working as shastra- 
kariya (fortune tellers). These people are known locally as Estate 
Tamils, and are the descendants of indentured labourers brought to 
the island by the British, to work in the highland tea plantations. 
The research area included all the Muslim villages within the 
vicinity of Weligama and all areas of Muslim settlement within the 
town itself. "' The villages outside the town are Kapuwatta, in the 
Denypitiya area, Koledande and Wellipitiya (Figure 1. b). These 
villages are connected to each other and to Weligama through trading 
connections and marriages, and on occasion they participate 
collectively in religious rituals. I also included one other village 
outside this immediate network. This was Horagoda, a town of Muslim 
is The name Polwatta (Polwatha) in Sinhalese means coconut 
garden. There is a local tradition that this area was the home of the 
island's first coconuts and one particularly prized variety, (kiri 
pol or dekiri pol, Sinhala - milk coconut) is only found in the 
Weligama area. Some informants believe that the town itself, was once 
known as Pol gama - coconut village. 
16 It was always possible to determine the ethnicity of an area 
by the animals in evidence, with the presence of goats indicating 
Muslim settlement and the presence of dogs indicating a Sinhalese 
area. Muslims have strong ideological objections to dogs and will 
never touch them, while goats in this area are never milked but kept 
solely for their meat. As Buddhists will not slaughter animals they 
had no reason to keep them. Further afield, Christian areas could 
always be identified by the presence of pigs. 
17 The town areas I discuss are Galbokka, New Street and 
Maduragoda. 
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cultivators, eight miles from Weligama, between Wellipitiya and the 
major inland commercial town of Akuressa. Although it is more 
closely tied religiously and economically to Akuressa, Horagoda does 
have some economic links with Weligama and Wellipitiya Muslims and 
a religious tie to Kapuwatta. 
Figure l. b : Research Area in Detail. 
When discussing the diversity of the island's Muslim community I 
later imply a certain homogeneity about the Muslim populations of the 
South-west, and indeed they do share a cultural milieu and common 
religious orientation to the world. There are however significant 
distinctions between the populations of different villages, in their 
current economic and political standings and in their histories and 
myths of settlement. Within the relatively small social field of the 
research area there are villages established by Arab traders who 
settled here, by Indian Muslims expelled from the Kandyan Kingdom by 
the Sinhalese King, and by Arab traders who were forced to flee from 
the coastal town of Dondra by the Portuguese. Despite the diversity 
however, this group of Muslims, as part of the South-western coastal 
group of Muslims, is relatively homogeneous, when wider island 
diversity is taken into account. 
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This historical diversity within the research area is reflected in 
tensions in the social order and ongoing ideological friction. The 
friction is most evident in the ideas which govern different social 
and religious practices and less often expressed in explicit 
ideological debate. The major concerns which underlie these differing 
interpretations and practices are those of Arab ancestry and the 
ideology of trade. Tension arises concerning the legitimate 
domination of the community by those whose claims to the first, and 
practice of the second, are most widely recognized. Thus tensions 
which are essentially those of class, are elaborated within the realm 
of a particular Islamic discourse, in which the governing ideas are 
those of social ranking based on Arabic purity on the one hand, and 
the ideal of a unified, egalitarian community on the other. The 
existent social order is radically fragmented by great disparities 
in wealth and vastly different status positions arising in part from 
Arab or non-Arab origins. The contradictions borne of this social 
reality which stands in stark contrast to an egalitarian ideal 
generates a constant communal dynamic which seeks to resolve them. 
The dynamic nonetheless contains the seeds of its own refutation. The 
idea of Arab traders as the basis of a pure Islam on the periphery, 
itself reinforces the idea of rank which counteracts the egalitarian 
ideal. 
In order to briefly highlight some of these tensions my discussion 
focuses at times on three distinct villages (Maduragoda, Kapuwatta 
and Horagoda) and the Muslim traders of the town itself. Maduragoda, 
although strictly part of Weligama town, is a distinct village 
entirely inhabited by people known as Ande or "out -castes". 18 
Maduragoda was divided from the adjacent town areas, by a 
18 Muslims in Sri Lanka divide themselves internally, into five 
ranked 'castes' which are, for the most part, endogamous. The five 
groups in rank order (highest to lowest) are (1) Moulanas, - the 
descendants of the Prophet, (2) Nala Manichal - "good people", the 
descendants of Arab traders, (3) Ostas - the barber caste, (4) Moulas 
- the newly converted Muslims, and (5) Ande - the "out-castes". 
(Excluded from this reckoning are the Shia Borahs and the Sunni 
Malays, who are regarded as separate ethnic groups). Although the 
Muslims use the term shazi (jati - caste) to refer to these 'caste' 
groups it does not imply a caste system in the terms that Dumont 
(1980) has outlined. He argues that caste is a purely Hindu 
phenomenon, borne of an internal hierarchical relation between the 
pure and the impure. Dumont would insist that the use of the term 
caste be restricted to India. I take this up below (in Appendix B) 
but for the present Muslim 'castes' are to be taken as endogamous, 
ranked groups. 
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substantial channel dug during the Dutch period, to prevent periodic 
flooding of the Polwatha Ganga. Kapuwatta is the site of an ecstatic 
religious sect, the Rifai Tariqa, to which most Kapuwatta villagers 
belong. Horagoda was included, because the Muslims there, in contrast 
to all other Muslims in the area, are agriculturalists and not 
traders. All three villages were surveyed in detail because they 
exhibited distinct characteristics which rendered them particularly 
relevant to a discussion of Islamic ideology within the Muslim 
community. 19 The Muslims of Weligama itself are an urban trading 
community of long standing and in this case my survey was 
specifically concerned with trade. " 
These four village communities were the main areas in which I worked. 
However, I also regularly visited mosques and households in all the 
areas of Muslim settlement in the vicinity of Weligama. 23 All the data 
that I collected and which I discuss in detail later in the thesis 
was collected in this area. I have included a far more detailed 
description of these villages, highlighting their distinct histories 
and current economic and social position in Appendix A. 22 There is 
a great diversity to be found among the Sri Lankan Muslim community 
in terms of class, background and religious practice. The research 
area mirrors much of this wider diversity. 
11 With the help of research assistants I compiled a population 
register of the inhabitants of every house in the villages of 
Maduragoda, Kapuwatta and Horagoda. This provided detailed 
information about the number of families in each house, the marriage 
patterns, numbers of children and also about family members employed 
elsewhere. In each household we completed a genealogical chart that 
enabled us to compile a single chart for the entire village. Twenty- 
five per cent of the houses in each village were then randomly 
selected and surveyed in far greater detail (see Appendix A). This 
survey was intended to capture the diversity of the villages and to 
illuminate the shared ideology and practices. 
20 See Appendix C for detailed discussions of both Muslim 
dominance of trade in this predominantly Sinhalese area and also the 
structure of trade. 
. 
21 I also made frequent trips to Galle, Matara, Akuressa and 
Colombo to meet Muslims and observe domestic and mosque rituals. 
Further afield I visited shrines in Kurenagala, Kandy and Kalmunai 
on the East coast. 
22 Each village has different employment characteristics, and 
reveals certain traditional fields of employment associated with it. 
Here my concern is an initial brief description of the area in which 
I worked. 
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The particularity of Islam and its cultural context shape the 
practice and lived experience of any given Muslim community. My 
ethnography is focused on the Muslim community of a region in 
Southern Sri Lanka - it is a study of the specificity of a Muslim 
community. This is a minority community in the midst of an island- 
wide ethnic conflict between Sinhalese Buddhists and the Hindu Tamils 
with whom the Muslims share the Tamil language. They are far from the 
Middle East and the origins of their religion. "Religion" and 
"origins" are crucial features of the deadly discourse in which they 
are enmeshed. 23 The term 'periphery' has an added meaning here. 
It is Islamic ideology, as revealed through historical action and 
religious ritual, and as engaged in political and religious practice, 
which holds this Muslim community together. The ideology of Islam is 
one which strives to eliminate difference, and Muslim identities, 
through time, may come closer and closer to the undifferentiated 
egalitarian possibility. These communities will inevitably always 
reflect some degree of cultural and historical distinction. Islamic 
ideology also however, recognizes difference, and it is the tension 
between the recognition of difference on the one hand, and its 
elimination on the other, which is a fundamental tension of Islamic 
life on the periphery. 
23 I do not take up this issue at length although its impact on 
the Muslim community is considerable. I point out that in this 
particular current political context - questions of ethnicity, 
religion and origins, sharpen the community's perceptions of itself 
as marginalized in local politics and peripheral religiously. 
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Chapter Two : 
The History of the Muslims in Sri Lanka 
The history of Muslim settlement on the island begins with the 
settlement of Arab traders in Ceylon. ' These traders are believed to 
have converted to Islam shortly after its rise in the Middle East. 
The present community is composed of diverse ethnic elements which 
over a long period of time have come to understand themselves broadly 
as members of a single Muslim community. The complexity of historical 
settlement is reflected in multiple and diverse historical 
interpretations which over time have begun to assume a more coherent 
and symbolic form. The original diversity in ethnic, cultural and 
occupational fields has been gradually transformed and amalgamated 
as the community has come to participate in politics on the national 
level. An examination of this process, which began in earnest in the 
late nineteenth century, traces the development of hegemonic control 
of the community as a whole by a fraction of it. 
At the broadest level the Muslims could be classified as traders and 
agriculturalists. It has always been the traders who have been the 
most influential in the island's history. The itinerant, petty 
traders exercised influence simply through their greater numbers and 
their critical transformative role in the island's economy, and 
those traders engaged in the import and export of luxury goods, 
though perhaps fewer in number, were more influential in terms of 
their direct relations with the indigenous rulers and power brokers 
here and abroad. This chapter traces the history and development of 
a competitive trading community as it charted its way through 
relations with local rulers, attacks by hostile colonial powers, and 
finally the demands of communal politics and the discourse that 
emerged in the late British period. This discourse continues to 
develop and transform, but the framing of the discourse has been 
set. The elements of that framing reflect the wider communal, 
political and religious concerns of the dominant Sinhalese Buddhist 
and Tamil Hindu communities. The unity that the Muslim community has 
today was forged during this process as the community was forced to 
I The name of the island was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. 
Henceforth I will refer to it as Ceylon in my discussion of the 
period prior to this. 
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develop a common identity, and to some extent to adopt a common 
history. 
Sri Lankan Muslims are a minority religious community who constitute 
only 7.64% of the island's population. ' The Sinhalese Buddhists are 
the dominant religious community comprising 69.31% of the population. 
The Tamil Hindus comprise 15.46%, the Christians (Sinhalese and 
Tamil) 7.49% and others the final 0.10%. ' Historically and 
ethnically the Muslims are a disparate group of whom the majority are 
the Ceylon Moors (6.5% of the total population). Ceylon Moors trace 
their origins to the arrival of Arab traders from the Middle East. 
The Indian Moors or Coast Moors (0.2%) trace their origins to India, 
while the Malays (0.3%) trace theirs to Java and Sumatra. 4 
The term Moors was first applied to the island's Muslims by the 
Portuguese, and later adopted by them. The Portuguese drew a 
distinction between Ceylon Moors, those accepted as the descendants 
of Arab traders and permanently domiciled on the island, and the 
Coast Moors or Indian Moors, understood as Hindu converts to Islam, 
whose permanent homes were in India but who lived periodically on the 
island for trading purposes. ' Part of the Portuguese concern was to 
diminish indigenous Muslim trade which stood in direct competition 
with their own economic interests. Both Ceylon Moors and Coast Moors 
are extensively engaged in trade and commerce and are renowned for 
their ubiquitous settlement throughout the island. ' In the Eastern 
2 1981 Census cited Mahroof (1990: 64 ff4). Census figures in Sri 
Lanka are compiled by "religious" and "racial" classification 
(Mauroof, 1980: 185). 
3 1981 Census cited Ali (1986b: 147). 
° 1971 Census cited Phadnis (1979: 30). The term "Malay", 
persistently applied by the British is a misnomer, reflecting the 
linguistic unity of the community based on its use of Malay as a 
lingua-franca and not their widespread Indonesian origins 
(Hussainmiya, 1986: 280-292). 
5 Among Indian Moors are those who immigrated from South India 
to work on the plantations during the British period 
(Phadnis, ibid: 29). 
6 The first formal recognition of these two distinct groups 
appeared in the 1911 Census with the separate enumeration of Ceylon 
Moors and Indian Moors, a move which quantified indigenous and non- 
indigenous populations (Phadnis, ibid: 29). It is clear that the 
distinction had a popular currency long before this. Ramanathan 
(1888: 241) delineates the terms applied to these groups by the 
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Province however most Muslims are cultivators and it is here that 
they constitute a significant proportion of the population. 
Numerically the greatest concentration of Muslims is found in the 
Colombo district followed by Amparai district in the Eastern Province 
and the Kandy district in the Central Province. ' Both of these 
groups speak Tamil domestically, and often Sinhalese as well in the 
predominantly Sinhalese areas. 8 The Muslim Malays were originally 
brought in by the Dutch as mercenaries. They came from Java, Sumatra 
and Malacca and were historically domiciled in the Slave Island 
district of Colombo. 9 They joined the British regiment when the 
British defeated the Dutch and more recently have sought employment 
in the police force and fire brigade. Another fraction of the Malay 
community is composed of fishing folk, domiciled in Hambantota in the 
Muslims themselves. They referred to Ceylon Moors as Monahan and to 
Coast Moors as nkaran. These terms are more often rendered as 
Sonahar and SaTrnükaras (see Mohan, 1987: 9) . The Sinhalese called them 
indiscriminately Marrakkalaha. This term is more often rendered as 
Marrakar and is understood as deriving originally from a caste/class 
among the Mappilas who were maritime traders from Cochin, the name 
referring to their navigational skill and occupation as sea-men 
(Indrapala, 1986: 118). Yalman (1971: 283) erroneously suggests that 
the term derives from Morocco. 
' Muslims as a percentage of the provincial population: 
Amparai (Eastern Province) 45.9% 
Trincomalee (Eastern province) 32.3% 
Mannar (Northern Province) 26.8% 
Batticaloa (Eastern Province) 23.9% 
(Figures from 1971 Census, cited Phadnis, ibid: 31). 
8In the Kandyan area for example Muslim students are often 
instructed in the Sinhalese medium (Phadnis, ibid: op cit). In the 
North, East and South students are instructed in Tamil and take 
Sinhala as a second language. Most Muslim men (outside the Eastern 
Province) are expected to be bi or tri-lingual owing to their 
employment. The women speak Tamil except for the Sinhalese dominated 
areas of Nuwara Eliya and Kandy (ibid, op cit). 
9 These Malay mercenaries were not the first Malays in the 
island. There are accounts in the Sinhalese chronicle, the Culavamsa 
(ibid, LXXXIII: 36-51, cited Hussainmiya, ibid: 282) of an invasion by 
Chandrabhanu, a Buddhist king of the Malay peninsula, determined to 
possess the relics of the Buddha (Mohan 1985: 9). Chandrabhanu ruled 
in the Kingdom of Jaffna for fifty years in the thirteenth century 
(K. M. De Silva, 1981: 67). Another group brought in by the Dutch were 
political exiles and members of the Javanese royal family exiled in 
the island. Within the research area, a relatively inaccessible 
interior Sinhalese village, Sultanagoda (Sin. - Sultan village) is 
held by many to be the site of captivity of Bulthul Mas Sultan. (This 
name does not feature in a list of Javanese royal exiles provided by 
Hussainmiya (ibid: 286-288), but it could be Pangeran Adipati 
Amangkurat III, known in Javanese history as "Sunan Mas", banished 
in 1708 and held in nearby Galle, or perhaps one of his sons). 
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Southern Province. 10 The Malays speak a creole Malay domestically, 
and those domiciled in Colombo are commonly assumed to also speak 
Tamil, Sinhala and English. " The Moors and the Malays are Sunni 
Muslims of the Shafi'i madhhab. 12 
There are small numbers of Sunni Memons (of the Hanafi madhhab) who 
are chiefly engaged in the textile trade in Colombo. 13 Another small 
but visible group is comprised of wealthy Shia Borahs belonging to 
the Mustalian Da'udi branch of the Ismaili sub-sect. 14 From Gujerat 
and Bombay, they speak Gujerati domestically and are extensively 
to Hambantota is taken from saatpan, a Malay word of Chinese 
derivation for boat (Hussainmiya, ibid: 281). In both the Colombo and 
Hambantota Districts the Malays accounted for 1% of the population 
in 1971. In other Districts they were never more than 0.31 although 
Kandy was a significant site of settlement. (Colombo -26,479, 
Hambantota-3,256, Kandy-3,177), (Phadnis, ibid, op cit). 
11 Mohan (1985: 42-43) argues that this community is losing its 
endogamous character and that marriages are increasingly being 
contracted with non-Malays. This fact was also noted by a British 
Officer as early as 1802 (Hussainmiya, ibid: 280). This is not 
consistent with the ideas about this community that I encountered 
in the South, where the Malays are regarded as a separate ethnic 
group who maintain their boundaries. Perhaps this is due to their 
closer location to the Malays of Hambantota who are generally 
regarded as more conservative than those of Colombo (see also 
Mauroof, 1990 for discussion of the Malay community). 
12 There are four schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Ar. madhhab); 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. The Shafi'i school or rite is 
maintained throughout the Indian Ocean littoral, from East Africa to 
the Malabar Coast and South-East Asia where small colonies of Arab 
traders settled in the early centuries of the Christian era 
(Forbes, 1981: 66-67, ff54). This contrasts with North-West India and 
Bengal where the majority of adherents to Islam follow the Hanafi 
madhhab (ibid: 60). The Shafi'i school has predominated in South-East 
Asia from the time of its initial conversion to Islam (Roff, 1985: 27 
ff20). South-East Asia is a region where later widespread conversion 
was related to the influence of South Indian Muslim traders. 
13 They numbered 3,000 in 1981 (Census on Population and Housing, 
cited Samarasinghe et al, 1986: 237). See Moosajee (1986: 311-317) for 
a full discussion of Memons and Borahs in Sri Lanka. 
14 This community numbered 1,800 in 1981 Census (ibid, op cit) . The term Borah is taken from the Gujerati word vohuru meaning trade, 
and thus reflects their occupation (Ahmad 1969: 22), (Moosajee, 
ibid: 313). 
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engaged in commodity trading. 15 Although the Shia Borahs maintain 
group boundaries in matters of worship and marriage, they are active 
in the welfare concerns of the larger island community of Muslims. 16 
There were also small numbers of "Afghan", Pathan and Bengali 
Muslims (all Sunnis), whose specific histories have not been 
documented and who have blended with the larger community. " The 
trading habits and histories of these groups are reflected in their 
settlement patterns and the fact that they are an urban population 
to a greater extent than the average. In 1963 38.9 of Muslims were 
urban versus a national average of less than 20% (Samarasinghe et 
al, 1986: 257). 
Despite vast ethnic differences and points of historical origin, 
these very disparate groups have come to understand themselves as 
part of a single Muslim community. The process of the emergence of 
the Muslim community as a separate, identifiable religious community 
which proclaims its own internal religious unity has taken many 
centuries, and is due more to outside forces than to any unificatory 
factor inherent in the ideology of Islam itself. But the process of 
engagement with historical forces has been, to a greater and greater 
extent, determined and organized through the adoption of a particular 
Islamic religious ideology on the wider political and economic front. 
The complexity of their original settlement, and the condensation of 
15 The Da'i is the regional spiritual leader of this earthly 
community. The line of Imams remains unbroken but hidden; this belief 
marks a major division between Shia and Sunni groups. The Shi'as 
broke away from the Sunnis after the murders of Ali and his son 
Hussain and they later developed and maintained a belief in the 
coming of the twelfth imam (Endress, 1988: 43). The origin of the 
Gujerati community may be traced to the arrival in the eleventh 
century of missionaries from Yemen who converted numbers of Naga 
Brahmins and Banias (Moosajee, ibid: 3l3). Gerholm (1977: 34) refers 
to pilgrims coming to Yemen to visit an Isma'ili shrine (see also 
Moosajee (ibid: 314) re pilgrims coming to Gujerat). 
16 Mines (1972) discusses the formation among Indian Borahs of 
corporate associations with the explicit aim of achieving "the 
economic and social uplift of their (... ) members" (ibid: 104). This 
process may also be observed in the Colombo Borah community who are 
a very tightly knit, mutually supportive and wealthy group, who still 
contract marriages in Bombay and retain extensive links there. The 
Dais active spiritual leadership of the Colombo community is 
organized these days through a daily telex link. 
17 Moosajee states that the "Afghans" were Muslims from 
Baluchistan whose business was small scale money lending (ibid: 312). 
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that historical diversity into a coherent identity in the face of 
colonial opposition, requires a brief elaboration of the history of 
the Muslims in the island. 
The Muslims have always been peripheral to major lines of scholarly 
enquiry which have tended to focus on the rise and fall of the 
various Sinhalese and Tamil dynasties, so historical evidence is 
slight. 18 My goal is to broadly characterize the major themes of the 
various periods of pre and post-colonial rule rather than to attempt 
detailed historical examination. " 
2.1 Arab traders in the Indian Ocean. 
In tracing the history of the Muslim community on the island and the 
Muslims' active role in the economy, it is necessary to focus 
continually upon. the development of an indigenous trading/merchant 
class, and the role of a particular religious fraction within it. 
Prior to that however, it is necessary to describe the conditions of 
trade in the Indian Ocean, a lucrative and well-established 
mercantile arena that extended from the Red Sea and East Africa to 
Sumatra in the East and the China Sea in the North. It was their 
participation in this trade which first led 'Arab' traders to the 
ports of Ceylon. 20 
The island was well known to the traders of the ancient world for its 
pearls, gems, elephants, and ivory, and renowned for its cinnamon 
which supplied the Venetian and Middle Eastern spice markets. Known 
to the Romans as Taprobane, and to the Arabs as Serendib (the land 
ie See Shukri (1986) and Mauroof (1990: 171-172,1980: 183). Both 
scholars bemoan the lack of attention to Muslim history in the island 
in the past and both have made significant efforts in that direction 
in recent publications (see also Ali, 1986a: 235 and Ma'ruf [formerly 
Mauroof], 1986: 322). 
19 My specific concern at this point is with the development of 
a "Muslim" identity (or the extent to which this can be argued to 
have taken place) at the national level. When discussing the research 
area in particular (Chs 4-9) I will focus more directly on specific 
regional histories, although similar themes will emerge and will be 
seen to reflect a similar orientation to the discourse, thus 
establishing its widespread influence. 
20 At no time was this trade purely Arab, in terms of either 
shipping or traders (Kiribamune, 1986: 89). 
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of rubies), it has a prominent history in the trade of the Indian 
Ocean and the Arabian. Sea. 21 Both Romans and Arabs had discovered its 
resources in the first century AD and they were followed by Greeks, 
Persians, Sabeans (from Yemen) and Chinese. It was only the Arabs 
however, who settled there and made it a permanent home 
(Mohan, 1985: 2). Miller (1976: 40) has suggested that these 
settlements date from the first century. 22 
Two instrumental factors in this particularly Arab choice to settle 
in the island were, a long history in "Arabia" of engagement as sea- 
farers and traders and the conditions of shipping at the time. The 
location of Arabia in a strategic position commanding the sea-ways 
of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea made it a vital intermediary in the 
ancient trade between the major civilizations of East and West 
(Hourani, 1963: 4-5). Its people were experienced sea-farers and they 
had acted as maritime middlemen from the sixth century BC 
(Kiribamune, ibid: 90). Similarly Ceylon stood, fortuitously located, 
between Arabia and the route to the Malacca straits, the South China 
Seas and the major Eastern ports of Sri Vijaya, Canton and Nanhai. 
Trade contacts appear to have been established between the Near East 
and Ceylon as early as the fourth century B. C. (Tibbetts, 1956: 184). 
By the fifth century A. D. we have evidence of Ceylon's articulation 
into the China trade, through connections between Trincomalee on the 
East Coast of Ceylon, and Tamlook near the mouth of the Hooghly River 
in the Bay of Bengal which was a crucial port in the China - Ceylon 
trade. By the ninth century A. D. the Arabs were using South Indian 
ports as an advanced base for their own China trade 
(Indrapala, 1986: 117). 
21 Alternatively Sarandib (Kiribamune, ibid: 98). These have been 
the most common terms in the literature but Shukri notes that 
Jaziratul Yaqut, - Island of Rubies was the Arabian term (Hourani, 
ibid: 71, Shukri, 1986: 337 cites Nafis, 1940: 221) . Marco Polo who 
visited the island in the late thirteenth century, noted that the 
name applied "for in this island, and nowhere else in the world, are 
produced superb and authentic rubies" (Marco Polo, 1987: 259). It is 
also clear that this trade was one in which Europe was only 
peripherally involved. As Marco Polo himself pointed out "You must 
not suppose that diamonds of the first water come to our countries 
of Christendom"(ibid: 273). 
" Forbes, discussing Arab settlement on the nearby Malabar coast 
in Southern India notes that "the South Arabian Kingdom of Saba', 
which flourished circa 500 B. C., is said to have sent out merchant 
colonists to India" (ibid: 67). 
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Even after the discovery of the monsoons and wind systems of the 
Indian ocean, which permitted travel across the Indian Ocean from 
East Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to the Far East, it was 
still essential to break these journeys on the Western coasts of 
Ceylon or India. 23 The boats of the Arabs and Persians were built 
from wooden planks held together with coir (coconut fibre) ropes and 
regular overhauling was critical. Early mariners required as well as 
trade items, safe harbours, food, fresh water and the necessary 
coconut trees to provide ship-building materials. In this regard the 
ports of Western India and Ceylon were ideal. 24 
Ceylon had a long established trade with South India which operated 
through the traditional ports of the North-west and across the narrow 
Palk Straits which separate the island from South India. These 
already well-established connections with the emporium ports of South 
India formed the basis of Ceylon's articulation into the trade of the 
Roman Empire. It was during this period that Arab ships are first 
reported sailing to the Malabar Coast in South India and Ceylon. 
Roman trade died out towards the end of the second century AD with 
the decline of the Roman Empire. It was the Sassanid Persian Empire, 
which rose in the third century AD, which then dominated maritime 
trade in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The Ethiopians in 
turn controlled the Red Sea route. The trade of Arabia was in decline 
between the fourth and sixth centuries, although the Arabs remained 
extensively involved in their role as sea-farers. It was at this 
time, in the fifth century, that Ceylon first became an entrepot port 
for the trade across the Indian Ocean (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 43, 
Hourani, ibid: 40). 
After the rise of Islam in the seventh century and its rapid spread, 
a new dynamism was introduced to 'Muslim trade' . This term is a gloss 
covering the trading histories of a number of different peoples; 
23 The word monsoon is taken from the Arabic mawsim meaning a 
"fixed season" (Forbes, ibid: 63, cites Yule and Burnell, 1986: 577-8). 
24 The Arab ships of timbers sewn together with coir rope were 
light before the wind but unsuited to heavy weather. A division of 
trade developed with the Arabs sailing the routes through the western 
side of the Indian Ocean and heavier ships operating through the Bay 
of Bengal. The weather patterns of the area also influenced sailing 
patterns with the lighter Arab boats relying entirely on seasonal 
winds and avoiding the cyclones in the Bay of Bengal (C. R. De Silva, 
1986: 153). See also Hourani (ibid: 87-122) for a full discussion of 
shipping and navigation in the Indian Ocean at this time. 
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Arabs, Yemenis, Persians, from the Middle East, and East Africans. 
After the twelfth century, it also included Muslim traders of Indian 
origin and later, Indonesians (Kiribamune, ibid: 89-93). Islam was 
spread throughout the Indian Ocean and to South East Asia by the 
traders of the Southern Arabian Peninsula, peacefully and in 
conjunction with the development of a trading empire. The later 
conversion of North Indian Muslims under the Turks and the rise of 
the Moghul empire was distinct from this process . 
25 The rise of Islam 
and the subsequent conquest of Persia, Syria and Egypt gave the Arabs 
control of all the important ports that stood between Europe and the 
East (Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol 1,1951-52: 305, cited 
Mohan, 1985: 3). 
... 
(A)s the Muslim character of the mercantile history of 
the Indian Ocean and of the silk road through Central Asia 
became more pronounced, new Muslim trading communities were 
generated at the focal points of international trade and local 
barter (Johns, 1975: 39). 
A significant factor in this new dynamism, which peaked in the ninth 
century, was that the 'Muslim trader' "could travel from Europe to 
China confident of the hospitality of his fellow Muslims at almost 
any sea-port at which he called" (Kiribamune, ibid: op cit). 26 This 
development of the Muslim community in the post-Islamic era also 
permitted an extension of the Arabs' traditional role as middlemen, 
and much local participation in ports of trade was eliminated. " The 
Sinhalese, for example, who had been sending regular missions to 
China between the first and eighth centuries, were now excluded. They 
resumed this trade in the tenth century (Kiribamune, ibid: 95). 
25 This is reflected in the prevalence of the Hanafi rite versus 
the Shafi'i rite found in the South (cf ff12 above). 
26 Johns notes that later in the fifteenth to seventeenth 
centuries the Indian Ocean resembled an "Arabic-speaking 
Mediterranean" (ibid: 38). The use of Arabic-Tamil - the writing of 
the Tamil language in the Arabic script, again reflects the 
importance of the Arab role in trade (Shukri, ibid: 346). See also 
Mahroof (1992: 16-19) on the use of this script by the Muslims in Sri 
Lanka. 
27 Shukri argues that along with "the growth and prosperity of 
the Arab trade, the Arab settlements too witnessed a corresponding 
growth" (ibid: 339). Although referred to as Arab settlements they 
were in fact a conglomeration of "Persians, Arabs and Abyssinians, 
all Islamised (sic) and speaking the Arabic language" (ibid, op cit) . 
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The structure of trade with its long haul and short haul components, 
made possible this gradual elimination of local competition. As 
C. R. De Silva argues however, this "dominance" was entirely dependent 
on the commercial success of numerous individual traders and not the 
widespread use of force (1986: 148). Certain boats would ply the 
routes between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Coast for example, 
with others transferring goods from Ceylon to the Bay of Bengal 
and/or to the Far East. Still others would ply the more local routes 
between India and Ceylon on the Western and Eastern coasts. Both 
Bengal and Gujerat were the basis of extensive hinterland caravan 
trading routes (ibid: 152) and other littoral ports also participated 
in local hinterland trade. Bengali trade of this period was almost 
entirely controlled by the Muslims, although some Chetti traders from 
the Cor omandel Coast were engaged (ibid: 151). 
The expansion of Muslim trade in the Indian ocean was checked by the 
rise of the Chola Empire in South India, in particular its sea-power. 
A Chola invasion of Ceylon in the tenth century and a subsequent 
period of rule during the tenth and eleventh centuries also hampered 
Muslim engagement in local trade. Prior to this, K. M. De Silva argues, 
the internal trade in Ceylon was largely controlled by Sinhalese 
merchants "who dominated the main market towns and were granted 
special charters by the Kings" (1981: 44), while external trade was 
entirely in the hands of the Muslims (C. R. De Silva, ibid: 152). 28 
This situation must take some qualification in my view, and should 
not be taken as representative of the situation prevailing throughout 
the whole island at the time. 29 I would view it as at most, 
28 These included Muslims from Arabia, Gujerat and also Mappila 
Muslims from Kerala (ibid, op cit). 
29 Historians rely in large part for their information about the 
island's early history, on the Sinhalese chronicles of Kingship; the 
Rajavaliya, the Culavamsa and the Mahavamsa. They are obviously of 
somewhat limited value in terms of information about groups outside 
the areas controlled by the Sinhalese kingdoms. Throughout the entire 
period under discussion the island was divided into a number of 
regional polities with constantly shifting boundaries. There was the 
Hindu Jaffna kingdom in the North, the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdom in 
the South and in between the two were the various Vanni 
chieftainships whose allegiances were shifting and at other times 
non-existent. From the fourteenth century on, the island's Southwest 
coast also supported other small and short-lived but none-the-less 
independent polities, who were constantly challenging older centres 
of power (Kulasuriya, 1976). 
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representative of the situation in the various inland capitals of the 
Sinhalese Kings, although it must be noted that these were often 
situated to take advantage of the major coastal ports of trade 
operative at various times. 30 The 'ubiquitous settlement' of the 
Muslims in the island suggests an early involvement in internal 
trade. "There is hardly a place without a crow or a Muslim" is a 
common Sinhalese adage (Ali, 1986b: 148). Their engagement within the 
Kandyan Kingdom as carters, although at a much later period 
(Dewaraja, 1986) also points to a specific connection with internal 
trade. Certainly in the littoral areas of the Southwest where Muslims 
were settled prior to the drift to the Southwest of the Sinhalese 
Kingdom, (following the collapse of the Dry Zone civilizations), 
there is little evidence of Sinhalese merchants controlling internal 
trade, although their participation is not in dispute. The coastal 
regions of the Northern and Western sea-boards had, "from the early 
Anuradhapura period (137 BC - 718 AD) supported small but 
economically viable trade settlements" that had long attracted 
Sinhalese traders (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 84). The extent to which these 
settlements of Arabs and other traders articulated with the Dry Zone 
capitals is nowhere explicit, but it is certain that the foreign 
trade (with China for example, see above) and the diplomatic missions 
(Bhuvenakbahu I's Mission to the Egyptian Court in 1238 (ibid: 91)) 
of the early Sinhalese Kingdoms relied upon them. 
The Dry Zone civilizations of this period were state run agrarian 
economies, characterized by extensive irrigation works and large 
scale agricultural production. The land tenure system was one in 
which service tenure was the norm and the King was the main source 
of land grants. There was also a sizable monastic land-owning class 
(Gunawardana, 1979). The rajakariya system of compulsory service to 
the King and a caste system centred on the King, ordered the internal 
relations of the Sinhalese state. State revenue was primarily 
30 The Sinhalese kings shifted their capitals in accordance with 
prevailing threats from the North or the vagaries of coastal trading 
centres on the island. Between the seventh and tenth centuries four 
Sinhalese rulers "left Anuradhapura and ruled from the north-eastern 
city of Polonnaruwa which could command the port of Trincomalee, 
facing the Bay of Bengal and the new centres of trade" 
(Kiribamune, ibid: 93). In the earlier period trade was not 
fundamentally important to the island's economy as far as the kingdom 
was concerned (K. M. De Silva, ibid: 42). 
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garnered in the agricultural field, and foreign trade was of little 
significance in purely economic terms. Foreign trade was 
predominantly in luxury items, (pearls from the fisheries of the 
North-West coast, gems from the South-West interior, ivory and 
spices), and the King acquired a proportion of the revenue generated 
in the form of customs duty. As K. M. De Silva points out however, the 
role of trade in this "agrarian economy of feudal society" should not 
be determined solely in economistic terms, (ibid: 42) and trade in 
some particular items was of symbolic import. Thus the role and 
position of the Muslim traders was one of some status. 
During the Chola period Tamil pressure on the Northern capital of 
Anuradhapura again forced the Sinhalese to move the capital to 
Polonnaruwa, near the port of Trincomalee, and the important trade 
with Bengal. Subsequently further Tamil pressure on Polonnaruwa 
forced a shift to Kotte (in the South West) ,a move which also served 
to protect the island's cinnamon resources, a subject of increasing 
Tamil interest. At this time Indian merchant alliances displaced 
Sinhalese merchants, particularly in the trade routes of the Rajarata 
in the Northern Dry Zone, and these alliances continued to dominate 
until the restoration of Sinhalese power in the middle of the 
fifteenth century (ibid: 48) . While the Muslim traders of 
foreign 
origin had continued to trade throughout the Chola period, the 
collapse of the Chola Empire gave way to the emergence of Indian 
Muslim trading communities, which gained control of the wider Indian 
Ocean arena of trade. 
Around the fifteenth century the island's agricultural production 
declined following the demise of the extensive Dry Zone irrigation 
works. These irrigation works, apart from the agricultural production 
they supported, had provided revenue in the form of water taxes 
(diyadedum/diyadada) to the state (ibid: 70). As a result of this loss 
to the economy, trade rose progressively higher in ruler's priorities 
but did not overtake the state's traditional sources of revenue, and 
land taxes and revenue from grain still outstripped any export 
revenue. Cinnamon became increasingly important after the Crusades, 
but remained less important than elephants and areca nut. Areca nut, 
which was "produced in practically every highland plot in the wet 
zone" (Abeyasinghe, 1986: 132) was at this time the Sinhalese peasant's 
main source of cash income and the exchange of areca nut for imported 
grain and cloth was a mainstay of small scale Muslim internal trade 
(Ali, 1986a: 240, see also De Silva, ibid: 175-6) . Indian traders, 
both 
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Muslims and Hindus, exchanged imports for areca nuts with Muslim 
traders in the island's ports. Statements concerning the ubiquity of 
the Muslims clearly indicate that the trading network was extensive 
and their role in the economy was highly significant. They served the 
Sinhalese state by converting agricultural surplus into state income 
and they were the agents of transformation as far as the Sinhalese 
peasants were concerned. These Muslim traders, from a number of 
different Middle Eastern and Indian regions, had by the end of this 
period perhaps begun to develop some initial internal cohesion 
through their practice of a common religion and common engagement in 
trade. Certainly by this time they had gained a collective identity 
as traders, as far as the rest of the island was concerned. Their 
collective history was already a long and powerful one. 
2.2 The position of Muslim traders within pre-colonial Ceylon. 
A consideration of the articulation of foreign traders into the 
social and ideological structures of pre-colonial Ceylon introduces 
the question of the interaction of egalitarian and hierarchical 
ideologies. It is evident that there was no clash between the two 
distinct ideologies at this period, as the egalitarian ideology of 
the Muslims, primarily expressed through their religious ritual, 
remained an internal matter and as small Muslim communities they were 
permitted to practice their religion, unheeded in the context of the 
hierarchical Sinhalese state. Hierarchy was the ideological language 
of the Ceylonese social and political order and the articulation of 
foreigners was in terms of this dominant ideology. 
Following Tambiah's (1976) conception of the hierarchical 'Hindu- 
Buddhist' state (a Galactic Polity) and Kapferer's (1988) discussion 
of the hierarchical Sinhalese Buddhist state in which he argues 
(following Dumont, 19B0), that diversity is the principle of unity, 
we have an understanding of the hierarchical state as one in which 
the apex (in this case the King) is both encompassing and determining 
of the whole. One specific, and in this case crucial, element of such 
a state is that the terms of its relation to small, foreign trading 
enclaves were hierarchical and encompassing, not exclusive. Thus the 
egalitarian ideology of the Muslims may have prevailed in their 
internal practices, but it remained encompassed by the hierarchical 
ideology of the Sinhalese state. These two opposed ideologies never 
came into direct conflict, and they should be regarded as operating 
in different ideological arenas. Indeed they co-existed to the extent 
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that Muslims were allotted land by the Kandyan Kings to build their 
own mosques within the kingdom (Dewaraja, ibid: 221 cites Robert 
Knox). 31 The Sinhala state was at best a loose federation; a weak 
centre with an ideology of power, rather than a powerful centre. 
Within this ideology the Sinhala kings had to be tolerant of multiple 
polities both indigenous and foreign. 
Foreign traders provided opportunities for engagement in regional and 
international trade, a trade that was primarily the province of the 
King. It appears that foreigners were unproblematically incorporated 
into the existing hierarchical, social and symbolic structure of the 
state. 32 In the Sinhalese state the King stood as divine head, and 
Sinhalese castes were determined through their relation to the King. 
Within this ideological system the position of foreigners was also 
determined in relation to the King and the position granted to 
foreign traders in ancient Ceylon appears to be one of considerable 
privilege. The King himself was understood to "own" all the Kingdom's 
economic resources (Senivaratne, 1978: 4) including the pearls and gem 
mines and thus it follows that any exploitation of them, was 
dependent upon a clear relation between the trader and the King. 33 
Miller (1976) argues that in the context of pre-colonial India the 
structure of trade depended upon credit, which in turn depended on 
the King. 34 C. R. De Silva also notes that "security of goods and 
fairness of treatment was a factor essential to attract merchants to 
31 Kotelawele (1986: 204) notes that "one Muslim priest (was) 
supported out of the revenues of a Buddhist temple". 
"Ali notes that Muslims were financed by the Kandyan treasury 
to trade on behalf of the King (ibid: 236, cites John Davy [1821]1969 
reprint p93) . John Davy was an Englishman who was held captive in the 
Kandyan kingdom for more than twenty years. 
33 In order to protect the King's interests in the gem 
districts, settlement was prohibited in the area and mining was 
carried out under royal supervision (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 71). 
'4 Miller argues that the term maha-pillai - great accountant, 
used to refer to Mappila Muslim traders in Kerala, reflects the 
structure of trade in India, which was carried out internally by 
native agents (see also Boxer, 1969: 57, and Dale et al 1978: 523, ffl, 
on this point). Another meaning attributed to Maha-pillai is "great 
child" meaning honoured (foreign) son-in-law, (Dale et al, ibid: op 
cit), and it is also used as "a descriptive honourific (for) 
foreigners who married into indigenous families" (Miller 1992: 31). 
The term reflects first and foremost the nature of marriages 
contracted by these Muslims and by extension, their distinct ethnic 
status. 
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any port" (1986: 149). It is clear that trade was always advantageous 
to the Sinhalese kings, but never critical in economic terms. (The 
situation shifted with the collapse of the Dry Zone and the colonial 
conquest of the littoral. ) Nonetheless the traders (merchants or 
bankers) "were indispensable intermediaries in converting 
agricultural surplus into disposable state income" 
(Chaudhuri, 1985: 11) and ruling elites were dependent on traders to 
create a market economy (ibid: 16). In the history of Ceylon, Muslim 
traders appear to have been consistently welcome in the early 
Sinhalese kingdoms and particularly favoured in the Kandyan kingdom. 
The earliest information we have of the living conditions of the 
Muslims in the Sinhalese kingdoms refers to the early fifth century. 
In the Dry Zone capital Anuradhapura, an important commercial centre 
at the time, we find a reference to the many "stately and beautiful 
houses " of the Vaisya elders and Sabean (Arab) merchants in the city 
(Legge, 1965: 104)75 According to the Mahavamsa, King Pandukabhaya had 
set aside an area of the city for the Yonas, a group whose trading 
status and foreign origins are readily acknowledged, but whose 
country of origin is in dispute. K. M. De Silva states that they are 
Yavanas, Greeks who had been in the region from early times 
(1981: 43), but Kiribamune (1986: 90) argues that it was the presence 
of Arab traders in the city that was the basis of this account. There 
were also Persian and indigenous Tamil merchants domiciled in the 
capital at this time. The policy of Asian rulers allowing "a limited 
form of extra-territoriality" was a common and long-standing practice 
(Boxer, ibid: 48) . 
36 
The impression created is that the position of foreign merchants in 
the Sinhalese capitals was one of privilege, but without confirmatory 
evidence we may only assume at this point that they were articulated 
into the symbolic hierarchy. There are much later references, during 
the Kandyan period, to the inclusion of Muslims in the Kandy 
Perahera, a ritual of the Sinhalese Kingship which was revived in the 
eighteenth century by Kirti Sri Rajasinha. This perahera was a 
ceremonial procession of the Buddha's tooth relic, itself an icon of 
35 Here the term Arab is again being used as a gloss, Mohan 
identifies the Sabeans as from Yemen (cf ff20). 
36 There were Both Indian and Javanese mercantile communities 
at Malacca, Muslims in Malabar, and Persians and Arabs in China to 
cite a few (ibid, op cit). 
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the Kingship, in which the entire symbolic order of the Kingdom was 
revealed and re-asserted. At this time the carrier of the Pearl 
Umbrella (anitukuda), an insignia of the King, was a Muslim 
(Senivaratne, ibid: 77). " 
The data available concerning the position of Muslims in the early 
kingdoms is meagre and arguments are therefore necessarily 
speculative (aside from the Kandyan kingdom in the later period). It 
seems clear, however, that for the most part Muslims were not subject 
to the requirements of rajakariya and that as a predominantly trading 
and therefore non land-holding class they were freed from the 
requirements of service tenure . 
18 Their "service", apart from the 
" Fa Hien, a Chinese monk who visited the island in 411AD, noted 
that one particular type of pearl found in Ceylon - the mani -was a 
symbol of the Buddha and his law, and further that the King required 
three of every ten pearls collected (Legge, ibid: 101). The symbolic 
value of the pearl umbrella then in a ritual of the Buddhist Kingship 
is clear, as is also the position of the Muslims in the symbolic 
order. However we should not overlook the symbolic value of pearls 
for the Muslims. It would appear that the Arabs came to Ceylon for 
its pearls in ancient times and that Muslims in particular were 
specifically engaged in their trade over many centuries. Ali states 
that 
culturally and historically Muslims have an ancient connection 
with pearl fishing. According to the Qur'an "He it is who has 
made the sea subservient that you may eat fresh fish from it, 
and bring forth from it ornaments which you wear" Al Qur'an, 
16: 14, Al-Nahl (1986a: 239). 
Some informants believe that there was an Arab name for Ceylon which 
meant "the island of pearls" and claim that pearls have traditionally 
been revered as the "semen of Allah". If this tradition was also 
shared by the Muslims of the eighteenth century who were trading 
in 
Ceylon, then the inclusion of the Muslims as carriers of the mutukuda 
in the rituals of the Buddhist Kingship had, quite possibly, a 
specifically religious value of its own. Marco Polo states that the 
"Maabar" (Cor. omandel Coast) and Ceylon were the major producers of 
the pearls and gems to be found in the world (ibid: 273). The pearl 
fishing in the Gulf of Mannar was held to be second only to that of 
Bahrain (C. R. De Silva, 1978: 15) and customarily engaged as many as 50- 
60,000 divers and merchants (ibid: 24). Bahrain was originally the 
pearl 'centre for the European trade routes. As late as Leonard 
Woolf's time in Ceylon (1904-1911) the greater part of the pearl 
diving force (of 20,000 - 30,000) engaged in the annual pearl 
fisheries originated there (Woolf, 1961: 89-98). See also Ali 
(ibid: 237-240) for later accounts of Muslims and the pearl industry. 
38 "The possession of lands to which special privileges and 
duties were attached was the material foundation for the hierarchy 
of castes" (Yalman, ibid: l7). 
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ceremonial duties referred to above, would have largely consisted of 
a tax on their trade which was a source of revenue to the crown or 
local authority. To the extent that they stood "outside", or more 
accurately in the interstices of the normal land-tied service tenure 
system, they could be argued to have had considerable entrepreneurial 
advantage. They were a community who were able to fully exploit the 
later development of capitalist enterprise in the island. 39 
As stated above there has been a tendency to read the history of the 
Muslims through the histories of the various Sinhalese kingdoms. 
Although they were clearly related, there is evidence to suggest 
that the Muslim communities existed both in the context of, and 
simultaneously outside, these arenas of Sinhalese power. Thus the 
degree of their articulation with the hierarchical state was never 
entirely fixed. At this point I turn to a discussion of their 
articulation with the Kandyan kingdom. This was the latest and last 
point of resistance to the colonial powers, an area which provided 
a refuge for threatened coastal Muslims, a period for which we have 
greater historical data (Dewaraja, 1986), and finally an arena in 
which Muslim agency became critical to the exercise of Sinhalese 
economic and political power. This was a new and significant chapter 
in Muslim history on the island. 
Dewaraja (ibid) has argued that the Muslims were "structurally 
assimilated" into the Kandyan Kingdom. She defines this as a process 
of full social integration in which the Muslims in the kingdom 
maintained their identity intact, largely through their religious 
practices. This differs from the process of "cultural assimilation" 
in which an ethnic minority acquires "the values, beliefs, language 
and behaviour of the dominant group" (ibid: 215). The structural 
assimilation of the Muslims was achieved through their voluntary 
participation in the badda system. Everyone in the kingdom lived on 
agriculture and with the exception of the highest caste (govikula), 
39 The areas where Muslims constitute the greatest percentages 
of the population are the Eastern and North Central Provinces, where 
the majority of the Muslims are agriculturalists and tied to the 
land. However those members of the community who were always 
connected to trade, (those of the South-west, Kandy and the coastal 
ports) were in a prime position to exploit capitalist opportunity 
in 
the British period. Their lack of ties to the land is reflected in 
their greater economic success. See also Roberts (1982: 85) on Muslim 
exploitation of the structural niches created in Sinhalese social 
organization. 
40 
practised some other craft and had the right to supply that labour 
to the state. All land nominally belonged to the King and in return 
for use of the land, 'tenants' rendered services to the state. The 
badda system was a centralized, caste based system of mobilizing the 
resources of the Kingdom for public service. The Muslims and the 
fisher caste formed the madige badda (ibid: 216). They were obliged 
to trade for the king and provide oxen for the transport of grain and 
other produce from the king's lands to the royal granaries. 
Initially Muslim traders were without lands to cultivate, but as 
time went by there is evidence that some of them worked as share- 
croppers on vihara (Buddhist temple) lands and many others married 
local women (who would have brought lands with them) . 
40 Their assigned 
caste position was a very high one in the Sinhalese caste hierarchy. 
The govikula was the highest caste and one to which more than a half 
of the population belonged. Within this caste the highest sub-caste 
was the n udaliperuva (high bureaucrats) and the Muslims were placed 
immediately below this. Despite this degree of integration into the 
caste system, their explicit role in the symbolic order and their 
marriages to local women, the Muslims remained, and were regarded as, 
culturally distinct. 41 42 Further they continued to practice their 
40 Binna marriages to Kandyan Sinhalese women indicated 
matrilocal residence. Yalman recounts a myth found in Batticaloa 
of seven Moors who came with seven Hindu Tamils from South India to 
fight as mercenaries against the Jaffna Tamils who controlled the 
East coast at the time. They were victorious and were asked whether 
they would like land or women. "The Moors knew that the Hindu Tamils 
were matrilineal, so they asked for the women, for in getting the 
women they also got land which descended in the maternal line" 
(Yalman, ibid: 282-83). 
4" After centuries of close habitation the Muslims still keep 
their women in purdah in the Kandyan kingdom despite the fact that 
purdah was unknown amongst the Sinhalese (Dewaraja, ibid: 228). it is 
however a religious practice which signs them as distinct. 
47 One myth from the research area refers to a group of Muslim 
Unani physicians in the Kandyan kingdom who cured the King's daughter 
and were granted wives. They were instructed by the King that at a 
public gathering the next day, they should each run and touch the 
hand of a young Sinhalese woman that they would like to marry. After 
this the parents came and complained to the King that their daughters 
had been polluted by this contact and the King had the parents agree 
to allow their daughters to marry the Muslims, since they would no 
longer find Sinhalese husbands (my emphasis). This would suggest that 
the Muslims were regarded as entirely 'other' given the relatively 
lax marital arrangements prevailing within the Kandyan Sinhalese 
community at the time (Yalman, ibid: 168). See also Kotelawele 
(ibid: 174-5), Dewaraja (ibid: 212-13) for versions of this myth. 
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egalitarian ideology even while functioning from a structurally 
assimilated position in the Sinhalese caste system. 43 The caste system 
in Ceylon had no religious sanction and Dewaraja interprets it in 
Weberian terms as a "vocational ethic" (ibid: 222) . In this instance 
the "special skills" of the Muslims were trade and transport and in 
these areas they were functionally able to serve society. They were 
also readily assimilated as physicians, another position which did 
not exist in the Kandyan feudal hierarchy. 
Their ready acceptance as a foreign trading group and their 
subsequent articulation into the Kingdom could perhaps be interpreted 
in the light of the much later arrival and assimilation of the 
Karava, Salagama and Durava (KSD) castes from South India in 
successive waves of immigration from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries (Obeyesekere, 1984: 308, K. M. De Silva, 1981: 91) .I note that 
at that time the principal imports of the island were cloth and dried 
fish, and the Salagama and Karava were non-agriculturalist, weavers 
and fishermen. The Karava and Salagama came from the West coast of 
India and many have become Sinhalese Buddhists with a proportion of 
the Karava becoming Catholics. 44 The Salagama weavers subsequently 
adopted cinnamon peeling as a caste occupation, providing an 
obligatory supply to the King in exchange for land-holdings and 
selling any excess they had. By the sixteenth century the entire 
external cinnamon trade of Ceylon had become a Malabar monopoly 
(C. R. De Silva, 1986: 154). In the case of the KSD castes, who were 
clearly entrepreneurial, they were initially articulated into the 
Kingdom and the Sinhalese caste system and with their later adoption 
of Buddhism their structural assimilation was complete . 
45 By contrast 
the Muslims, although welcome in the inland kingdom and articulated 
43 The egalitarian ideology of the Muslims in contrast to the 
hierarchical values of the Sinhalese is also stressed in the Akurana 
(Kandy) area, where the same myth (ff42 above) is used by informants 
to explain the introduction of hierarchy into the Muslim community 
through the marriages of Muslim men to Sinhalese women of different 
castes (Rob Jones, p. c. ). 
66 The latter as a result of the Catholic Portuguese control of 
the littoral where, as a fishing population, the Karava had settled. 
45 K. M. De Silva notes that there remains some "disparity in the 
extent to which segments of each of these castes have been 
assimilated within the social system", a fact which suggests that the 
"length of their contact with Sinhalese society has varied. The 
process of assimilation has been facilitated by their adoption of the 
culture of the region to which they had migrated"(1981: 91). 
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into the hierarchy in a position of considerable status, nonetheless 
remained an encompassed yet entirely distinct, religious and largely 
egalitarian group. 
2.3 The Portuguese Incursion 1505 - 1658. 
The arrival of the Portuguese in the region in 1498, flushed with 
their success in the Iberian Wars, heralded a radical disjuncture in 
the structure of Indian Ocean trade. In contrast to the prevailing 
'Islamic dominance' of trade at this point, an aggregation of 
individuals and groups of merchants from India and several Middle 
Eastern countries, whose commercial networks profited to a limited 
extent through adherence to a common faith, the Portuguese (and later 
Dutch and English) colonial intervention operated through a single 
trading organization "directed from a central point and backed by 
armed power" (C. R. De Silva, 1986: 148, see also Chaudhuri, ibid: 10) . 
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The explicit aim of the Portuguese was to control the spice trade, 
the cinnamon of Ceylon and the pepper of India's Malabar coast. 
Pepper, or "Black gold" (Miller, 1976: 41) remained the basic commodity 
of Portuguese Indian trade as late as 1611 (Boxer, ibid: 60), a trade 
which from Kerala to the Red Sea was in the hands of the Arabs 
(Indrapala, ibid: 121). The clear commercial objective of the 
Portuguese was to break the trade routes through the Red Sea 
and prevent any more spices from passing to the hands of the 
Sultan (of Turkey) and persuade all the people of India to put 
aside the fantasy that they can ever again trade with any but 
ourselves (.. instructions issued to Francisco de Almeida, 
first Portuguese Vice-roy of India, cited C. R. De Silva, 
ibid: 156-7) . 
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Their initial interests were opposed however by the incumbent traders 
and between 1507 and 1509 the combined fleets of the Muslim Zamorin 
of Calicut (on the West coast of India) and the Sultan of Egypt were 
a6 These trading organizations were the Estado da India of the 
Portuguese, the Vereenidge Oost-Indische Campagnie (V. O. C. ) of the 
Dutch and the British East India Company. 
47 Boxer argues that following the build-up of military power 
during the Iberian wars the Portuguese and Spaniards were forced to 
deploy this power elsewhere. A Bull of Pope Alexander VI (The 1494 
Treaty of Tordesillas), divided the undiscovered world between the 
crowns of Portugal and Castile (ibid: 231), along. a line drawn North 
and South 370 miles from the coast of Europe (Collis 1946: 16). This 
expansion then, following the wars, which themselves had a religious 
character, was given a specifically religious (as well as economic) 
legitimacy. Portugal's sea-borne empire in Asia was "a military and 
maritime enterprise cast in an ecclesiastical mould" (Boxer, ibid: 75) . 
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engaged in battles with the Portuguese and posed "a serious threat 
.. to their power 
in the Indian Ocean" (Abeyasinghe, ibid: 134). 
Ultimate Portuguese success against the Muslim traders and the 
subsequent decline in Muslim trade must be attributed to Portugal's 
far superior naval strength, "the use of force based on superior 
technology" (C. R. De Silva, ibid: 160) and a willingness to exploit any 
point of weakness, a factor which allowed them to wield "an influence 
out of proportion to their real strength" (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 100). 
Muslims responded to Portuguese attacks "with a mixture of armed 
force and accommodation until a fragile balance of power was reached 
by the mid sixteenth century" (C. R. De Silva, ibid: 147). 
What were once a series of free ports under the control of the local 
rulers were now the subject of consistent colonial attempts (not 
always successful) to secure exclusive trading monopolies. The 
Portuguese introduced a system of cartazes - or bills of permission 
to trade (Boxer, ibid: 48, C. R. De Silva, ibid: 159), which were often 
avoided by Muslims traders, particularly on the "piratical" Kerala 
coast. 48 As the Portuguese established control over particular ports 
in the region, other ports where traders sought to avoid these 
invasive measures of curtailment were opened up. 49 In a similar 
fashion the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea shifted the trade 
between Turkey and Europe to the ports of the Persian Gulf. The 
initial aim of the Portuguese was to establish control of commerce 
through the use of naval power rather than direct territorial 
control. They relied on a line of forts, from Ormuz at the mouth of 
the Persian Gulf, to Malacca which controlled the Straits and the 
route to China, forts specifically located in order to control the 
trade routes with the use of maritime power. Goa, on India's Western 
coast, became the principal fort and the seat of the Viceroy of the 
Indies, and was regarded as both the mercantile and ecclesiastical 
centre of Portuguese activity in the region (Collis, ibid: l6-23). 
48 Piracy was common on the west coasts of India and Ceylon 
(Mukundan, 1979: 71) prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, and during 
their period of rule (See also Boxer., ibid: 58, C. R. De Silva, ibid: 157- 
8) 
09 The Portuguese recognized however that the Muslims performed 
a vital service and initially sought simply to prevent them from 
participation in the spice trade, (pepper in Malabar and cinnamon in 
Ceylon)(Abeyasinghe, ibid: 132). 
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The Portuguese first arrived on the coast of Ceylon by accident in 
1505 (Schreuder, 1946 [1762] : 6) and were deceived by the Moors, who had 
a local prince impersonate the King of Kotte and then led them on a 
roundabout journey through the jungle to his "court". The "king" 
provided them with a bogus permission to trade and they established 
a fortified warehouse near Colombo on the West coast (Mohan, 1985: 13). 
The Moors, who were largely in control of the island's external 
trade, raised popular sympathy against this move and the first 
fortified warehouse was later burnt down. The Portuguese returned to 
the island in 1517, better prepared, and by 1518 had completed a fort 
in Colombo. However the Sinhalese king of nearby Kotte, in 
conjunction with the Moors and the Zamorin of Calicut harassed it 
constantly, until in 1524 the Portuguese decided to demolish it 
(Abeyasinghe, ibid: 134). 
Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese the polity of Ceylon was in 
a fragmented state, with a number of separate kingdoms. 50 There was 
a Tamil Hindu kingdom in Jaffna in the North, and between this 
kingdom and the South were the various Vanni chieftainships, areas 
under independent chiefly control. In the South, as a result of King 
Vijayabahu being deposed in 1521, the kingdom had been divided among 
three of his sons (C. R. De Silva, 1978: 17). There were therefore three 
Sinhalese kingdoms at Raigama, Kotte and Sitawaka. The Kotte economy 
of the early sixteenth century was basically one of subsistence 
agriculture with a limited commerce in valuable commodities 
(cinnamon, gems, pearls, elephants, and areca nut) which were traded 
through the West and South-west ports of Puttalam, Kalpitiya, 
Salavata (Chilaw), Kammala, Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara, Beruwela, 
Galle and Weligama, all largely in the hands of Muslim traders. 51 The 
Portuguese took advantage of the political fragmentation in the 
island and in particular sought to exploit the conflicts arising 
through the wars of the Kotte succession. 52 The King of Kotte, 
so This fragmentation had been going on for some time. See 
Kulasuriya (ibid: 136-155) for a full discussion. 
51 Coastal populations of Muslims "whose interests coincided with 
those of local rulers" (Dewaraja, ibid: 211). Similar coastal Muslim 
populations were found in Gujerat, Malabar, Coromandel and Bengal 
(ibid, op cit). 
52 They applied this policy in India also. By exploiting "an 
age-old enmity", between the Zamorin of Calicut and the Raja of 
Cochin, they were able to secure "their first firm foothold in India" 
and subsequently to get a strong hold on the Malabar Pepper trade" 
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(Dharma Parakramabahu IX) became a Portuguese satellite, in order to 
buttress his own power against a threatened take-over of his Kingdom 
by his brother Mayadunne in the adjacent kingdom of Sitawaka. 
Mayadunne and a third brother, the ruler of Raigama, sided with the 
Moors and Mayadunne made an ally of the Zamorin of Calicut who sent 
troops in support. The Portuguese won this conflict and demanded 
that Mayadunne "execute the leaders of the Malabari forces who had 
come to the island to assist him and send (them) their severed 
heads"(K. M. De Silva, 1981: 103). Mayadunne complied, and this act of 
betrayal ended the long-standing Siteaka-Calicut alliance (1527- 
1539) (C. R. De Silva, 1978: 19-20) . As a result of the Kotte King's 
reliance on the Portuguese and their increasing role in the defence 
of the kingdom he was forced to expel the Muslims from Colombo in 
1526. They moved to Sitawaka and "probably relocated themselves in 
other port-towns on the Western coast such as Beruwela (and) 
Alutgama" (Abeyasinghe, ibid: l35). 
After 1565 "most, if not all the cinnamon lands of the littoral were 
under the control of Sitawaka", and were a key source of revenue to 
the Sitawaka kings (K. M. De Silva, ibid: lll). This cinnamon which was 
exported from Ceylon to the Malabar remained a monopoly of the 
Mapillas of Malabar (C. R. De Silva, 1986: 154) but Portuguese incursions 
decimated the Arab role in its transport. The Portuguese, with the 
exception of the cinnamon trade, left most of the external trade 
(areca exported in exchange for cloth, rice and dried fish) in the 
hands of the Muslims and also found that they had to use some of them 
to crew their boats (Abeyasinghe, ibid: 132). Battles over the control 
of trade continued between the Portuguese and the Ceylonese. In 1579 
King Rajasinghe (of Sitawaka) laid siege to Portuguese held Colombo, 
and did so again in 1587 and 1588. The response of the Moors to 
Portuguese tactics was determined by the prevailing circumstances. 
Their policy was a mixture of conflict and accommodation which 
sometimes led to their changing sides. Thus some of the Moors who 
had fought against the Portuguese in 1517, had by 1586 transferred 
their allegiance and fought with the Portuguese against Rajasinghe 
(C. R. De Silva, l986: 147). 
In 1593 Sitawaka fell to the Portuguese and the Muslims were again 
forced to flee. Many retreated to Kandy, the only remaining sovereign 
(Boxer, ibid: 50) . In the case of Kotte, it was the cinnamon trade that they were after. 
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kingdom. By 1594 Portuguese policy had altered to one of direct 
conquest and they made several attempts to subdue the Kandyan 
Kingdom. During this period the Kandyan kingdom served as a refuge 
to the Muslims, and they in turn supplied access to "men, munitions 
and provisions from abroad" (K. M. De Silva, 1977: 15 ff1), through the 
ports of the Eastern coast which remained under Kandyan control. In 
1617 the Portuguese signed a treaty with the Kandyan king and sought 
to have the Moors expelled, but in this they were unsuccessful. 
The Portuguese came as both religious adversaries and trading rivals, 
and the construction of a "Muslim" identity began in earnest with 
their arrival. Portuguese opposition to the Moors on religious 
grounds was a product of their own experience (and more particularly 
that of Spain) in the Iberian wars, and in part due to their own 
religious ambitions. They applied the term Moors, indiscriminately 
to all Muslims, irrespective of origin. It was adopted by the Moors 
and I suggest that its application and adoption are indicative of the 
earliest construction of a unifying local Muslim identity. An 
identity which went deeper than the prevailing religious ideology 
that Muslims as co-religionists were all members of the one Islamic 
community - tmanah. This common religious identity had undoubtedly 
been of some instrumental value to traders in the region in providing 
a certain guarantee of hospitality at foreign ports but they remained 
individuals, and strong trading competitors. 53 The arrival of the 
Portuguese and their opposition to the Moors en masse (as traders and 
religious enemies), was the basis of the first construction of a 
common identity among the Moors who found a much more common interest 
in seeking to avoid Portuguese attempts to control their trade. 
The Portuguese were ruthless adversaries, and informants in the 
research area cite an early attack launched in Colombo, specifically 
against the Moor trading community. The Portuguese blockaded both 
ends of Old Moor Street, the centre of trading activity in the town, 
and massacred everybody in the middle. In 1643 a Portuguese Captain, 
Antonio de Almaral de Menezes, employed in the Galle and Matara area 
in the Southern Province, believed that the Muslims were in league 
with the Dutch, and he surrounded the bazaar area in Matara where the 
majority of Muslims resided, and "put to the sword some 200 to 300 
53 In Ceylon for example, there is a reference to a battle for 
control of the pearling in the Gulf of Mannar between two local 
Muslim chieftains (C. R. De Silva, 1978: 17). 
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adult males and youths and sent the women and younger children to 
Colombo as slaves" (Goonewardena, 1986: 191). These accounts of the 
massacres are still remembered with some venom by the community 
today. 54 There are also accounts of the Portuguese setting fire to 
boats of Muslims traders and pilgrims en route to Mecca. 55 
The establishment of a common identity in opposition to the 
Portuguese was by no means total however, and in pursuit of trading 
opportunities, some Muslims threw in their lot with the Portuguese 
sooner than others. A further source of the development of cohesion 
among the Moors must be attributed to the opposition of the 
Portuguese to the Muslims on religious grounds. To the Portuguese the 
Moors were "enemies of the name of Christ" (Doc. Rem. Vol. VIII (Lisboa 
1977) p. 56, cited Abeyasinghe, ibid: 136) and "enemies of the human 
race" (Querios, 1930, pp. 530,1128,1143, cited ibid: l42 ffl). 
The Portuguese were followed by a number of missionaries, of whom the 
most influential was undoubtedly St Francis Xavier, now entombed in 
the Bom Jesus Church in Goa. 56 They actively sought to proselytize 
their Catholicism and successfully converted large numbers among the 
predominantly coastal Parava, Karava and Mukkuver castes (C. R. de 
Silva, ibid: 20). They had a "ruthless policy of proselytisation and 
sa A. C. Sheik Mohammed Ajwad (of Matara) remembers that as a 
child when he was taken on picnics by his parents, they used to halt 
their cart on the way to Meddawatte near the East end of town. There 
they recited a Fatiha and invoked Allah's blessings on those who were 
executed by the Portuguese on the banks of the Niwala Ganga (ibid, 
1970: 116). 
55 Forbes (1981: 79) has a reference to the Portuguese burning 
alive a shipload of Muslims in a Maldivian gundras (barque) in 1503 
(cites G. Correa quoted in Pyrard Vol II, p473-4). Another source 
states, "They butchered crews of captured Muslim dhows, slinging some 
from the yard-arm for target practice, cutting off the hands and feet 
of others and sending a boat-load of bits to the local ruler, telling 
him to use them for a curry" (Plumb, 1969: xxiii). 
Similar tactics were also employed by the Muslims and C. R. De Silva, 
(1978: 19) cites an incident in a Portuguese-Muslim battle over the 
Ceylon pearl fishery at Mannar when the Kunjali fleet of the Samudri 
(Zamorin) of Calicut set fire to two Portuguese boats. 
56 Goa in the mid seventeenth century was the supreme power in 
the region and it remained a Portuguese colony until 1975. The right 
arm of St Francis Xavier was sent to the Vatican in 1614 (Collis, 
ibid: 38). This relic is now displayed for worship on a side altar of 
the Jesu Church, the main Jesuit church, in Rome. At the side of the 
altar is a collection box for donations to the missions in South 
Asia. 
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destruction of Asian religions and religious establishments" 
(Kotelawele, ibid: 167). 57 To further this aim they introduced the 
Inquisition to Goa in 1560 (Collis, ibid: 45) where it remained 
operative for more than fifty years. 
Portuguese enterprise in the region was both mercantile and religious 
and following their arrival, religion was shifted into determining 
relation in a new way. From the Muslim perspective this meant that 
their religious identity (above and beyond their trading occupation) 
became the basis for a powerful colonial opposition. Prior to this 
their religious identity (and their trading occupation) had been the 
basis for their incorporation into the encompassing Sinhalese 
hierarchical (religious and political) system. The Buddhist religion 
at the apex of the system had embraced and encompassed within it all 
alternative religious communities. The ideological constitution of 
the civitas dei of the Catholic church tolerated no alternative 
religious practice within its borders, although it is clear that in 
practice a certain tolerance and accommodation were soon 
forthcoming. 58 Owing to the fact that the Muslims were largely an 
encompassed minority and rarely the object of scholarship this new 
determination of religion is to be ascertained with reference to the 
clash between the Portuguese and the local kingships. With the 
arrival of the Portuguese in the region the civitas dei of the 
Catholic Church stood in opposition to the galactic polity of the 
Buddhist and Hindu kingships. 
Prior to Portuguese arrival the language of the polity in which the 
Moors were included was religious, that of the Sinhalese hierarchical 
and encompassing state. This was a state which permitted them, 
unproblematically, to follow their own religious persuasion. 
Conversely there is no suggestion of any Muslim - Buddhist conflict 
at this time, and further there are no accounts of specifically 
religious conflicts between Moors and Hindus in the Tamil kingdom of 
Jaffna or the South Indian Hindu states. In those small 
principalities ruled by Muslims in South India and the areas of 
57 The religious and mercantile ambitions of the Portuguese are 
evident in the title of a book written by Fernao De Queyroz, The 
Spiritual and Temporal Conquest of the Island of Ceylon 
se See Kapferer (1988) for a comparative analysis of hierarchical 
and egalitarian ideologies. In particular he discusses the potential 
intolerance of egalitarianism. 
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Muslim chieftainships in Ceylon there are no accounts of forced 
conversions to Islam among the local populations. " The Portuguese 
were determined to convert Asia and in 1567 a vice-regal decree was 
promulgated "which enacted inter alia - that all heathen temples in 
Portuguese territory should be abolished" (Boxer ibid: 68). In 1588 
they destroyed the great Vishnu temple at Dondra on the South coast 
and they also sacked the Vibhisana temple in Kotte which was likely 
the guardian of the Sinhalese capital and the "sovereignty of the 
Sinhala kings" (Obeyesekere ibid: 290). Also during this period, many 
Muslim mosques were destroyed and this religious persecution is often 
cited as a factor inducing Muslim communities to leave their coastal 
homes and seek refuge elsewhere in the island. " 
Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese there were numerous battles, 
both in the island and the wider region between Hindu and Buddhist 
kings seeking to extend their region of dominance. It must be noted 
however that although this pattern of "over-rule and conversion" was 
very strong in the actual history of South-east Asian politics, the 
conversion was "co-extensive with the process of political expansion 
by monarchs or of political unification, which is more an embracing 
of diversity around a centre than a centralization of power itself" 
(Tambiah, 1976: 46, my emphasis). Political and religious dominance 
were always inextricably linked and within the polity, religious 
diversity tolerated. The kings in these hierarchical states always 
had the potential, at the ideological level, to extend their arena 
of religious and political dominance and become a world ruler. In the 
Indic states this was encapsulated in the idea of a cakkavatti, a 
"king of kings" or universal emperor. In the Buddhist conception 
(Sinhalese, Burmese and Thai), this was a boddhisattva or Buddha to 
be. 
59 Quieros (Queyroz) specifically states that the Muslims of 
Ceylon did not attempt conversion (1930: 193, cited Abeyasinghe 
ibid: l33). 
60 These historical themes may be observed in the research area 
also. See Appendix A for an account of the Horagoda community who 
settled there after fleeing Portuguese persecution in Dondra and in 
Chapter Five, the Portuguese destruction of the Koledande Mosque. 
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The Boddhisattva was believed to be a Buddhist king who possessed the 
"seven gems", one of which was the white elephant. 61 These ideas of 
the religious polity were widespread throughout the region and 
invasions of one kingdom by another were often organized with the 
explicit purpose of capturing either the white elephant or another 
of the Buddha's relics. As Tambiah points out, the Buddha's relics 
were repositories of the Buddha's "power" of conquest. 
His relics became indissolubly associated with Kingship and 
Buddhist politics, acting as part of the royal regalia and 
serving as objects of the royal cult and as symbols of 
legitimate kingship (ibid: 43-44). 62 
Thus the Buddhist king of Burma had hoped to capture the king of 
Siam's white elephant by invading Siam and the Malayan, Chandrabanu's 
invasion of Ceylon (cf above) was mounted in order to possess the 
Buddha's tooth. 63 This was the supreme Buddhist relic and it was 
believed that it s possessor was on the thresh-hold of final 
enlightenment. When possession was not possible, deference was called 
for and the Buddhist king of Pagan had sent a brush made of his own 
hair and his queen's to the Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth) in 
Kandy (Collis, ibid: 162). 
Buddhist kings dreamt that they might be a Boddhisattva, the divine 
instruments of saving the world. This was in sharp conflict with the 
Portuguese intentions and Xavier, 
the embodiment of Catholic Portugal, dreamt of rescuing Asia 
from certain damnation and bringing it under the jurisdiction 
of St Peter's thereby unifying the world under one spiritual 
government (Collis, ibid: 160). 
61 The Buddha had previously been a white elephant. See Collis 
(ibid: 156-158) for details of the seven gems. 
62 Ibn Battuta who visited Raigama in the fourteenth century 
reports that a minister of distant Kerala extraction named 
Alagakkonara was making a bid for independence in what had been a 
petty principality. He possessed the white elephant, "the emblem of 
supreme power (.. and.. ) had set himself up as an independent ruler" 
(Kulasuriya, ibid: 144). By the end of his period of office his sphere 
of influence ranged from Raigama "off the South-west coast, to 
Samanalakanda in the central hills and from Kalaniya to Matara on the 
south-western coast" (ibid: loc cit). 
63 Other missions to acquire the dalada (Buddha's tooth) were 
sent by the Chinese emperor in 1405, and by Kublai Khan in 1284 (De 
Silva, 1981: 86-87). 
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Despite the absolute opposition in these two world views, one 
hierarchical and encompassing and the other oppositional and 
intolerant of internal difference, they both had ideologies of the 
demonic and attributed occult values to objects. An account of the 
battle for the Buddha's tooth relic in Jaffna is instructive for it 
reveals that Portuguese determination to possess the relic was not 
based simply on the idea that this relic, as an icon of the Kingship, 
or symbol of its legitimation, must be captured in order to de- 
stabilise a royal claimant's basis to rule, as might be the immediate 
supposition. Rather this (and presumably other), icon(s) were 
perceived as redolent with the power of evil in and of themselves. 
These relics were the objective power of the anti-Christ and had to 
be destroyed. The tooth in particular was regarded as "the most 
devilish relic in all heathendom" (Collis, ibid: 162). At the time the 
Buddha's tooth was temporarily in Jaffna and the Portuguese fought 
a fierce battle under the standard "of the five wounds of Christ" and 
captured it (Collis, ibid: 164) . 
64 Despite "a very handsome offer" for 
the tooth by the king of Burma "it was publicly pounded to 
smithereens with a mortar and pestle by the Archbishop of 
Goa"(Collis, ibid: 165), (Boxer, ibid: 75-6). 65 
As I have explained above, the conception of the boddhisattva had a 
wide regional influence, in which the kings of the Buddhist states 
viewed possession of the Buddha's relics as both temporarily 
empowering and divinely legitimating evidence of the power of their 
kingship. It is reasonable to assume that the Portuguese were well 
aware of this logic and perceived themselves as deeply engaged in 
a clash of two world views. Through the ideology of the galactic 
polity common in the East and that of the civitas dei of the 
Catholic, Portuguese and Spanish forces, both sought to rule the 
world. 
64 Roberts (1989) interprets the portrayal of the Portuguese, in 
Sinhalese folk-tales, as "eaters of stone and drinkers of blood", as 
acts of "nationalist opposition" (ibid: 69). Following Kapferer (1983) 
he argues that such portrayals act to render the Portuguese "like 
demons, (... ) both disordering and comic, (... and... ) ultimately 
controllable" (loc cit). I suggest that Portuguese representations 
of themselves, as seen in this instance where they fought under the 
standard of the five wounds of Christ, inadvertently helped to 
reinforce Sinhalese cultural logic. 
65 There is still a Buddhas tooth relic in the Dalada Maligawa 
in Kandy. 
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In this context, the Muslims were clearly both trading and religious 
enemies of the Portuguese. Previously their religious difference was 
tolerated by the encompassing Sinhalese state, whereas the Portuguese 
tolerated no difference at all. Portuguese antipathy to the Moors in 
Ceylon however, was tempered by personal economic interest. The Moors 
maintained total control of the trade in areca nut and as virtually 
every Portuguese in the island owned land which produced areca nut, 
they had a vested interest in the continuation of this trade. As a 
result of this, the orders sent from Goa by the officers of the 
Portuguese crown, to expel the Moors from Ceylon, were applied to the 
Coast Moors who were permitted to reside in Colombo "from monsoon to 
monsoon" and the Ceylon Moors were permitted to remain 
(Abeyasinghe, ibid: 137). 
2.4 Dutch Repression 1658-1796 
The V. O. C. was established in 1602 with extensive state support and 
monopolist privilege and it deliberately set out to challenge the 
Portuguese control of the spice trade in the East. It was billed as 
a rationalist economic enterprise with religion as a secondary 
factor, and when relevant at all, specifically directed against the 
Roman Catholic influence of the Portuguese. Portuguese conversion of 
local fishing populations had been partly responsible for their 
economic success (C. R. de Silva, 1978: 14). Between 1638 and 1658 the 
Dutch conquered all Portuguese settlements in coastal Ceylon while 
the Kandyan kingdom remained sovereign. 66 
The Dutch in Ceylon also stood in opposition to the Moors on economic 
grounds and were far more determined than the Portuguese to remove 
them from any participation in trade at all. Dutch policy was 
explicitly geared to the removal of the Moors ("a canker in the 
Hon: Company's profits" Kotelawele, ibid: 180), from all areas of 
economic activity in the island. They employed both legislation and 
religious persecution towards the attainment of that end. 
Only agriculture and navigation must be left open to them as 
occupations, and they are prohibited from engaging in all 
other trade within the country, either directly or indirectly 
(... ) The Dessave (... [provincial administrator]... ) must not 
permit the Moors to perform any religious rites nor tolerate 
66 The first Dutch Governor of the island dates from 1640 but the 
Portuguese did not leave entirely until 1658. 
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their priests either within or outside the Gravets 
(Mahroof, 1990b: 360, ff32) . 
67 
While the Portuguese had in the main relied on superior sea-power and 
to a lesser extent on religious conversion to control their 
territory, the Dutch sought extensive control of the island's 
littoral. They took over all the Portuguese forts and established a 
new fort at Matara on the South coast and an interior fort at 
Embilipitiya on the Southern border of the Kandyan kingdom. In line 
with their policy of total control of the littoral and all trading 
activity, the Dutch employed a specific policy of social management 
with their creation of a Burgher community through the marriages of 
Dutch men and local women. 68 This community was intended to increase 
their economic hold on the island through an increase in the size of 
their population. Those areas of commercial activity which the 
company itself could not manage were to be passed to the Burghers, 
and failing them to local Christians. In order to oust the Muslims 
from trade with the Kandyan kingdom preferential tariffs were 
introduced, 
discriminating in favour of Burghers and Sinhalese Christians, 
much to the disadvantage of Muslim traders (Dewaraj a, ibid: 213, 
cites memoir of Ryckloff van Goens, 1663-1675, trans. by E 
Reimers, 1973: 17). 
It was in short, a systematic repression of the Moors in order to 
reinforce total Dutch control of commercial interest. 69 
67 Both agriculture and navigation were casual and seasonal 
occupations (Mahroof, ibid: 358). 
69 The Portuguese had also inter-married with the local 
populations (creating Portuguese Burghers) but this appears to have 
been less ideologically motivated than was the case with the Dutch 
who were concerned to establish a colony of settlers to act as "a 
resource of adjunct manpower for the Company" (Kotelawele, ibid: 180, 
see McGilvray, 1983 for a further discussion of Burgher ethnicity). 
Plumb argues that Portugal has long been seduced by apologists within 
its ranks into believing "this great legend", that they were free 
from racial prejudice (ibid: xxv). In his view they were intensely 
racist, nevertheless the ideology persists and I note that there is 
a common saying in Portugal today: "God made people black and white, 
but the Portuguese made the mulattos". 
69 The Dutch sought to exclude the Moors from several professions 
and make these occupations the exclusive province of the Burgher 
population. Apart from trade, which had long been the province of the 
Moors, they targeted leather-work (against which most Hindus and 
Buddhists had objections on the grounds of pollution) and tailoring. 
The Muslims never took up trading in arrack for religious reasons 
(Ali, ibid: 237). 
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A series of legislative acts were passed to control Moorish 
settlement, and initially they were rigorously enforced. After the 
conquest of Colombo separate locations were allocated for Moors, 
Chetties and Paravas outside the environs of the Colombo Fort and 
Pettah (bazaar) area. Separate headmen were appointed for each 
community and were responsible to the Dutch Dissawe of Colombo 
(Kotelawele, ibid: 176). Similar headships were later established in 
the Galle and Matara areas to prevent Muslims from moving into the 
interior. A Regulation of 1659 confined Moorish residence to the town 
limits of Galle, Matara (outside the forts) or Belligam 
(Weligama)(Goonewardena, ibid: 196). This move suggests the density 
of Muslim settlement at these trading ports. 7° In 1665 Moors were 
forced to register themselves under threat of banishment and it was 
ruled that landed property could not be sold to them. In 1670 they 
were ordered to quit the areas around Colombo and relocate themselves 
between Alutgama and Galle on the Southwest coast (Mohan, ibid: 21). 71 
The Dutch introduced the Uliyam service; an obligatory public service 
to which "ordinary" Moors were subject. Merchants were obliged to pay 
a poll tax (Mohan, ibid, op cit). Along with the Chetties they were 
further taxed for wearing any kind of shoe (Schreuder, ibid: 88). In 
1744 if they could not furnish a certificate to prove that they were 
listed for taxation or services they were liable to be put in chains. 
One way to avoid Dutch attempts to monopolize trade was smuggling, 
an activity which the Moors took to wholeheartedly. The Dutch 
administrator Schreuder commented that "the Moors in particular will 
not give up smuggling although it is done at the risk of life and 
70 The Dutch were also determined not to permit any new Muslims 
to arrive and the Governor of Dutch Ceylon wrote to the Dissawa of 
Matara that "The Dissawa must see that those who arrive from 
elsewhere are made to return by the same vessel that brings them. 
Special care should be taken at the harbour of Beligam (Weligama) and 
other outstations, that this rule is carried out" (Mahroof, 1990b: 357- 
8). Weligama lies mid-way between Galle and Matara, both of which 
were the sites of Dutch forts. It is clear from the evidence above 
that it became a port where Dutch justice could be more readily 
avoided. 
71 These were already areas of Muslim trading settlements. Van 
Goens noted that Muslims living in the coastal towns of Beruwala, 
Maggona and Aluthgama carried on a profitable trade with the Kingdom 
of Kandy (Kotelawele, ibid: 172). 
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goods" (ibid: 24). 72 The coast between Mannar and Puttalam on the 
island's West coast, is closest to India, and 
was the chief theater of operations for smugglers, in the 
period prior to 1766 when these lands still belonged to the 
Kandyan kingdom (Kotelawele, ibid: 174). 
This further strengthened the relations between the Moors and the 
Kandyan kingdom and the Moors served as a profitable connection with 
the wider world for the virtually land-locked kingdom. During the 
Kandyan-Dutch wars of 1760-1766, after which the Dutch gained total 
control of the coastline, the Moors were able to solicit support from 
the British in Madras for the Kandyan cause. " 
By the middle of the eighteenth century however, the position had 
begun to change and with a weakening of Dutch policies of repression 
the Moors were permitted greater freedom to pursue their own economic 
interests. The Dutch 
were initially averse to the granting of any offices or 
privileges to them... (but)... when they settled down to the 
task of administering their territorial conquests in (... ) 
earnest they were forced to accept realities and grant 
offices and privileges to the Muslims and to use (them) in 
their economic scheme in the island (Kotelawele, ibid: 175-6). 
It was primarily a result of the traditional expertise borne of 
Moorish engagement in trade that eventually led the Dutch to moderate 
their position. On the other hand it appears that the Moors sought 
always to pursue and extend their commercial interests both within 
and against the repressive measures ranged against them. 
The Dutch established a monopoly over the areca trade which became 
a major source of income for them. It was gathered under a system 
which involved both direct purchase and tax areca. Tax areca had to 
be collected and delivered to the Dutch as a duty and a paltry price 
was paid for it. In the mid eighteenth century in the Galle and 
Matara districts the inhabitants let the areca rot under the trees. 
'Some resourceful Moors' offered to collect the tax-areca and deliver 
it on the condition that further deliveries should be bought at the 
72 Schreuder notes in 1762 the extensive smuggling of cinnamon, 
pepper, arecanuts and coffee (ibid: v), and cloth (ibid: 17), off the 
island's South and East coasts. See also (Kotelawele, ibid: 173, De 
Silva, 1981: 157, Ali, 1986a: 236, and Goonewardena, ibid: 205). 
" This was the Pybus mission of 1762, see K. M. De Silva, 1981: 157- 
9 and Kotelawele, ibid: 179). 
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usual price. This proposal was agreed to by the Governor (ibid: 177). 
Confronted with the demise in opportunities to generate income from 
their traditional sources of trade, the moors exploited all economic 
niches left open to them. In 1746 the official laws preventing the 
granting of new lands to Moors and Chetties were removed and later 
in 1765 when new lands were made available for the cultivation of 
cash crops Moors were active participants (ibid: 184). Another system 
of the Dutch administration was that of rents, whereby incomes (from 
textiles, fish, paddy, gemming, bazaars, toddy and arrack), that they 
were not willing to collect through headmen, were farmed out at 
annual auctions. By the end of the Dutch period the Moors had 
established themselves well in the renting business. The Dutch had 
taken a more generous position with regard to the poorer Moors of the 
island, those engaged in agriculture rather than trade, and who thus 
posed no threat to Dutch commercial interests. Despite the 
legislative inequities, the entrepreneurs prevailed over the peasants 
and at the end of the Dutch period there was an economic elite 
within the Moor community made up of traders, renters and physicians 
and a non-elite subject to service obligations and a poll-tax 
(ibid: 177). Moorish persistence alone led to their continuation as 
an economic force on the island during the Dutch period, though in 
a state considerably weakened by the colonial enterprise. 74 
2.5 British Recognition 1796 - 1947 
The British ousted the Dutch from the maritime provinces of the 
littoral in 1796 and by 1815 had subjugated the Kandyan Kingdom and 
gained control of the whole island. Muslim fortunes underwent a 
vigorous change as 
persecution was halted and they were able to conduct their 
trading activities without restriction and the community 
visibly prospered (Samaraweera, 1979: 245). 
The British removed all the Dutch trading and social restrictions on 
the West coast Moors and large numbers of them migrated back to 
Colombo. British perceptions of the Muslim trading community led 
them to characterize Muslims as industrious and energetic, working 
from dawn until dusk, in contrast to the largely peasant Tamil and 
Sinhalese agricultural communities who, dependent upon seasonal rains 
74 Antagonism towards the Dutch remains in the writings of some 
Muslims; see Azeez who refers to "the bigoted Dutch whose antagonism 
to and persecution of the Moors are proverbial" (1957[1907]: 2). 
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for their crops and with greater periods of leisure, were 
characterized as lazy and indolent. 75 The introduction of laissez- 
faire capitalism widened the gap between rich and poor Muslims, 
especially in Colombo; a gap that had already become noticeable 
during the late Dutch period. This internal fragmentation was the 
background to later political movement within the community intended 
to re-establish strong community ties. 
The British arrival marked the beginning of a major period of 
transformation for the island's. Muslims, one which was critical in 
determining the course of action for, and control of, the community 
in the future. It marked the final point in Muslim emergence as a 
unified community on the national level. This transformation was 
composed of a number of elements and while it took its own unique 
course, it cannot be separated from the political context of the 
times which involved all the island's ethnic communities in battles 
with the British. As they reacted to centuries of colonial 
domination, the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus developed new 
nationalist ideologies which culminated in demands for self- 
determination. The Muslims underwent a Revival which had two broad 
themes; a search to define community identity and ethnicity, and a 
movement to improve Muslim access to education. The revival was 
shortly followed by the Sinhalese-Muslim Riots in 1915. The end of 
British rule was marked with the island's independence and a new 
political role for the Muslim community in the post-independence 
period. 
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of 
revivalist movements in all three of the non-Christian communities. 
These movements were characteristically located in the urban areas. 
After centuries of Christian dominance, which explicitly favoured 
members of the indigenous Christian (Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher) 
communities in education and employment within the colonial 
bureaucracies, the non-Christian communities sought, through largely 
nationalist sentiments to re-establish their own participation in 
this arena, and in more general capitalist development. The Buddhist 
revival, "which set the stage for the others" (Samaraweera, 
75 See Ameer Ali (1987) for a full discussion of this issue and 
comment upon the "colonial theory" (Myrdal, 1968, Vol 111: 977-981) 
which attributed these characterizations to "certain innate ethnic 
traits"(ibid: 311-315). 
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1979: 243), had as its central figure the Anagarika Dharmapala, an 
English educated, high-caste Buddhist from a wealthy family, who 
asserted an explicit ideology of Buddhist development in the context 
of a post-colonial capitalist system. 76 The Buddhist revival was 
followed by a Hindu revival which ran along similar lines. The Muslim 
revival, while it shared some aspirations with the others, has 
generally been classed as distinct, in that it was primarily 
concerned with education and ethnicity and was seen as 
less concerned with purely religious matters than either the 
Buddhist or Hindu revivalist movements (Samaraweera, ibid: 247, 
my emphasis, see also Mohan, 1985: 29). 
Although not as explicitly religious as the Buddhist and Hindu 
movements, which sought to re-define the dominant value of their 
respective religious and cultural traditions in relation to the 
British, there was an important religious significance to the Muslim 
revival. This is to be found in its assertion of the Arab origins of 
the community, in the arguments concerning their ethnicity. 
Samaraweera calls the revivalist movement "the major force that 
moulded the self-identity of the Muslim community", the starting 
point of modern history (1986: 363). Their revival entailed a "search 
for an identity" (Samaraweera, 1978: 467), the final outcome of which 
was a "sedimentation of traditions" which favoured one history over 
another. However, in his interpretation of the events Samaraweera 
overlooks the fact that this search engaged an explicitly religious 
base to arguments concerning their ethnic character. . 
The debate concerning the origins of the Moors was elaborated around 
two traditions, one which held that they were the descendants of Arab 
traders, and the other that they were South Indian Tamils converted 
to Islam. " within the context of the revival, the Muslim search for 
76 The Theosophical movement and European intellectuals were also 
a significant force in this revival (Kapferer, 1983: 24). 
" Samaraweera argues that there were two distinct literary 
traditions in the late nineteenth century; the first stated that the 
community originated from Dravidians in South India who had been 
converted to Islam by Arab traders (long involved in Indian ocean 
trade) and the second that the community members were the descendants 
of Arab traders who settled in South India. Both traditions locate 
the community as originating from South India. This contradicts much 
local informants' testimony and some of the evidence. It should be 
remembered that these were not necessarily competing histories but 
the separate histories of different fractions of this disparate 
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an identity "involved the firm acceptance of the one and the vehement 
rejection of the other" (Samaraweera, 1978: 468) . This is the level at 
which the Muslim revival is to be interpreted as indeed having an 
explicitly religious character, although distinct from the more 
overtly religious cultural revivals of the Buddhists and Hindus. 
Considerable momentum was provided to the Muslim revival by the 
arrival in the island in 1883 of an Egyptian, Arabi Pasha, who was 
exiled there by the British as the result of a revolt which he led 
against them. 78 Although he eschewed all engagement in local politics, 
a possibility which had been of some concern to the British 
authorities, he became a significant force within the Muslim 
community. 79 He is recognized, correctly, by Samaraweera (1979: 247, 
1978: 470) as a symbol around which the community could gather, but 
the critical significance of his symbolism has not been addressed. 
At the time, the Muslim community of the island was fragmented "by 
class, life style and regional (and perhaps even ethnic) differences" 
(Samaraweera, 1978: 469) . The agriculturalists of the Eastern Province 
were largely a peasant population and the scattered settlement 
patterns of the rest of the community had not, prior to this, led to 
the existence of a common religion serving as a unifying force at the 
national, political level. In the context of growing nationalist 
revivalist sentiment among the indigenous population, it was Arabi 
Pasha and not a member of the local elite who had the "mantel (sic) 
of leadership" thrust upon him (ibid, op cit) . It 
is significant that 
Arabi Pasha, as a Muslim outsider, was in a unique position to 
encompass the totality of the Muslim community. Samaraweera notes, 
but does not attribute much significance to the fact, that an 
impression was created that 
community. Nonetheless this period marked a coalescence of histories 
-a totalizing movement which condensed many truths into only one. 
78 Colonel Orabi el Misr was born the son of fellahin. He 
joined the Egyptian army, rose to the position of Colonel and finally 
became Minister of War. As "Leader of the Nationalist Party - he led 
the famous 'Arabi Pasha Revolt of 1881-82 against the domination of 
England and France" (Mahroof, 1992: 20 & ff). 
79 The extent of his new role vis-a-vis the British may be 
determined by the fact that at the Golden Jubilee Celebrations for 
Queen Victoria, it was Arabi and three fellow exiles who headed the 
Muslim procession (Samaraweera, 1979: 246). 
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in coming to the island, Arabi was guided by an old Arabian 
tradition that Sri Lanka was the home of 'Man's First 
Parents', 
and this gave his presence in the island a "special 
meaning" (ibid: 246-7) . 
80 Another possibility according to Samaraweera 
was a local appreciation of his "nationalist" role in Egyptian 
politics (ibid: 246) but in my view this is of little significance. 81 
Rather it was his role as "orthodox outsider", interpreted as 
virtually on a pilgrimage to Ceylon, which explains both, his 
80 Arabi Pasha chose his place of exile based on the Arabic 
tradition that Adam had first set foot on earth in Ceylon. He wanted 
to be closer to Paradise (Samaraweera, 1986: 369) . Many Muslims believe 
that Adam's Peak in Sri Lanka is the place where Adam first set foot 
on earth outside Paradise. This fact had made the island a site of 
pilgrimage to Middle Eastern Muslims in earlier times, indeed Ibn 
Battuta came to the island on pilgrimage to Adam's Peak. In Chapter 
Four the miraculous arrival of Middle Eastern Muslim saints in stone 
boxes/tombs on the shores of the island is fully discussed in the 
context of local cosmological understandings. For the present I note 
that Arabi Pasha's arrival, "guided by an old tradition" could also 
be seen as a "miraculous return", one which ensured his 
interpretation as a legitimate religious figure. 
si Informants consistently stated that wherever Muslims live as 
a minority in a non-Muslim country, they are obliged to offer their 
allegiance to the government of the day. Similar statements from 
Muslims consistently appeared in the media also: ".. a strict 
abstention from Partisanship and loyalty to the government wherever 
they reside .. " 
(The Island, 10/11/84). This explains why Arabi's 
role as a "freedom fighter" against the British, the "hero" of Tel 
al Kabir (Samaraweera, 1978: 469), was not the basis of his 
significance to the Muslim community at this time. This was a 
community which was largely favoured by, and offered its support to, 
the British colonial government. The most recent and telling 
historical example was during the Kandy Rebellion when the Moors took 
an independent stance, vis-a-vis the Sinhalese community, and 
remained staunchly loyal to the British (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 234). A 
keynote address by M. H. Mohammed - Minister for Transport and Muslim 
Affairs (at the International Seminar on Shariah and the Social 
Order, Bangkok) was a more recent, explicit presentation of ideology 
on the issue. 
The Shariah forbids most vehemently, any argumentation with 
adherents of other religions and societies, on the Quranic 
injunction to you your religion, to me, mine own" ... seen in this light, the political imperatives of the Shariah... 
demand(s) of a Muslim his complete obedience to the laws of 
the state. It means the unstinted patriotism of every group 
within the social framework (Daily News 20/2/85, my emphasis). 
The timing of these statements in the light of the continuing ethnic 
struggle between the Tamil separatists and the agencies of the 
Sinhalese Buddhist state should not be overlooked. However, they 
reflect a long-standing and widely-held view, no doubt borne of an 
historical, minority, ethnic and religious status, and the congruence 
found in the Hadith (see also Ali, l986b: 154). 
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becoming the charismatic focus of the Muslim revival, and his 
ability to unify the Muslim community. It was his perceived location 
in a cosmological schema rather than his role as a political freedom 
fighter which made him an apposite figure in this context. 
It was also at this period that a Muslim national elite emerged for 
the first time. Following Roberts (1982), Samaraweera argues that 
prior to this the fragmented Muslim community, had only local leaders 
and local elites, in contrast to the other communities amongst whom 
national elites had already arisen. It was this absence of any 
national Muslim figures at this time and Arabi Pasha's ability to 
assume a charismatic leadership role within the community that was 
a prime factor in his significance. He was further in a position to 
take an encompassing role, regionally un-connected and nationally 
embraced. 
This is where Samaraweera locates his symbolic significance entirely, 
without exploring the ideological conditions of his dominance. 
However, as I have argued above, the reasons for his symbolic 
significance run deeper than this. A further vital factor in his 
assumption of the leadership role (as symbol if not politically 
active figure) was the force generated in a sedimentation of the 
tradition of Arab origins, and as a consequence, the establishment 
of political and economic hegemony by the fraction of the community 
to whom these traditions most immediately applied. Thus, although the 
traders of the South-west coast already held a dominant economic 
position within the community viewed as a whole, the emergence at 
this period of a national elite among this group, in conjunction with 
a national revivalist movement which found much of its meaning in the 
final assertion of an Arab identity, determined that this fraction 
was placed in a position from which they could continue to 
legitimately dominate the community in both religious and economic 
terms. Alternatively their continued economic dominance could be seen 
as religiously legitimated. 
in the following Chapter the debate over the 'ethnicity' of the 
diverse Muslim community, and its religious significance within the 
community, is discussed in full and I do not take it up here. In 
short however, we are dealing with a schema of religious and ethnic 
origin, which powerfully condenses the Arabic origins of Islam, the 
Arabic trading origins of the community, and the place of Ceylon 
within an Arabic cosmology as the home of man's first parents, into 
an ontology of the Moors. 
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The other focus of the Muslim revival was an awakening within the 
community to the value of a secular education. 82 The Muslim community 
during the nineteenth century was notorious for its educational 
backwardness, as a result of an explicit refusal to associate with 
the Christian schools of the European colonial powers which were 
recognized as agencies of conversion. 83 In conjunction with this there 
was a general attitude which placed religious education and the 
status of religious knowledge above a modern education and employment 
in the Christian dominated bureaucracy. Secular education was seen 
to offer little chance of material improvement in the community and 
trading itself was not believed to require or benefit from a secular 
education. 84 During the revivalist period considerable effort was 
directed towards the establishment of Muslim schools, but community 
indifference and an insistence that the Koran and Arabic be the basis 
of initial learning blocked this development. The conservative 
community believed that for boys and girls alike intellectual 
ambition begins and ends with the Koran" (A. R., 1890, pD19), cited 
Samaraweera, 1979: 250) . 
85 Financial grants from the government required 
an annual examination in Sinhalese or Tamil and this proved 
problematic, when the entire first year of schooling was devoted to 
the Koran and Arabic, and only in the second year were the other 
languages taken up and funding granted. 86 A further problem was that 
91 Education was a concern of all three revival movements and 
both the Buddhist and Hindu communities readily acknowledged the need 
to allow their children to compete for employment in both the 
government service and professions such as law and medicine 
(Samaraweera, 1986: 389) . Much of the renewed 
interest in Education was 
influenced by the shift in importance of English as a commercial 
language. 
83 The Christians soon ignored the Muslims because of the 
difficulty of conversion. From a Muslim perspective the schools were 
seen to lack relevance because Koranic studies were not covered and 
participation in the trading sector was not seen to benefit from a 
Christian education. See also Goonewardena (ibid: 190). 
ea Mines cites the existence of similar sentiments among Muslims 
in Tamil Nadu (1972: 101). 
85 There were also attempts to establish several schools for 
Muslim girls. The strongest opposition to this idea arose among the 
religious figures in Kandy, but despite this, a school was 
established there by the sister of Siddi Lebbe, a Christian educated 
Colombo Muslim who worked tirelessly in the field of educational 
reform (see also Wimalaratne, 1986: 427). 
s6 Siddi Lebbe, whose commitment to Muslim education pre-dated 
Arabi Pasha's arrival, constantly sought to have the Education Code 
revoked, so that Muslim schools could be examined in Arabic, but was 
unsuccessful. 
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teachers skilled in Arabic were the products of an entirely religious 
education with little facility as teachers in other areas. "' Many 
schools that were established ran into considerable difficulty and 
foundered, but there remained nonetheless a consistent effort on the 
part of the leadership to introduce a modern educational alternative 
to the traditional "verrandah system" (Samaraweera, ibid: 255). 88 The 
overall concern of the educational efforts of the community's 
leadership was to modernism, and 
more enlightened Muslim leaders were profoundly disturbed to 
find their community sunk in ignorance and apathy, parochial 
and grossly materialistic (Mohan, 1985: 28-9). 
It was not until 1939 that an ordinance was passed which governed the 
integration of religion into the school curriculum. 89 At this time 
Islamic syllabi were formulated and textbooks produced for schools. 
The Education Department also agreed to recognize the qualifications 
of the Madrasah graduates and to pay their salaries (Mahroof, ibid op 
cit). This was a huge boost to the Muslim community. 90 
87 These teachers were the products of the Madrasahs - 
essentially theological colleges where boys received free board and 
lodging along with free tuition for a seven year period of training. 
They graduated with the degree of alim. The two earliest madrasahs 
in Ceylon were established in the 1880's. The first was the Madrasat 
ul-Bari in Weligama (1884) (whose centenary celebration I observed) 
and the other was the Madrasat ul Bahjath ul Ibrahimiyya in Galle 
(1892). The principals and staff of these colleges were as a rule 
ulema from South India. This factor and their non-use of Urdu marked 
a separation between the Muslim intellectuals of Ceylon and those of 
India (Mahroof, 1991: 12, see also Shukri, 1986: 354 and Mahroof, 
1990b: 363). 
88 The Malay Muslims had always been "more willing" 
(Mahroof, 1990a: 58) to embrace education. Initially some of the exiles 
had established pesantiren, Qur'an schools, which had been accepted 
and patronized by resident Sunni Muslims (ibid: 56). During the 
revivalist period however, "not a single school was established" in 
the Eastern Province, a situation which Samaraweera terms "an 
indictment on the Muslim educationalists" (ibid: 256). This reflects 
accurately the position of the Eastern Province at the time as a 
region of minor importance in the island's developing capitalist 
system, "the Siberia of Ceylon" (K. M. De Silva, 1981). 
11 Section 4, Ordinance No. 26 1939 (Mahroof, 1991: 14-15). 
9o The standard arguments concerning the Muslim community's lack 
of interest in Education have recently been challenged as 
ethnocentric. Mahroof (1991: 5) argues that the Muslims in the island 
who left Arabia in the Eighth Century, educated themselves in their 
own enclaves. This tradition of a mosque centred education system 
with an Islamic basis continued within the community. The two central 
features of this community education were the Qur'an schools which 
taught children recitation, reading and writing of Arabic and also 
arithmetic. The other was the training of the ulema. I think the 
overall characterization of the community as lacking an interest in 
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Numerous Literary and Friendship societies were established, modelled 
on similar associations established in the Buddhist and Hindu 
communities. In the journalistic field also, newspapers and journals 
rang with the message of the regeneration of the community 
(Samaraweera, ibid: 257-60). The press was the site of a vigorous 
discourse as for the first time "the community was attempting to 
define and set goals for itself within the context of Sri Lanka's 
plural society" (Samaraweera, 1986: 373). Overall the readership was 
limited to the elite and newspapers and journals were often short- 
lived because they competed so strongly within such a small market. 
One critical factor to note however was that they often carried 
information about Muslims in other countries. In conjunction with the 
emergence of a national elite we must also credit that there was a 
new level of awareness of an identity as Muslim members of a wider 
religious community - tmimnah. 91 Sidde Lebbe founded the Tamil language 
Muslim Naisan (Muslim Friend)in 1882. Among other items it carried 
information about the Caliph of Islam, the Turkish defender of the 
faith who was mentioned in Jumma prayers (Shukri, ibid: 357). 
The movements in the fields of education and journalism are indices 
of the emerging 'collective identity', an identity which was clearly 
contested for a considerable period of time. The moves to broaden 
access to education and to refocus it towards secular skills (albeit 
within a traditional Islamic context) challenged the traditional role 
of the ulema. Teachers were transformed from their traditional roles 
(Mahroof, 1990b: 364) and essentially co-opted into the newly organized 
and eventually government funded, education system. 
education is ethnocentric but it appears that Mahroof overstates his 
case for ideological reasons. The first madrasahs were not 
established until the 1880's (cf ff 87 above). On a slightly 
different tack Mahroof (ibid) argues that education has always been 
founded on Islamic principles and where it was not (as in the 
colonial periods) the Muslims have neglected it. 
91 It is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy to 
what extent the various Muslim communities of Ceylon previously saw 
themselves as members of a world-wide Muslim community. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the Haj was a significant practice at this 
time. I suspect that the clearest line to take is that as with the 
other communities in the island there were those with quite 
cosmopolitan trading connections, engaged in a wider arena of ideas 
about religion and the polity, and also there were Muslims aware of 
their common religious links to Muslims in other countries but not 
with a great deal in common beyond that. 
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Another critical effect of the Revivalist movement and the 
establishment of a South-Western hegemony over the island's Muslim 
community was the move to re-order the community's adherence to 
Islamic doctrine. It marked the first period in which "laymen came 
forward to challenge the exclusive jurisdiction of the men of 
religion over doctrinal matters" (Samaraweera, 1979: 265). The Dowry 
system in particular, was regarded as a "slur" on the community (Bawa 
1888: 219-220), not only with regard to the fact that the requirement 
of dowry was held to be un-Islamic, but also that it was a field in 
which the lebbes as Marriage Registrars could commit irregularities 
(Samaraweera, ibid: 266-7). The Muslim reformers sought to pass this 
traditionally religious authority over Muslim marriage and divorce 
to the control of the state. This raised enormous controversy among 
the religious leaders of the time and as a result the Mohammedan 
Marriage Registration Ordinance of 1886 was not promulgated until 
1888, and registration remained optional. 92 This initially 
unsuccessful early move by the reformers and modernisers to seek the 
power of the state, to control aspects of what had previously been 
regarded as the province of the religious leaders, did not stop them. 
A similar thrust was later observed in the establishment of the state 
control of mosques, with the passing of the Waqfs ordinance. 93 These 
actions must be interpreted as the dominant Muslim fraction seeking 
the power of the state, a state within which they were endorsed as 
the legitimate fraction with access to power, to extend their own 
hegemony over the Muslim community. 
The general perception of the Hindu and Buddhist revivals is that 
they were cultural /religious movements with political overtones, the 
earliest stirrings of Nationalism. The Muslim revival was explicitly 
concerned with the two factors of ethnicity and education, and in 
both areas expressly religious considerations were engaged. Although 
92 The reforms desired by the reformers were not undertaken until 
1926 (Samaraweera, ibid: 268, see also Mahroof, 1987). In the research 
area the prevailing perception of the legitimacy of state protection 
of religious matters, was that as Buddhism is a state religion, so 
there are Ministers for Hindu and Muslim affairs. In 1984 Mr 
M. H. Naina Marrikar (the Deputy Minister for Finance and Planning) was 
arguing that the administration of the Q azis (Muslim judges) and the 
Qazi Courts, should "be taken over by the Ministry so that they could 
function properly" (Daily News 15/12/84). 
93 Waqfs refers to the "endowment of movable or immovable 
property for religious purposes in Islam" (Troll, 1992: 149, see also 
Mahroof, 1985). In most cases this is the charitable donation of 
mosque properties to God. This is an issue I take up below in Chapter 
Five. 
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the revival has not been characterized by scholars as either 
religious or political, I assert that it was clearly both. In the 
period of the revival Arab origins were asserted successfully as an 
answer to the "crisis of identity" of the island's disparate Muslim 
communities, and the dominant fraction of the Muslim community began 
their challenge to the traditional religious authority of those 
communities' religious leaders. The enshrinement of the recently 
emerged first Muslim national elite was avowedly political, a 
politics nevertheless in which the arena was religious, and 
domination to be sought in religious terms. 94 
This emergent national Muslim identity was further reinforced in the 
1915 Buddhist-Muslim riots. Suppressed brutally by the British, they 
were of great importance in the island's history "because they served 
as a catalyst for the growth of demands for Ceylonese self- 
government" (Kearney, 1970: 219). 95 Jayawardena points out that these 
riots are not to be understood as merely 
an eruption of religious animosity between Sinhalese Buddhists 
and a fraction of the Muslim population (... ) sparked by 
religious fanaticism (1970: 223), 
but that rather the explanation is to be sought in the political and 
economic conditions of the time. In the years immediately preceding 
the riots and emergent from the Buddhist revival, an awakening 
nationalism in the Sinhalese community had been directed initially 
against Christianity and missionary education, and later against both 
the continued domination of the British, and the economic power of 
the minority groups. The Coast Moors who were the initial focus of 
the riots were particularly despised As rapacious money-lenders and 
exploiters of the Sinhalese peasantry. Although they were primarily 
94 The widespread perception of the community at this time as 
one in which identity was tied to religion is demonstrated in the 
reports concerning the "Fez Question" of 1905. This is cited as one 
instance when the Muslim community "stood together" (Samaraweera, 
1979: 268). A Muslim Advocate was forbidden by the Chief Justice, to 
appear before the High Court, with "both head and feet 
covered"(ibid, op cit). It was declared that he could wear the Fez, 
only if he wore the 'traditional' dress of sarong and coat (itself 
British) , but not 
if he wore European dress. For Muslims it is a mark 
of respect to cover one's head before God or temporal authority and 
this refusal was widely interpreted as an "affront to the 
religion" (ibid, op cit) . Massive support was forthcoming, reportedly 
attracting a crowd of 30,000 Muslims to a meeting at the Maradana 
mosque and also attracting support from the Buddhist and Hindu 
communities as well. The ruling was eventually withdrawn. 
95 A total of 34 people were executed and 4,497 convicted of 
various offences (Blackton, 1970: 249). 
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the target of Sinhalese anger, the distinction between Coast Moors 
and Ceylon Moors was not always maintained during the riots. 
The riots were sparked by an incident in Gampola, near Kandy, and 
soon spread throughout the Southern, Western and Northwestern 
districts of the island. In Gampola, Buddhists and Moors had 
traditionally lived in harmony. However following the building by 
Coast Moors of a new mosque in 1907, they "promptly raised objections 
to the Buddhist Esala Perahera which traditionally passed along that 
way with music and beating of drums" (Blackton, 1970: 237). The 
Buddhists argued that this was a "via sacra laid out by ancient 
custom" (ibid, op cit) and they believed it to be guaranteed by the 
1815 Kandyan Convention. Despite the fact that no other Moor 
populations had previously complained, the Coast Moors registered 
their protests each year and in 1909 the procession was rerouted. In 
1911 the argument again recurred and the government 
agreed to a return to the traditional route provided that the 
Buddhist's music and drumming cease 50 yards on either side of 
the Coast Moormen's mosque (ibid, op cit). 
Between 1911 and 1915 the matter remained within the Courts and 
communal tension began to erupt in small incidents. It was in May 
1915, just after Wesak (the Buddha's birthday) when the Buddhist 
Esala Perahera 
led by the Maligawa's giant tusker wearing false silvered 
tusks and bearing the Tooth in a jewelled casket ... escorted by drummers, dancers and torchbearers (loc cit) 
was about to pass the new mosque in Castle Hill Street that trouble 
flared. The singers had agreed to be silent when they passed the 
mosque on their traditional route but the crowd in attendance had 
grown so great that a police decision was taken to divert the 
procession away from the mosque altogether. As the procession turned 
away 
some Moormen outside the mosque jeered and hooted as if they 
had bested the Buddhists after all. So the latter returned, 
attacked the Moormen and wrecked the mosque, going on to 
attack their shops (Diary of R. N. Lyne, in C. O. 54/782 (33883) 
cited ibid: 239). 
After this, sporadic violence ensued and a number of other mosques 
were wrecked, a Sinhalese murdered and a Muslim priest stabbed. A 
rumour spread in Kandy that gangs of Moors were coming to Kandy to 
"destroy the Maligawa in retaliation for mosques wrecked" (ibid, op 
cit) . The rioting spread throughout the Sinhalese districts over the 
next few days and during attacks led by Sinhalese headmen and 
68 
instigated by Buddhist monks, numerous mosques were destroyed. In the 
Western Province alone some 600 villages saw attacks on Moors and 
property, and large numbers of mosques were destroyed. In Colombo 
by contrast, the prime force in the riots was the working class and 
this "mob", 
was not bent on attacking the Moors themselves or pillaging 
their places of worship on religious grounds, but rather on 
plundering the Moor's shops, which symbolized the hardships 
caused by profiteering and unfair trade practices 
(Jayawardena, ibid: 229). 
The British government interpreted the riots as a "rebellion" against 
British rule and as part of their ruthless suppression proclaimed 
Martial Law which was not lifted until 30th August 
(Fernando, 1970: 255). Sinhalese were confined to their villages for 
weeks after the riots and the Riots Damages Ordinance introduced the 
principle of 'district responsibility' in collecting compensation. 
According to this ordinance, even those who had nothing to do with 
the disturbances had to pay compensation to the Muslims if they lived 
in an area where rioting had occurred (ibid, op cit). 
The impact of the riots within the Muslim community at the time has 
been largely left unstudied, (rather the focus has been on the 
development of Sinhalese nationalism), but Samaraweera argues that 
their principal effect was a feeling of "helplessness" among them 
(1979: 271). A helplessness which he believes may have attributed to 
"the even closer collaboration of the Muslim leaders with the 
government which was seen in the years to come" (ibid, op cit). 
Certainly we must observe that a new level of religious identity has 
been formed, one in which religious symbols of the community were 
attacked en masse and one in which their economic dominance (although 
limited to a fraction of the community) became a symbol of their 
wider identity also. The closer relationships established between the 
elite and the government are hardly surprising. 
2.6 Post Independence 1948 - 
Ali notes that prior to the granting of Independence in 1948 the 
Muslim community had a peripheral role in politics and he classes 
them as 'observers' rather than 'participators, (1986: 147). As we have 
seen however, historically they were not without influence in Ceylon, 
particularly in the Kandyan Kingdom, and on several occasions had 
sought to directly subvert and obstruct colonial policy, when it 
conflicted with their trading activities. During the events of the 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which saw the debate 
on Muslim ethnicity, the revivalist movement and the Sinhala-Muslim 
riots, their cri Muslim identity was strengthened. Their direct 
engagement in local politics where it concerned government however 
was still marginal. The British period may be characterized as one 
which saw the crystallization of a polity increasingly defined in 
communal terms, a polity in which the Muslims were a minority. The 
problem they faced as a minority community was the fact of their 
demographic distribution, which was in most districts one of 
consistent and acute minority status. 96 They were however an 
electorally significant minority, prepared to engage in "bargaining 
strategies... (and) ... Muslim support remained crucial to, any political 
party that aspired to form a government until 1977" (Ali, 1986b: 154- 
162). The United National Party won a "landslide" victory in 1977, 
one which most Muslims supported. 97 In 1978 the U. N. P. introduced 
significant changes to the constitution (Ali, ibid: 162), two of which 
are critical to the future political tactics of the Muslim community. 
Firstly, the new system of proportional representation. significantly 
devalued the "deterministic role" that Muslims votes played earlier 
(ibid, op cit) . Secondly, this constitutional change, which 
devalued 
the minorities voting strengths has been interpreted by some Muslims 
as "the retaliation by the Sinhalese majority to the electoral 
tactics of the minorities" (ibid, op cit) . While Tamil politics 
have 
emphasised regional autonomy the Muslims (influenced by their vastly 
different settlement patterns) have wisely joined National political 
parties rather than establish a separate Muslim political party. In 
a number of electorates where the Muslims are a minority, Muslim 
candidates as members of the U. N. P. or S. L. F. P. have consistently 
been elected by Sinhalese majorities on party grounds (K. M. De 
Silva, 1986b: 446). 
As a community they have been more valued by recent UNP governments 
for their "Islamic connection with the Muslim countries than for 
(their) role in the island's domestic politics or economy" 
(Ali, ibid: 163). This is due to the importance of the Arab states as 
both markets for exports, and the employers of large numbers of 
foreign migrant workers. By 1983 some 150,000 Sri Lankans were 
96 This again reflects their 'ubiquitous' pattern of settlement. 
" One problem recently facing the Muslim intelligentsia is that 
"the total identification of Muslim politics with the United National 
Party may be counter-productive" Lanka Guazthan 7 (23 & 24), April 
1,1985: 1. 
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employed in the Middle Eastern states (ibid, op cit) and their 
remittances are reportedly the second highest generator of foreign 
exchange after export sales of tea. 98 These two factors; the Middle 
East as market for workers and exports, and the possibilities of 
funds from the "Arab charity purse" have determined that recent 
governments have offered the post of Foreign Minister to a Muslim 
(ibid, op cit). 99 This is in line with a more general and long- 
standing policy of rewarding loyalists in the minority elite by 
giving them ministerial posts (Phadnis, 1979: 47). 
The community is currently facing severe political problems. A major 
concern is their apparent "neutrality" in the Sinhalese-Tamil 
conflict engulfing the island (Ali, ibid: 163) One third of the Muslims 
reside in the Tamil districts and there have been a number of Muslim- 
Tamil clashes, some believed to have been stirred up by the Sinhalese 
military forces in the Eastern Province. 100 
(T) he Muslims have been caught in the communal cross-fire. The 
northern terrorist movement is trying to infiltrate the East 
(... ) harping on the fact that both Muslims and Tamils share 
a common language, and is trying to win sympathy for the Tamil 
cause. 
But Muslims have generally been suspicious of Tamil 
motivations in such a context and have been particularly 
opposed to moves to amalgamate the North and East as one 
administrative unit (The Island 17/4/85). 
98 In 1983 private remittances from overseas accounted for 17% 
of the island's total foreign earnings, with 60% of that figure 
coming from guest-workers in the middle East. Remittances rose from 
2 million Rupees in 1973 to 6957 million Rupees in 1983. These 
figures are now being reduced by the fact that the Bangladesh 
employment market is opening up (Central Bank of Ceylon Reports, 
1982,1983, cited in The island 12/8/84 p4). The Middle East guest- 
worker economy has also had a significant role in reducing internal 
unemployment. In 1983 1143% (57,000) of the nett annual addition to 
the work force emigrated there for employment" (ibid, op cit) , bringing the total number of Sri Lankans employed there to 175,000. 
99 J. R. Jayewardena appointed A. C. S. Hameed as Minister of Foreign 
affairs in order to earn points both at home and abroad. During my 
period of fieldwork this appointment was cynically regarded by some 
Muslims who referred to the Foreign Minister as "The Minister for 
getting money from Arabic connections". Muslims also are well aware 
of the critical value of the Middle Eastern states as protectors of 
their interests and numerous informants expressed the view that the 
migrant workers there were in effect "hostages" against the threat 
of any Sinhalese communal attacks on their community. - 
ioo A reportedly popular Tamil militant tactic for raising funds 
in the Batticaloa District was the regular kidnapping, and holding 
for ransom, of young Muslim men in the area. 
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In response to this new threat, the Muslim elite has been quick to 
make public statements of support for the government, stressing the 
long ties of friendship between Muslims and Sinhalese, and taking an 
active part in multi-faith religious programmes to pray for peace. "' 
The All-Ceylon Moors Association convened a meeting at which a large 
gathering of Muslim M. P. 's, lawyers, businessmen and others, decided 
that the Muslim community should "play a positive and dynamic role 
in bringing about national peace and unity in Sri Lanka" (Daily News 
17/1/85). The political aspects of this campaign were so successful 
that the then Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, declared that the 
Muslims were "angels of peace" (Daily News 21/8/84). The late 
National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, further praised 
"the religious attitudes of "brotherhood" and "equality" among the 
Muslims which had helped them live peacefully in the country for a 
very long time" (The Island 21/12/84). 102 This potent political 
alliance between the Muslim elite and the Sinhalese government 
however, does not necessarily reflect the views of the East coast 
Muslims, who share many of the economic and social disadvantages of 
the East coast Tamil population. 103 This region does not yet however 
reflect at the national level the separate political interests of the 
poorer majority of Muslims who live here. 
In the 1950's there had been a brief alliance between some of the 
Muslims of the Eastern Province and Tamils who were attempting to 
build an organization of "Tamil-speaking peoples" of Sri Lanka in 
order to preserve their language rights. The alliance did not last 
and in general since then 
Muslims have been among the most inveterate opponents of 
federalism and separatism, seeing in these the conferment of 
advantages on the Tamils which could endanger Muslim interests 
to a far greater extent than the country's unitary political 
structure(K. M. De Silva, ibid: 449). 
There is no doubt however that if the country is divided as Tamil 
separatists demand, it is feared that the young Muslims of the 
Central Districts, many of whom are being educated in the Sinhalese 
101 "A Muslim religious ceremony was held at the Jumma Mosque in 
Dematagoda to invoke blessings on the people of Sri Lanka, and on the 
armed forces currently engaged in defending the nation" (Daily Mail 
14/1/85). 
102 Both Ranasinghe Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali were 
subsequently assassinated by Tamil forces. 
103 There were many local reports of young Muslims in the 
Batticaloa region joining the militant movement. 
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medium, will lose the ability to speak Tamil, and the Muslim 
community will become linguistically divided. The fact that Tamil is 
predominantly the language of religious texts and sermons, with few 
understanding Arabic, makes this a critical factor. 
This chapter has pointed to the complexity of Muslim settlement and 
reveals some issues I now want to take up, in a discussion of their 
competing interpretations of this history and the contradictions that 
continually arise as a result of movements to totalise. 
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Chapter Three : 
Interpretations and Contradictions 
The Muslims have a diverse history of settlement in the island and 
as I have argued, their perceptions of themselves as a unified 
community have increasingly been forged in the face of external 
contingency. This began with Portuguese opposition, was followed by 
Dutch repression and finally faced British concerns with devolving 
power along communal lines. Their construction of a unified history 
however, has been fraught with contradictions, which reflect the 
basic diversity of the community. -The production of histories is 
always complex and continually meaningful. In this instance the 
complexity is borne of diverse historical origins and experience, and 
the necessity to compete for power as a unified group in the late 
colonial period. An explicit assertion of a distinct, non-Tamil 
identity took place in the context of rapid class formation under the 
British, where power was to be inherited proportionally by ethnic 
groups. This unified history was imbued with religious meaning. Prior 
to the revival there had been recognition of two distinct traditions. 
One stated that the community were the descendants of Arab traders 
and the other that they were Tamils from Kayalpattanam in South 
India. The revival involved the acceptance of one tradition and the 
firm rejection of the other. What was probably historical fact for 
a minority segment of the diverse Muslim population, became an 
ideology endorsed by the elite, and subsequently, the history of the 
many. 
In this chapter I take up two Muslim interpretations of their history 
which are loaded with symbolic import. The first was publicly aired 
in the "Ethnology Debate" which arose in the late nineteenth century 
and was concerned to establish whether the Muslims were the 
descendants of Arab traders or Tamil converts to Islam. The second 
concerns the representation of Muslims as traders, and I examine this 
representation for its social and religious significance. 
3.1 A symbolic history. 
The most popular representation of the origins of the Ceylon Moor 
community is that 'Sri Lankan Muslims are the descendants of Arab 
traders who settled on the island and married local Tamil women', 
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and it is here that any discussion of the history of the community 
should begin. ' This simple statement of ideology condenses a wealth 
of historical complexity. It portrays the community as a unitary one, 
with a common history and a common point of origin, in a manner which 
condenses their historical and ethnic diversity. It is of significant 
interest to determine what historical circumstances have led the 
community to emerge with the particular identity that it currently 
has. 
Abeyasinghe writes that the Muslims in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were "a people without an historical tradition" (1986: 129) . 
This lack of a specifically religious or unitary history, in contrast 
to the Hindus and Buddhists in the island, reflects accurately the 
position before the emergence of the national elites, a factor which 
was critical to the establishment of a Muslim symbolic history. 
National elite formation influenced the shape which that symbolic 
history developed. The formation of national elites took place 
within a political order whose fundamental language was hierarchy. 
In this context to argue that one was from a high category, of 
impeccable Arab stock for example, enabled the Muslim community to 
engage with other 'high' groups - the Goyigama and Karava of the 
Sinhalese community and the Velallas of the Tamil community. 2 The 
introduction of these hierarchical ideas must be assumed to have 
already made their way into the Muslim community, indeed they were 
reflected in the division of the community into caste-like groups, 
but in this political context they began to act sharply in the 
structures of internal political domination. The location of much of 
this political re-ordering in all communities was confined to the 
Western and Central Provinces and thus also lent to those Muslims the 
I In some instances it is held that Arabs also married Sinhalese 
women and this certainly was the case in the Kandyan kingdom. 
Generally historical sources suggest that they married predominantly 
Tamil women, from Tamil trading families, even in the areas of heavy 
Sinhalese settlement. The 'bogey' of mass Sinhalese conversion to 
Islam was often conjured up by the Dutch in order to justify 
discriminatory practices. (Kolonial Archief of the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief at the Hague, 1121, folios 106-08, cited 
Goonewardena, 1986: 93). It is possible that in conjunction with the 
recent statements stressing Sinhala-Muslim unity that there will be 
a growing emphasis on Sinhalese wives in the histories. 
2 The Goyigama are the highest Sinhalese caste, closely followed 
by the Karava. The Velalla are the highest Tamil Hindu caste in the 
island. 
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chance to exploit their historical traditions, to construct new 
meaning in them and even to generate new significant traditions. 
These traditions were nonetheless, of wider ontological significance 
prior to this.; I am concerned with the increasing deployment of a 
religious ideology in a process whereby an ethnically and culturally 
diverse group of Muslims came to share a common set of religious and 
ideological assumptions and how they came increasingly to forge their 
collective action through them. ' 
3.2 The "Ethnology" of the "Moors of Ceylon. " 
The ideological value of the Arab origins of the Sri Lankan Muslims 
received its most explicit airing in the political arena of public 
debate. A prominent Tamil member of the Legislative Council, Sir 
Ponnambulam Ramanathan, in 1885 during a parliamentary debate on the 
Mohammedan Marriage Registration ordinance, expressed his view that 
the Moors of Ceylon were not a separate race. 5 They were, he argued, 
"Tamils in nationality and Mohammedans in religion" (I. L. M. Abdul 
Azeez, ibid: 1). This speech, which was reported in the English 
newspapers, was answered by Siddi Lebbe with a series of articles on 
the Arab ancestry of the Ceylon Moors. In these he refuted 
Ramanathan' s claims and argued that most of the Ceylon Moors were the 
descendants of Arab colonists who had settled on the island centuries 
3 The Muslim construction of history has a significance which 
requires us to look at cosmologies, cosmologies which they think are 
vitally important. That history is symbolic for Muslims in the Sri 
Lankan context is evident in their rituals and in culturally and 
historically constituted perceptions of male-female relations. A 
constant contradiction arises for Muslims from the local, non-Islamic 
customs of their wives, a contradiction that is specifically 
addressed in the marriage rites. These issues are taken up in detail 
later in the thesis. 
° This hegemonic domination reflects only the ruling concerns 
and outcomes in the political arena of the time. History is always 
contested and the Muslims of the Eastern Province have probably never 
accepted and are certainly beginning to challenge these 
interpretations of orthodox legitimacy (cf below). 
I Ponnambulam Ramanathan was "a gentleman of great renown and 
world-wide fame; a brilliant and accomplished lawyer, having filled 
for some time, with credit to himself and the Ceylonese in general, 
the responsible position of Her Majesty's Solicitor General in 
Ceylon; and a man of much intellectual attainment and public 
spiritedness" (ibid, op cit) . Some years 
later in 1911, he was elected 
to the 'Educated Ceylonese' constituency (K. M. De Silva, 1981: 384), a 
position of great moral authority. 
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before. These articles were published in the Tamil language 
newspaper Muslim Naisan whose unfailing message was the "reawakening 
and re-generation of the community" (Samaraweera, 1979: 258). 
Ramanathan chose not to re-assert his views in the press in answer 
to these articles and the debate remained unresolved. Three years 
later, on the 26th April 1888, Ramanathan delivered a paper titled 
The Ethnology of the "Moors" of Ceylon to the Royal Asiatic Society 
in Colombo. He argued again that the ancestors of the Moors of 
Ceylon were Tamils who had originated from South India and embraced 
Islam and settled in the island in the fourteenth century. During 
British rule in Sri Lanka the Royal Asiatic Society "functioned as 
the principal forum for Academic debate" (ibid: 261), and in the 
context of a British colonial government that laboured under an 
ideology of communal representation for native groups, the impact of 
his paper on the Muslim community was considerable. 
In the Legislative Council created in 1883, the Muslims were not 
represented by a separate member, rather, the Tamil member, as the 
representative of all Tamil speaking inhabitants of the island, 
served them as well. But a restructuring of the Legislative Council 
was proposed in which both the Muslims and the Kandyan Sinhalese were 
to be represented with separate members. Ramanathan's paper, timed 
as it was, just prior to this proposed restructuring, and more 
importantly, his taking the position as representative of all Tamil- 
speaking inhabitants in the island, was not well received. 
' It was 
widely believed 
that his object in calling the Moors Tamils in race was to 
dissuade the Government from appointing a Moorish member in 
Council, it having leaked out then that the Government were 
contemplating to appoint such a one, and to make them 
understand that there was no necessity for taking such a step, 
as the Moors did not form a distinct race 
(I. L. M. Azeez, ibid: 2). 
The fact that he was the incumbent Tamil member and further, had not 
entered into -a public debate in the newspapers, but had chosen 
another highly influential platform from which to propound his views, 
was perceived to be further evidence of his ideological intent. He 
was accused of ignoring the traditions of the Moors themselves, of 
being prejudiced, partial, of relying on the evidence of a historian, 
6 He was at this time British appointed representative of the 
island's Tamil-speaking inhabitants. 
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Valentyn, one of the "bigotted Dutch" and of ignoring abundant 
evidence contrary to his purpose (ibid, op cit). 
Ramanathan sought to establish his thesis that the "Moors" like the 
Tamils were of a common Dravidian stock, on four counts; their 
language, history, social customs and physical features (ibid: 239). 
In elaborating his argument that the Tamil language of the Moors was 
evidence of their Tamil nationality, he followed Max Muller who 
argued that 
if there is one safe exponent of nationality it is 
language... (and) 
... 
(I)n ancient times particularly 'language 
and nation' meant the same thing... (ibid: 238). 
Calling to attention the diversities of creed and custom to be found 
amongst Tamils of Brahmin, Vellala and Paraya castes, and between 
Low-country and Kandyan Sinhalese, Ramanathan argued that these 
people are known simply as Tamil or Sinhalese because they speak 
those languages. 
Language in oriental countries is considered the most 
important part of nationality, outweighing differences of 
religion, institutions and physical characteristics. Otherwise 
each caste would pass for a race (ibid: 262). 
A common language as evidence of common nationality was the crucial 
factor for Ramanathan, therefore Tamil speakers "must be adjudged 
Tamils" (ibid: 239), but in deference to the arguments of Sir Edward 
Tylor that language is only "some proportion of ancestry ... (and) ... 
partial evidence of race" (ibid: 239, & ff3), he sought to further 
justify his conclusions with an examination of the history, social 
customs and physical features of the Moors. Relying extensively on 
material from India he outlined his thesis concerning the common 
history of the Indian Tamils (who converted to Islam) and the Ceylon 
Moors. He first established an argument about the course of 
conversion to Islam in India, and its rapidity. This latter part of 
the argument was directed towards diminishing the numbers of foreign 
settlers originally required for conversion of a population and thus 
negating their influence in an assumed subsequent alteration of 
material character. An alteration in material character constituted 
a critical component in his reasoning. 7 In North India the greatest 
number of converts (adopting Islam in the Western Punjab in the 
thirteenth century, and in the Eastern Punjab in the seventeenth 
century) were low caste Hindus attracted by the ideology of equality 
The argument took place on grounds which reflected the 
concerns and the texture of the discourse at the time. They have 
since been discredited. 
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preached by the missionaries of the governing race, or the members 
of opportunist villages who sought to protect their landholdings, and 
these conversions were attained "without an appreciable admixture of 
blood with that of foreigners" (ibid: 245, my emphasis). 
Turning next to the West coast of South India, he observes that the 
Mappilas attribute their Islamic tradition to the initial shipwreck 
of an Arab trading ship on the riverine island of Chaliyam in 
844AD. (ibid: 245), 8 Treated kindly by the Hindu ruler who was 
interested in trade, they settled and were later followed by other 
Arabs including a number of missionaries. The Mappilas constituted 
a new ethnic category in the area (a point Ramanathan ignores), a 
category composed chiefly of traders from Hadramaut and Yemen who 
married local women and maintained local matrilineal traditions 
(Miller, ibid, op cit). Conversion outside of marriage in this case 
took place predominantly among the fishing castes attracted by the 
opportunities for sea-faring trade. 9 Later conversions were 
encouraged by the Muslim Zamorin of Calicut who required seamen to 
defend the coastal towns against Portuguese colonial incursions. 
These converts to Islam are argued to have retained their native 
customs and Malayalam language as indeed he suggests is the case with 
the Ceylon Moors. The influence of Cheruman Perumal, their Raja, who 
converted to Islam and retired to Mecca is also held to be a 
significant 'example' and instrumental in conversion. "' 
e See also Miller (1976: 41) who notes this tradition but holds 
that the first Arab colony in India pre-dates the Islamic era which 
began in 610AD. 
9 "Hindus found an easy refuge from their own stringent caste 
laws, which debarred them from sea-faring pursuits, in the open arms 
of Islam" (Inperial Gazetteer of India, First Edition, Vol VI : 247, 
cited Ramanathan, ibid: 245). The declaration of fishing and sea-borne 
pursuits as polluting arose after a resurgence of Hindu orthodoxy. 
Forbes (1981: 68) cites Bouchon's (1973: 9-15) reference to the 
emergence of Sankara orthodoxy amongst the Malabari Hindu population 
with the introduction of strict taboos against all forms of maritime 
activity. See also Boxer(ibid: 45). 
io See Kutty(1972: 6) Miller(1976: 46-49) Mukundan(1979: 59-61) 
Forbes(1981: 68) and Rashid(1986: 135-136) for accounts of this 
conversion. In the Laccadives off the coast of Kerala, live a 
matrilineal people who were originally Hindus from the Kerala 
region. The conversion of these islands to Islam is attributed to 
the same period. In 1545-50 these previously independent islands came 
under the control of Chirakkal Raja of Malabar and later from 1784-99 
were under Tipu Sultan (Rashid, ibid, op cit). See also Chapter Four. 
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Entirely ignoring the possibility of this early Arab trade reaching 
the coast of Ceylon at this time, or possibly earlier, Ramanathan 
links the conversion of Ceylon Moors to the conversion of the 
"Choliyas" (Lebbes, Coast Moors) in the town of Kayal-pattanam in 
South India's Tamil Nadu. " Kayal-pattanam, originally a flourishing 
coastal port since silted up, was of great importance in South Indian 
trade, particularly from the thirteenth century. Host to foreign 
merchants from many countries and renowned for its trade in horses, 
Indrapala notes. that it was a chief port for trade with Ceylon 
(1986: 118). According to Ramanathan the ancestors of the Ceylon Moors 
formed their first settlement in 'Kayal-paddanam' in the ninth 
century and later in 1024 AD a colony from here migrated to 
'Berberyn' (Beruwela on Ceylon's South-west coast) and settled there 
(ibid: 247). Concluding from the fact that Beruwela is widely 
believed to be one of the first sites of Arab settlement on the 
island, if not the very first site (ibid, op cit) and a tradition in 
'Kayal-paddanam' (and Ceylon) that Coast Moor colonists from there 
migrated to Beruwela, he insists that this therefore dates the 
arrival of Islam in the island, and, by implication, the beginning 
of the conversion process. 12 The notion of conversion which he glosses 
as a "change of manners and customs" (ibid: 249), is critical to 
Ramanathan's reasoning and he argues that 
(C)onsidering that not much more than 100 Europeans have 
laboured in the cause of Christianity at any given period in 
the island, and have made as many as 250,000 converts during 
three centuries, it may be concluded that the Egyptians and 
Arabs who settled at Kayal-paddanam could not have infused 
their blood among the converts to so great an extent as to 
materially alter their character... (and)... (H)ence it is that 
the Choliyas continue to be in point of language, features, 
physique, and social customs still Tamils in all respects 
except religion (ibid: 249-250). 
11 Called Kayal-paddanam by Azeez (ibid). 
12 Indrapala (ibid: 118) also cites the existence of this 
tradition in the island but Azeez denies it (1957: 24). Some local 
informants repeated it and further stated that Kayal-pattanam was 
a popular pilgrimage site for Muslims engaged in the textile trade. 
(It was indicated that traders from the research area, from the East 
coast and from the Pettah were involved, among others. ) The Bawas who 
travelled throughout the island during Ramazan collected niyaaths 
(vows) to take to Kayal-pattanam each year on behalf of others. The 
tradition need not be the 'whole truth' and the question that is not 
posed is whether or not Coast Moors from Kayal-pattanam migrated to 
a Beruwela that was already a long established site of Arab 
settlement. This is entirely possible given the history of Arab and 
South Indian trading involvement in the area. 
so 
By extension, the small number of Arabs claimed by the Muslims to 
have settled in Ceylon could not possibly have altered their material 
character, creating a justification for the racial distinction 
between Ceylon Moors and Tamils, or Ceylon Moors and Coast Moors. 
Azeez later argues in characteristically rationalist fashion that the 
early arrival of 100 Arabs would have been sufficient, an early 
arrival which is totally denied by Ramanathan in favour of the Kayal- 
paddanam colonisation thesis. The distinction between the Coast Moors 
and Ceylon Moors arises, Ramanathan argues, from the 
cessation of intercourse (... ) produced and continued for 
several decades between the Mother-country (Kayal-paddanam) 
and her colonies (Beruwela, Batticaloa, Puttalam 
etc)(ibid: 255, brackets mine), 
as a result of the advent of the Europeans generally and the 
particular persecution of the moor community by the Dutch. 
A prevalent tradition among the Muslims is that among the early 
Arabs, and in some versions the first Arabs to settle in the island, 
see Johnston (Vol 1, p630, cited ibid: 253) were Hashimites, subject to 
persecution and driven out of Arabia by the tyranny of the Caliph 
Abd-al-melek Ben Merwan (ibid: 251) and who settled in India, Ceylon 
and Malacca. Eight settlements are held to have been established in 
Ceylon at Trincomalee, Jaffna, Mantota, Mannar, Coodramale, Puttalam, 
Colombo, Barbaryn (Beruwela) and Point-de-Galle (Galle). Ramanathan 
finds these myths of "wholesale Arab colonisation" difficult to 
conceive as historical fact, and further asks why it is, when they 
settled in the "purely Sinhalese" districts like Kalutara and Galle 
"they abandon(ed) both Arabic and Sinhalese and (took) to the Tamil? " 
(ibid: 252). Ramanathan has recourse to the history and literature of 
the Sinhalese in seeking to further his arguments and notes that the 
ancient Sinhalese chronicle, the Mahavamsa (sixth century) contains 
no reference to the Moors but that the later seventeenth century 
chronicle, the Rajavaliya records 
that a great number of them arrived in 1505 from Kayal- 
paddanam, and attempted to settle by force at Chilaw, and were 
beaten back by Dharmma Parakrama Bahu (Upham's 
translation, p274, cited ibid: 253). 13 
13 Tennant, (in a further elaboration of the 'lazy native' view) 
writes that the Sinhalese were not traders though K. M. De Silva (1981) 
suggests otherwise. However, trade was a limited pursuit among the 
Sinhalese prior to the arrival of the KSD castes from India and 
conducted largely on behalf of the King. Tennant argues that the 
Sinhalese desired to escape , from intercourse with the strangers 
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Two Sinhalese poems, the Parevi Sandesa ("Pigeon Message") and the 
Kokila Sandesa (both produced in the reign of Sri Parakrama Bahu, 
1410-1461), allude to Beruwela as occupied by "cruel and lawless 
Bamburas"(barbarians)(ibid: 254). 14 Ibn Battuta visited the island in 
1344 and travelled from Galle to Colombo, via inland Adam's Peak on 
a pilgrimage (a route which avoids coastal Beruwela altogether) but 
his failure to mention Beruwela incites Ramanathan to argue that 
therefore 
we may safely conclude that Beruwala had not been seized upon 
by the Muhammadans in 1344... (likewise Galle and Puttalam)... 
and that though Arabs, Egyptians, Abysinnians and other 
Africans may have constantly come to and gone from Ceylon, as 
merchants, soldiers, and tourists, long before the fourteenth 
century, comparatively few of them domiciled themselves in the 
island: and that the settlement at Beruwala, which the Ceylon 
Muhammadans generally admit to be the first of all their 
settlements, took place not earlier than the fourteenth 
century, say AC 1350. We may also safely conclude that this 
colony was an offshoot of Kayalpaddanam, and that the 
resorting to trade on their coasts.. (and this) .. serves to explain the 
singular scantiness of information regarding the interior of the 
island which is apparent in the writings of Arabians and Persians 
between the eighth and thirteenth centuries" (Ceylon, Vol I, p596, 
cited Azeez, ibid: l2). It would also serve equally well, to explain 
the lack of information regarding traders in coastal ports, in the 
Sinhalese chronicles of Kingship. 
i' Obeyesekere (1984) argues that the Bambura is to be taken as 
a Berber, the term itself not implying a strict linguistic, cultural 
or geographical connotation(ibid: 303). He also refers to an earlier 
tradition of Bambura dances held in Beruwela. (I note that Beruwela 
is held to be the first site of Arab settlement) . This may 
be related 
to an annual ritual procession for Hata Bamburu, held by the 
Sinhalese population of the Weligama area. An enormous and grossly 
rotund figure in Middle Eastern dress of silk trousers and turban, 
is taken late at night from Mirissa (which is a small harbour) 
through to Pelena (by Weligama Bay) along the coastal road. The 
procession is accompanied by men cracking whips of burnt rope which 
make a particularly loud sound. Obeyesekere (ibid) notes the 
appearance of the Bambura in the Sinhalese gammaduva traditions at 
Matara and Sinigama, both located on the South-west coast. (The gam 
maduva is "a village ceremonial for the Gods, mainly Pattini" 
(Kapferer, 1983: 279). Pattini in one tradition is believed to have 
been brought up by Muslim parents. The idea that the Bambura is a 
'Berber' is consistent with the opinion of a Sinhalese exorcist from 
Akuressa who states that Hata Bambura is a Muslim. Obeyesekere 
further argues that this ritual performance which often engages the 
miming of shooting incidents, in which the performers dance with 
sticks is to be interpreted as dealing with Sinhalese psychological 
castration anxieties. This exercise in Freudian reduction is 
difficult to sustain in my view and it is more probable that the 
greatest clue to the significance of the ritual lies in the sheer 
size of the figure which suggests the wealthy nature of foreign 
traders and their particular transformative skill which was 
historically demonstrated along this coastal area. 
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emigrants consisted largely of a rough and ready set of bold 
Tamil converts, determined to make themselves comfortable by 
the methods usual among unscrupulous adventurers ... speaking a low Tamil interlaced with Arabic expressions ... and practising after their own fashion the rights (sic) of the 
Muhammadan faith ... (ibid: 254-55). 
A challenge indeed, to the Muslim community of the time, one which 
struck at the heart of their own conception of their history and 
ethnological background. 
The other two areas in which Ramanathan sought to argue that the 
Moors were Tamils were on the grounds of their social customs and 
physical features. The marriage customs of the Moors, the subject of 
an 1888 Royal Asiatic Society paper by Ahamadu Bawa, feature elements 
borrowed from the Tamils (a point never denied by the Moors) and 
distinct from those of the law of the Prophet. However as I will 
discuss below, an examination of the Muslim marriage ritual, 
including those elements borrowed from the Tamils, reveals that in 
toto, it stands as a 'rite of conversion', one in which the relations 
between 'Islamic men' and 'local women', are governed by an over- 
arching and determining Islamic ideology, which itself is re- 
ordering, and constitutes the establishment, in each and every case, 
of a new Muslim family. This interpretation denies to a large extent, 
the dichotomy suggested by Ramanathan between the 'pure' marriage 
laws of the Prophet and the 'impure' or non-orthodox inclusion of 
Tamil elements in the Muslim marriage and further, any rendering of 
these marriages as non-Islamic, and the community by extension, as 
non-Arab. " 
Ramanathan's final point was to refer to the question of the 
physical appearance of the Moors, a field in which these days racial 
and physical characteristics have been discredited as possible 
determinants of ethnicity in favour of arguments which are based on 
is The 'impurity' he infers however is a community concern. The 
structure of relations in the Muslim community of the South-west, 
with a patrilineal ideology of descent, and greater moral authority 
of men inherent in Islamic ideology, determines that men and Islam 
stand in a dominant and incorporative relation to women. The fact 
that the women historically (and sometimes presently) converted to 
Islam however, coupled with the practice of matrilocal residence, 
means that they stand in a position of constant threat to the purity 
of Islamic men. A constant dynamism is borne of this structure - with 
men constantly purifying the community and women constantly 
(potentially) threatening it, or at least rendering continual re- 
assertion of Islamic values necessary. This issue is dealt with at 
length below and I do not take it up here. 
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local ideological positions. Ramanathan, who favours language as the 
only safe determinant of ethnicity also felt this to be a fruitless 
line of argument and takes up the question only in deference to the 
arguments of Tylor. In any event, he concludes that there is 
insufficient scientific evidence to establish that the Moors are 
other than Tamil or Sinhalese and none to establish that they are of 
Arab extraction. 
The published response to this paper, A Criticism of Mr Ramanathan's 
"Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon" written by I. L. M. Abdul Azeez was 
published under the auspices of the Moors Union in Colombo in 1907. 
We may assume, and contemporary evidence supports this, that his 
reply represents an accurate portrayal of the prevailing Muslim 
ideology concerning their history at the time. Samaraweera points out 
that the printed discourse of the time had a limited readership 
(1986: 373). Ramanathan's argument is refuted carefully point by 
point, in exactly the same terms in which it was initially presented. 
A critical evaluation of the evidence, and the argument refuted in 
similar rational and common-sense terms. These terms, and the 
structure of the rhetoric, were, it is true, part of the wider 
political discourse of the period, one in which the British were 
concerned to grant suffrage, on a proportional and communal basis. " 
Further, this discourse was one whose structure later manifested the 
increasing concern with language which resulted in the Sinhala Only 
Language Act of 1956, introduced by the Sinhala nationalist S. W. R. D. 
Bandaranaike. However, the argument, produced by Ramanathan and later 
refuted by Azeez in these rationalist terms, obscures the greater 
import of the case for the Arab ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon, 
that of its symbolic value. The real concern in this context is with 
the religious significance of ethnicity. 
Ramanathan argues that the term Moors was applied by the Portuguese 
to the Muslims of Ceylon and has a religious meaning. He means that 
it was no more than an appellation applied because of their religion. 
But Azeez rejects this outright, stating that the term, as applied 
by the Portuguese, and in its current usage, refers to Arabs and 
16 Universal adult suffrage was not granted until 1931 as a 
result of the report of the Donoughmore Commissioners (K. M. De 
Silva, 1981: 422). 
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their descendents as a racial category. 27 Further Azeez argues that 
distinctions have always existed between Ceylon Moors and Coast 
Moors. Ramanathan takes the position that religion does not signify 
race, whereas Azeez asserts the non-separation of the two. Arab 
origins for Azeez are of vital religious import and he takes what is 
symbolic to be real. He is firmly embedded however, in this ideology, 
and unfortunately the religious value of Arab ethnicity is nowhere 
explicitly discussed. 
Ramanathan's Kayal-pattanam colonisation thesis must be taken as 
discredited. Azeez cites numerous references to earlier Arab 
settlement and not simply temporary residence in the island. 
Arunchalam states that 
(F)rom the tenth to the fifteenth century the Arabs were the 
undisputed masters of the Eastern seas and trade, and 
exercised great influence in Ceylon till ousted by the 
Portuguese. During this period they settled on the Indian and 
Ceylon coasts, and intermarried largely with the natives, 
especially the Tamils (Census of 1901, par 34 Ch 10, cited 
Azeez, ibid: 9). 
Tennant states that the Arabs were known as traders in Ceylon 
"centuries before Mahomet was born" (ibid: 630). Further that the 
author of the Periplus found them in Ceylon about the first 
century, Cosmos Indico-pleistes in the sixth: and (that) they 
had become so numerous in China in the eight (sic) as to cause 
a tumult in Canton"(ibid, op cit). '819 
Samaraweera (1979: 244) argues that it is possible to write of them 
as a settled community only from the twelfth century, their transient 
nature being linked to their trading activity but significantly he 
also pre-dates Ramanathan's 'fourteenth century' thesis. Those 
Muslims who arrived from Kayal-pattanam to settle in Beruwela then, 
must have come to what was already a long-established port of trade 
and site of Arab settlement. Beruwela stands at the symbolic heart 
17 See also Tennant (ibid: 169). 
18 On this latter point see Forbes (1981: 62, ff32) who states that 
the "massacre of the Cantonese Arabo-Persian community in 878 AD 
(... ) destroyed the basis of the sea-borne Muslim community in China 
(120,000 Muslims and other foreigners are said to have perished) and 
ensured the primacy of the Central Asian link between China and 
Islam. " As a result the Hui Muslim community is predominantly Hanafi 
and not Shafi (see also Gladney, 1991: 100). 
19 See also Miller(ibid: 40) Mauroof(1990: 170) Hussainmiya 
(ibid: 289) Forbes(1981: 66-67) for references to the settlement of 
Arabs from the first to the seventh centuries. 
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of Islam in the island, particularly in the South-west, where it is 
held to be the very first port of arrival of Arabs in the island. The 
name Beruwela is generally believed to mean "sails down". " 
To deny at a stroke, the Arab ancestry of the Moor population, and 
the original status of Beruwela as a site of Arab settlement, 
claiming rather that it was colonised by converted Hindus in the 
fourteenth century was an attack of such proportions that, the later 
reply, actually sharpened the division between myth and history and 
sedimented even more strongly the acceptance as historical fact of 
what had once, been more widely regarded as a fiction. In certain 
respects one effect of this was to make myth indeed reality, and to 
expand its significance and applicablity to the Muslims as a whole. 
Traditions are factual in Azeez's interpretation and unfortunately, 
the symbolic value of this history, (real or mythical) is not made 
grounds for any discussion. The debate is conducted solely in 
20 The symbolic importance attached to Beruwela as a point of 
origination of Arabs, and Islam, in the island is borne out in 
contemporary ritual practice. The annual feast at the Beruwela Buhary 
Mosque, located on the sea-front at Beruwela, is subject to the most 
stringent rules of conduct that I encountered. Rules which it could 
be argued, reflect its orthodox and original purity. In particular, 
and in radical contrast to the practice elsewhere, the recitation of 
the mowlood (story of the Prophet or saint, in this case "Buhari 
Muslim" a book of sayings by Muhammad), is not broadcast outside the 
mosque. It is believed that only those who are inside the mosque 
should participate. This reveals an exclusivist dimension in the 
religious ritual practice of this egalitarian community. An 
exclusivity which shares a logic with the practices of Mecca (another 
point of origination), where non-Muslims are excluded also. The fact 
that Beruwela, was a point of origin, may also be significant in the 
Kayal-pattanam myth, that they migrated to the site of Arab 
origination in the island, but this remains conjectural. It does 
share a logic with the beliefs around Saint s'shrines however as will 
be seen in the next chapter. This coastal area also has significance 
for Sinhalese in similar myths of origination, in particular the 
arrival of Devol Deviyo, a deity who arrived with Muslim traders and 
merchants from South India and was shipwrecked here, but landed at 
nearby Panadura (Neville, 1954, Vol. I: 6, cited Kapferer, 1983: 258). 
In a South-coast Muslim version of this myth I was told that 
accompanying Devol Deviyo on this originary journey were seven people 
of each of seven tribes, travelling in seven ships. Among them were 
seven Muslims from each of the following groups. The Yon (sailing 
traders), Lai Bandaras (from the Karachi coast), Marikkars (Mappilas 
from the Kerala coast), and Mukaru (Muslim gem miners). Here again 
there is an explicit theme in the mythic tradition which unifies an 
original diversity. Today Beruwela is the site of the recently 
established (1973) Jamiah Naleemiah, endowed by Al-Haj Nalim and 
established as an Institute of Muslim Studies. Its location must be 
interpreted in line with the symbolic purity and original status of 
Beruwela itself. 
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rational, historical and ethnic/racial terms. The only allusion to 
the power and depth of the attack lies in Azeez's statement 
that there is nothing humiliating in being Tamil in race (but) 
the persi+nt attempt... ( )... in attributing to the Moors an 
origin which they do not claim, in spite of their assertion to 
the contrary, is annoying, if not offending... (Azeez, ibid, ii)21 
In reply to the assertion that the Tamil language is indicative of 
the Tamil nationality of the Moors, Azeez points out that the Tamil 
language of the Ceylon Moors is a borrowed language. It is not their 
national language and it therefore cannot be argued to establish 
their Tamil origins in the manner in which the common Tamil language 
of low or high caste Hindus, or the common Sinhala of Low-country and 
Kandyan Sinhalese establishes them, distinct cultural and ritual 
practices not-withstanding, as belonging in each case to one race 
(ibid: ll). Tamil became the lingua-franca of Indian Ocean trade after 
the Chola period in which Indian Muslims assumed a dominant role. 
When the Arabs settled, even in the predominantly Sinhalese areas of 
the South-west, they traded with Tamil traders and married their 
women. In time they came to speak the language of their "Malabar 
wives" and forgot their own (ibid: 13-14). Azeez draws a parallel case 
between the Moors of Sri Lanka and the Parsees of India. The Parsees 
are the descendents of a group of Persians who migrated to Gujerat, 
and yet, their Gujerati language aside, they are accepted as a 
community of Persian descent. Neither the Parsees nor the Moors, or 
for that matter, the Dutch Burghers of Ceylon, speak the language of 
their ancestors, and in no case, should this be taken to deny their 
ancestry . 
22 
21 A later statement by Sir Razik Fareed was more trenchant. He 
accused the Tamil community of "stretching its treacherous tentacles 
and annihilating a race with history, culture and religion of its 
own" (Mohan, 1987: 30). He stated that the Ceylon Moors were "the 
proud progeny of an heroic race - the Arabs" and the idea that they 
were Muslim Tamils was the result of Ramanathan's "sordid 
imagination" and further that the Moor members of the Parliament 
would "fight to our last cent, the last drop of our blood and our 
last breath (... ) to counter this falsehood (that we are Tamil 
converts)" (ibid, op cit). 
22 A point made by George Wall, as chairman of the Royal Asiatic 
Society Meeting at which Ramanathan's paper was read. ". .. (I) f we are to accept (Max Muller's) definition in its simplicity and without 
qualification, we must regard the Parsees as Indians and not as a 
separate nationality... "(ibid: l5). 
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3.3 The ideology of descent. 
A further aspect of the argument which has not been taken up 
explicitly in this debate and subsequent analysis, though it remains 
implicit throughout, is the ideology of descent. Both Ramanathan and 
Azeez rely on an 'ideology of descent' as a fundamental component of 
their reasoning. But in both cases these different ideologies (one 
Tamil and one Muslim) are embedded, and remain unquestioned, 
unconsidered and implicit. As a direct consequence of this, the 
greatest source of distinction in the two arguments also remains 
unexamined. In Ramanathan's view, a few Arabs married into an Indian 
Tamil or Malabar community, adopted their language and some of their 
customs and merely changed their religion to Islam. In essence, the 
community remained basically Tamil or Malabar, the result of a 
religious conversion which did not (and in his terms could not) 
significantly alter the "material character" of the converting 
(Malabar or East Coast Tamil) matrilineal community. On the contrary, 
in the arguments of Azeez, the patrilineal ideology of Islam leads 
him to understand, and the Ceylon Moor community also, that the 
children of Arab men who converted and married local women were of 
Arab descent. In essence these conversions and marriages established 
by Arab men gave rise to a new racial/ethnic category, that of Ceylon 
Moors. This ideology of the transmission of blood through the male 
line, retains all its force in the community today. In the Southwest 
of the island this ideology is found in patrilineal communities in 
conjunction with a system of dual unilineal inheritance of property 
and matrilocal residence. 23 The situation of the matrilineal Muslim 
communities of Sri Lanka's East Coast may seem initially to prove a 
contradiction to the wide acceptance of a patrilineal Islamic 
ideology. However, with a few qualifications this situation in fact 
strengthens rather than weakens my argument. On the East Coast, 
descent is determined through the matrilineal line and the Muslim 
community, like the adjacent Hindu community is a society composed 
of a number of matrilineal clans - kuti. '° However, concerning those 
aspects of inheritance in which specifically religious ideologies are 
Z' Household property is passed through the female line as dowry 
and business property passes from father to son. This distinction in 
property has been referred to as Friday Property (male) and Monday 
property (female), (McGilvray, 1973: 9 see also Dube, 1969). 
24 The number of kuti. s, 18 for Hindus and 7 for Muslims, itself 
reflects a different religious ideology (McGilvray, ibid: 9). 
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engaged, the East Coast Muslims follow patrilineal rules of 
determination. Thus in the case of the Moulanas (descendents of the 
Prophet traced patrilineally from his daughter Fatima and son-in-law 
Ali) for instance, in which Moulana status travels in the male line, 
on the East Coast also, it is descent in the patriline which remains 
the critical factor. 25 So we clearly have a situation in which the 
Ceylon Moors understand themselves to be a particular ethnic category 
- Arab descendants, borne of the union of Arab men and local Tamil 
(or Sinhalese) women. This is entirely at odds with Ramanathan's 
perception of 'Tamil in race, Mahommadan in religion', and should not 
be reduced either, to the 'Indo-Arab' ethnic composition used by 
K. M. De Silva (1981: 91). What we are alerted to, beyond the 
application of two different ideologies of descent applied by 
Ramanathan and Azeez is rather a further dimension to the Muslim side 
of the argument whereby a new ethnic group is created through the 
marriage and conversion of local women by Arab traders. Religion in 
this cultural context must be understood as a fully engaged, 
25 The Thangals, (the Malayalam equivalent of the Arabic 
Seyyid, Sri Lankan Moulana), found in the Laccadives, also exhibit 
this ideology. The Laccadives, although entirely Muslim are a 
converted Malabari Hindu population, with a three tiered caste 
structure, and matrilineal inheritance governed by marumakkathayam 
laws. However "... the powerful religious associations of the (high- 
caste Thangal) family with patrilineal Islam are considered to over- 
rule marumakkathayam and .. (they).. operate on a strictly patrilineal basis in accordance with the established precepts of sharia law" 
(Forbes, 1978: 193-198). (For further discussion of the contradictions 
raised by a patrilineal Islamic ideology in this matrilineal context 
see Dube, ibid). 
The Bawas on the East Coast of Sri Lanka raise a further interesting 
application of the ideologies of descent. They are a group of 
religious mendicants chiefly inhabiting the areas of Eravur and 
Kalmunai near Batticaloa. It is possible to either be born a Bawa 
or to become one by attaching oneself to a teacher for a long period 
of time and taking instruction from him. In either case a very 
specific ritual of death and re-birth is required for initiation into 
the order and Bawas are Sufis, who are in essence the 'living dead' 
(see also Chapter Four) . To have a father who was a Bawa renders one 
a Bawa, but it is not clear whether or not a son will automatically 
choose to pursue the life of a mendicant. The Islamic idea of silsila 
or 'chain of grace', is pertinent here. The 'baraka' (grace) may be 
either transmitted with a physical dimension through the blood from 
a father to his son, or in a line of teachings from one saint to 
another. Informants state that Bawa blood may provide a certain 
aptitude or pre-disposition towards an understanding of the 
teachings, but alternatively such awareness or grace can be developed 
within the self. This is the egalitarian possibility of Islam. The 
ideology of self-transformation, inherent in the rituals of death and 
re-birth, arises through the context of the ritual itself and stands 
outside the ideology of blood lines. 
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ideologically determining, culturally shaping factor. It has a value 
in a distinctive and enabling manner. Islam is far more than simply 
an adopted religion, it is entirely and powerfully transformative. 
The status given to various arguments on each side is also different 
in one other respect. While Ramanathan relies on language as the 
fundamental determinant of nationality, for the Moors their Tamil 
language is simply a borrowed one. There remains of course the 
problem of the Moors continually embedding themselves in another 
language, and this is one they implicitly recognise. They are 
consistently cognisant of the fact that they are not Arabic speakers 
by birth, and this lack of facility with the language of their 
religion, constantly reminds them that they remain a peripheral 
community. There have been numerous religious writings in Tamil, 
largely generated in the Indian context, and the development of 
Arabic-Tamil (Arabic written in Tamil script) which Mauroof believes 
to be "the true language of Sri Lankan Muslims" (1972: 68), though no 
longer much in evidence, should not be overlooked. 26 
Condensed within the ideological statement that Ceylon Moors are the 
descendents of Arab traders who converted and married local women are 
three points which are worthy of note, for they have a significance 
well beyond any immediate historical truth. At an immediate 
historical level they do not explain the arrival in the island of the 
disparate groups of Muslims that together constitute the Muslim 
community. At the ideological level however, they are highly 
pertinent in the internal ordering of the community. Their 
significance is to be determined through a consideration of their 
meaning within a peripheral Muslim community which understands itself 
as Islamic. Thus their meaning must be sought in the 'structures of 
significance' internal to the community itself, through an 
examination of a particular cosmological schema in which Sri Lankan 
Muslims are located, and through which they apprehend and experience 
their world. First, the point of origin of Islam itself - Arabia, 
is revealed. Secondly, the manner of transmission of the religion by 
26 In Androth Island in the Laccadives, the religious centre of 
the island complex where several of the Thangal families claim Arab 
ancestry, the native Malayalam language is written by the Mappilas 
(Moppilas) in an Arabic script. This marks them as distinct from the 
Mappila mainlanders who use a Mayalali script (Forbes, 1981: 82) . Rashid (ibid: 35) argues that these days the Malayali script is 
becoming more common. 
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traders is clearly signed, and thirdly, the way in which the 
religous community within the island was created through the marriage 
of Arab men to local women is implicit. All three points are integral 
to the history of the religion and the religious community within the 
island. The ideology increasingly negates original diversity in a 
manner which is consistent with the principles of egalitarianism 
itself. It is an ideology which signs the community as religious, 
unequivocally. 
Part of the legitimating force of this ideology can be seen today in 
the structure of internal domination of the Muslim community by the 
Muslim traders of the South-west coast who declare themselves to be 
of Arab descent. Those Muslims on the East coast, more densely 
concentrated, and generally engaged in agriculture and fishing, are 
a much lesser force within the Muslim community, and the Eastern 
Province as a whole may only be regarded as an emerging economic 
region. 27 It has been suggested (Gunasinghe, p. c. ) that in order to 
challenge successfully, the current dominance of the Muslim 
community, those on the East Coast will have to 'purify' themselves 
through a new fundamentalism. 28 Despite the existence of one 
27 Early historical references to the period of Dry Zone 
civilizations suggest that there were at least thriving trade routes 
adjacent to these predominantly agricultural communities and that 
Trincomalee was a major site of trade with Bengal. The collapse of 
the Dry Zone civilizations and the subsequent drift to the South-west 
reduced the importance of this area as a trading centre. Currently 
the Eastern Province is one of the sites of massive Sinhalese 
government resettlement schemes, perceived by the Tamils as a 
deliberate attempt to significantly alter the ethnic balance of the 
region, and this has certainly been their effect. "In part, the 
settlement plan draws inspiration (... ) from the highly controversial 
Israeli project in the West Bank (and) the demographic changes (have) 
a "counter-insurgency" or strategic component. The main objective is 
to undermine the theory of "Traditional homelands" and to isolate the 
Jaffna peninsula" Lanka Guardian, Vol 7, nos 23 & 24, April 1, 
1985: 1. 
28 I note from a brief visit to Kalmunai on the East Coast in 
1985 that many new mosques were at that time under construction, or 
had been recently completed. Some it seemed were built with funds 
donated by the Middle East and others by an emerging class of 
business entrepreneurs, or with the help of remittances from local 
Muslims employed in the Middle East. As part of the resettlement 
schemes referred to above there has been announced an extensive 
project of Buddhist dagoba (stupa) restoration thus underlining that 
these areas are claimed as having once been Buddhist. Kapferer terms 
this "a Sinhalese government concern to distribute the icons of 
Buddhist dominance" (1988: 38). In line with this staking of 
territorial rights through the restoration and reconstruction of 
religious structures, the building of mosques in the area, with its 
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tradition which traces a Muslim presence in the region to those 
expelled from the South-west coast, the majority of Muslims here 
trace their presence to the arrival of Indian Muslims. Given the 
ideology of descent that I have outlined above, there is a sense in 
which Indian Muslims who converted populations on the East Coast 
through marriage, although they are Ceylon Moors, stand as less 
'ethnically pure' than the Ceylon Moors of the South-west whose Arab 
connections are more direct. This situation is no doubt reinforced 
by the greater focus on matrilineality which remains within these 
populations while those on the South-west coast are unambiguously 
patrilineal. The entire native population of the Southern and Western 
littoral was at a much earlier period, the subject of attempts at 
colonial law reform and Yalman (ibid) has noted structural 
transformations in kinship ideology which occurred as a result. 
In the previous chapter I suggested that the movement towards the 
establishment of a "Muslim" identity in Sri Lanka, began in earnest 
with the arrival of the Portuguese and the colonial era. Each 
colonial power adopted a different policy towards the Muslims and 
their fortunes during this period, shifted more radically than those 
of any other group. The Portuguese came as both religious adversaries 
and trading rivals, while the Dutch despised them, subjected them 
to heavy taxation and banned their settlement within the urban areas. 
The British, on the other hand, rather favoured them. The nationalist 
and revivalist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries which progressively consumed Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims 
as a prelude to the granting of Independence in 1948, marked the 
final articulation of an explicit ideology of Arabic descent. An 
ideology which was legitimated by its enshrinement in Hansard in the 
context of pre-Independence British determination of new structures 
of access to political power. A determination which was moreover 
explicitly communalist. 29 It was within this historical context that 
rapidly shifting ethnic balance, has an added significance. 
29 A problem similar to that of the Moors arose for the Burgher 
community in this context of prevailing popular ideologies concerning 
"racial" descent. The British didn't recognize the internal 
distinctions between the Portuguese and Dutch Burghers and had 
reserved only one seat for a political representative of the Burgher 
community. This seat had invariably been held by a Burgher drawn from 
the "Dutch Burgher Civic elite of Colombo ' and Galle" 
(McGilvray, 1983: 246). With the proposed changes to the Legislative 
Council in the Constitutional Reforms of 1910 "ethnic representation 
(... ) would soon become a matter of democratic choice within 
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their current political position which is predominantly 
'opportunistic' (Mohan, 1987: 5&32) was created. Historically they were 
always a flexible community, subject to the vagaries of internecine 
disputes between the island's early Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms, 
peripherally involved and always seeking to trade. Their current 
position however derives from more than a simple economic pragmatism, 
born of an acute minority status in most electorates. What is more 
in evidence is a perception of themselves as a 'beleagured' 
community, always on the periphery. It is the condensation of this 
historical complexity into simple and forceful ideological statements 
which has been my concern. An exploration of the historical process 
of development of an ideology which in its current distillation 
asserts, that it is the place of origin of the religion, Arabia, 
which determines the origin of the people. 
3.4 A trading coniau ^ity. 
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka is consistently represented as a 
trading community. This is both a common perception of other 
religious groups and a representation of the community promulgated 
by the Muslims themselves. However most of the Muslims are not 
currently, nor have they ever been, traders. This therefore raises 
an immediate question concerning what is essentially, an 
ideology of 
trade. This ideology which presents the Muslims as traders and which 
continues to structure much of their political engagement in the 
island condenses a complex of ideas. The most immediate is that of 
the association of Islam with the 'Arab' traders who first brought 
the religion to the island. These traders plied the trade routes of 
the Indian Ocean for centuries and settled in colonies all along the 
western coasts of India and Ceylon(Forbes, l981: 66-67). Informants 
in Sri Lanka believe that these settlements were converted to Islam 
shortly after its rapid rise in the Middle East, but published 
historical sources are mute on this point. In spite of the paucity 
of research on this community, scholars have noted the 
importance of 
the Muslim community owing to the "dominant position they have 
officially demarcated (i. e. ethnically defined) electorates" 
(ibid: 247). This made it likely that the more numerous, lower class 
Portuguese Burghers would easily outvote the Dutch Burgher elite. As 
a result the Dutch Burghers lobbied extensively for a restricted 
electorate, claiming that they were the only true Burghers with a 
distinct "Northern European racial identity" which was traceable only 
through a direct male line of descent (ibid, op city. 
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traditionally held in trade and commerce" (Samaraweera, 1978: 466). 70 
This dominant position has waned considerably in recent times but the 
representation and perception of, the community as one of traders 
still persists. Historically this dominant role was restricted to a 
fraction within the community, chiefly those living in the commercial 
regions of the island's South-west coast, and to a lesser extent 
small enclaves at the major coastal ports of Puttalam and Mannar on 
the West coast, Trincomalee on the East coast, and Jaffna in the 
North. Another significant group were those living in the central 
highlands near Kandy, a site which gained particular importance 
during the Portuguese and Dutch colonial periods when the Kandyan 
Kingdom remained free of colonial control. In this context it 
continued to provide an area of free trade and became a place of 
refuge for the island's Muslims who were subject to particular 
harassment because their trading role was in direct conflict with 
colonial intentions. The largest concentrations of Muslims however 
are to be found in the agricultural regions of the Eastern Province 
and the greatest number of them are not traders but impoverished 
agriculturalists. 31 (In Amparai District they constitute 46.2% of the 
population, in Batticaloa 24.2% and in Trincomalee 24.2%, 1971 
Census, cited Mauroof 1990: 173)32 Even in the purely urban areas the 
majority of Muslims are poor and unemployed, and of those who are 
traders, most are engaged in petty trade (Mauroof, ibid: 176-77). 
10 See also Kulasuriya(1976: 150) and C. R. De Silva (1986: 152). 
31 A figure of 94g belonging to the farming community was cited 
by a prominent Muslim in the Daily News 2/2/85. 
32 Mohan (1985) argues that during the Portuguese period many 
Muslims were forced to flee from the South-west coast and among them 
at least 4000 fled to the Kandyan Kingdom and were settled in fertile 
lands around Batticaloa on the island's East coast (ibid: 17). Some 
informants state that the Muslims of the E. P. were traditionally 
traders before the colonial period and that they were reduced to 
farming. This cannot be argued to apply to more than a minority of 
E. P. Muslims, and other traditions support the view that many more 
Muslims simply moved, with their trade, away from ports under direct 
colonial control. In other cases Muslims sought to negotiate with the 
new colonial rulers. The bulk of the E. P. Muslim community are 
converted Hindus. Yalman (1971) recounts a myth of "seven wily Indian 
Muslims" who arrived to assist local rulers in battle and who later 
settled on the East coast, taking wives rather than land, since they 
knew that the women would bring land with them (ibid: 282-283, see 
also McGilvray 1982): What is significant about Mohan's argument 
however is that it is a further reflection of the "trading" ideology 
of the community , one which is here given a particular historical interpretation, that in part perhaps, seeks to deny a Hindu past. 
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This representation of the Sri Lankan Muslims as a trading community 
in a readily apparent contrast to the social reality has been 
questioned by Mauroof (1990,1980,1972) and Samaraweera (1979: 245). 
Mauroof is concerned to dispel. the myths and uncover the true 
economic position of the Muslims within the wider Indian and Sri 
Lankan region, arguing that 
labels and classifications ... tend to conceal rather than 
reveal the realities of the harsh and cruel objective 
conditions that Muslims have to find their survival in 
(1990: 167)33 
This is a problem inherent in the social situation in Sri Lanka where 
the widespread perception of the Muslims as a wealthy community 
(particularly by the Sinhalese in the South) rather than as a 
community which has a wealthy fraction within it, has considerable 
political implications. In the recent political context where 
economic issues have been subordinated to a struggle taking place on 
ethnic lines between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, such mis- 
perceptions are very powerful and potentially dangerous. 34 
Mauroof observes the prevalence of the association of Muslims with 
the occupation of trade citing a common Tamil proverb found in 
coastal and inland communities, amongst both merchants and peasants - 
"Sail the deep oceans if you have to and seek the wealth" 
(1990: 170). This association he argues, is an enduring consequence 
of the ancient Arab maritime link with the Muslim communities but 
33 Appreciation of. Mauroof's genuine concern for the plight of 
his countrymen must be tempered with the knowledge that these 
articles are published in the Journal Institute of Muslim Minority 
Affairs, established in Jeddah and with particular ideological 
concerns. His general comment "that in the urban areas (... ) the 
majority of Muslims are poor and unemployed" (ibid: 177) is not 
entirely in line with my observations nor as simple as he might 
suggest. His own view is perhaps a particularly urban one and 
certainly in Colombo there are huge Muslim slums in Maligawatte and 
Maradana (shared with other communities also). In the urban areas of 
Weligama for instance, where widespread unemployment did occur in 
both the Muslim and Sinhalese communities, it followed "caste" lines, 
an aspect not evident in his argument, perhaps for ideological 
reasons. 
34 In the research area, some informants expressed the view that 
when the Sinhalese had dealt with the Tamil "problem", then it would 
be their turn. It is possible that the Muslims here indicate that 
they implicitly recognize the logic of the Sinhalese Buddhist 
hierarchical state, in demonic encompassing mode, which as Kapferer 
(1988) has argued is a determining factor in the current ethnic 
struggle. Alternatively they may perceive the struggle in more simple 
communalist terms in which they as non-Sinhalese are interpreted as 
outsiders. 
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beyond noting that the idea of trade is influential in the community 
in "innumerable ways" (ibid, op cit) he does not extend our analysis 
at all. 
The representation of Muslims as traders has also been observed in 
the-South Indian context (Tamil Nadu) by Mines (1972). 35 All of the 
Muslim groups that he surveyed in the town of Pallavaram claimed 
. 
"merchant" as their primary occupation. Mines was primarily engaged 
in an exploration of 
the interrelationship that exists between the Muslim: Tamil s 
economic behaviour and their beliefs, values, aspirations and 
social structure(1972: 6). 
In short he sought to discover what, in this social world, it meant 
to be a merchant. He established a close link between Islamic 
religious values and the behaviour of Tamil Muslims as businessmen 
and posited a contrasting ethos between Tamilian Hindu and Muslim 
traders. Mines argued that 
a Hindu would seek satisfaction and fulfillment in a state 
bureaucratic career while a Muslim would seek the same in a 
business career (ibid: 62-65). 
In particular the Muslims felt that "conducting business is a sunnath 
(a custom of the Prophet's) and is, therefore, an occupation 
conveying religious merit (ibid: 83). The contrast in ethos reflects 
the different values which Hindus and Muslims hold and has possible 
implications for their future development possibilities. The Islamic 
ethos of the Muslims is argued to have an inhibiting effect on their 
move towards industrialisation. Their insistence upon individualism 
and equalitarian values leads them to reject the corporate activity 
necessary for industrialisation. Their business practices favour the 
employment of kin, rather than non-related but professional managers 
and technicians essential for development. 
Muslim Tamils are distrustful of purely contractual business 
relationships. They do not feel that the simplex nature of 
contractual bonds, based as they are solely on monetary ties, 
are sufficient to keep employees loyal and trustworthy 
(ibid: 110-11). 
In most cases when a young unrelated, male employee is taken on, he 
will be invited to live in his employers home as a member of the 
family while he learns the business. This relationship may then be 
cemented by a marriage to the employer's daughter. The Tamil Muslim 
35 "The Tamil Muslims are the offspring of Arab traders and 
local converts" (Mines, 1975: 405). 
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employee also will seek a position in which he retains his 
individuality, here expressed through his incorporation into the 
family of the merchant, in preference to a subordinate position in 
a larger hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation. This contrast 
in ethos borne of different underlying values is reflected in other 
aspects of social life as well. While Hindus (and Jains) aspire to 
educate their sons and have them enter high-prestige professions the 
Muslims are less interested in education and aspire to become 
successful merchants (ibid: 107). "Employment is viewed as the only 
training needed" (ibid: 110) .A further contrast exists in the fact 
that the Muslims are a highly mobile and urban population without 
rural roots and they would rather re-invest in their businesses than 
buy agricultural land, while the Hindus, whose status structure is 
still based on land ownership, would prefer to buy land which has a 
high economic and status value. Hindus are often more tied to a 
region because of their attachment to local deities and family gods, 
a factor which explains in part their lower mobility and the higher 
value they place on the land. The Tamil Muslims also are likely to 
have a more universalistic world view than the Hindus. This enables 
them to fit into "any social setting where they find their fellows 
and a mosque"(ibid: 98) and they achieve their status by virtue of 
their economic success, among their neighbours and kin. 
The contrast in ethos between Tamilian Hindu and Muslim merchants 
discussed by Mines bears some relation to a similar comparative 
contrast drawn by Muslims in the research area, between the business 
practices of their own community and those of the Tamil business 
community. In particular they refer to their own tendency to divert 
capital from a family business in the event of a son's marriage. 
Often a son who marries a Muslim woman in another town or village, 
is given funds to establish a new business of his own. In contrast, 
they see the Tamils as always consolidating a family business, with 
sons joining the firm, often in an initially subordinate position. 
Thus the pursuit of further educational, and often distinctly 
professional qualifications by a Tamil Hindu son (as an accountant, 
lawyer, etc) serves to continually increase the commercial expertise 
of the family business, and further, its commercial viability is not 
threatened by a continual generational drain on its accumulated and 
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available capital. 36 A similar pattern of views is evident in the 
respective communities' regard for education. In Sri Lanka as in 
Tamil Nadu the Hindus have always sought to pursue education whenever 
possible in order to acquire higher status, while the Muslim business 
community have argued 
that as trade in itself was a means of accumulation of wealth, 
which, in turn, led to ascendency in society, lack of 
education did not matter much (Mohan, 1985: 28). 
The contrast in business practices and attitudes to education is 
clear in both cultural contexts. In Sri Lanka however this reflects 
both a contrast in ethos and at a fundamental level, distinct 
marriage and residence practices. In Hindu families where post- 
marital residence is virilocal (apart from the East Coast), sons 
remain at home and are available for incorporation into a family 
business run on patrilineal lines. In Muslim families in Sri Lanka 
where all post-marital residence is matrilocal (in both the 
patrilineal communities of the South-west and the matrilineal 
communities of the East Coast), sons are constantly relocated in the 
homes, towns or villages of their wives. In Tamil Nadu both Tamilian 
Muslims and Hindus prefer to marry people from the same locality and 
both groups move with their families to take up employment if the 
need arises. (The non-Tamil Muslims in Pallavaram (Pathans and 
Moppilahs) are generally there alone having left their families in 
North India and Kerala respectively). Mines examines the link between 
Islamic religious values and the behaviour of Muslims as businessmen 
and finds that their behaviour is indeed a rational response to their 
business environment. Given their committment to egalitarian and 
individual working conditions, the structure of the bazaar credit 
system and their tendency to re-invest in business rather than 
diversify their capital, it is only the top traders who are in a 
position to risk the capital required for long term capital intensive 
industrial production. 
Mines' study is a broad application of the Weberian paradigm with a 
concern to avoid 'blanket statements' through detailed ethnographic 
work. A greater focus on ethos however would have been in order. The 
religious value of 'equalitarianism' and the regular participation 
in egalitarian religious practice are given considerable weight in 
36 My information in this regard is limited, particularly with 
relation to the Tamil community, but at a purely observational level 
within the research area these statements appear to be supported for 
the middle and upper income groups. 
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his analysis as factors which structure Muslim economic behaviour. 
The dis-proportionate numbers of Muslims who are merchants (rather 
than bureaucrats for example) is linked to the value Muslims place 
on egalitarianism - prefering to work either as individuals or for 
other Muslims thus avoiding the hierarchical structure of a Tamil 
Hindu firm. But beyond acknowledging that trading is a valued 
activity because the Prophet was a merchant, mines does not examine 
the meaning of being a trader in religious terms. Despite his care 
he actually assumes an economic 'rationality' untempered by the 
religious value of representing oneself as a trader. 
Were we to consider the value placed by the Muslim community on 
trading as opposed to alternative pursuits, then it is indeed the 
case that Sri Lankan Muslims as do the Muslim merchants Mines 
observed, express a definite interest in the pursuit of trade. In the 
Sri Lankan context I would argue that it is clearly important to 
represent oneself as a trader. " The link between Muslims and trade 
and the stereotype of Muslims as traders in Sri Lanka however is an 
ideological one, not to be reduced to ethos (Mines) or a 
representation which belies sociological facts (Mauroof) . The 
ideology of Muslims as traders is borne of particular historical 
circumstances which lead Muslims to find an explicitly religious 
value in the activity of trade, and which render the merchant himself 
a religious figure. The significance of trade is not simply to be 
found in a religious value attached to its practice - to trade is 
sunnath because the Prophet was a merchant, but more significantly 
because to be a merchant establishes a direct historical link to the 
traders of Arabia who brought Islam to Ceylon. This historical 
dimension is missing entirely from Mines' argument, yet I am 
convinced that the argument applies there also. 38 He notes that those 
" One informant, with a university degree and employed in the 
teaching profession explained that this activity was not entirely 
legitimate and he felt he had to pursue and develop some interest in 
. 
business as well. As a general rule it seemed that wherever possible 
the men of a family would attempt to engage in petty trade in 
addition to other occupations. See Appendix C for a detailed 
discussion of the Muslim dominance of trade in the research area. 
38 Forbes (1981: 55-92) also ignores aspects of the historical 
argument. He details the extensive historical links between Southern 
Arabia and the Laccadive and Maldive religious communities with 
particular reference to the early introduction of the Shafi madhhab. 
The symbolic significance however, of Arab legitimacy in the 
genealogical links between the Laccadive Thangal (Seyyed) families 
and Hadramaut eludes him entirely. 
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Non-Tamil Muslim groups (Pathans and Moppilahs) who claim a slightly 
longer Islamic ancestry, are ranked higher, but that this ranking 
does not perceptibly affect interaction(ibid: 26). It does however 
suggest a shared set of values in which percieved connections to the 
Middle East are critical. 
As I have suggested, a great deal of the significance of the value 
of trade is historically located in the arrival of Islam in Ceylon 
with Arab traders. This gives trade an originaxy significance in this 
context. Traders are pure Muslims. There is an ideology of 
particularly Arab traders, in which both Arab origins and trading 
itself, have great and current significance. This significance 
although undoubtedly part and parcel of Islamic practice on the 
island, particularly in those coastal trading communities, gained new 
meaning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was 
during this period under British rule that this ideology of Muslims 
as the descendants of Arab traders was explicitly engaged by the 
Muslim community in the pursuit of essentially class interests. The 
employment of this particular ideology, and a re-interpretation of 
Muslim history on the island, elevated and gave new meaning to the 
role of the Arab trader, a meaning which was increasingly sedimented 
during the period of what Roberts (1982) has called - national elite 
formation. This period of transformation within the island saw for 
the first time, the construction of national rather than local, 
elites. This transformation paved the way, within the Muslim 
community for the establishment of hegemonic domination by the 
Muslim elite. Their dominance was in the first instance economic but 
more importantly was now legitimated by the enshrinement in a new 
form, of a particular religious interpretation of the significance, 
and by extension rightful dominance, of Arab traders and their 
descendants. This ideology has always served the interests of the 
dominant fraction within the Muslim community, those on the South- 
west coast. There is a particular hegemonic structure in which they, 
with undisputed Arab trading traditions stand in dominant relation 
to predominantly agricultural East coast Muslim communities. 
This process, a construction or sedimentation of a symbolic history 
which reveals a complex religious ordering of the links between 
'race', wealth and faith, undertaken in the context of revival 
movements in Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim communities is discussed 
further below. Yet here we should consider the link between wealth 
and faith in Islamic religious ideology. This is a favourite 
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consideration of many of the Weber inspired studies, though 
discussion around these two powerfully linked ideas has often been 
limited to considerations of ethos, taken as a universally 
applicable, unexplained analytical blending of the two. 39 Clammer 
(1978) has roundly criticised any attempt to continue the assertion 
that Weber's project was to assert a unidirectional causal link 
between religious ideology on the one hand and the development of 
capitalism on the other. Rather it has been argued that Weber saw 
European capitalism as an historical category and not a universally 
applicable analytic construct. Weber's interest was in determining 
the uniqueness of European capitalism in contrast to the development 
or non-development of capitalism elsewhere. 
Nonetheless these studies have also been more concerned with clearing 
up the mis-reading of Weber and asserting the possibility of 
indigenous Asian capitalist development, than with the discovery of 
internal ideologies. 40 This remains to be taken up. One more 
productive and initial step towards overcoming the positivist cast 
of prior analysis would be to take into account the way in which 
wealth and faith stand in symbolic relation in this particular Muslim 
community, rather than to search for the degree of correlation 
between the production of wealth (in contrast to its meaning) and the 
ideology of faith (in contrast to the domains of its practice). 
To anticipate my conclusion there is, in the Sri Lankan context a 
definite link between the production of wealth by a trader and what 
it means to profess the faith of Islam. There are a number of levels 
to this conception. One of the most important is the explicit link 
with Arab traders and the Middle East and the arrival of Islam. 
Another which develops from this is the direct blood link claimed by 
traders who reflect in their trading traditions, their patrilineal 
(religious and 'racial') links with the Middle East. Another level 
concerns the general understanding that wealth is open to 
interpretation as the rewards of an active faith, in itself a further 
legitimating factor. Muslims in the research area state that 
being a Muslim (their ethos) involves preparing for this world 
as if you would live forever and preparing for the afterlife 
as if you would die tomorrow. 
39 Johns (1975) insists on the uncertainty of what one may or can 
mean by "Islam". 
40 Mines (1972) for example. 
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Thus the pursuit of worldly wealth, and the ability to responsibly 
provide for your family and the poor are endorsed as religious modes 
of being. Worldly wealth may therefore be interpreted as a sign of 
grace. There is however a certain ambiguity in the possession of 
great wealth. It does not guarantee the automatic respect of the 
Muslim community, through an appreciation of this sign of grace. 
Rather it places the individual firmly in the public eye and subject 
to harsh critique with regard to the discharge of his 'Islamic duty' 
to provide for the poor in particular, and the community in general. 
The wealthy Muslim in my observation was extremely rigorous in his 
observance of this duty; a rigour which increased along with 
increasing wealth. 41 This tendency marks a further point of contrast 
in the ethos of Hindu and Muslim as Buss (1985) argues following 
Weber. It would not have occurred to a Hindu 
to see in the success of his economic professional integrity 
the signs of his state of grace or - what is more important - 
to evaluate and to undertake the rational reconstitution of 
the world according to objective principles as a realisation 
of God's will (Weber, 1921: 360, Buss translation). 
Both Mines in Tamil Nadu and Mauroof in Sri Lanka have noted the 
"windfall circumstances" by which investment capital is expected to 
be generated. Mauroof argues that the fascination of the gem business 
derives from the stories current in the country of some 
individual or the other striking it rich quickly because of 
the accidental find of a rare stone(ibid: 177). 
This sudden accumulation of wealth through hard work and some 
"unusual circumstance" is found in other businesses too (ibid, op 
cit) . He also argues that the recent growth of "inept bureaucracies" 
has further increased this view. 
(S)ince favours from politicians for a quota or an export 
licence are more fortuitous and frivolous that predictable and 
systematic, i. e. seemingly magical, the windfall pattern that 
suddenly makes millionaires out of peddlars seems to persist 
(ibid, op cit, my emphasis). 
This magical quality is also open to interpretation as miraculous and 
the resulting wealth as a gift of God. 42 Wealthy gem traders in 
41 See also Mauroof (1972). 
42 Mauroof elsewhere (1972: 69) uses the "gem trader" as one of 
three ideal types in the Muslim trading community. The other two are 
the urban entrepreneur and the village boutique keeper. The gem 
trader however is one whose wealth is perceived as sacred, a notion 
which is extended in their use of secret gestures "to sign deals and 
quote prices" (ibid, op cit) . He argues that "the wealth that gem traders deal in comes from within the soil and is retrieved, 
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particular, may concievably be regarded as truly blessed, with their 
wealth signing their faith. 
Rodinson (1974) who takes a wider definition of capitalism than that 
of many other Marxists and sees it as any kind of entrepreneurial 
activity carried out on a systematic basis, argues "that the 
influence of Islam on socio-economic development is minimal" (cited 
Clammer, 1978: 5). There is nothing inherent in the Qur'an or the 
Sunnath which can be interpreted as inhibiting the development of 
capitalism, which was as Clammer points out, not neccessarily the way 
it was interpreted in South East Asia (ibid, op cit). Further he 
argues that the forms of embryonic capitalism found in the mediaeval 
Muslim world were of a similar type to those of Europe. Despite all 
subsequent differences in the socio-economic development of the two 
regions - Islam itself cannot be isolated as the factor for the 
inhibition of capitalism or modernisation (ibid, op cit) . Rodinson's 
argument is explicitly concerned with the (economic) rationality of 
the belief system and he fails to embed this in the cultures of the 
Middle East. Weber did not write simply of the rationality of 
religious beliefs themseves, but about the complex levels of 
sociological, practical and ideological implications that those 
beliefs have in relation to their attendant cultures (ibid, op cit, 
my emphasis) . My concern 
is not to argue for or against the relevance 
of the Islamic doctrines or local interpretations as to their effect 
in initiating, facilitating or retarding capitalist development. My 
point is that contra Rodinson (1974) the influence of Islam in the 
Sri Lankan context, although not substantially integral to the 
development of capitalism per se, is nonetheless employed in the 
processed and handled in a manner that stands in stark contrast to 
the ways in which the ordinary peasant derives his wealth by tilling 
the soil"(ibid, op cit). I agree with this point entirely but would 
argue that there is a further symbolic significance to the gem trader 
which he has missed. Gem trading in Sri Lanka seems to have been 
traditionally a Muslim occupation (Mohan, 1987: 16) although the recent 
government establishment of the Ceylon Gem Corporation has introduced 
large numbers of Sinhalese gem brokers into the business. The 
island's gems were one of the initial items of trade for the Arabs 
and I note that Adam's Peak in the Ratnapura district lies at the 
head of the Manik Ganga (Gem River) that rises here in the highlands 
and runs to Kataragama by the coast in the South-East. (Both are 
major pilgrimage sites for Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims in the 
island) . Thus gem trading has both historical associations with 
Arab 
traders and also arguably draws some significance from the originaxy 
status of Adam's Peak. A further point which should be noted is that 
it was the gem industry that "formed the principal foundation for the 
emergence of the Muslim elite" (Mohan, ibid op cit). 
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establishment of economic and spiritual hegemony. This hegemony is 
based upon the Arab trader as an ideal type, which through a 
particular cultural construction of history and religion has become 
a figure imbued with a religious value. This value is shared 
throughout the community and is exploited by those who are 
economically dominant in extending their dominance. Local religious 
ideology is employed in the service of class interests. This 
ideological link has its historical base in the early Islamic trading 
communities and a general view that Muslims were traders and it 
recti ved new emphasis in the late British period during the cultural 
revivals of the Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim communities. In short, 
there is within Sri Lanka, an ideology of particularly Arab traders, 
in which both Arab origins and trading itself, have great, and 
current, significance. 
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SECTION TWO : 
RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY 
AND 
CALENDRICAL PRACTICE. 
Chapter Four : 
Saint's Shrines: Islamic Presence - Islamic Practice 
I have discussed this particular Muslim community in terms of its 
historical, political and socio-cultural context. I have argued that 
religion has been a critical element of ethnic and political 
identity, and further a critical element in the assertion of 
political power. In this section I wish to address this Muslim 
community in terms of its relations to the wider Islamic world, 
through an examination of its religious and ritual practice. While 
this community shares much in common with the Islamic world in broad 
ideological terms, its' historical particularity shapes a significant 
part of its' religious practice and ideological interpretation. 
Following Geertz (ibid) who argued strongly for the distinction 
observed in practices emergent from different cultural contexts, I 
focus here on the particularities of this Islamic community as a 
preliminary step in analysis. There are different "Islams" (Eickelman 
1982, Geertz ibid) and anthropological comparison cannot be 
undertaken unproblematically. Islamic practices in distinct cultural 
and historical contexts, may appear similar 
but we must 
initially compare the ideologies in which such practices are embedded 
(Dumont 1960). 
In this second section of the thesis, I explore Islamic ideology and 
ritual practice among Muslims in Weligama, with a view to asserting 
their interpretations of egalitarian religious practice. I examine 
Islamic ideology as it is revealed in the practices surrounding the 
shrines of the saints, and contrast it with differing ideologies in 
the South Asian region and with analyses of shrine practices in 
Morocco. I discuss Islamic ideology as it is revealed in the rituals 
associated with the mosques and examine their articulation with the 
domestic order. Finally I explore the ideology evident in the 
calendrical rituals surrounding Ramazan and the Hajj pilgrimage. This 
leads to a discussion of the particular relation of gender and 
cosmology and the meaning of the marriage ritual in this cultural 
context. By focussing on ritual practice I take ritual as a cultural 
hermeneutic and elicit the potentially wider meanings of ritual in 
cultural practice. By observing the operation of an egalitarian 
ideology employed in this particular cultural context we may begin 
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to understand both, what egalitarian ideology overcomes, and how this 
movement is achieved in ritual. 
I argue that the individual in Islam, understood as an ideological 
value (Dumont: ibid) is, created through the rituals of Islam itself. 
Calendrical Islamic rituals culminating in the Hajj pilgrimage essay 
an argument, which in liminal practice, strips the historically 
distinct, culturally embedded individual of all elements of a given 
social and historical identity. Taken as a ritual complex, 
calendrical ritual may be seen to operate against status, kinship 
networks, social context, history, time and finally gender, creating 
the Islamic individual and ultimately the universal Muslim 
collectivity that is the ummah. There is a logic of inclusion within 
Islamic ritual practice that actually recognizes vast distinction at 
the periphery and which legitimates all points of difference on a 
periphery-centre continuum. In the discussion of the calendrical 
ritual this point will become much clearer as we examine this logic 
which becomes ritually operative between Ramazan and the Hajj. The 
Hajj can be argued to be the ultimate point of inclusion when 
individuals are granted their greatest degree of substantiation and 
even gender differences are denied/overcome. The very practice of the 
Hajj pilgrimage recognizes cultural and historical distinction and 
reveals the means by which those distinctions are ritually negated. 
This is the level at which we should begin to determine what is 
universal in Islam - in the contents of its own arguments, essayed 
in ritual structure and enlivened by culturally embedded actors. The 
calendrical complex is the argument of the universality of Islam. 
' 
4.1 Saint's Shrines - Orthodox or Popular Islam 
The material on Sri Lankan Muslim saints calls into question previous 
assumptions that the ideologies behind a common Muslim practice - 
'saint worship', although emergent from the one Islamic ideology, are 
in fact identical. ' Part of the problem is that Islamic ideology has 
1 The Hajj pilgrimage is the pre-eminent ritual of a universal 
Islam and it is surprising that so little analytic attention has been 
paid to it. Previous studies have tended to treat the 
hajj "as a 
means of confirming social status or as a religious rite 
de passage 
it (Eickelman, 1982: 11), and/or "a ritual of affliction" (Roff, 
1984: 239-40). 
2 Currie (1989) points out that "scholars have tended to use the 
word 'saint' to translate a plurality of Arabic, Persian and Urdu 
terms. By rendering wali, murshid, shakyh, darvish, sufi, pir or 
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generally been taken for granted as a given set of practices and 
consequently a common set of interpretations has been assumed to lie 
behind them. To some extent this is true and much universal 
interpretation may be found. However to assume their identical 
meaning from the outset, denies both historical particularity and the 
tension which is the dynamic behind much current Islamic 'reform'. ' 
This reform takes very distinct forms throughout the Islamic world, 
but in all cases, endeavours to overcome the perceived gaps between 
what are (locally) held to be the orthodox understandings behind 
prescribed practices, and local culturally and historically generated 
interpretations. The tension behind reform reflects a constant 
dynamic within Islam which is universally appreciated by Muslims 
themselves. A crucial and a fundamental step in any ethnographic 
analysis, must be to recognise it and explore it. ' 
Islam in all cultural contexts presents a set of contradictions 
between the ideal and the real; the ideal Islamic society of the 
Qur'an and the everyday cultural reality. The dichotomies routinely 
drawn by anthropologists in relation to particular Islamic 
communities; orthodox/popular, scriptural/folk, are an initial 
recognition of a tension internal to communities, but less often of 
the fact that this tension is recognised by and often of fundamental 
marabout as 'saint' the reader is led to believe that he is dealing 
with a single category. This obscures the considerable diversity 
which underlies these terms" (ibid: l). Turner makes a similar point. 
"When Western anthropologists talk about Islamic saints, they use the 
term as a shorthand for a diversity of social roles" 
(Turner, 1974: 61). 
3 Reform as I use it here, implies only a common process, but 
in no sense, a taken for granted, common structure to that process. 
It follows therefore that Islamisation may also only be taken to 
indicate movement towards what is locally (not universally) held to 
be orthodox, universal Islam. I do not deny any evidence, or 
increasing likelihood, that these movements may come to be similarly 
motivated as various Islamic states take advantage of increasing 
print opportunities to promote distinct ideologies of the correct 
'universal' Islam. There was a Libyan funded local newspaper in the 
research area for instance, but this had not had any success. 
°A fundamental recognition of the acceptance of debate and 
interpretation (although limited) within Islam may be drawn from 
Mecca. The four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence (madhhab) are 
incorporated symbolically and ideologically at the heart of Islam 
itself. Surrounding the Ka'bah, within the Holy mosque at Mecca, are 
the pulpits (minbars) of each madhhab, where the leaders of each 
school may represent their ideological positions to the Muslim 
collectivity during the hajj. 
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concern, to those communities. 5 Eickelman states that in Morocco 
there is 
an inherent tension between formal ideological tenets 
propagated and accepted by an educated, religious elite and, 
coexisting with them, an implicit ideology of religion as 
locally practiced and understood (1977: 5). 
The religious practices of the subordinate classes are frequently 
considered un-Islamic by the elite but "are taken for granted as 
authentic expressions" of their religious traditions by the people 
themselves (ibid: op cit). By formulating the dichotomy as between 
"orthodox" Islam on the one hand, and "popular" practice on the 
other, the tension inherent in Islam itself (or Islam in practice) 
is denied, by classifying "popular" practice as outside it. In this 
schema Islamisation or reform of folk practices may only be argued 
to be a movement to Islam, rather than a movement within it. On the 
whole however, the "orthodox" schema is assumed (and assumed to be 
universal), rather than examined, and "popular" folk practices are 
discounted as aberrations. It is an analytic practice, which, from 
the outset, rends the fabric of the cultural world, and denies the 
apperception of that world as a totality, by those who live it. 
Further, this analytical glossing denies much that is of particular 
interest; the particular context of internal Islamic debates, and the 
ways in which Muslims interpret and work with these tensions 
ideologically, in their efforts towards reform. 
4.2 Windows to Heaven - Understanding Shrine practice. 
Saints shrines are a common phenomenon throughout the Muslim world. 
Equally common has been their classification by anthropologists as 
features of a "popular" as opposed to an "orthodox" Islam (Von 
Grunebaum, 1988, Spooner, 1963, Gellner, 1972, Fernea & Fernea, 1972, 
Eickelman, 1976,1977, Marx, 1977, Peters, 1990, Currie, 1992, Jones, 1979, 
Lewis, 1980, Dwyer,, 1982, Waardenburg, 1978,1979,1985, Goldziher, 1977 
Saiyed, 1989, ) .6 
5 Gellner reported a "permanent, if sometimes latent, tension 
and opposition between two styles of religious life" (1981: 159). 
6 The dichotomy is here glossed as "orthodox/popular", although 
it has been formulated slightly differently by some scholars. 
Waardenberg has moved from an "official/popular" classification 
(1978,1979) to that of "mystical/normative" (1985) . Dwyer contrasts 
"mystical" and "orthodox" and Spooner (1963) distinguishes between 
"mosque" and "shrine" religions (characterised by ideologies of 
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This position appears to be derived from the greater focus given to 
shrine practice rather than to shrine ideology. Shrine practice or 
"worship" has been viewed primarily as intercessionary activity in 
which Muslims seek boons from the entombed saint. The tomb itself, 
in these cases is regarded as a "source of miraculous power" 
(Lawrence 1984: 121). This implies a tacit polytheistic influence in 
a religious community that purports to be entirely monotheistic. It 
is this contradiction which underlies the Western analytical decision 
to class these practices as popular, in opposition to orthodox. This 
is evidence of a comparative method which fails to account for 
cultural and historical particularity. ' The shrines in the Sri Lankan 
context may not be regarded as simply intercessionary. Neither 
shrine practice nor shrine ideology in Sri Lanka may be 
satisfactorily discussed within the "intercessionary" framework, and 
indeed both present a thorough challenge to it. I describe the basis 
behind Sri Lankan shrine practice, Sri Lankan shrine myths, shrine 
ideology in practice and finally I compare the Sri Lankan myths to 
others in the region. 
The locations of saint's shrines on the island mirror the 
distribution of the Muslim community and there are over one thousand 
shrines throughout the island. ' In sharp contrast to the 
equality and hierarchy). Gellner classes the dichotomy as 
"legalistic/mystic"(1981: 115), and as "mystical" and "formal" 
alternatives, within the urban context, with "mystical" serving as 
the surrogate for "formal" Islam in the rural environs (1972: 8). 
Lewis points out that " the Qur'an itself provides scriptural 
warrant for the existence of a host of subsidiary powers and spirits 
(ibid: 60). 
8 The 1975 list of Mosques, Shrines, Places of religious Worship 
and Muslim Charitable Trusts gives the following numbers by District. 
I have included only Mosques, shrines and Takia's. A total figure of 
1219. 
Anuradhapura 77 
Batticaloa 144 
Galle 44 
Jaffna 24 
Kandy 131 
Kurenagala 119 
Matale 34 
Nuwara Eliya 18 
Polunnaruwa 26 
Ratnapura 24 
Vavuniya 15 
Badulla 42 
Colombo 107 
Hambantota 12 
Kalutara 63 
Kegalle 63 
Mannar 49 
Matara 28 
Moneragala 12 
Puttalam 94 
Trincomalee 88 
(Borah mosques) 5 
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'folk/orthodox' distinctions revealed in other ethnographies, the 
shrines here are almost always located adjacent to a mosque, often 
under the same roof, although clearly distinct in both area and 
character. In many cases the shrine has come first. The location of 
shrines as almost invariably joined to a mosque is highly significant 
and reflects at the ideological level, the position of the shrine in 
relation to the mosque. There is no greater statement of the orthodox 
position of shrines within Islamic practices and understandings on 
the island. The shrines stand at the heart of orthodox Islam on the 
island, and shrine practice continually engages an ideology which 
reasserts the position of the island as integral to an Arabic 
cosmology. 
The shrine generally contains at least one large oblong tomb 
ziyarram, which stands directly above the actual grave of the saint. 
It is a marker and not a container. ' The ziyarram is invariably 
painted green and covered with a number of predominantly green cloths 
which have been donated as gifts to the saint. 10 Many shrines have a 
separate entrance direct from the outside as well as one which leads 
from the interior of the mosque. This outside entrance is essential 
if women are to worship freely at the shrines. The women are not 
permitted to enter or pray within the Karam (sacred) area of the 
mosque itself, and at most shrines their visits are normally subdued, 
and in very small numbers. There, are however significant exceptions 
to which I will refer below. 
Muslim Mosques and Charitable Trusts or Wakfs (Amendment) Act No. 33 
of 1982. supplement to Pt II of Gazette of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka of September 24,1982. Colombo, Government 
Publications Bureau. 
9 In some shrines there are also one or two other tombs of the 
disciples of the saint. In these cases the other tombs are smaller 
and placed to one side. 
10 Green is understood to be the colour of death and the 
afterlife, a powerful symbol of death and rebirth. As I will argue 
below it should be understood as the colour of transcendence or 
"living death". At the Porwai (Poruwa) Feast in Godepitya one of the 
Bawas (Sufis) from the East coast stated that the bolts of green 
cloth which were on sale there could be made into shirts by Bawas but 
could only be used by other Muslims to cover tombs. The Bawas undergo 
an initiation rite which is essentially a burial and when they do 
die no further rites are required (see also McGilvray, l974). 
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Initially I explore the understandings behind shrine practice through 
an exploration of the ideology of death as reflected in the 
community's burial rituals. The meaning of the shrine and the power 
of the entombed saint in this cultural context are located in wider 
Islamic understandings concerning the nature of the Muslim 
individual, and the individual experience of death. The fact that 
death is universal is significant in a religious (as well as a 
social) sense. The religious requirements at birth and death in local 
Muslim communities are both simple and widely observed. Thus the 
high points of. embedded individual life experience - entering and 
leaving the cultural world are ritualized in an entirely Islamic 
form. These rituals provide a critical condensation of the religious 
arguments about what it is to be a Muslim and therefore may be seen 
as ontological. In this community the rituals are generally accepted 
to be performed entirely in accordance with "orthodox" Islamic 
practice, with no "cultural" component. " 
The Burial Rituals. 
When a Muslim dies the preparation of the body and the burial of the 
corpse should proceed very quickly. In most cases the body is buried 
within eight to twelve hours, although on occasion, the burial may 
be delayed a little in order to await the arrival of a son or father 
from elsewhere in the island. 12 The corpse is ritually washed 
(kulappaaduthal) by a male or female member of the Ande caste and 
then wrapped in the burial cloth - kafan. 13 The ritual washing of the 
11 See Bowen (1984) for a contrasting argument concerning death 
rituals among the Gayo. 
12 A high percentage of the younger Muslim men work elsewhere in 
the island and a significant number of the adult men. Bus travel is 
constant, as is the bus service. 
13 The kulippaaddupavar (corpse washers) in the research area 
are these days all members of the ands caste. Formerly this task was 
the province of the Osta (barber caste), but they have given it up 
because they say, "the financial rewards are insufficient". Generally 
the washers work in male or female pairs, and the complete washing 
takes two hours. They are called by the household as soon as someone 
has died, and they wash the body immediately. The burial cloths and 
all the towels for drying the body are provided by the funeral 
household. The body is washed successively with soap, water, sea- 
water and rose-water. After this, the complete ablutions required to 
ensure bodily purity for prayer, are performed with pure well-water. 
The body is then wrapped in seven cloths; three saddai, one thoppi, 
one muhamoodi, one pavadai, and the kafan. If the deceased is a 
woman a further seven cloths are used to cover the vulva. The payment 
for this duty ranges from fifty to one hundred Rupees and payment is 
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corpse is a highly elaborated form of the purificatory ablutions 
performed by Muslims before prayer. The body of the deceased is 
therefore, moved into a state of ritual purity and this pure state 
is maintained by the sealing of the orifices and the wrapping of the 
body in the other cloths, before it is sealed in the kafan. After the 
family gather in the house and say prayers on behalf of the deceased, 
the shrouded body is placed in the sundugl` which has been brought 
from the local mosque. News of the death travels quickly and the 
local men gather at the house in order to escort the body to the 
mosque for final prayers. This crowd is not restricted to the kin 
group of the deceased, or merely reflective of their wider social 
network. Rather it engages all the local men who are able to 
participate. Escorting a Muslim corpse to the mosque, and praying for 
the salvation of a soul, are responsibilities of the entire male 
Muslim community and not at all dependent on personal relation. This 
procession should proceed quickly, and any Muslims who see a burial 
procession, should join it. The practice is sunnah (recommended). 
Women are excluded from all the public burial rites and remain at 
home. 15 The sunduq is placed in the mosque for communal prayers, but 
made on the day of the feast following the funeral, when prayers are 
offered on behalf of the deceased. Sometimes the washers are given 
gifts of cloth and if the deceased was from their own village 
Maduragoda, then food from the funeral feast house will be sent to 
them also. 
The male kulippaaddupuvar also dig all the graves and supply the 
planks of wood which are used to cover the top of the body to protect 
it from the earth. One informant from this group stated that 
previously all graves were uniformly dug to a depth of five feet, but 
after a woman's body once "rose from the grave", the Moulavis advised 
that women should, from then on, be buried at a depth of six feet. 
This is in accordance with a general cultural view among Sinhalese 
Buddhists and local Muslims, that women are more prone to 
cosmological dangers. The graves for babies are dug in the normal 
manner and then a small hole is hollowed out on one side at the 
bottom of the grave and the baby is secreted there. Some Muslims 
believe that the Sinhalese will steal the babies skulls for use in 
exorcism rituals (see Kapferer 1983). 
14 This is a silver coloured coffin-like container on long poles, 
that is carried on the shoulders of men. 
15 The exclusion of women at this point stresses the fact that 
this is a male, communal religious activity and is not simply an 
effect of the purdah requirements. Undoubtedly however it also serves 
to emphasize the exclusion of women on the grounds of their 
cosmological weakness. In one household, when a Muslim had died in 
the house next door, the women and children of a large extended 
household moved their sleeping quarters to the front of their 
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the body is removed before being interred in the burial ground next 
to the mosque . 
16 The body is buried in the kafan alone, placed on its 
right side facing Mecca, with the kafan pulled back to uncover the 
face slightly, to allow the cheek to be in direct contact with the 
earth. 
Once the body is interred it is understood that an angel immediately 
comes to question the individual about their life on earth and 
whether or not their actions were exemplary. '' The soul itself must 
remain in the grave until the final Day of Judgement, when eternal 
rewards or punishments are determined. However if an individual has 
led a perfect life, filled with prayer and good deeds, then the angel 
provides a "window to Heaven", in order that they may see, though not 
yet participate in its glories. This belief in a state of 
consciousness after death does not imply however, any continuing 
relationship between the soul of the deceased and those remaining in 
the phenomenal world. Death has a finality about it more marked among 
these Muslims than many other cultures. Long periods of grief are not 
recommended even for the closest relatives. Death is not considered 
a matter for continued grief, rather people are exhorted to direct 
their attention towards prayers on behalf of the soul. This communal 
acceptance of an individual's demise as complete "social death" is 
reflected in the structure of the burial itself. The body is intended 
to decompose very quickly, unimpeded by a coffin, and the graves 
themselves are designed to disappear within a relatively short period 
of time, leaving no mark upon the earth at all. The grave is marked 
with two simply carved, wooden boards (mizan) , placed at the head and 
foot of the grave. The boards are painted with prayers and have no 
personal names on them. The mizan are symbolic of the scales of 
sister's adjacent house, to avoid any possibility of contact with 
shaitans (devils or spirits) attracted by their neighbour's death. 
16 This is the only occasion on which the body of a woman will 
enter the Karam of the mosque. This state of ritual purity in which 
all her orifices are sealed, permits no further breaking of 
boundaries to disrupt the pure state. Also at this point there can 
be no possible sexual attraction engendered between this female and 
those unrelated males at prayer, the reason behind the ruling that 
men and women should never pray together. 
17 Gaborieau notes that among Muslims in Nepal and North India 
"as soon as the grave is filled up, all the men go back forty paces 
and recite another prayer, for they believe that, at that precise 
moment, the two angels Munkar and Nakir come to punish the deceased 
in the tomb"(1984: 246). 
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justice, and the deceased lies between them, facing an individual 
judgement, prior to Judgement Day. In the context of the grave the 
mizan symbolically represent the state and fate of the Muslim 
individual. " 
The burial practices taken as a whole, clearly demonstrate that death 
should be a ccnlete social death, to the point that even the grave 
itself is designed to disappear. Further, burial is a process which 
should proceed with speed, without excessive expressions of grief, 
and ultimately should be regarded as a birth, into the afterlife. 19 
One should be completely dead to this world, and not the centre of 
any cult of remembrance or of personal aggrandizement. Following 
this logic it could appear that the grand shrines of saints stand in 
marked contradiction but in the terms of the ideology outlined above 
concerning "windows to heaven", the tomb should rather be seen as 
marking a sacred space and not a personal prestige. 20 
The tomb of any acknowledged saint, is most definitely understood to 
have this corridor of access, to mark a space where the veil between 
Heaven and Earth has been withdrawn, and is therefore in a very real 
"" The mizan (lit. "the balance scale") are "the Koran's symbol 
of harmony in creation and of cosmic equilibrium, and also of 
eschatological justice and retribution for deeds in this life" 
(Glasse, 1989: 271). 
19 The feasts and celebrations held for the saints on an annual 
basis, throughout the Islamic world, the "death anniversary 
celebrations" (Lawrence ibid, op cit), or "Urs" (Tirmizi, 1992: 59), 
arguably celebrate these "deaths" as points of transcendence. I 
suggest that death is in fact more significant generally for Muslims, 
a point which is consistent with an orientation towards an 
everlasting life. Within the research community actual birthdays are 
of little significance and are not ritualized or celebrated in any 
form, even for children. However, remembering the dead on an annual 
basis (not only saints but also kindred) is relatively common. 
20 There are Muslims who mark the graves of their loved ones, 
with far more permanent memorials than the wooden mizan referred to 
above. (In the research area these amounted to around 3's. ) These 
graves were in most cases, those of the wealthier members of the 
community, who had during their lifetimes, patronised the mosques and 
provided well for the community. Thus in most peoples eyes they had 
attained a certain religious prestige. These tombs could in future 
become the sites for new miracles and thus potential shrines. In a 
truly egalitarian ideology - all may become saints. In Morocco informants reported that "it takes more than the construction of a 
shrine to make a marabout, but all shrines are regarded nonetheless 
as those of marabouts" (Eickelman 1976: 103). 
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and immediate sense, a sacred space. Thus the rationale behind 
attendance at a shrine is generated from an understanding of what a 
shrine is, rather than simply what or who, the saint is. The shrines 
are pre-eminently spaces, rather than people. Shrines sacrify spaces 
and make them closer to Heaven. It is within the context of this" 
ideology, that shrine practice and "shrine worship" should be 
interpreted. It is clear that the idea of intercession is not 
entirely applicable here. 21 
4.3 The Problem of "Intercession" 
Much of the discussion surrounding the practice of shrine visits 
implies a contradiction. The apparent worship of a saint in order to 
seek supernatural assistance leaves analysts uneasy in a religion 
which claims only one God. The idea of intercession, left unexamined, 
implies a tendency towards polytheism, a quasi-deification of the 
saint in which he comes to stand between the worlds of man and God. 
Crapanzano (1973: 170) notes that the pilgrim in Morocco goes to the 
shrine of the saint in order to ask the saint to intercede with God 
for him, to help him to obtain something. Eickelman (1977) also lays 
stress on the intermediary argument but relates this to a 
"patron-client" understanding, generated out of the Moroccan social 
order and applied in the religious sphere. He argues that 
the strength of maraboutism (saint worship) rests on the 
implicit assumption that relations between men and God work 
just like all other social ties (ibid: 7). 
As one of his informants related 
God, like a minister or the King is too powerful to be 
approached directly, so the client works through a marabout 
who is "close " both to him and to God (loc cit). 
To apply these arguments on the. intercessionary character of the 
purpose of visits to a shrine to the Sri Lankan practices would, 
reduce our understanding of the phenomenon to a purely functionalist 
one. It would deny the complexity of understanding that structures 
21 There are of course, many Sri Lankan Muslims who go to a 
shrine to ask for help from the saint. This understanding of the 
practice is disparaged by others on the same grounds as those applied 
by Western analysts, that of "tacit polytheism", and a failure to 
realise that Allah alone, is the source of all things. The ideology 
that I have outlined above however, is prevalent, and ultimately 
closer to a cultural exposition of the Islamic ideology of shrines 
in this context. It is also I suggest, a likely unexplored 
possibility of other Islamic ideologies on the issue. 
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Sri Lankan Muslim thought and action. In this cultural context the 
practice of worship at the shrine of a saint is not "intercessionary" 
in our taken-for-granted sense. The significance of the shrine 
practice is primarily in its ideas of space and a cosmology which 
outlines a "sacred geography". When we reveal the logic behind their 
practice, we find that saint "worship" presents no contradiction to 
the idea of a single God. It is true that the saint does embody 
divine power as a result of his exemplary life but he himself is not 
regarded as an intercessionary figure in the sense that we take for 
granted. The logic illustrates clearly that the 'intercession' has 
a particular character. The saint as a result of his exemplary life 
has attained a consciousness after death with a clear view of heaven. 
He is incapable of action in the sense of granting boons, in fact it 
would appear that he has no consciousness of life on earth at all - 
that he is oriented only towards heaven. However he is 
intercessionary in the sense that his sentient soul remains entombed 
as permanent "witness to heaven" and provides for those who visit a 
means of greater access to God. 22 
The concept of intercession which I have outlined as the logic behind 
the Sri Lankan practices is quite possibly an unexplored element in 
the Moroccan practices also. Certainly both Eickelman (1977: 6 & 255) 
and Crapanzano (ibid: 174) present evidence that the saints are 
regarded as still alive within their tombs. 23 
4.4 The Myths of the Saints. 
The myths of saints in Sri Lanka fall into two distinct categories. 
The first set of myths tell the stories of dead saints who travelled 
22 Troll points out that dargah literally means - place of 
access, shrine (ibid, 1992: xi, my emphasis). The question of access 
in the sense that I have outlined above however is overlooked 
throughout the entire text. 
23 Gellner also refers to "living saints" in the Maghreb 
(1981: 40) and Gladney mentions them among the Hui in China 
(1987: 515). Gaborieau (1984: 250) reports that the founder of a purely 
Indian Sufi order (Madarai), Shah Badi 'al-Din Madar, is reputed to 
be still living in his grave. He argues that this belief indicates 
a Hindu parallel; the renouncer, sariyasi when he is buried is not 
considered dead. but as plunged into a state of deep meditative 
samadhi. He is perhaps correct, though he overlooks the Islamic 
ideology cited above. I find more immediately obvious links between 
the Hindu ideology of renouncers and the ideology of the Sri Lankan 
Bawas, whose ritual practices in effect, render them dead before 
burial (McGilvray: ibid). 
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miraculously, in stone boxes on the seas, and were washed up on the 
shores of the island. The second set relate tales of Middle Eastern 
Muslims who had come to the island on pilgrimage to Adam's Peak and 
had died while meditating in the jungle. The location and existence 
of these saints, in unmarked graves, has been revealed by local 
miracles. Together both sets of myths account for almost all of the 
coastal and interior shrines on the island. 24 
Stone boxes. 
The vast majority of these shrines are located in the South-west 
coastal area, and are to be found at Alutgama, Beruwala, Gintota, 
Galle Fort, Kaparatota (Weligama), Dondra, Matara, Miella, Kirinde 
and Trincomalee. 25 I recount here, a myth taken from the Kaparatota 
mosque in Weligama. This mosque stands on a small headland at the 
Western end of the Bay, which provides the only safe deep-water 
anchorage for the larger boats. of the Sinhalese fishing fleet. The 
out-rigger canoes of the other fishermen are merely pulled to safety 
all along the beach. There are no longer any Muslims with boats in 
this area, and no history of Muslim settlement in the area 
immediately around the mosque. 26 
24 There are certainly others but as far as I am aware they are 
currently relatively few in number and I would assume those of 
originally foreign and religious men. This is the case with one of 
the research area tombs where the Indian founder (son of an Iraqi 
father) of one of the religious colleges is buried. 
25 This list corresponds exactly to the list of sites commonly 
given as the original sites of Arab settlement in the island. They 
are all coastal centres with a definite trading past. The location 
of the shrines therefore acts to reinforce the early orthodox nature 
of these centres. There is also however a similar myth in the central 
highlands near Kandy, where the saint arrived in a stone box 
travelling miraculously in the river(Jones p. c. ). 
26 The inhabitants of the nearby Sinhalese fishing village 
regularly drop a small coin in the till as they pass the mosque. This 
gift to the saint is in order to secure the safe return of their men. 
The men themselves if they encounter any danger at sea, simply think 
of the name of the saint, and after their safe return, place a coin 
in the till. Fishing is a night-time activity and for the Sinhalese, 
the night is a time of the demonic. The Sinhalese do regularly 
approach different gods for assistance and perhaps in this instance, 
to pray to one who has mastered the sea is efficacious. Whatever the 
particular logic it is clear that this shrine and the saint protect 
both the ships at anchor, and the men at sea. 
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It is believed that when this saint arrived at Kaparatota, another 
four floating tombs were also on the sea. This particular group of 
five, was followed by a later group of seven. 
Over 300 years ago, somewhere around 1645, a stone box was 
seen floating on the sea near Weligama. The Sinhalese 
fisherfolk who were living in the area thought it must be the 
debris from a ship wrecked at sea. They rushed into the sea 
towards the box, but the box moved further out into deeper 
water and they could not reach it. The following day they 
agreed to try and surround the box on all sides in order to 
bring it to shore but the box again slipped out of reach. Some 
Muslims from the nearby town had heard about the box by now, 
and went to the beach to see what this wonder was all about. 
To the astonishment of everybody present, the box came to the 
shore and the Muslims opened it to see what it was. 
Inside they found a corpse fully wrapped in the Islamic kafan 
(burial cloth). With the corpse there was a talappa (turban), 
with the name Sheikh Inayathulla Vali Ullah, "' a pair of 
sandals, a walking stick, a lamp and miswak (a small tooth 
brush made from a frayed wooden twig) . The Muslims carried the box from the beach up to higher ground and put it down. When 
they attempted to pick it up again, they found to their 
astonishment that they could not lift it. They were forced to 
leave it there and they went back to their homes. They 
discussed the matter with other Muslims, and all agreed that 
the body should be brought to the Muslim area (Galbokka/New 
Street) and buried. During their. sleep, they all dreamt that 
the saint was speaking to them, and making it known that he 
wished to be buried on exactly the spot where the stone box 
now remained. 
The land near the beach where the box stood, belonged to a 
Sinhalese man, and the Muslims approached him in the morning 
to tell him all that had happened and also that they wanted 
some land from him. He refused their request and demanded that 
they remove the box immediately. The Muslims then returned to 
the land and tried innumerable ways to move the box but found 
that they still could not lift it. As evening fell they 
returned to the Sinhalese landowner and told him they had not 
yet been able to shift the box, but that they would return in 
the morning with more men. 
That night Sheikh Inayathulla came to the Sinhalese landowner 
as he slept and beat him with a cane, leaving marks all over 
his body. The landowner could not bear the pain and came 
running in the dead of night, to the home of a Moulavi, and 
told him what had happened and showed him the marks. He said 
he had no further objection to the corpse being buried on his 
_' Valli Ullah here reportedly means "friend of Allah". This is 
more often rendered Awliya, the term used to refer to all the saints. 
The Arabic word for saint is wali (p1 awliya )literally "friend" or 
"patron" (Geijbels, 1978: 176). 
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land, and he donated two acres and some money towards the 
building of a small mosque. 28 
Sheikh Inayathulla is believed to have lived in Iraq, where he was 
a faqir (holy man) who had spent his life preaching. His two 
disciples had buried him in the stone box according to his wishes, 
and cast him into the sea. They then left Iraq and travelled the 
world in search of him. They finally found him in Kaparatota where 
they became caretakers of the shrine until their deaths. Their tombs 
are also in the shrine, on either side of Inayathullah' s. The saint' s 
miswak, was planted in the ground and has grown into a huge tree 
which stands beside the shrine. " During the annual mosque feast 
flags are hoisted on a rope which stretches between the tree and the 
mosque thus linking the two in this ritual celebration. 30 The tree 
itself has curative properties, and its roots, leaves, bark, flowers 
and unripe fruit were formerly used to cure a wide variety of 
illnesses from asthma to wounds and burns . 
31 During the 1915 ethnic 
riots between the Muslims and the Sinhalese this mosque was 
destroyed. A Sinhalese man however, who attempted to destroy the 
saint's tomb "fell a victim to his own axe" and died instantly. 
Someone else tried to chop down the tree and "it oozed blood" where 
it was cut. Ultimately neither tree nor tomb was destroyed. 32 
28 This version was given to me by the Imam of the Mosque. 
Z' Similar circumstances have been observed in Pakistan. Solitary 
trees standing near shrines there are-often regarded as sacred and 
it is sometimes alleged that after a saint's death his disciples 
"planted his staff into the ground and it became a tree" 
Geijbels, ibid: 178). 
90 There are only two mosque feasts in this area at which flags 
are raised and some local informants argue that this practice has 
more to do with Hinduism than Islam. The flags themselves (pennants 
really) are invariably green and white (considered Islamic colours). 
The use of flags at shrines has been reported in Tamil Nadu by Mines 
(1972: 41), in Pakistan by Geijbels (ibid: l78), in Kashmir by Khan 
(1992: 173), in Kerala by Dale & Menon (ibid: 534)and in Rajasthan by 
Moini (1992: 70). At the Sea-shore Mosque in Kalmunai (Eastern 
Province) a particular flag known as pooran kudi - centipede flag, 
is raised at the mosque feast. 
31 The medicinal cures from the tree have faded in importance in 
recent times, but their existence is widely known. 
32 The tomb that was in the shrine at the Station Road mosque was 
destroyed in these riots. The Koledande mosque was also destroyed, 
with the use of dynamite, but the nearby Kapuwatta mosque was 
untouched, owing to the close relations between this village and a 
local Sinhalese vithane - headman. 
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There are a number of levels of meaning in the interpretation of this 
myth. The first condenses around the miraculous journey of the dead 
saint to the shores of Ceylon. When entombed on the island, his tomb 
marks a sacred space. A second level of interpretation is the clear 
metaphoric reference, to the arrival of Islam itself on the island, ' 
brought by Arab traders sailing from the Middle East and settling in 
various coastal ports. This metaphor stresses the fundamentally pure 
nature of the Islam on the island and further the greater orthodoxy 
of the earliest sites of settlement. The myth also contains a clear 
ideological statement concerning the supremacy of the saint and his 
determination to be entombed on the headland. The 'struggles' with 
a Sinhalese landlord are also a very common feature of the saints' 
myths and refer to the situation of the first Muslims who were always 
in the position of having to acquire land. 33 This they invariably 
did through the marriages they contracted with indigenous women. 34 The 
Kaparatota shrine attracts family groups who often come on a 
pilgrimage for the day and recite Ya Sin Sura, 35 combining a picnic 
and beach visit with their pilgrimage purpose. When groups come from 
Galle, Matara or Balapitiya they will often remain in the shrine and 
mosque all night, returning home in the early morning. 
Miraculous revelations. 
The second type of shrine are those of saints who initially reveal 
their presence through a miracle which occurs on the spot where they 
are buried. These myths also have a set of common features and 
outline a particular logic. These saints were men who came on 
33 The saint in the Kahatapitiya shrine at Gampola, Bhawa Kauf, 
was one of five saints who came from Mecca in the seventeenth century 
and were granted lands by the Sinhalese King. Saint Sheikh Shahul 
Hamid Nagore Meeran Sahib was granted land by the Rajah of Tanjore 
in India after he cured him (Thawfeeq, ibid: 115-121). In these cases 
both saints demonstrated the superior power of their faith. 
34 Perhaps this is the cultural significance which leads people 
to this particular mosque when their problem is that of finding a 
husband for their daughter. When a marriage takes place in these 
circumstances it is common for the young couple to return together 
to the shrine, bringing a gift with them. Marrying daughters is 
always a difficult business for poorer Muslim families because of the 
'dowry problem'. 
35 Ya Sin Sura has a special significance for Muslims in this 
area see Chapter Seven. 
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pilgrimage to Adam's Peak and later died while meditating in the 
jungle. These shrines are some distance from the coast and spread 
throughout the interior of the island. The example here is taken from 
the Dewatagaha Mosque in Colombo. This is the most important Muslim 
shrine in Colombo and is widely patronised by members of all faiths 
and from all social groups. The myth elaborates both the original 
miracle which led to the discovery of the saint, and his later 
identification by another foreign Muslim. Finally it outlines the 
establishment of a feast in his name, to celebrate his 'birthday'. 
As with the shrines above, the sacred space, once discovered, is 
immediately cloaked in the surrounds of a new public mosque, thus 
rendering it the potential heart of a new Muslim community. While the 
stone box myths stress the establishment of an Islamic presence on 
the island, these myths are distinct in that they stress the 
establishment of Islamic practice. 
Each miraculous revelation myth may be taken as an ideological 
statement which outlines both the movement of a pure and originary 
Islam from the Islamic heartlands to the island of Sri Lanka, and the 
establishment of its correct practices here, in a non-Islamic 
context. In short it is an ideology of the arrival of Islam and 
. 
Islamic practice. 
In 1820 a Sinhalese woman who was an oilmonger and the sole 
wage-earner in her family, was going on her daily rounds 
travelling from Bambalapitiya through the cinnamon jungle to 
Maradana. In the jungle she tripped over the root of a cadju 
(cashew) tree and fell, smashing her clay pot to pieces. She 
cried out bitterly because her family would have no food that 
day as her only source of income had been destroyed. She wept 
until she fell asleep exhausted. She awoke to hear a voice 
telling her not to despair, that everything would be alright 
soon. When she looked up and found no one in sight she broke 
into desperate tears again. 
Again she heard the voice, and suddenly she saw "an old man in 
green garb (whose) holy mien was an inspiring sight": He told 
her that she had nothing to fear, and that he would give her 
oil, if only she would fetch him a pot. The woman ran to the 
house of a Muslim, Mamina Lebbe, in Maradana. He was one of 
her regular customers and she asked his mother to give her a 
new pot. When she returned to the jungle she found the old man 
reclining against a Dawata tree. He told her to place the pot 
on the ground where the other one had broken. Then he pressed 
his foot on the ground and the oil bubbled up from beneath. 
The woman was able to scoop up the oil with leaves and refill 
her pot. The old man asked her to tell her Muslim customers of 
the events, and the spot where he had appeared. She thanked 
him and invoked his blessings. 
The woman told the Muslims of this miracle and a party of them 
went to find the evidence in the jungle; the oil, the broken 
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pot, the cadju tree and the Dawata tree. The party then 
recited Ya Sin and the Fathiha (the primary article of Islamic 
faith) and prayed "Oh Valiyullah", Praise be to Allah for 
having given us the opportunity to bear witness to your 
miracle". They prayed that Allah would reveal to them the 
identity of the unknown saint. The Muslims appointed Mamina 
Lebbe as their leader and the trustee of the shrine. 
In 1847 a saint (divine) came to Ceylon from the Mahgreb and 
took up residence at the Maradana Mosque. When he was informed 
of the miracle he went to the shrine with a number of other 
Muslims and they recited prayers together. The divine shrouded 
himself with his robe and knelt upon the ground seeking 
communion with the buried saint. When he emerged from his robe 
it appeared as though his face was ablaze with a divine light. 
He said that the grave was that of a "most venerable saint (by 
the name of) Seyed Usman Siddiq Ibn Abdurahaman, from Arafat 
in Arabia, one who came to this island on a pilgrimage to 
Adam's Peak and after living in the vicinity for some time, 
died here". The divine having announced the name of the saint 
declared that henceforth each year there would be a ten day 
mawlood recital and distribution of ghee rice as niyaath to 
the people. He gave a sovereign to Mamina Lebbe to prepare 
ghee rice immediately and then he took a bamboo pole, and 
tearing off a piece of his white turban to make a flag, 
planted this flagpole in the ground at the head of the 
grave. 36 
The practice at the shrine reflects the details of the original myth. 
An enormous oil lamp stands just outside the shrine, and is kept 
burning continually, with gifts of oil. Women passing often stop to 
offer a prayer here and many of them dip a finger in the oil to 
anoint the forehead or tongue of an accompanying child. This practice 
is peculiar to this shrine. " Above the ziyarram there hangs another 
large glass oil lamp, and the ziyarram itself is piled high with 
gifts of cloth. The men either pray inside the shrine or in its 
doorway and very small boys are often seen circumambulating the 
ziyarram with their fathers. In these cases the safe conception and 
delivery of the child is being acknowledged, a common practice among 
the Muslims. Adjacent to the shrine is a room reserved for women, 
which is divided from the shrine by an iron grille. Women often tie 
a small votive piece of cloth with a coin in it to the grille and 
36 This version of the myth is adapted from Thawfeeq 
(ibid: 109-111). 
"I am referring here, to the shrines that I saw on the South- 
west coast where the large brass open oil lamps were rare. It could 
be a more common practice elsewhere. I observed a woman performing 
a similar action at the shrine of the Sea-shore mosque in Kalmunai 
on the East Coast. Perhaps this is a borrowed Hindu custom. 
"Traditional Hindus generally consider the oil used in cleaning idols 
in temples to have special curative properties" (Dale & Menon, 
ibid: 531 ff19). 
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others bring garlands of white flowers to hang there . 
38 Other women 
as they leave, may take a few of these flowers back to their homes. 
Gifts of food and milk are also common at this shrine, and on 
Thursday evenings before Jumma (Friday) crowds of beggars gather at 
the gates to receive zakat (alms) and gifts of food. 
The saint of 'the myth had come to the island on pilgrimage and died 
"living in the vicinity" (ibid: op cit) . Not explicitly stated here, 
but nonetheless common in myths of this type, is the belief that the 
saint died while meditating in the jungle. 39 The idea of meditating 
in the jungle is common in Hindu and Buddhist thought, and often 
engages ideas of states beyond pain and of supernatural endurance. 
In many respects the Muslim saint or Sufi shares the fate of the 
Hindu "renouncer", isolated from society and engaged in full-time 
religious reflection. The Bawas are the only contemporary group of 
full-time religious mendicants amongst the Muslims and many of them 
may be seen wearing green cloaks and turbans to represent their 
status as ' living dead' I. Despite this however, most of them live with 
their families, on the East coast. 40 
38 This shrine is patronised by people of all faiths and the 
offering of garlands is likely a Hindu gift. Buddhists often take 
flowers to their own temples, but Muslims do not. A Sinhalese woman 
at the shrine (a servant in a prominent Colombo politician's family) 
was wearing a white sari. She wore it in the manner of a Muslim 
woman, with the end pulled up to cover her head, in deference to the 
fact that it was a Muslim shrine. She wore white however, because to 
Buddhists that symbolizes purity and auspiciousness, and is therefore 
the colour most often worn to temples, particularly on Poya (Full 
Moon) Days. Muslim women almost never wear white saris, apart from 
the occasional wedding, and very often the bride wears a western 
style wedding dress on that occasion, even amongst the working 
classes. 
39 Thawfeeq (ibid) provides several examples of this. 
40 The Hindu renouncer according to Dumont (ibid) achieves 
individuality by standing outside the social order. The Muslim saint 
therefore may not be reduced to the renouncer of Hindu ideology. 
There are a small group of Bawas who live the year round in caves, 
at a shrine known as Dafter Jailani (near Adam's Peak) . The Jailani 
myth has an explicit association with the Bawas, featuring a man in 
a green turban who appeared to a little boy who fell into one of its 
many caves. The Bawas who reside at Jailani are reported to wear 
little or no clothing and in this respect may appear similar to Hindu 
holy men. Jailani has a special significance for Muslims because it 
is believed that a tunnel leads from here directly to Mecca. It is 
the site of a month long mowlood recital attended by many Muslims and 
in particular by the East coast Bawas, who include this as part of 
their annual cycle of feasts. Unlike other Muslims, many of the Bawas 
travel from feast to feast performing the Rifai rathib (a recital 
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The myths of the saints shrines have an ontological significance 
beyond their narrative detail. They describe "the fundamental 
principles of a being in the world and the orientation of such a 
being towards the horizons of its- experience" (Kapferer, 1988: 79). 
They support the ideology of Islam within the island and they also 
share part of the logic of a wider Islam. One point which looms 
largely significant in both types of myths, is also a fundamentally 
determining factor in the lives of the Muslims themselves. That is 
that Islam is foreign to the island and that they remain a minority 
Islamic community far from the origins of Islam in the Middle East. 
The two types of myths together elaborate the ontological horizon of 
this peripheral Muslim community. The stone box myths have a further 
and deeper significance when we place them in the context of Adam's 
Peak, revered by Muslims as the point of origin of man on earth. It 
was here where Adam first set foot on earth outside of Paradise . 
4'- The 
saints in their miraculous return to the island, are signing their 
closeness to the point of origin of man on earth, travelling through 
the waters of rebirth in their transcendent state. They further 
sacrify the primordial point of man on earth, by their entombed 
presence on the island. The other type of myth, the miraculous 
revelation, signs the arrival of orthodox Islamic practice on the 
island. In this case it is the discovery of the burial places of 
saints who died during the performance of their religious practices, 
pilgrimage and meditation. 
In much of the discussion of Muslim saints it is the practices which 
have generally been favoured as of analytic significance over the 
mythic contexts in which they are couched. Coupled with this, apart 
from the pervasive, fo], k variety/textual orthodoxy nnc Qc . c, '-. 
comparative wor% has been done. Geertz (ibid) is the notable 
exception. The particular historical and cultural contexts of Islam 
in Sri Lanka are vital in understanding its ideological form. In 
order to uncover the full significance of saint worship it is 
essential to examine not only the meaning of the shrines of the 
accompanied with ecstatic practices of self-mutilation). Their month 
long presence at Jailani follows a month in attendance at the Porwai 
shrine at Godepitiya, near Akuressa. This latter feast is an 
important one in the research area and attended by many women in 
order to secure the conception and safe delivery of children. 
41 According to many informants Eve came down somewhere in the 
Lebanon. 
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saints but the logic which governs the practice of saint worship 
also. When compared with similar practices elsewhere the distinctions 
revealed indicate more than simply the relocation of Islam in a 
different cultural environment. Rather they point to an underlying 
ideology in Islam which is concerned with ideas of space and a sacred 
geography. 42 The Sri Lankan distinctions should not be reduced to 
simply a cultural or historical variation of an Islam which is 
assumed to be universal. Rather the ideology underlying these 
practices should be closely examined in order to see if it reveals 
aspects of an Islam which is universal. 
4.5 Shrine Practice among Sri Lankern Muslims. . 
Despite the fact that the majority of mosques have shrines attached 
many of them are not the centre of any particular cult of worship 
and for the most part are not widely revered at all. By contrast 
there are some shrines which have an enormous following and a big 
reputation for curing particular ailments and these shrines are the 
subject of family pilgrimages at certain times of the year. Generally 
these occur at the time of the annual mowlood recital and feast 
which is held to celebrate the life and commemorate the death of the 
saint. Some of these shrines have a particular association with 
the problems of fertility and safe delivery of children and others 
with the problems of finding a suitable husband for a daughter of 
marriageable age. " All of them are patronised for minor ailments, 
major illnesses, success in exams, the successful outcome of 
litigation, finding employment locally or abroad, success in 
business dealings and the safe return of loved ones from the Middle 
East or other hazardous journeys. In these latter cases the choice 
of shrine reflects either the particular desires and beliefs of the 
family involved or the location of the shrine in their vicinity. 
42 There is a universal concern with geography in the Islamic 
world which is patently manifest in the orientation of all Muslims 
towards mecca when they pray. Local informants report that the Ka' bah 
in Mecca stands beneath a replica in Heaven which is continually 
circumambulated by angels. 
43 Locally this would require a visit to the Porwai mosque shrine 
near Akuressa in the first case and the shrine at Kaparatota in the 
latter. This 'specialization' has been noted by Gaborieau in Nepal 
(1983, cited Saiyed, ibid: 244). 
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When an individual has a problem that they wish to solve they will 
often make a vow (niyaath) to a saint to take a particular gift to 
the shrine when the problem is resolved. This conditional vow which 
is simply a personal promise made in the home is the usual background 
to a shrine visit. 44 Some people will go to the shrine in the first 
instance to make their request but this is by no means essential. For 
instance if a woman wakes up to find that her baby is ill she may at 
that moment vow to take a cup of milk or some sweets to the mosque 
when the child recovers. A vow may be made for any problem that an 
individual has and the vow itself may take a number of forms. 
Generally it is some small money gift to the shrine or alternatively 
some money, food or service provided at the next annual feast held 
in honour of the saint. The gifts may be oil for the lamps, milk, 
incense, small strips of cloth or large pieces to serve as coverings 
for the tomb itself and these are accompanied with a small gift of 
money, often a single coin, and always prayers. Those gifts which may 
be provided for the feast will range from a bag of rice or a bull 
from wealthy members of the community to small quantities of rice or 
coconuts from other members of the community. On occasion some will 
gift their labour thus women may vow to spend a certain amount of 
time peeling and preparing vegetables or scraping coconuts and 
squeezing the milk required for the feast curries. In general men do 
not dedicate their labour in this way. 
The practices briefly outlined above are similar to those described 
by Crapanzano (1973) and Eickelman (1977) at saint s' shrines in 
Morocco. The problems which individuals have to face and for which 
they patronize the shrines are those generated by the human condition 
everywhere; illness, fertility, and material well-being. As in 
Morocco the Sri Lankan tombs are credited with different 
reputations with regard to their efficacy. Thus one saint may be 
known as good for arthritis and rheumatism, another for fevers and 
a further one for problems with fertility. There is an implicit local 
hierarchy with respect to their efficacy and importance 
(Crapanzano, ibid: 170). However a comparison between the practices at 
shrines in Morocco and Sri Lanka is problematic. Although within Sri 
Lanka there is a common logic which governs shrine practice there are 
94 In these cases the individual directs their prayer/vow to the 
shrine. Nanda and Talib writing of dargahs in Uttar Pradesh observe 
these 'spiritual invocations' also, but insist that Muslims are 
invoking the saint independent of the dargah - based on a pir-=rid (saint-disciple) relationship (ibid, 1992: 126). 
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quite different types of shrines and this may also be the case in 
Morocco. The most important shrines in Sri Lanka, those which attract 
huge crowds, including many women and often family groups are those 
which stand towards the interior of the island and are not limited 
to an association which is bounded by a village (Jailani, Kataragama, 
Porwai/Poruwa and Gampola). By contrast the mosque and shrine at 
Alutgama, in the centre of the South Western coast, and one of the 
first sites of Arab settlement presents itself as a bastion of 
orthodoxy and doesn't permit women to attend its feast, one of the 
most important in the calendar. This is in line with the general 
scheme of ideas which relates men more strongly to din - religion and 
women more strongly with valakkam -custom. When these opposing sets 
are placed in the context of the history of Islam on the island the 
fact that the coast bore all the earliest sites of settlement renders 
those shrines more orthodox than those of the interior. Current feast 
practices reinforce this logic. 
Apart from the two types of shrines in Sri Lanka there do appear to 
be some other significant differences in the shrine practices and 
understandings in the two countries. In the Moroccan studies the 
stress on the pilgrimage aspect of the visit is somewhat stronger and 
two visits are required. On the first the pilgrim makes known their 
problem to the saint and promises to come again bringing a 
particular sacrificial gift when the problem is solved. A small 
strip of cloth is tied either at the grotto itself or to the 
branches of a tree in one of the urban lodges (ibid: 177). In Sri 
Lanka the initial vow is made in the home, or wherever the individual 
happens to be. There are occasions when individuals may make a 
pilgrimage to make a vow known followed by a second visit upon 
resolution. This is by no means the norm however and is more commonly 
associated with some shrines rather than others. In fact some shrines 
are the particular focus of annual feasts on a very large scale 
attracting people from near and far and in these cases families may 
make pilgrimages only once a year though they may make vows to the 
saint throughout. The Porwai shrine to a Muslim saint in Godepitiya, 
the Jailani shrine and the shrines at Kataragama (a site which is 
shared by all faiths) all fall into this category. The shrine at the 
Dewatagaha Mosque in Colombo on the other hand, is attended by huge 
crowds every night and the practice here is for individuals to visit 
on a regular basis for a promised period of time. Thus they may come 
weekly for two months or monthly for three months etc. The practice 
of the vow itself has a different structure also. In Morocco the vow 
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is composed of two parts, there is both ar - vow and debiha - 
fulfillment of vow (ibid: 178). In Sri Lanka by contrast the vow 
itself, the gift promised and the food distributed at a feast are all 
condensed in the term niyaath. Once the request has been granted the 
Muslim is duty bound to fulfill their vow. Another difference in the 
practice is in the gifting of sacrifical animals to the shrines. The 
only occasion on which Muslims would gift a sacrificial animal would 
be on the occasion of the annual feast at a particular mosque. In 
those cases the sacrificial animal could be a goat but in most cases 
would be a bull and therefore would be limited to the wealthier 
members of the community. At all other times some other gift would 
be offered. All animals that are eaten are of course sacrificed and 
it is not unheard of for a family to sacrifice a bull at home for the 
sake of their household's health and welfare45. I suggest that part 
of the Moroccan preference for offering sacrifi+l fowls to the 
shrines is that some of their shrines are to demonesses such as Aisha 
Qandisha who require blood sacrifice before they grant their boon. 
It does give weight to the argument that in these cultural contexts 
saints intercede for individuals but in the Sri Lankan context it 
would conflict with the logic that all life from sacrifices should 
be offered only to God. 46 
The differences in shrine practices indicate significant distinctions 
in the character of the cultural logics generating Islamic 
practices in different cultural contexts. This is a large problem 
and I do not attempt to do the topic justice here. However there 
are three issues related to saint worship on which the different 
cultures appear to have distinct positions. These issues are 
intercession, baraka - grace, and the folk/orthodox dichotomy. I 
have already argued that the intercessionary character of the 
45 I witnessed one of these occasions when two young bulls were 
sacrificed for the sake of an extended household. One of the animals 
was led through one family members house and into all the rooms 
before it was taken outside to be killed. The inhabitants stated that 
this was to remove all the "bad luck". Both animals were slaughtered 
some distance from the house and none of the meat from the first 
animal was kept by the family. In order for this sacrifice to be 
effective all the meat had to be given away. With the other animal 
as was the custom 1/3 of the meat was kept by the family, 1/3 given 
to relatives and 1/3 as alms to the poor. 
46 However Crapanzano (ibid) does not discuss the symbolic 
significance of particular gifts at different shrines so this is 
speculation on my part. 
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understanding of shrine practice is not immediately applicable in Sri 
Lanka. I now turn to the concept of baraka or grace that is a 
fundamental element in the structure of Moroccan shrine practice and 
far less featured in Sri Lanka. Muslims in Sri Lanka are far more 
likely to associate the concept of karamat - miracles with the 
shrines of their saints. '"' An explicit purpose of shrine pilgrimages 
in Morocco is to obtain some of the saint's baraka. This baraka 
according to Moroccans is associated with a silsila (chain) of 
relationships traced through the patriline of the saint, and 
reflected. in some measure through the wealth and popularity of his 
lineage and his shrine. In Sri Lanka there are no shrines which 
stand at the heart of a lineage group among whose membership may 
exist one or more saints. There are thus no occasions where the 
baraka of a shrine saint is embodied by members of the lineage. 
Saints are acknowledged to possess baraka but saints have no 
connections to local kin groups and this is the basis of a 
significant distinction in the two concepts of baraka. In Morocco 
baraka is continuously evident amongst members of the saintly 
lineages whereas in Sri Lanka it remains the province of the saint 
in his tomb. The only "lineage" resembling a Moroccan saintly 
lineage in Sri Lanka are the various Moulana families who trace their 
descent from the prophet and they do not constitute a definable 
lineage or corporate group on the ground. 48 The chain of patrilineal 
relationships which connects them to the prophet is termed a silsila, 
and this word also refers to the documented evidence of such a 
genealogical relationship which all Moulana families should hold. 49 
This group as a whole is worthy of certain communal respect on 
account of their connection with the Prophet, and where they are 
" Glasse terms karamat "acts of generosity" or "spiritual powers 
acquired by a saint", short of miracles (ibid: 219). The term karamat 
however is glossed as miracles in the South Asian discourse 
(Gaborieau, 1992: 221). 
48 They would prefer to marry endogamously but their numbers are 
limited and many families do not. The Moulana status passes through 
the male line and thus any children of a Moulana male will themselves 
be Moulanas. In line with my general argument about the greater 
orthodoxy of the South-west coast informants report that Moulanas 
there endeavour to marry their daughters to other Moulanas and East 
Coast'Moulanas are reportedly not as concerned. 
49 I was told that very few Moulana families actually hold a 
silsila. I saw only one and it traced the relationships from all 
members of the current family back to the Prophet and before him to 
Adam. 
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educated in Islamic matters their advice should be sought. They are 
not saints however, and most of them have no particular religious 
function at all, unlike Morocco where a large number of the saints 
fall into this category (sherfa/sherif) (Gellner, 1969; 70) . In 
Morocco the baraka is passed equally from a father to all his sons 
and Gellner argues that this diffusion of grace creates pressures 
which lead to large numbers of these saints becoming "laicised" - 
members of the laity, where their baraka remains latent 
(ibid; 142-145). This again contrasts strongly with Sri Lanka where 
living saints are a rarity. In fact I only ever knew one and his 
following was in India where he stood as a foreigner in relation to 
them, although his holiness was widely accepted in his home country. 
The significance of foreign origins will be explored below but first 
I will briefly explore the concept of baraka in relation to the 
saint. This particular saint was from a Moulana family and came as 
he said "from a long line of saints" who originated in Iraq and one 
of whom migrated to India in the late nineteenth century. The baraka, 
or saintly grace had come to the current saint from his father who 
in turn had received it from his father. However this man was the 
youngest of three brothers and it was he who received the baraka and 
not his brothers. The baraka was understood to pass directly from 
saint to saint and in this instance the saintliness had manifested 
itself in the youngest son. The pattern of attaining baraka in this 
case shares the logic of the spiritual chain or silsila, believed to 
exist between Sufis and their disciples, where it is manifest in 
terms of an individual spirituality rather than as a genealogical 
sense of grace. But it is either transferred through the male lineage 
or directly between saints or Sufis. Without the lineage group 
located in the vicinity of the shrine as in Morocco, there is in Sri 
Lanka where saints are not associated with lineage groups at all, no 
direct association of the tomb with the idea of baraka. 
The governing concept associated with the Sri Lankan shrines is that 
of. karamat. The logic of "windows to heaven" outlined above 
receives further emphasis through the many miracles that take place 
in the vicinity of the tombs. There are two types of miracles 
associated with all the tombs. First are the original miracles which 
led to the discovery of each and every tomb and the establishment of 
a shrine and mosque. Second are the continual stream of cures and 
boons that are achieved through prayer here. Or more precisely 
through prayers "directed" here. Since to offer a vow initially it 
is merely necessary to intend the name and place of the saint and the 
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promised vow. This logic of directional prayer is akin to that which 
underlies the orientation of all daily prayers towards Mecca for 
instance. The tomb itself is of course oriented towards Mecca and 
Mecca itself is understood to be a point of conjunction between 
heaven and earth.. The Ka' bah is understood to stand immediately below 
its heavenly replica which is circumambulated continuously by angels 
in the same manner as the pilgrims move around the Ka'bah on earth. 
The city itself is haram - forbidden and non-muslims are not 
permitted to enter it. The pilgrims must wear the special pilgrim 
garb within the precincts of the holy mosque itself and they are 
under special restrictions as to their conduct. This is "sacred 
space" par excellence, and, although it is of a much higher order it 
nonetheless shares the same logic of space and relation to heaven 
as that of the shrines. 
It is another curious fact that many of these ziyarrams in the island 
are not confined to the dimensions of a normal human being but 
achieve great length. Some of the saints upon revealing themselves 
have stated their physical dimensions which must be reflected in the 
size of the tomb above. Some of them have been enormous. Many other 
shrines have tombs which continue to "grow" in line with their 
popularity. Thus the tomb in Trincomalee is held to be 60 cubits 
long and growing and one at Panadura is 40 cubits. Another one 
located at Poruwa near Akuressa is already 30 feet long and it also 
has a miraculous chain hanging from the roof which has three links 
to it and these are growing down towards the ground. When they 
finally reach the floor this will mark the imminent end of the world. 
This miraculous shift in dimensions within a space which is sacred 
and in line with its popularity echoes entirely the logic of the 
dimensions of the mosque at Mecca. According to informants if ever 
the pilgrimage crowd is too large the angels simply extend the 
dimensions of the Mosque to incorporate everybody. 
The final area of distinction is the structure of the 
"folk": "orthodox" dichotomy. This has been found repeatedly in the 
past in studies of Islam and religion generally and the current 
approach appears to be towards a more holistic view. Thus saints 
shrines for instance have been in many cases relegated to the status 
of a folk Islam and discussed as an aberration, not on a par with 
formalised scriptural Islam. I have argued above that within the Sri 
Lankan context the shrines are seen as orthodox in themselves - and 
shrine practices are favourably regarded although by no means, does 
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everybody participate. Shrine practice is often closely associated 
with mosque feasts held annually in all the mosques. The cultural 
logic of the shrines is shared with the logic found elsewhere in the 
Islamic ideology. However, that aside, I want to point out that there 
do exist dichotomies for the Muslims themselves between different 
practices within Islam. Eickleman uses the term "part-ideologies" to 
refer to the ideology behind maraboutic practices, to highlight the 
fact that these practices are seen by some as inconsistent with the 
ideas of Muslim reformists. Thus certain believers may be led to 
dis-avow their belief in shrine practices in contemporary contexts. 
This "part-ideology is never found in isolation, but co-exists with 
formal Islamic ideology" (ibid: 6). Because it overlaps with locally 
maintained assumptions about the social order it functions as a 
"conservative" ideology, it has no need of defense or conscious 
articulation since its legitimation is "the way things are". He goes 
on to argue that the conjuncture of conflicting patterns of belief 
can be found in most of the world's religions. He identifies a 
locally drawn distinction between a "formal Islam" on the one hand 
and "shrine practices" on the other. Those who worship at the shrines 
consider all their practices to be Islamic but they are aware that 
others of a more reformist character would term the shrine practices 
as un-Islamic. Islam in Sri Lanka has its reformists also and they 
regard some of the cultural practices such as dowry giving, and some 
of the ecstatic Sufi practices as not in keeping with an "orthodox" 
Islam. But there is more significantly a reformist character to Sri 
Lankan Islam as a whole, in large measure due to their perception 
of themselves as permanently located on the periphery of the Islamic 
world. Thus there are local distinctions drawn between "folk" and 
"Islamic", practices but these are generally expressed in terms of 
'custom' versus 'religion', and always associated with the concept 
of converted indigenous women and foreign Muslim men. This apparent 
dichotomy has numerous formulations for individuals in this cultural 
context, but most importantly it is always in the process of being 
overcome. It has none of the conceptual strength of a structuralist 
opposition and should not be used as a fundamental analytical tool 
without the recognition that above all it indicates an orientation 
to the world, that orientation of a people whose constant concern is 
the reproduction of an Islamic world. 
133 
4.6 The Regional Myths. 
When turning to the islands in the immediate South Asian region, 
those of the Maldives and the Laccadives, we find that the myths of 
the saints reveal the foreign Muslim saint as a critical figure in 
the conversion of the population to Islam. In this region, conversion 
often implies both the construction of a new Muslim ethnic identity 
and the arrival of orthodox Islam itself. Thus a study of Islam in 
this particular region calls for an initial analysis of the saints 
myths in order to examine the ideological base of the 'orthodox' 
community. 
Placed in the context of the saints myths from other island 
communities in the immediate region the Sri Lankan myths reveal 
significant distinctions. The Maldives (formerly Buddhist) and the 
Laccadives (formerly Hindu) are two groups of islands in the Central 
Indian Ocean which now have entirely Muslim populations. The people 
of the Maldives share ethnic and cultural links with the Sinhalese 
in Sri Lanka (Forbes, 1981: 88), while those of the Laccadives (the 
Mappilas) were originally Hindus of the Kerala region. "' The Maldives 
are located on the direct sea-route between Southern Arabia, Sri 
Lanka and the Far East, and the Laccadives lie on the direct route 
between Southern Arabia and South India. Both sets of islands were 
incorporated into the Arab trading networks at the same time as Sri 
Lanka. 
All the myths share certain ideological aspects with regard to the 
originary status of the saints, and their role in relation to the 
Islamic communities. Yet the distinctions between them reveal certain 
cultural understandings which reflect in each case the distinct 
nature of their Islam. Further the particular historical arguments 
embedded in the myths reflect in vastly different ways, their 
different cosmological worlds. The myths provide valuable evidence 
about the different patterns of conversion to Islam in the region. 
More specifically however, they outline how they are to be understood 
to be different. There is no case in which Islam may be interpreted 
as simply an overlay, atop an original cultural world. In each case 
Islam has been incorporated trans formatively, through a complex 
dialectical relation with the given cultural context. The myths 
reveal distinct ideologies of the construction of new Muslim 
so Minicoy Island which is part of the Laccadive group, belongs 
ethnically and culturally to the Maldives (Forbes, ibid). 
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communities. My focus here is quite clearly on the myths and the 
various cultural arguments they essay about the conversions of 
respective populations. In this sense they offer (to the analyst, as 
too, the culturally embedded individual) a primary source of access 
to a cosmological view of particular cultural worlds, all of them 
Islamic. 
In the Maldives. and the Laccadives, the myths encode an argument 
about the conversion of the population to Islam. In Sri Lanka by 
contrast, the myths are primarily about the deepening of links in the 
phenomenal world, between the island and its already existent place 
in the Arabic cosmology. There is therefore a pre-ordained and pri- 
mordial link between the island and Arabic Islam. The conversion 
themes in the myths below from the Laccadives and Maldives make 
explicit the cultural view of Muslim identity. The myths outline in 
each case the construction of a specific ethnic Muslim identity. 
Given the different original ethnic identities of the Buddhist 
Maldives and the Hindu Laccadives, we may see clearly that Islam was 
never simply an overlay atop old ethnic and religious systems. When 
contrasted with the Sri Lankan myths the differences in mythic 
arguments and the distinct forms of transformation in each case are 
so unique, as to render any simple assumptions about the universality 
of Muslim saints and shrine practice, being a single phenomenon, 
totally untenable. The only means of comparison is to examine the 
ideologies behind the practices. Once this is undertaken, any focus 
on shrine practice, shifts from a central analytical concern with 
intercession, to questions of identity. I will return to this point 
below. 
The Maldives. 
The last Buddhist Raja of the Maldives is believed to have converted 
to Islam in 1153AD and established the Maldivian Sultanate. The 
saint who converted the Raja is currently entombed in the Medu Ziyare 
(Central Shrine) in the capital, Male. In one myth51, the conversion 
is ascribed 
by Ibn Battuta ... to a wandering Maghrebi shaykh and 
hafiz 
called Abu al-Barakat al-Barbari, who through his piety was 
able to rid the islands of an evil, virgin-ravishing demon 
('ifrit)(Forbes 1983: 47). 
ei There are three versions of the myth (cf below) ascribing the 
conversion to a Maghrebi, a Persian, and a Muslim shaykh 
respectively. There is however only one shrine. 
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Another version attributed the conversion to a Persian alim, Maulana 
Shaykh Yusuf Shams al-Din Tabrizi 
who performed numerous miracles to win the Maldives for Islam, 
the most impressive of which was the raising of a colossal jinni "whose head almost touched the sky" (Forbes, ibid: op cit, 
cites Bell, 1940: 19). 52 
The third version, from a Weligama Muslim, states that the Buddhist 
people of the Maldives were at the mercy of a demon who demanded the 
sacrifice of a virgin each year. A visiting Muslim shaykh who was. 
told of the problem tricked the demon by luring it into a pot which 
he quickly sealed and threw far into the sea. The islanders were so 
relieved and so impressed with his powers that they converted to 
Islam. 53 Having converted the Raja and his people, the shaykh built 
the first mosque and remained in the Maldives. His tomb in Medu 
Ziyare is attached to the Medu Miskit (Central mosque) and both sites 
are regarded with great reverence. 54 The conversion of the Raja was 
followed by the conversion of his family, his court and finally - the 
people. The conversion of the Buddhist Raja into a Muslim Sultan, 
made Islam the state religion. Official backing, through the seizure 
of lands belonging to those who remained Buddhist and the destruction 
of Buddhist idols ensured its rapid spread (Forbes ibid: 48). Once 
52 Forbes argues that it is most likely that the first shaykh 
came from the Maghreb and not Tabriz, as he introduced the Maliki 
madhhab (ibid: 71, ff 28). The introduction of the Shaft madhhab was 
not until the sixteenth century (ibid: 68). 
s3 The informant who related this version of the myth was a 
'talsimar' worker, a ritual specialist and maker of talismans. He 
pointed out that he uses a similar logic in some of his exorcist 
practices. He ties a thread to his patient and attaches the other end 
to a small bottle and then lures the demon (jinn) along the thread 
and traps it in the bottle. Trapping demons in pots (which are 
metonymic with wombs) is entirely consistent with Buddhist exorcist 
practice (Kapferer 1983, Russell, p. c. ), but the possible associations 
of jinn (genies) in bottles should not be overlooked. 
54 In 1921 Bell noted that "at the conclusion of the noon-day 
service on Friday at the Hukuru Miskit (Jumma Mosque), the sultan and 
other members of the royal family recite the fatiha in front 'of the 
closed portico entrance (of the shrine)" (Bell, ibid, cited 
Forbes, 1983: 60) . There are seven days only, when the sultan may cross the threshold to worship inside, and the only other visitors are the 
heads of foreign diplomatic missions (ibid: 61). It is not stated, but 
I assume that these are the heads of Muslim foreign diplomatic 
missions since non-Muslims are not permitted to stand on the haram 
(forbidden) ground of the mosques. This shares a similar logic with 
that reported for the Ka'bah, where on the day of creation in the 
month of Ashura, Muslim heads of state enter and sweep it out. The 
link is between Muslim heads of state and points of Islamic origin. 
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outside the new Islamic state, Buddhism suffered at its hands. 55 The 
hierarchical social order laid out geographically in the earlier 
system of distinct wards (avaru), for royalty and commoners (ibid: 57) 
was maintained. Thus certain cemetaries were reserved for the 
nobility (ibid: 58) and certain mosques for the militia and royalty 
(ibid: 60). A description of the Hukuru Miskit (Jumma Mosque) in Male 
by Pyrard, a castaway in the Maldives from 1602-7, indicates that 
hierarchy was maintained in this mosque where the community gathered 
for Friday prayers. There was a separate enclosure for the Sultan, 
a relative bearing his sword and shield, the qadi, khateeb and four 
Moulins. Two large galleries were set aside for the soldiers and 
their captain, and within the body of the mosque "there (were) 
partitioned spaces for .. persons .. of a certain order, estate. age 
or quality" (ibid. -54-56). This order was rigorously maintained 
through the sanction of fines for transgressors (ibid, op cit). 
All versions of the myth attribute the conversion of the population 
to the powers of the saint. Thus the origin of Islam in these 
Buddhist islands was due to a Muslim saint who demonstrated his 
ability to encompass the demonic. It is an ideological btatement 
concerning the supreme power of Islam over the demonic forces of a 
fragmented Buddhist state. (A fragmentation we may assume from the 
extreme manifestation of the demonic. ) The Persian alim was further 
believed to be 
the most religious God-fearing chief of saints of that age, 
who was acquainted with the hidden secrets of the everlasting 
world (.. and.. ) whose knowledge was as deep as the ocean 
(Bell, ibid: 203, cited in Forbes, ibid: 47). 
This further stresses that the agent of conversion, was himself the 
purest embodiment of Islam -a "chief of saints" (loc cit) . The myth 
also describes the conversion of a Buddhist state, embodied in the 
person of the Raja. By saving the people from the demands of a 
"virgin-ravishing" demon, the saint provides the moment of 
transformation, of the fragmented hierarchical state. The Raja 
converts, and establishes the transformed state - the Sultanate. The 
Sultan, who embodies the new order, re-orders the community and 
restores its wholeness. The Sultan remains at the apex of the state, 
ss Kapferer (1988) has outlined the movement of the hierarchical 
state against those who remain outside it. In this instance a 
religious transformation at the apex of the state, rendered Buddhists 
who were formerly encompassed by the Buddhist state, outside it, and 
the legitimate target of its aggression. 
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and the embodiment of both the people and the state. The Raja is the 
first convert (as the Divine King), and the process of conversion 
moves downwards. The conversion of the Raja is followed in 
hierarchical order, by the conversion of his family, his court and 
then the people. This hierarchical process of conversion is entirely 
consistent with the hierarchical process outlined by Kapferer (ibid) 
within the Sinhalese Buddhist state. 56 The transformed hierarchical 
Islamic state begins to legitimately act against those who do not 
convert, thus signing themselves as standing outside it, and 
therefore allied with the demonic. The myth behind the central 
saint's shrine, the originary shrine within the Maldives57, both 
reflects and reproduces the cultural context of conversion. 
The Laccadives 
In this myth from Kutty (1972: 6) conversion of the islands is 
attributed to Ubaidulla58 a grandson of Abubakr, the first Caliph of 
Islam. He had a dream in which the Prophet appeared to him and sent 
him on a voyage to propagate Islam. As a result of the dream he set 
out from the Hijaz but was shipwrecked and cast ashore on Amini 
Island in the Hindu Laccadives. There he met a local woman, "the 
daughter of a high-caste Hindu family" (Forbes, ibid: 86) who embraced 
Islam, and he married her. 59 The islanders were infuriated by her 
conversion and marriage, and attempted to kill Ubaidulla. The couple 
were miraculously transported to Androth island but again they met 
a hostile reception. When the Androth islanders also tried to kill 
Ubaidulla a miraculous earthquake occurred and the people converted 
to Islam. 60 The myth outlines Ubaidulla's visits to all of the other 
inhabited islands in the Laccadive group. In every case there was a 
further miracle which enticed the inhabitants to convert to Islam. 
56 The hierarchical state is one in which identity is achieved 
through hierarchy. See Kapferer (ibid) for further comment upon 
"identity within hierarchy" and "hierarchical process". 
57 A shrine whose custodian is the Maldivian Sultan, as King Fahd 
of Saudi Arabia remains custodian of the Ka'bah; both are state 
shrines. 
58 
59 
Alternatively 'Ubaid Allah (Forbes, 1981: 83). 
She was known as Hameedath Beebi (Mukundan, 1979: 30). 
6o The spot where the couple were first sighted after their 
miraculous transportation from Amini is marked (Mukundan, ibid, op 
cit). 
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In each of the islands that he visited, Ubaidulla established a Jumma 
Mosque, but he settled and spent his later years in Androth (Kutty 
ibid: 7), where he is now regarded as a saint and entombed in the 
Jumma mosque (Ellis 1924: 16). Ubaidulla established the Khaziship of 
Androth which his family held until 1920. This office was held "in 
the greatest veneration throughout the islands" (Ellis, ibid; op cit) 
and Androth itself is regarded as the "citadel of orthodoxy" 
(Mukundan, ibid: 44). This myth also essays a very clear argument about 
the establishment of Islam on the island, through the miraculous 
arrival of a doyen of orthodox Middle Eastern Islam in the grandson 
of the first Caliph. His was an originary journey directed by the 
prophet, and through his saintly powers he converted the islands. He 
also established the religious spaces (Jumma Mosques) and the sacred 
governing structure (the Khaziship) of orthodox Islam. 
In the case of both the Maldives and the Laccadives, foreign saints 
converted the populations and established the first mosques. 61 
However, while in the Maldives the conversion of the Raja transformed 
an hierarchical Buddhist state into a sultanate, in which the 
transformed sultan remained the new head of the religious order, in 
the Laccadives the saint married a local high-caste woman and founded 
a "religious dynasty" in the Khaziship. 62 It would appear that there 
61 Mosques to which their shrines were later attached, thus 
sanctifying them even further by making them a point of direct access 
to Heaven. 
ez It may be possible to argue that this was in essence, a 
transformation of a priestly caste (Brahmans) into the "priesthood" 
of Islam. Ubaidulla (the Caliph's grandson) married a high-caste 
(Brahman) woman and his male descendants assumed the highest 
positions in the new religious order. This is reflected in the 
current caste structure of the island; the Thangals (moulanas/People 
of the Prophet) are the transformed matrilineal Nambiduri Brahmans 
and head of a three-tiered caste structure Koya, Malmi and Melacheri 
(which governs religious duties). The Koyas are the land-owning 
class, Malmis are sailors and Melacheris are labourers 
(Forbes, 1978: 24). 
The myth has an even deeper level of meaning when it is linked to the 
original myth of settlement of these islands. A linking which 
suggests (as with Ceylon) a pre-ordained conversion of the islands 
in question. The original settlement of the Laccadives is attributed 
to the followers of Cheruman Perumal, the last King of Malabar. He 
had a dream in which he saw the moon splitting in half and then 
becoming whole again. This dream was interpreted for him by Muslims 
in the Kingdom and as a result he embraced Islam, divided his kingdom 
into eighteen parts and set forth on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Ships 
were sent after him to persuade him to return but were shipwrecked 
in a great storm and the survivors washed up on the Laccadive islands 
(Forbes, ibid: 82 ff98, Kutty, ibid: 6). (See Mukundan, ibid: 61, for the 
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is a definite link between identity and the type of conversion 
outlined in the myths. In the Maldives, where the supreme head of 
state converted, national ethnic identity remained intact and 
conversion was embodied in the King. 63 In the case of the Laccadives 
the grandson of the first Caliph of Islam was ship-wrecked and 
married a local Hindu woman and a new ethnic identity arose. Thus 
in the Laccadives the islanders are Moppilas, a particular ethnic 
identity which arose from intermarriage between Arabs and local 
women. The social order of caste was maintained, but the people came 
to constitute a new ethnic category. 64 The Sri Lankan myths are 
remarkably distinct and the saints are clearly not agents of 
conversion. Rather they legitimate a Muslim presence on the island 
and institute an originary, orthodox, Islamic practice. 
4.7 The Question of Identity. ' 
The significance of the Muslim saints and religious practice at the 
shrines has been analysed in a variety of ways. Two major points of 
focus are clear however. The first is an examination of the saints 
and their association with the Sufi brotherhoods, an approach which 
links these religious practices with men. The second is an 
examination4the shrines of local saints linked to particular 
territories, an approach which concludes that the burden of worship 
lies with women. In both instances the "ecstatic" practices 
of the former and the "non-normative" practices of the latter have 
contributed to the overall classification of saints shrines as 
elements of popular Islam. 
views of a rationalist sceptic on this myth). 
63 The process of 'state conversion' that I am proposing shares 
some similarities with Geertz' work in Java but presents further 
analytical possibilities. In fact state conversion itself provides 
both an over-arching ideology which contains so-called syncretic 
practices - "The Doctrine of Graded Spirituality" (1971: 36) and also, 
allows the idea of the state a greater historical role post 
conversion to Islam. Mataram was the transformed Islamic state, 
modelled upon Madjapahit. The conversion of an hierachical state 
allows, indeed calls for, absolute, unadulterated purity at the apex 
- "the Exemplary Centre" (ibid, loc cit) and this is cogently 
reflected in the myths from Java and the Maldives. 
6a The Laccadive islanders are a matrilineal people, but the 
Thangals trace religious descent patrilineally, in accordance with 
the ideology of Islam. See Dube (1969) and Forbes (1978) for 
discussions of this apparent contradiction. 
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The local base of the saints orients many analysts to exclude them 
from normative/orthodox, universal Islamic practice. This raises the 
question of the significance of the saints in the establishment, 
and/or reproduction of distinct local identities. That the burden of 
this worship is often laid upon the women would suggest that they 
have a particular role in the identity and reproduction of the social 
group. In patrilineal societies with virilocal residence this proves 
an interesting counterpoint to construction of identity. The 
construction and reproduction of identity has been a focus of much 
anthropological analysis and I do not deny its complexity. Here 
however I am specifically concerned with the role of the saints and 
the particular significance of saints in the establishment of local 
and/or regional identity. In much analysis of the local saints 
shrines the saint is seen as reinforcing an older tribal or local 
identity which has at some level been transformed by the adoption of 
Islam in some cases and the transformation of Islam in others. 
Unfortunately the case with most scholars is to deny the complexity 
of the situation from the outset and see the apparent contradictions 
as evidence of syncretism. The ideology of Islam is actually 
concretely concerned with the maintenance of kin groups and the 
progressive incorporation of vast difference, essayed in some Islamic 
ritual, proves that initial difference is unproblematic. Those 
studies which deal with the shrine phenomenon as aspects of the 
reproduction of a local identity tend to stress the opposition 
between shrine practice and orthodox Islam at worst, and the 
syncretic incorporation of popular religion into Islam at best. Such 
an approach is untenable from the outset in the South Asian region 
where saints are arguably the vehicles of the establishment of 
orthodox Islam in the region. They establish a new Muslim identity 
and form the base of the new orthodox Islamic community. Another 
assumption behind much analytic interpretation of saint worship is 
that this practice lies by definition outside orthodox practice in 
a religion which professes a strict mono-theism. 
Van Binsbergen (1980) argues that the Tunisian saints "straddle" a 
popular/formal Islamic dichotomy. His analysis discerns a segmentary 
base to kinship structures- allied to a territorial occupation which 
is "mirrored" in the location of shrines and the patterns of practice 
surrounding them. As the segmentary groups increase in size so also 
there are saints with wider and wider spheres of influence. In his 
arguments saints are intimately associated with the construction and 
maintenance of local identity and they have a specifically unifying 
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function. The saints are treated as "ancestors", (though in only a 
few cases are they held to be the actual ancestors of a kinship 
segment) and they are referred to by honorific kin-terms as 
grandfathers or grandmothers of the groups. As ancestors these saints 
require respect. The saints through the engagement of/expression of, 
a local area and/or tribal group - have been understood as reifying 
a local identity in opposition to the universal brotherhood of Islam. 
In fact saints in this ethnographic area have often been politically 
unifying figures in both local and anti-colonial conflicts (Evans- 
Pritchard, 1949, Peters, 1990). 
The Sri Lankan situation is one which reflects first and foremost its 
spatial role in an early Islamic Arabian cosmology. 65 As I have 
explained earlier, Adam's Peak was revered by Arabs as the place 
where Adam first set foot on earth when he left Paradise. 66 This is 
reflected in the Arabic name for the island - Serendib. It had long 
been a site of pilgrimage for Arabs. The most famous Muslim pilgrim 
being Ibn Battuta (who also spent five years married to four wives 
in the Maldives) 
( 983$)1. 
Arab settlement in the island is widely held 
to pre-date Islam. (It is also certain that some degree of Arabic 
inter-marriage had occurred prior to the 1153 Maldive conversion 
also. A fact which H. C. P. Bell argues would "smooth the way towards 
the firm establishment on the islands of the faith in the power of 
Islam" (Bell, 1940: 17, cited Forbes, 1981: 88). That this may be part of 
historical fact for other communities, but is not enshrined in myth 
as cosmological argument is significant. 67 
65 The term "Arabian" is a gloss here. 
66 It is not insignificant that Adam's Peak was the first 
navigational sign of the island -a point of great significance to 
mariners. This symbolic significance may be further strengthened by 
it s association with the Manik Ganga (Gem River) in an island known 
to the Arabs for its rubies. The name Taprobane means red sands. The 
peak stands at the head of the island's four major rivers - this 
contributing to its sacred significance in primarily Hindu but also 
Buddhist cosmology. I am not suggesting a purely functional 
relationship to the significance of the Peak - navigational aid = 
symbolic significance, rather I am pointing out that its multiple 
significances reinforce its original cosmological position. 
67 The critical difference here is that between the conversion 
of a minority or majority of the population. This requires further 
comparative study in the region. 
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The Sri Lankan Muslims have, and always will be a minority religious 
population. Here the action of the saints is to purify an already 
existent Moor (Arab-local ethnic group) and post-Islam, Muslim 
community in a very unique way. In both types of myth the veracity 
of the saint's holiness or his foreign origins is both critical and 
undisputed. One group came from Middle Eastern countries as already 
dead saints travelling miraculously upon the waves to the island 
where they were later entombed at the point of man's origin on earth. 
The others were Middle Eastern Muslims who had come on pilgrimage to 
Adam's Peak, many of whom were reputed to be so attracted by the 
climate and scenic beauty of the jungle that they had stayed many 
years in meditation. 68 These graves were most often revealed later 
through miracles on the spot or simply a revelation in a dream to a 
local Muslim who then undertook to build a shrine. 
Together both sets of myths account for the shrines on the coast and 
in the interior and stake out the entire island as a place where 
Muslims might practice their Islam. They also clearly reflect the 
two major patterns of Muslim trade in the island. Firstly the 
coastal settlements and trading associated with the major trade 
routes on the seas. Second the Muslims who traded in the interior, 
many of whom would have been concerned with petty trade but also the 
gem traders whose business would have led them to Adam's Peak in the 
heart of the gem district. The argument of the myths does much more 
than simply legitimate the presence of the Muslim community on the 
island, rather it creates them as a community located in a particular 
space in an Islamic cosmology. The Muslims here construct their 
history in the context of other communities (Sinhalese and Tamil) 
whose own concerns with their history are profoundly ideological. The 
ideology of the myths explains the cosmological and historical 
attachments of Muslims and their practices to Sri Lanka. It sacrifies 
the island, reclaims Paradise, subordinates culture to religion and 
above all incorporates periphery with centre. 
68 The fact that pilgrims did arrive reinforced the idea that the 
island was significant in an Arabic cosmology. 
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Chapter Five: 
Mosques and Symbolic Cana nities 
The Muslim community of Weligama perceives itself as a relatively 
orthodox community of long standing. A critical component of this 
view is the belief that there have always been Arabic speakers here, 
since the days when Weligama was a site of early Arab settlement. 
As argued in the previous chapter, symbolic connections to the Middle 
East are a significant part of Sri Lankan Islamic practice and 
consequently, fluency with Arabic has great religious value. This 
reputation as a centre of orthodoxy has a currency well beyond the 
town itself and elsewhere in the island people refer to the town as 
one of the more orthodox sites of Muslim settlement; one in which 
young men are trained as religious leaders and where the purdah 
requirements are observed with far more rigour than elsewhere. ' 
Islam is the fundamental element of this community's identity and 
they take their Islamic ideology very seriously. My analysis 
therefore, concentrates upon the ideological dimensions of religious 
practice within the community. Islamic ideology is primarily directed 
towards the creation of the perfect egalitarian community of 
believers - the imimah, and this is also the explicit focus of much 
religious practice. The ideology of Islamic egalitarianism is a 
crucial element of local religious discourse and community practice. 
The community is not however, monolithic in its views but rather 
is alive with debate and contrasting opinions and religious practice 
is by no means uniform. In order to comprehend the reality of this 
11 encountered comments about the orthodoxy of Weligama in 
Colombo, on the East Coast at Kalmunai and all along the Southern and 
South-western coasts. This reputation is clearly generated within the 
structure of understanding of the arrival of the religion on the 
island. I have argued earlier that the South-western coast has many 
sites of early Arab settlement in particular, Beruwela, Alutgama and 
Weligama. (I find it somewhat surprising that Galle does not seem to 
have quite the sacred significance that one might have expected. ) It 
is critical to understand that the current and historical dominance 
of the island-wide Muslim community has been in the hands of those 
on the SW coast and they produce their religious and economic 
dominance through these shared understandings. In contrast to my data 
however, a colleague reports that Muslims in the Kandyan area also 
understand themselves as 'orthodox' Jones, p. c. ). Working as he did, 
within the Tabliq movement perhaps this claim should be understood 
as more fundamental (modern, puritan, revivalist) than orthodox 
(historically legitimated through a direct Arabic connection). This 
latter orthodoxy was itself buttressed by a turn of the century 
revivalism. 
144 
existence it is essential to examine in detail facets of an 
extremely diverse and dense religious life. In this chapter I explore 
organized religion 'on the ground' in the context of Weligama. I 
begin with an examination of the meaning of the mosque within the 
Muslim community and those religious practices centred upon the 
mosque. The mosque encloses a space, where all men are equal, and its 
'order' presents the central values of the Muslim community. Islamic 
ideology represents the fundamental dimensions of egalitarian 
existence. The focus on space and ideology in this chapter leads to 
a discussion of egalitarian religious practice in the next chapter. 
5.1 The Meaning of the Mosque. 
The religious community of Islam revolves around the mosque. This 
is the space at the heart of the Muslim community. There are two 
types of mosques however, and two levels of engagement of Muslims 
with the mosque. The first type of mosque is the village mosque 
where men perform their individual "five times" prayers 
(salat/namaz), in accordance with the second Pillar of Islam. 2 The 
second type of mosque is the Jtmma (Friday) mosque, which all men 
must attend for communal Friday prayers. Each mosque reveals a 
different level of identity within the community as I shall explain 
below. Within the mosque none of the status or wealth differences of 
the wider social world are permitted to intrude. Islam lays great 
stress on equality within the community of believers and Muslims 
constantly state that "All men are equal before God". The religion 
therefore has no sacraments and requires no special class of priests 
to effect its rituals or its individual worship. The mosque, (masjid) 
is fundamentally a house of prayer (masjid - literally, the place of 
prostration), and may be taken as symbolic of the Islamic community 
itself. Ideally the mosque should be located at the centre of the 
village and all Muslim dwellings should be located within hearing 
range of the azan - "the call to prayer", which issues from the 
2 The Five Pillars of Islam are :- (1) The Shadadah (Kalimah) - 
affirming that "there is no God but God (Allah) and that Muhammad is 
his prophet", (2) Salat - prayer, five times daily, (3) Zakat - the 
giving of alms, (4) Saum - fasting (T- narzbu) during the month of 
Ramadan, and (5) The Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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mosque. 3 Thus at the ideological level each Muslim community is 
defined by a mosque and all houses stand in relation to a particular 
mosque. The situation on the ground mirrors the ideological 
prescription. The greater Muslim community of the research area must 
be seen as composed of a series of smaller communities each 
distinguished by its own mosque. Areas of Muslim and Buddhist 
settlement are interspersed throughout the town's urban centre and 
surrounding rural environs. The mosques define the Muslim community 
externally and distinguish them from the majority Buddhists and few 
Christians with whom they share the area. In this multi-ethnic 
context the significance of the mosque as an external symbol of local 
religious identity has been clearly attested to historically. During 
the 1915 riots three mosques in this area were destroyed by Sinhalese 
Buddhists. ' The mosques also differentiate the Muslim community 
internally, into distinct "communities" or villages. This internal 
social differentiation has elements of rank to it, borne of 
historical and current, relative economic and political position. 
This presents a constant source of tension between the ideal of 
Islamic egalitarianism on the one hand and the reality of wealth, 
class and rank distinctions on the other. 
In this country mosques are generally the ambit of males and the 
locale for the expression of male religious practice whilst female 
religious practice is more often located within the home. This 
On hearing the azan women in their houses quickly cover their 
heads with the end of their saris or with their shawls, until it is 
completed. If they are engaged in conversation at the time, both men 
and women stop speaking in order not to prevent anyone else from 
hearing it. Conversation resumes immediately it is finished. 
Two were damaged and one was completely destroyed. The 
Koledande/Palathaddi Mosque, which was 700 years old and formerly a 
Jumma mosque, was destroyed with dynamite. This mosque has since been 
rebuilt but is no longer a Jumma mosque. The Meera Shahib mosque in 
Station Road was damaged and the saint's tomb has gone. Attacks were 
also mounted against the mosque and tomb at Kaparatota (see previous 
Chapter). The mosque at Koledande was the oldest mosque in the area 
and before the building of the "coast road" during the British 
period, all traffic from Galle went through Koledande to Akuressa, 
and from there to Matara, or Kumburipitya and the interior. Koledande 
(Sinhala - from keledande - jungle bridge) or Palathaddi (Tamil - 
under the bridge/low bridge) was located by the bridge which crossed 
the Polwatha Ganga on the road to Akuressa. Akuressa itself, on the* 
main Southern trunk road between Galle and Matarä was always an 
important trading. post historically. 
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clearly divides the community into two groups; male and female. All 
mosques, by definition, are open to all Muslim men and in this sense 
from one village to the next, all mosques may be seen as "male 
spaces" and share an equivalent identity. The rules of matrilocal 
residence however determine that a man, upon the occasion of his 
marriage, will often shift his place of regular worship to the mosque 
in his wife's village, where he will pray with her father and 
brothers. So although we may see mosques as "male spaces", it should 
be noted that in this cultural context it is women who primarily 
determine which mosque a man stands in relation to. A man's natal 
village mosque is determined by his mother and his later village 
mosque is determined by his wife. 
It is the Jumma mosque and the practice of the Jumma prayer - the 
group of men who pray together weekly, that constitutes the 
fundamental unit of the egalitarian religious community. Jumma 
communal prayers are in stark contrast to the individual male prayers 
offered in the village mosque and it is the practice of the Jumma 
congregational prayer which most cogently expresses the egalitarian 
ideal. It is here that men in a similar state of ritual purity, offer 
their prayers as an undifferentiated group. It is here, as the 
ideologues claim, that "the rich may rub shoulders with the poor". 
The rows are filled as men arrive and no hierarchy is observed. The 
class, wealth, and status distinctions of everyday life outside the 
Jumma are suspended, albeit temporarily. Gerholm (1977) argues of the 
Jumma prayers in a Yemeni town that social status differentials are 
maintained and that. 
it would be going too far to describe the interaction in the 
mosque as a truly egalitarian counterpoint to the 
hierarchical melody played on the other side of the walls 
(ibid: l76). 
In this caste based, hierarchical, cultural context however, the 
ideological weight of a ritual suspension of status differentials is 
far greater and the assertion of egalitarianism in the Jumma prayer 
is more radical. 
The egalitarianism of the Jumma permits the poor to continually seek 
the companionship of the rich, on the basis of equality. Because 
everyone, potentially, meets in the Jumma, internal fissioning in the 
community does not lead (immediately) to complete break-away. The 
Jumma acts as a centripetal tendency countering the centrifugal 
tendency of the effects of class formation. Within the Jumma the poor 
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are continually bound to the rich, and function to make the rich 
wealthier. This ideological distortion of reality in Islam may 
account (in part) for the continued acceptance of wealth gaps within 
the community. ' The wealthy, although they may be critically regarded 
by others, are nonetheless protected to some extent by the widespread 
idea "that Allah gives to those who please him", and thus their 
wealth is perceived to be legitimate. The wealthy are also expected 
to provide for the poor within the community and in a sense, 
individual profit, through the Jumma, becomes communal profit. 
It is here, at the Jumma sermon - khutbah that issues of political 
import within the religious community may be voiced and the sermons 
may also serve as a platform for the dominant points of view. Far 
from a situation in which the i1flams - prayer leaders, speak with all 
the authority of Islamic law behind them, there are many in the 
villages who freely and publicly disagree with the opinions expressed 
in the sermons. One imam was consistently declared to be "an 
irritating idiot" by a particular informant and there were -many 
others who took issue with prevailing opinion at various points. In 
Kapuwatta the sermons are broadcast over the loudspeaker and on 
occasion remarks may be addressed directly to the women in their 
homes. One woman told of such a sermon, against abortion, in which 
the imam declared that an act to prevent conception itself could be 
tolerated, but that once a pregnancy was established, to resort to 
abortion was against the laws of Islam. 6 In this instance it is clear 
that the village women are obliquely related to the Jumma and its 
sermons although their presence as part of the congregation is 
neither required nor permitted. 
The village mosques have no regular communal prayers, rather they are 
used by individuals. Men offer their private prayers there within 
the various prayer periods of the day, and the women quietly and 
5 The Muslims from the village of Maduragoda are caught within 
this ideological distortion and do not apply for the government rice 
coupons to which they are entitled, "because the others wouldn't like 
it,,. 
6 Women were able she said, to procure ayurvedic abortifacients 
and subsequently miscarry. I did not establish this independently. 
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occasionally visit the shrines. ' The practices associated with the 
village mosque however, also constitute an Islamic ritual community, 
but one which is constituted on different grounds and which 
celebrates a different facet of Islamic life. The ritual community 
of the village mosque is seen most clearly in the practice of the 
annual mosque feast (kanduri) held at each and every mosque in the 
area. This feast which is organized by village members is a ritual 
celebration of a Muslim community; a community made up of 
kin-groups, households, and individual men, women and children. It 
is not simply the egalitarian religious community of the Jumma mosque 
- the "brotherhood of Islam" that is celebrated here but the 
reproductive Islamic families who congregate around their village 
mosques. 
The annual mosque feasts whilst celebrating village unity and 
identity, are not entirely exclusive and may draw much support from 
the wider area. It is common practice for the many young men of the 
village who often work and live elsewhere in the island, and the 
village men who have married elsewhere, to make all possible efforts 
to return to their natal village to celebrate the feast. This stress 
on returning to the village for the feast has also been observed in 
India (Saiyid, 1981; 135). a On these occasions the village may extend 
its links throughout the wider local Muslim community, thus signing 
both its distinct and cohesive village identity, and its 
participation in the wider egalitarian community of Islam. In the 
celebration of village identity Muslims fully recognize their 
internal differentiation as a principle of unity. It is primarily a 
celebration of a diverse collective; an assertion of a collective and 
local identity. Unity is unproblematic at this level, it is assumed. 
In the Jumma, by contrast, all men suffer a loss of identity and are 
rendered equal. The collectivity that is celebrated there is that of 
the tm mah. Thus the Jumma is oriented to developing a unity of 
diversity. The village mosque by contrast, is fundamentally a 
collection of households, and as such implicitly recognizes that 
Saiyed argues that as women are prevented from "participating 
fully in public prayers and worship (... there... ) had to be a 
substitute for the mosque, and the dargah (shrine) is this 
'functional alternative' (Saiyed, 1992: 254 cites Smith, 1987: 244) 
(brackets mine). 
8 Yalman states that "the Muslims always "belong" to some mosque 
or another" (ibid: 285, my emphasis). 
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these are reproductive kin centres. The village mosque asserts a 
collective identity whereas the Jumma mosque subsumes individual 
identity in the egalitarian ummah. There appears to be a fundamental 
contradiction here between the assertion of a collective identity in 
the village mosque and the loss of individual identity in the Jumma 
mosque. However, as I shall argue in the following chapters the 
logic of Islamic ritual and calendrical practice essays a process of 
continual transcendence of the elements of social identity and 
actually creates individuality in its most autonomous form. 
Figure 5. a : Location of Research Area Mosques. 
In the research area (excluding Horagoda) I there are a total of 
thirteen mosques. (See Figure 5. a, ; numbers in brackets refer to this 
9 The research area proper, is outlined in Appendix A. 
150 
figure. ) Four of the thirteen mosques (2,3,5&8) are Jumma mosques. 
Four mosques are associated with the Arabic colleges where young men 
train as imams (11,12,13&14). These mosques are not considered to be 
village mosques though they can be and are used for private prayer 
by any men in the neighbourhood. The Jumma mosques are both village 
and Jumma mosques. With the exception of Wellipitiya (2 & 2a), almost 
all villages currently fall within the orbit of the centrally located 
Mohideen Grand Mosque(8). This mosque was built in 1814 and is 
located on the borders of two adjacent trading communities within the 
town area; Galbokka and New Street (formerly New Moor Street). 
Visually the two communities run into one another and to the outsider 
are not at all easily distinguished. However there are two distinct 
village identities involved and this is reflected in the fact that 
this mosque has two imams who take turns to preach the sermon on 
alternate Fridays. Each community jealously guards its right to this 
significant opportunity to give voice to its particular ideological 
interests. This mosque also has two Trustees, one elected by each 
community. This Jumma mosque which serves as the central mosque for 
congregational prayers for the bulk of the areas' Muslims is also 
clearly the "village" mosque of two distinct communities. 
This somewhat unusual situation is instructive for it highlights a 
number of points. Firstly, we realize that mosques have a complex 
significance and any single mosque may function at a number of 
levels. This mosque is the site of the largest local gathering in a 
Jumma prayer, catering to approximately 1500 males; the greatest 
expression of ritual egalitarian community within the area. It is 
located close to the central commercial district of the town and as 
all Muslim shops are closed for the duration of the Friday prayer, 
it draws all of the town's most powerful and most impoverished men 
to an egalitarian exercise of communal public worship. Yet, despite 
this, clearly the mosque is not solely about an undifferentiated 
community of Muslim males, for it also symbolically condenses the 
distinct identities of two Muslim villages within it. Secondly, it 
is clear that village identity is an important aspect of Islam in 
this context and this is actively maintained at a ritual level, 
through the annual mosque feasts. In the structure of the annual 
feast associated with this particular mosque the two communities 
maintain their distinct identities also, feasting on adjacent nights. 
This raises questions about the nature of Islamic egalitarian 
ideology and suggests that mosques are not simply "egalitarian" 
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spaces. Rather the engagement of the mosque in the practice of the 
ideology would seem to be simultaneously about identity and 
differentiation. Another way of looking at this would be to speak of 
two distinct types of identity here; identity as a member of an 
egalitarian group of Muslim males and identity as a member of a 
particular village. Gilsenan presents evidence of a similar 
distinction in Morocco between the Jumma and the local mosques. He 
contrasts the sacred space of the public mosque where 
men form a congregation as Muslims that ideally dissolves the 
specifics of self, family and group into what is taken as the 
basic, fundamental identity of membership in the community of 
the faithful (1978: 178) 
with the small local mosques which are 
vital signifiers of the identity of a particular community in 
a particular place (ibid, loc cit, my emphasis). 
This contrasts with Weligama, where all the Jumma mosques condense 
both village and Jumma identity, thus reflecting perhaps that in this 
cultural context a greater ideological weight is accorded to the 
constitutive role of the village in the mosque. Within the research 
area two other more recent Jumma mosques have been established which 
bound off two very distinct villages (Figure 5. a, 3&5). The Jumma 
Mosques at Kapuwatta and Maduragoda were built in 1897 and 1942 
respectively, and on each occasion split a village away from a larger 
Jumma mosque area. Prior to the building of their own Jumma mosque 
the men of Kapuwatta had attended Jumma prayers either at the 
Koledande (Palathaddi) Jumma mosque (destroyed in the 1915 riots) 
or at the central Jumma mosque in Galbokka/New Street whilst the men 
of Maduragoda had always attended the central Jumma mosque. With new 
Jumma mosques each of these communities establishes a new level of 
corporate identity and new relations with the former communities of 
the central Jumma mosque. 
Mosques, therefore, have a complex significance within this Islamic 
community, being both symbols of and for the community. As village 
mosques and Jumma mosques they are the sites and centres of two 
distinct types of ritual community to which Muslims belong, and thus 
they serve to define both actual village communities and the wider 
ideological communities of Muslims. In the discussion below I will 
draw out the varied meanings and contexts for Islamic mosque centred 
rituals and explore their meaning for, and connection with, the 
domestic order. 
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5.2 The Form of the Mosque. 
The mosque is used for prayer by the men in the community and all 
the mosques follow a standard form. In ideological terms the mosques 
here seem broadly equivalent to those of Muslim communities elsewhere 
in the world (Gilsenan, 1982, Gerholm, ibid). The terms used to 
describe the parts of the mosque are Arabic, although the building 
itself is most often colloquially referred to with the Tamil word 
- palli. The mosques are often resplendent with minarets and cupolas 
in line with ideas of Islamic architecture but in most cases this 
takes the form of an elaborate ornamental facade with a much simpler 
building behind. The building itself is most often open, light, 
spacious, cool and inviting, and contains a central room whose 
ground is haram - sacred and forbidden for non-Muslims and women (in 
this instance) to stand upon. 10 The haram is therefore a sacred space, 
but in the sense of forbidden or restricted. It shares an equivalence 
in logical structure with all other Muslim mosques, and Mecca in 
particular, to which it is oriented. It is distinct from the sacred 
space of the adjacent saint's tomb, but together they serve to orient 
the mosque to both Mecca and Heaven. l1 
Men will only enter the mosque when they have completed their ritual 
ablutions (wudu) and are in a state of purity, and women never enter 
this part of the mosque. 12 Within the central haram there is a 
11 When a former' prominent Sinhalese politician could not be 
politely deterred from entering this haram area in one of the local 
mosques, the floor had to be washed with water to purify it, before 
it could be used for further prayers. This reflects the exclusivist 
dimension in Islam yet again. The same logic is applied to the public 
space within a household, before any rathi_b or khattam (funeral 
prayers and feast 40 days after burial) are held there. It is also 
applied to the house as a whole before the month of Ramazan. 
11 The Ka'bah itself stands immediately beneath its heavenly 
replica and is circumambulated continually by angels. Thus the mosque 
is oriented towards Heaven through Mecca, and also has a window to 
Heaven by virtue of the entombed saint. 
12 The Colombo Borah community contrasts strongly with this 
practice. They have collapsed the five-times prayers into four (by 
combining two of them) and on all occasions women perform their 
prayers in rows behind the men in the mosque. The women of this 
commodity-trading, urban community are far more visible than the 
women of the majority Sunni community, and they have the freedom of 
the streets. The most orthodox among them wear a long dress coupled 
with a short cloak (often in a matching fabric). that covers their 
head and the upper half of their body but which exposes their face 
and hands. The Borahs are also reported to practice a more severe 
form of female circumcision - thus signing femininity much more 
153 
mihrab and a minbar. The mihrab is a small semi-circular concave 
niche, the height of a man, which has been built into the structure 
of the wall and which indicates the direction of Mecca - the qiblah. 
A spiritual doorway of sorts, it signs the orientation of all prayers 
offered in the mosque. The minbar is a pulpit at the top of a small 
flight of steps which faces the crowd assembled in the interior of 
the mosque and it is used by the imam for preaching purposes. The 
remainder of the area inside the mosque building is the subject of 
no particular ritual proscription, and traditionally Muslim 
travellers may seek refuge in any mosque and sleep there. This occurs 
locally from time to time but is far more common in some of the 
Colombo mosques . 
'3 In some cases the imam lives in a room in the 
mosque. 14 The outer area of the mosque will contain at least one bawl 
-a cement pool about a metre deep and filled with water. This is 
surrounded by shallow guttering and it is here than men perform their 
ablutions before prayer. Often there are a few fish swimming in the 
hawl which in local opinion confirms that the water is pure and 
fresh. " Islam has no icons and the only permitted form of decoration 
strongly in a physical sense, and concurrently permitting women a far 
greater degree of social freedom. Among the Sunni community, the new 
mosque at Maligawatte in Colombo (a shanty area and traditional area 
of Muslim settlement), has a circular upstairs gallery for women, 
with a separate entrance. Here women may also offer their prayers in 
the mosque and avoid contact with men. Forbes (1983: 69, ff72) states 
that in the Maldives there are namad-ge (prayer houses) which are 
used exclusively by women. Within the research area during Ramazan 
there is a Tharavih House. (Tharavih is a particular Ramazan prayer), 
set aside for women on the New Street housing estate. This allows 
women to offer their Tharavih prayers communally. Another house in 
the grounds of the Baari mosque is used once annually for a women's 
feast, attended by the kinswomen of the founder of the mosque (See 
also fn 37). 
13 The Grand Mosque in Second Cross Street, Colombo, in the heart 
of the textile area within the Pettah (the commercial area par 
excellence), is constantly host to a huge variety of. Muslims from 
elsewhere in the island. These Muslims are in the city on business 
or some personal errand. The village by contrast, has generally drawn 
visitors who have come to see friends or relatives, and who 
therefore, reside with them. The occasional stranger passes through 
on a longer business trip or a pilgrimage. 
la There is an expectation that all Muslim males will marry and 
invariably the imam will move to his wife's house. A visiting imam 
or saint may well reside in the mosque however. 
is Many of the household wells from which people draw water to 
bathe or drink, are also stocked with a few fish for this purpose. 
The understanding is that fish eat impurities. This is arguably a 
local interpretation of the running, and therefore fresh and pure 
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is the word of God, which 'has itself become iconic. Sri Lankan 
mosques are designed in accordance with this prescription but they 
are not elaborately tiled or intricately adorned with the words of 
the scriptures. Most of the mosques in the research area are very 
plain with a sparse and cool aesthetic in common with that aspired 
to in the houses themselves. 16 The vast majority of mosques are 
painted white or green and white, but there are also blue mosques to 
be found. " 
The mosques are used constantly by the men of the community for daily 
prayers, during the five prayer periods which make up the twenty-four 
hour day. 18 Prayers do not necessarily have to be offered in a mosque, 
any clean space will suffice and indeed all women offer all their 
prayers within the home, but there is a greater value attached to 
prayers offered within a mosque. The major point of social and 
religious differentiation between women and men is most radically 
water, that is used in the Middle East for ablutions 
(Glasse, 1989: 422). When performing ablutions, the water is always 
poured from a container if a tap is not used. 
16 It is the modern houses of the middle class that"most closely 
approximate this ideal; being both light and airy. They often have 
the name of Allah incorporated decoratively into the cement frieze 
blocks that stand above the doors to provide added ventilation. The 
older and poorer houses are generally darker with smaller windows and 
high pitched rooves, achieving coolness through lack of light. 
17 The Sinhalese sometimes say that the blue colour is associated 
with Vishnu whose colour is blue. However, the question of any 
possible 'Hindu association on this point is firmly laid to rest by 
the total aesthetic contrast between the mosque, which ideally should 
be light and airy, and the Hindu temple which is dark and heavy, as 
befits a hollow mountain. The Omar Mihular Mosque was the site of a 
major congregational dispute in 1965 when one group painted the 
mosque blue, without authorization. 
18 The five prayer periods are Subah (Sunrise) , Luhar (mid-day) , 
Asar (mid-afternoon), Maghrib (Sunset), and Isha (evening). The azan 
announces the beginning of each new prayer period and Muslims are 
required to offer the appropriate prayers before the next period 
begins. The prayer periods are determined in relation to the movement 
of the Sun, as the calendar is similarly determined in relation to 
the Moon. Observance of the five times prayers varies enormously, 
with some people observing them all and others almost none. The Jununa 
prayer however is always well-attended. Women to my knowledge, are 
more likely to observe the daily prayers, but there are no hard and 
fast rules as to class or sex determining religious observance. Some 
of the most Westernized women certainly miss them, but on the other 
hand I also came across some younger women in the most religious of 
households, who were steadfastly dis-interested in prayers and 
attracted no opprobrium. 
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reflected in the fact that women have no access to the mosque or to 
the egalitarian community of believers. The fact that their prayers 
are always of less value, helps to render them always, less-Islamic. " 
This continually re-enforces their greater distance from orthodox 
Islam in this cultural context, where they are always perceived as 
the indigenous wives of the descendants of Arab traders. 
5.3 Mosque Organisation. 
The overall control of the mosques rests in the hands of the mosque 
Trustees. The number of trustees in any mosque may vary but an odd 
number is the most common. These men are nominated or elected by the 
mosque community and the appointments are confirmed by the Commission 
of Mosques and Charitable Trusts or Waqfs Board, as three year 
appointments. The three year term is a purely bureaucratic device 
imposed on top of community notions of trustee or guardianship which 
have a much longer life in many cases . 
20 Formerly, the trustees were 
often from the families of those who had built the mosque in the 
first place and they maintained an unofficial but widely accepted 
right to the trusteeship. This situation is altering but is by no 
means complete, and the hands of those men associated with building 
the mosques can still be observed not far from the reins of power. 
In the case of one very wealthy benefactor the position of trustee 
in three local mosques is held by his brother-in-law and it is 
widely, but quietly stated, that the original man maintains control 
through his sister. Two of these mosques are small ones associated 
with Arabic colleges and although equivalent in terms of "sacred 
spaces" they are not village mosques, located at the heart of village 
structures of significance. They do not therefore condense within 
themselves any village identity. Thus they are not nearly so 
important in terms of prestige and control. When discussing village 
identity I argue that the practices associated with the mosque, in 
particular the mosque feast, consolidate the identities of the 
various households which surround the mosque in geographical space, 
and the multiple kinship webs that emanate from these households and 
19 The aesthetics of female worship stand in sharp contrast to 
those of male worship. While the men worship both commnuially and 
publicly, prayer for women is on the whole, a solitary and private 
affair carried out in the home. 
20 There were two men who acted as trustees at the Kaparatota and 
Maduragoda mosques for sixteen and thirty-six years respectively . 
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tie them together, into a cohesive and unique identity. Kinship webs 
are a fundamental dimension of village 'structures of significance' 
and influence both political loyalties and business relationships. 
In this context it would not be likely for a man to be Trustee of 
three village mosques. In a second case, the current effective 
"trustee-ship" is held by the son of the family who built the mosque. 
A committee of three trustees, confirmed by the Waqfs Board does not 
function but leaves the control to him. 21 At one level this is simply 
a continuation of the culturally accepted method of mosque 
administration whilst tacitly acknowledging the overall control of 
the Wagfs Board. The contradictions between the traditional 
situation and the more recent, politically egalitarian structure of 
the Waqfs 'elected' trustees are well recognized by the communities. 
This particular case however provokes great anger amongst the young 
men of that community. This anger, which is not often openly 
expressed, due to fear (of their elders) they say, is a reflection 
of the shifting ideological arena which surrounds mosque control. 22 
These young men who have yet to carve their niche in the economic 
field are objecting to forms of domination (in this case symbolic) 
which exclude them from access to power. A Trustee is generally 
someone who is considered both powerful and respected within the 
community and most are merchants in the 40 - 60 year age group. (Table 
5. b) . In the past trustees were generally those men who 
had endowed 
the mosques in the first instance or male members of their extended 
families. The other category was composed of those men who had not 
necessarily made their fortunes as merchants but rather had extremely 
religious backgrounds. However these men were fewer in number and 
tended to be concentrated in the trustee positions associated with 
the college mosques. 
21 The Mosque was handed over to the Waqfs Board in 1958. Since 
that time they have appointed the son to the Trusteeship every three 
years. The other two trustees are his brother and 'cousin-brother' - 
cross-cousin. 
22 They had attempted to "issue a notice" against the family 
control of this mosque but finally gave up "due to their inexperience 
and fear". 
157 
Table 5. b: 
Occupation of Mosque Trustees in 
Weligama 1985 (12 mosques) 
Occupation Number 
Merchant 15 
Gem Merchant 623 
Other* 4 
Total 33 24 
Trustee-ship formerly signified both wealth and religious commitment 
and a particular cultural idea that if one was wealthy, dominant, and 
prepared to endow a mosque - then one was ipso facto - blessed and 
legitimately dominant. " 
23 An actual total of four men here, as one man in this category 
is the sole trustee in three mosques (cf above). "Other"* includes 
one District Development Council member, one Muslim school principal, 
one labourer and one technical officer. Of the 31 actual trustees, 
five are Hadjiars (those who have completed the pilgrimage) and two 
are Moulanas. 
24 A total of 31 men see ff above. 
25 I refer here to cultural understandings of the wealthy and 
dominant which for most people in the island have been formed within 
the understandings of encompassment found in hierarchical societies 
(Kapferer, 1983,1988). I have used throughout the thesis a concept of 
incorporation rather than encompassment when referring to Muslims, 
as this more accurately describes the situation in egalitarian 
societies. Following Dumont (ibid) I perceive individuals in 
egalitarian societies to constitute the society rather than being 
constituted through society. However the Sri Lankan Muslim society, 
despite its internal egalitarian ideology, exists amidst an avowedly 
hierarchical society. This gives rise to a constant tension within 
the community, where there are elements of transformed ideologies and 
shared understandings. (Without further extensive research the areas 
of ideological overlap are impossible to determine with any 
accuracy). Certainly Muslims in a dominant position within the social 
hierarchy were held in high regard by their Sinhalese neighbours. In 
particular, on the occasion of Sinhalese New Year, Muslims report 
giving gifts of money to Sinhalese villagers. In Sinhalese 
understandings it is highly auspicious to receive gifts of money from 
those located well above you in the hierarchy; it augurs well for 
your own financial well-being in the coming year. In these instances 
both Sinhalese and Muslims are behaving according to the logic of the 
hierarchical system. 
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After the introduction of Waqfs control and the formal election of 
trustees, to continue with what was increasingly perceived as 
dynastic control rather than a form of spiritual succession was 
interpreted by the young men in the case above, as "undemocratic" and 
as excluding them from access to power. This situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that these men were disputing the 
Trusteeship of a small village mosque in Galbokka and the adjacent 
New Street community, had elected as their Trustee to the Grand 
Mosque, a 25 year old technical officer. The young mens' perception 
of the situation as "un-democratic" however, was not shared by 
everybody, and there was another interpretation of the situation. 
This particular mosque had been built by a local man as the result 
of a dream by his wife. The dream featured the Battle of Badr 
which is now remembered in the annual feast celebrated at this 
mosque. All dreams are of great significance to many in the community 
and their inner meanings regularly explored for clues to the future. 
Religious dreams are interpreted as minor miracles, as the intrusion 
of a religious truth into the phenomenal world. As I discussed in 
chapter Four, many of the island's Muslim saints revealed their 
identities through individual's dreams. For most of the older Muslims 
in this area the fact that her son remains "sole" trustee in effect, 
is interpreted in terms of a spiritual succession in which the son 
Internal to the Muslim community however, when considering the logic 
of the egalitarian system, it is the concept of incorporation which 
should properly guide the discussion. Within this ideological system 
(in practice), prestige and sanctity go hand in hand. The gift of a 
mosque is arguably a form of accumulation of "symbolic capital" 
(Bourdieu, 1987). We must also consider the idea of zakat -a 
religious gift of alms which blesses the remaining portion. Having 
sufficient wealth initially, to endow a mosque, suggests to the 
community that "Allah is pleased" with the individual, and this 
commands a certain degree of respect on religious grounds. 
Nonetheless class friction introduces tensions into the relation and 
many resent both the economic, and religious dominance of the 
wealthy. (See Thawfeeq, ibid) for trenchant criticisms of Muslim "big- 
men". I suggest that there is also here an element of hierarchical 
understanding in which, the accumulation of symbolic capital and 
distribution of wealth by the wealthy is understood as an attempt at 
encompassment. The wealthy are in a position to stamp their 
individual identity on the community, and this will always give rise 
to resistance. A resistance which is expressed in egalitarian terms. 
Perhaps the whole argument can be interpreted in these terms, simply 
gaining its force from the ideology of egalitarianism, but the 
hierarchical possibility should not be ignored. The question awaits 
further research. 
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continues to discharge his mother's religious vow. 26 This practice is 
therefore accepted as legitimate, Waqfs Commission and the 
introduction of new forms of legitimation aside. 
The island-wide control of all Mosques and Shrines by the Waqfs Board 
is comparatively recent although the idea of Waqfs in the island 
would undoubtedly have arrived with the religion itself. In 1956 the 
government passed The Muslim Mosques and Charitable Trusts or Wakfs 
Act, No 51 which established state control over the island's 
mosques, and itself appointed the Commissioner of Wagfs and 
Charitable Trusts. These political appointments (as all 
appointments in Sri Lanka are) have undoubtedly contributed to an 
extension of a traditionally held South-western dominance and control 
of the island's Muslim community through their overall alignment with 
the ruling U. N. P. The Waqfs Board collects 29. of all takings from 
Mosques and 10% from the Shrines in the island. The Shrines are by 
far the most lucrative category and generate most of the funds which 
are then used in a charitable manner to assist in the upkeep of 
mosques in the poorer areas. "' 
The mosques are administered on a day-to-day basis by an imam. This 
is a full-time "holding" and in many cases . the incumbent is from 
another village and has moved to take up the post. An imam is a man 
who has completed a lengthy period of training in an Arabic College, 
(generally seven years) and has the qualification and title of a 
religious scholar; alim (plural ulema) . Locally however they are more 
often referred to as mculavi. 28 A few are married with families 
26 Apart from the son's obligation to continue to fulfil a vow 
taken by his Mother this also reflects a particular cultural 
understanding of the Mother-son kinship-tie. When engaged in the 
practice of numerology a man will use his mother's name as the basis 
of this interpretative exercise. This indicates a definite connection 
between the Mother and the son's inner being. The Father's name 
confers a clear social identity and in line with Muslims in the 
Middle East the first three initials of an individual's name (male 
or female) are the initials of the immediate patrilineal ascendents 
(FFF, FF, F, Ego). 
27 The most popular (and therefore most lucrative) shrines 
nationally, are those in Gampola near Kandy, and the shrine at 
Dewatagaha Mosque in Colombo. Both are widely patronized by members 
of all religious communities. 
28 The term khatib (katheeb - preacher) is used in some cases 
instead of imam, although they perform the functions of both prayer 
leader and preacher. The term lebbe is also used occasionally but it 
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but the majority are young and single. Another mosque functionary 
is the muazzin who performs the call to prayer. This is a minor 
post, meagrely rewarded financially and held as a part-time 
position. In some cases the recipient supplements his income by the 
sacrificial killing of goats and bulls for households who wish to 
make particular sacrifices and are holding a feast. In other cases 
the call to prayer is an honorary task, undertaken and shared by a 
number of men of the community. 
5.4 The Tariqas. 
A tariqa is a "way" or chosen "path" to God and is followed with more 
or less commitment according to individual choice. The majority of 
men in the area belong to either the Shasuliah or Qaddirriyia tariqa 
and several of the mosques are identified as belonging to both of 
these tariqas (Table 5. c). There is thus no division drawn in the 
community between men who belong to either of these tariqas, and 
membership of any particular tariqa is no bar to mosque use. Only in 
the case of Kapuwatta where the mosque and village are identified 
with the Rifai (Rif fai I iyya) tariqa, is there any visible distinction 
at all. The Rifai tariqa however is an offshoot of the Qaddirriyia 
tariga. 29 The only other tariqas mentioned were the Naqshabandia 
tariqa with a few members in Galle, and the Allawiyia. 10 Tariqa 
has two definite meanings in this context. It refers both to a man 
who performs religious activities, and is also used as an honorific. 
It is possible that as honorifics they refer to the point of origin 
of the individual concerned. Marrikar (an honorific used in 
Kapuwatta), refers to those from the central highlands and Lebbe to 
those from the Eastern Province (See McGilvray, 1973: 47). Mahroof 
states that the term "lebbe" is "generally employed in Sri Lanka to 
denote those whose knowledge of Islamic practice is derived from 
their ascendents while those who have formally studied in madrasahs 
are called alims or moulavis (Mahroof, 1990b: 98, ff44). All of the 
imams in this area were graduates of Arabic colleges and commonly 
called n ulavi. Women also may undertake the training required to 
become a Moulavia at a college in Alutgama on the South-west coast. 
These women may then take posts as teachers in Muslim colleges for 
women but there is no opportunity for communal prayer leading. There 
were two young women with these qualifications in Kapuwatta. 
29 Aziz states that the Rifai are a heterodox offshoot of the 
Junaydi order (1969: 36-7) in contrast to informants beliefs. 
90 The spiritual leader of one other tariqa, the Hakkia tariqa, 
lives in the area but his followers are mostly located in Tamil Nadu. 
The tariqa was started by his father who came to India and Sri Lanka 
from Iraq and is now enshrined as a saint near Madras. (He was thus 
in the position of "orthodox outsider". ) The name of the tariqa 
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membership is not exclusive and indeed it is possible to belong to 
several at one and the same time (see also Gilsenan, 1973: 66). This 
appeared to be more common twenty and thirty years ago than it is 
today. 
Table 5. c. 
Tariqa Affiliation of Weligaina Mosques 
No. Mosque Name Type Tariqa Usage 
1 Koledande 
Mohideen 
Village Shasuliah/Qaddirriya 200 + 
2 Wellipitiya Jumma Qaddirriya 50 + 
3 Kapuwatta 
Mohideen 
Jumma Qaddirriya/Rifai'yya 100 + 
4 Denypitiya Village Shasuliah/Qaddirriya 100 + 
5 Masjithul Falah Jumma Shasuliah/Qaddirriya 250 + 
6 Kaparatota Village - 10 - 
7 Meera Shabib village (some Tabliq members) 100 + 
8 Mohideen Grand 
Mosque 
Jumma Qaddirriya 900 - 
9 Omar Mihular Village - 75 + 
10 Masjithul 
Bat hriyya 
Village Qaddirriya 100 + 
11 Masjithul Baari College - 100 - 
12 Mursiyyia College/ 
Zawia 
Shasuliah 150 + 
13 Al Madrasathul 
Khilurriyyia 
College/ 
Takia 
- 150 + 
14 Al Madrasathul 
Aroosiyyia 
College Qaddirriya 150 + 
TOTAL USERS31 2435 
refers to "the inner way" and thus shares a philosophical position 
with many of the other forms of Sufism. But they also believe that 
all religions are the same and the Qur'an is an entirely metaphorical 
text. Thus for the Hakkia, Heaven and Hell are facets of this life 
and not the rewards or punishments of the next. 
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Membership in a tariqa is formally obtained by swearing an oath 
before the kalifa (khalifah, a spiritual successor) of the order, 
but in practice most of the younger men simply identify themselves 
as belonging to the tariqa of their father and have not formally 
taken an oath at all. Tariqa membership or affiliation, stresses an 
identity traced through males, in contrast to village mosque identity 
which is always linked to female (mother or wife's) residence. There 
are no resident kalif as of either the Shasuliah or Qaddiriyya tariqas 
within the town and these tariqas do not in any concrete 
organizational sense function co-operatively as 'brotherhoods'. The 
Shasuliah tariqa in Colombo (Dehiwela) arranges meetings every two 
months where members may meet and extend their business 
relationships. These meetings function along the lines of a 
religious 'chamber of commerce' where economic enterprise may be 
pursued with partners who share a common religious orientation thus 
providing an elementary guarantee of character. As Cohen states 
"religion provides an ideal blue-print for the development of an 
informal political organization" (1969: 210) . There is no such public 
face for these tariqas in the town, rather the tariqa members are 
incorporated within a structure which for the most part has no 
organizational significance, tariqa membership is simply assumed. It 
is one aspect of Muslim male identity. 
I met a few informants who stated that they did not belong to a 
tariqa, but only one who argued strongly against the existence of 
tariqas in Islam altogether, saying "Muslims are Muslims, and that's 
it, pure and simple! " This exponent of the puritan Wahhabi line 
has not had much success and many other men stated that everyone in 
Weligama believes in tarigas and that is why "the Wahhabi' s can' t get 
in! sz 
31 The figures for usage in each case are not based on survey 
data but are estimates sought from the imams or Mosque Trustees. When 
compared with Census figures they appear too low, but this is no 
doubt due to the large numbers of Muslim males who reside in the 
research area, but who work, and therefore pray, elsewhere on the 
island. The presence of a+ sign in the final column of the Table 
indicates whether or not there is a Qur'an Madrasa attached to the 
mosque. 
32 The Wahhabi's are a Saudi Arabian sect, with a strictly 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, who during the nineteenth 
century gained a considerable following in North India. Their 
practice "denies all esoterism or mysticism, and rejects the idea of 
Saints, including the visiting of Saint's tombs... " (Glasse, 
ibid: 416) . Their beliefs are centred on the principle of tawhid - the 
163 
The Rifai tariqa in Kapuwatta stands in marked contrast to the 
situation above. Most of the villagers state that they are members 
of the Rifai tariqa, and the majority of the young men of the village 
spend some time actively engaged in tariqa activities. The Rifai 
tariqa arrived far more recently in the area and through the Rifai 
Tariqa Association (R. T. A. ) has a definite organisational structure 
and strong village membership. There are two resident kalifas in the 
village. The spiritual head of the order lives in Androth Island in 
the Laccadive Islands and visits on the occasion of the annual feast. 
The members of the Association regularly perform the Rifai Rathib at 
households throughout the Galle and Weligama areas. " 
assertion of Divine Oneness. In their interpretation, the notion of 
baraka suggests polytheism. They further reject any understanding of 
sacredness applied to particular places. Following the ideas behind 
shrine practice outlined in Chapter Four it is not surprising that 
they have had little success here. 
" The rathib is of a similar structure to the zhikr, (dhikr) 
that is found elsewhere in the Islamic world (Gilsenan, ibid, 
Crapanzano, 1973) and is understood as a lengthy recital of praises 
of God and repetition of his 1000 names; essentially a meditative 
process which allows the performer to more directly experience faith. 
Each tariqa has its own rathib and many of them incorporate a 
particular pattern of physical movements and rates of breathing, in 
association with the repeated prayers. The experience of trance or 
higher levels of consciousness is implicit within the practice. In 
the research area the Halara rathib of the Shasuliah tariqa and the 
Haddath rathib of the Qaddirriya are regularly performed. What is 
distinctive about the Rifai rathib is that it requires the use of 
rabans and may often be accompanied by "amazing acts of faith in 
spiritual ecstasy by the mureeds" (Koya Thangal, p. c). This "self- 
mutilation" often involves quite spectacular feats of apparently 
painless yet severe attacks on the body with knives, swords, skewers 
and spikes. The great power of the ritual is held to derive from its 
display of the victory of faith over pain. All rathibs are regularly 
performed in the community and all these performances are understood 
to have the value of prayer. It is only the Rifai rathib when 
accompanied by "these acts of spiritual ecstasy" which if witnessed 
in full, will actually strengthen the faith of the observer rather 
than simply the performer (Thawfeeq; ibid). 
One popular household venue for the Rifai Rathib recitals by members 
of the (R. T. A. ), is at 'circumcision households'. The performance of 
the Rathib on these often large and elaborate occasions stresses the 
religious significance of these events. However the ideas of 
transcending pain through spiritually induced trance make the Rifai 
Rathib a particularly apt choice for circumcisions as far as some 
people are concerned. 
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5.5 Religious Education. 
Another important facility associated with the mosques is the Qur'an 
madrasa (Koran school) for all Muslim children in the area. 34 In the 
madrasas small children learn to recite the Qur'an from its Arabic 
script. 35 There is no attempt here to teach the children to read and 
comprehend Arabic itself; the ability to recite is all that is 
required. Newly washed and scrubbed, with covered heads and carrying 
small painted wooden slates, children heading off to the madrasa are 
a common sight in all the Muslim areas. The fact that each village 
mosque has a Madrasa associated with it underscores the fact that 
the religious instruction of children is the responsibility of the 
village community. Al Madrasathul Aroosiyyia is a full-time Qur'an 
school running classes from 8.00-11.30 and 2-4.30 each day. 
Instruction in a Qur'an Madrasa is a child's introduction to 
communal religious life. Both male and female children attend up 
until the age of puberty. After this the young girls remain at home 
and the boys shift all of their religious activity to the mosque. 
Part of Weligama's claim to orthodoxy rests in the fact that it 
contains a number of Arabic colleges and trains young boys from all 
over the island as imams. There are three residential colleges of 
this type in the town with students aged between 13 and 23 years of 
age. Mursiyyia belongs to the Shasuliah tariqa and is called a zawia 
(Sufi lodge), Al Madrasathul Khilurriyyia is called a takia, (from 
Takya -a pillow; a resting place of Faqirs (Herklots, ibid: 3 71) . 
36 
The third, Baari College, belongs to the Qaddirriya Ahrouhissia and 
" In the research area these schools were always referred to by 
the Arabic term - madrasa, but the Tamil palli-koodam (mosque school) 
is used elsewhere (Thawfeeq, ibid: l8). 
35 The Grand Mohideen or central Jumma mosque in the town has no 
Qur'an Madrasa attached to it. There are however three Arabic 
colleges with Madrasas in the nearby area, all of which hold Qur'an 
classes for the local children. There are also a couple of classes, 
run by women in their homes, for very small groups of children in the 
immediate neighbourhood. 
36 The close links between these schools and the tariqas, or 
mystical brotherhoods is also noted in Java, where the pesantren "is 
both a theological school and a center of mystical learning and 
practice" (Woodward, 1988: 60). 
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was started over one hundred years ago by Mapilla beh Alim Ahrous, 
a missionary from South India. " 
In each of these institutions the boys undergo a rigorous, seven-year 
period of training, which combines both secular and religious 
schooling. The life is very simple and intense. They live for the 
entire time in the college building, which generally has a room for 
them to sleep in, one for the imam, and the haram space of the mosque 
itself which they use regularly for prayer. These Islamic 
institutions represent the pinnacle of Islamic purity - as all-male 
religious environments. The students at the Shasuliah zawia perform 
a Halara rathib each Monday night which is attended by some of the 
village men from time to time. A group of students from one or other 
of the colleges will often be invited to households in the town to 
recite a mowlood and partake of a feast on an occasion of importance 
which a family wishes to celebrate. The students' dress of long white 
sarong, knee-length white shirt and a white cloth thrown over their 
shoulder is very distinctive and they are immediately recognizable 
around the town. The distinctive caps which they wear identify the 
particular institution they are associated with. The students shave 
their heads regularly, an act which stresses their religious purity. " 
When their training is complete, the students graduate in a "turban 
tying" ceremony. On this occasion they ritually deliver their first 
sermon in the mosque. 39 Not all of these young men will take up 
" Mappilla would suggest that he originated from Kerala 
(Dale, 1980). He travelled all over Sri Lanka and started more than 
fifty mosques in his life-time. He is entombed in a small room next 
to the college mosque. 
38 The spiritual leader of the Rifai tariqa is regarded as 
particularly blessed because he has always been "naturally bald" - 
a circumstance regarded by most as a minor miracle. Body hair is 
regarded as polluting in some cases. In the case of a new Muslim 
baby, the head is shaved seven or nine days after birth to remove 
hair polluted by its contact with the mother's birth canal. Some 
women in the area also regularly shave their bodies to remove their 
body hair (see also Boddy: 19B2). 
39 Metcalf (1984: 7) speaks of turbans as signs of spiritual 
perfection and succession. I witnessed a "turban-tying" ritual which 
was attended by many men from the research area and the ulema, both 
local and from Galle. As is customary on such occasions the uleia 
approached the mosque on foot, at the head of a large crowd of men. 
The two young men who were graduating on this occasion, first took 
part in a Halara rathib. This rathib, of the Shasuliah tariqa is 
performed in a circle, the perfect egalitarian form. After the rathib 
they became qutb, defined as the "centre which contains the 
periphery, or is present in it, (... ) a primordial spiritual symbol. 
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permanent employment as an imam in a mosque. There are many moulavis 
who are engaged in business. Interestingly, both these long periods 
of religious study and active tariqa involvement are primarily the 
province of the younger unmarried men. This could be a point of 
contrast with other ethnographic material (Crapanzano, ibid, 
Gilsenan, ibid, Evans-Pritchard, 1949, Gellner, 1969) where the implicit 
assumption is that men of all ages are involved. 
The Table below (S. d. ) indicates the natal villages of the religious 
students within the town. What is significant in the table is the 
island wide distribution of students. There are other colleges in 
Galle, Colombo, Kandy and the North Central Province, plus one for 
women in Alutgama. 
Table 5. d : 
Villages of Origin of students training in two Arabic Colleges 
in Weligama in 1985. (Total 33 students) 
Village of Origin Province Al Madrasathul 
Khiluriyya 
Mursiyyia 
Arabic 
College 
Narammala N. C. P. 3 - 
Batticaloa E. P 1 1 
Hemmatagama C. P. 3 - 
Colombo W. P. 3 1 
Matale C. P. 1 1 
Mawella S. P. - 5 
Panapitiya W. P. - 3 
Anuradhapura N. C. P. - 5 
Kandy C. P. - 1 
Nawalapitiya C. P. - 1 
Kurenagala N. C. P. - 1 
Trincomalee E. P. - 1 
Weligama S. P. - 2 
TOTAL 11 22 
The idea of the quth is the recognition that the function of 
"spiritual centre" can reside in a human being. The quth is at the 
same time a celestial reality, and when actualized as the delegation 
of authority upon earth, it implies a sanctity of the highest order" 
(Glasse, ibid: 327). 
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Whether the students are despatched here by their parents rather than 
to those colleges located closer to their homes may be on account 
of the symbolic value of colleges located in these orthodox centres 
of the South or alternatively due to family connections here. This 
I was not able to determine. 
5.6 Variation in Mosque Organisation. 
The fact that young men, from all over the island are being trained 
here as imams to work in mosques could lead one to assume that all 
the mosques throughout the island are similar in orientation. At a 
broad doctrinal level most of them are, the greatest majority being 
Sunni's of the Shafi school, but there is a strong degree of 
variation in mosque organisation throughout the island and I note 
particularly the differences between the East coast, Kandy and the 
South West coast. In the Kandyan area where Muslims and Sinhalese 
share an identical formal kinship structure (Yalman, ibid: 300), Muslim 
villages may be distinguished from those of Kandyan Sinhalese by the 
existence of a Palliya Jamaat (Mosque Council). This is a body of 
elected representatives (Marikkars) headed by a Matticham or leader. 
The Jamaat elects various office holders and appoints the religious 
functionaries, the Muaddin (Muazzin) and the Lebbe(ibid: 284). This 
council also takes responsibility for "all the public affairs of the 
laity" (ibid, op cit); and thus they act as marriage registrars and 
courts of law. Non-attendance at the Friday prayer in Yalman's time 
(1954-56) was punished by a fine of one rupee. The overall situation 
was structured 
so that the boundaries of a group with a mosque and the limits 
of the judicial powers of the mosque council are co-terminous. 
(... ) all disputes are heard first by these councils, and only 
when the councils fail to make a settlement - which is 
apparently rare - are they taken to regular law courts 
(ibid; 285). 
Thus in Kandy, the mosque Council was a body of elected 
representatives which had a very penetrating degree of community 
control . 
40 
This differs markedly from the situation on the East Coast where the 
Mosque Councils are made up of the male heads of the named 
`0 This situation was confirmed to be still operative in 1984 
(Jones, p. c. ). 
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matrilineal clans or kudis (McGilvray, 1973; 9) .A kudi is a unilineal 
descent unit and this social structure is shared by both Tamil Hindu 
and Muslim East Coast communities although the ideologically correct 
number of kudi s varies, with eighteen for the Hindu communities and 
seven for the Muslims. 41 In both communities the kudis are the basis 
of mosque and temple organization (ibid, op cit) . On the South West 
coast the situation is again radically different. There are no 
matrilineages as on the East Coast and there is no body of elected 
representatives which constitutes the Palliya Jamaat as in the 
Kandyan area. Here it is the male electorate at large which is 
understood as the jamaath (jamaat) and there is no functioning Mosque 
Council beyond this. All the mosques are controlled by individually 
elected trustees. Often the trustees are appointed to distinct 
offices on a committee which governs the mosque; those of President, 
Secretary or Treasurer but they remain first and foremost trustees 
of equivalent status. They may acquire a certain status through the 
position of Trustee but Mosque Trustees have no authority beyond the 
Mosque itself. The post of Qazi or Registrar of Muslim Marriages is 
also held by an individual and the attached duties are not the 
responsibility of the Palliya Jamaat. There is no Qazi court in the 
town for those wishing to divorce. 42 
The radical variation that is found in mosque organisation begs 
some further comment. 43 There seems to be a far greater stress on 
individualism on the South-West coast where originally Arab traders 
married local Sinhalese and Tamil women and lived matrilocally with 
a patrilineal rule of descent. The Low country was subject to much 
earlier colonial penetration and control than the Kandyan kingdom 
and it appears certain that these were the earliest areas of Muslim 
settlements. In the Kandy area conversion to Islam seems to have 
involved both Indian Muslims and early Middle Eastern traders. On the 
41 The number seven here clearly refers back to the original myth 
of the arrival of seven Muslims from India (Yalman, ibid: 282-3). 
42 I assume the nearest Qazi court is in Galle or Matara although 
I did not visit it. There was a local Registrar of Marriages in 
Kapuwatta. I observed the practice at the Qazi Court in Colombo and 
it was explained to me that every effort was made initially to 
mediate between the husband and wife in dispute and to only agree to 
a divorce after three such attempts had failed. 
" It is also an area that richly deserves further investigation. 
It lies however, outside the scope of this thesis which deals 
primarily with a South coast community. 
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East coast Indian Muslims married into a Hindu Tamil community which 
was both matrilineal and matrilocal. Islam in the South Asian region 
has been historically, a religion of conversion and as foreign Muslim 
men married into the indigenous communities so Islam has been shaped 
by local kinship ideologies and practices. Muslim society of the 
South-west coast is highly differentiated and individualist, the 
Kandyan Muslims are essentially bi-lateral and the East Coast Muslims 
are for the most part matrilocal and matrilineal. The marriages of 
Muslim males (Indian and Middle-Eastern) into communities with three 
very different kinship structures produced Muslim communities with 
three very distinct patterns of organisation. These structural 
differences are reflected in the different patterns of mosque 
organisation. 
The property rights and marriage rules are distinct in each of these 
three areas yet in every case residence is matrilocal. Universal 
matrilocal residence, across the island, renders them a very distinct 
community. It marks them as distinct from most Hindu Tamils (not 
those of the East Coast), and from Sinhalese preference. 44 It is the 
widespread nature of the Muslimsl distinctive residence practices 
which indicates most clearly their "Muslim" influence on the local 
kinship structures. This distinctive and universal residence practice 
which makes them distinctive as a religious group within the island 
paradoxically however, renders them radically distinct from those 
Muslims of the Middle East whose post-marital residence is 
virilocal . 
45 
To return to the variation in mosque organisation that I have 
briefly outlined above. It is the mosque in each community which is 
its most potent symbol of Islam, a symbol which itself condenses the 
identity of the community. Given the universal nature of matrilocal 
residence among Sri Lankan Muslims, a factor we can only attribute 
to Islam, it might then be assumed that in the area of fundamentally 
44 The Kandyan Sinhalese recognize two forms of marriage binna 
(matrilocal) and deega (patrilocal). There is a distinct preference 
for patrilocal residence after marriage and these marriages have 
higher status (Yalman, ibid: 122-123). 
as Ahmed (1993) however argues that uxorilocal post-marital 
residence was a popular choice in the Middle East at the time of 
initial Arab settlement in Sri Lanka. 
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religious practice, there would be little dramatic variation. As we 
have seen above however this is not the case. The difference in the 
structure of mosque organisation is clearly a reflection of the 
different community structures within which mosques are constituted. 
I have referred all too briefly to three areas in Sri Lanka and have 
no information concerning other areas and thus I am vastly 
oversimplifying a complex question. However within those constraints 
it would appear feasible to argue the following points. Initially, 
that it is a variation in the original local kinship structure in 
each case, rather than any perceptible doctrinal difference which is 
the more significant factor in determining the structure of mosque 
organisation and control. It may be possible to extend this line of 
argument as there are some indications in the data that doctrinal or 
ideological difference, when it does occur between areas, is 
determined to some extent by the already existent distinctions in 
social structure. The success of the Tabliq movement in the Kandy 
area for instance, may be due to the already institutionalized 
ideology of communal control. Secondly, if variation in mosque 
organisation is a direct reflection of a variation in the kinship 
structure in each area, then it is an undeniable assertion of the 
fact that it is the ccmaum ty in a very real sense which constitutes 
the mosque. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Mosque - Ideology and Practice 
The mosque is the symbol of a Muslim community. It signs each 
community as a distinct entity and also unites all communities within 
the wider Islamic world in relations of equivalence. Mosques 
constitute the central arena for religious practice and the 
establishment of cohesive identity within the village. In this 
cultural context they are sacred spaces linked to both Heaven and 
Mecca. In this chapter I examine the ideology and practice of the 
mosque feast - the annual ritual at all mosques. This is followed by 
an examination of four very different events at four mosques in the 
research area in which the significance of the mosque as a symbol of 
egalitarian ideology is further elaborated. 
6.1 The Structure of the Mosque Feast 
The mosque feast, palli kandoori, l is understood as the supreme 
exercise of egalitarian ideology. Central to the feast is the 
practice of Muslims sharing their food; seated on the floor, six 
to a large ritual bowl - saban, from which they eat directly with 
their hands. In this act they sign their status as equals and their 
participation in the brotherhood of Islam. Within the context of an 
hierarchical caste based society, in which inter-caste dining is 
rarely practiced, this unfettered commensality is all the more 
striking. ' The feasts, which are held annually in all the mosques 
are organized in each case by individual village communities. Through 
the performance of this ritual villagers sign their identity as a 
cohesive unit defined by a mosque. There are two arenas of 
participation in the mosque feast. The men are engaged in a 
celebration as the egalitarian community of Muslim males, and 
households celebrate as the reproductive kin-groups that constitute 
a Muslim village. Both are inextricably linked in an overall 
I kanduri is an Indo-Persian word whose literal meaning is 
"tablecloth,, (Woodward, ibid: 64) and/or "napkin" (Herklots, ibid: 201). 
2 Kapferer (1983: 73) argues that "food is integral in the 
cultural status code", symbolizing the quality of social 
relationships and "in signing the relative status of the parties... 
(T)o share the intimacy of a meal, is to imbue a relationship with 
great symbolic import"(ibid, op cit). To share a meal with five 
others, eating with your hands from one coamon bowl is to radically 
sign egalitarian values. 
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understanding which celebrates the reproductive Muslim village in an 
annual ritual of regeneration. 
The feasts vary slightly from one village to another but follow a 
common general structure, and each feast is associated with the 
Prophet or a particular saint. Every evening for ten days a mowlood 
is recited in the mosque by a group of six to twenty men of the 
village. 3 The mowlood recitation is followed by the distribution of 
ghee rice and the rice is taken home and consumed by individual 
households. " On the last two nights feasts are held in the grounds of 
the mosque itself. The final night sees a large public feast which 
is attended by people from all the villages. On the occasion of the 
feast the street outside the mosque is lined with small stalls 
selling sweets and trinkets. The mosque itself is extensively 
decorated with coloured lights. These completely festive occasions 
sometimes includes entertainment in the form of a martial arts 
display and frequently continue until two or three in the morning. ' 
' In the cases of a few mosques the normal mowlood recital 
period is twelve days. 
a Ghee rice is rice boiled with ghee and coconut milk. 
5 These displays of martial arts may vary considerably and are 
not included in all the feasts. They are however, sufficiently common 
to be considered an integral possibility of feast structure. Dale and 
Menon have noted them at feasts in Kerala (ibid: 526). The Kapuwatta 
feast in 1984 included a kolkali (stick-fighting display) (Sinhala 
le keliya) 
, by a group of young men from Tangalle. Thawfeeq, (ibid: 57) bemoans the decline in the martial arts among Muslims, a factor he 
attributed to their no longer living in "small concentrations" and 
needing these skills as a form of defending "their homes, women and 
lands" (ibid, op cit) . The 
idea of martial arts however is still in 
the public arena. At the Porwai Mosque feast in Godepitiya in 1985, 
this aspect of ethnic tensions was explicitly depicted in a staged 
fight by students of a Muslim martial arts group. A number of the 
students played the parts of Sinhalese arrack-drinking thugs, well 
armed with knives, broken bottles and broken fluorescent tubes. The 
"thugs" proceeded to attack the "Muslim" (the martial arts expert), 
and were summarily dealt with and hurled off the stage, much to the 
delight of the assembled crowd. Thawfeeq notes that the "tragedy of 
the Kerbala" (where the Prophet's grandson Hussain was murdered) used 
to be re-enacted throughout the island, but is these days rarely seen 
(ibid: 56). The Hassan/Hussain mosque in Denypitiya also included 
displays of martial arts in the 1984 and 1985 feasts. When a scuffle 
broke out on the road near this mosque, during the display at the 
1985 feast, the rapidity with which the gates were shut was 
astonishing. There was no idle curiosity, simply an instant defence 
of the group. There is a big fascination with martial arts in the 
country generally. They are a feature of many of the popular Hindi 
films, and pictures of the Buddha, the Hindu gods and Bruce Lee, vie 
for popularity amongst the drivers of three-wheeler taxis, who 
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The details below are taken from the annual feast at Kapuwatta where 
most people are followers of the Rifai tariqa and the mowlood is 
recited in honour of Sultanul Arifeen Seyedna Ahmed Kabeer Rifai. 
At sunset on the first evening the flags are raised, stretching 
between the mosque and a nearby tree. 6 Then a group of village men 
together with their spiritual leader Nalla Koya Thangal, the village 
kalifas from the Rifai order and the imam, gather in the mosque and 
recite the mowlood which is broadcast to the village at large. The 
Arabic recital is followed by- a condensed Tamil version of the 
story. On each of the first eight evenings the ghee rice is donated 
by particular persons within the village, and is taken to the mosque 
as the mowlood is due to end. The donors are generally from the more 
wealthy, established families, and the donation is clearly understood 
as a household gift, condensed in the male head of the family. There 
are however occasions when two or more male business partners who 
have come by their wealth more recently, may combine to provide the 
feast as partners, rather than as kin. There is an explicit 
understanding within Islam that Muslims should pursue wealth, in 
order to provide for themselves and their families, and further that 
the wealthy should provide for the poorer sections of the community. ' 
A common saying locally is 
that you should look after the affairs of this world as if you 
would live forever, and after the affairs of the next as if 
you would die tomorrow. 
Economic pursuits can thus be read as a religious duty, and the 
donors, as business partners or as reproductive kin-groups, represent 
both aspects of the Islamic community. 
invariably display one or another of them. 
6 The flags are not a common feature of all the feasts, in fact 
they appear only at the Kapuwatta and Kaparatota Mosque feasts . 
They 
are a variety of shapes and sizes but are invariably green or green 
and white. The flags are kept at the mosque and are attached to the 
rope on a 'first come-first served basis. It was suggested by a few 
informants that the flags in a sense represented those who attached 
them on that occasion and of course the possibility of providing new 
flags always-exists. 
One donor, a professional cook, and by no means a member of 
the village elite, stated that he was not a Rifai Tariqa member, but 
that as he was "a wealthy man, he must give niyaath" (a vowed gift). 
Another donor also was not a member of "any fixed tariqa" but his 
family had been donors for forty years, and he himself had been a 
donor for the last fifteen years, because his father had made a vow 
"and had been blessed with a son". He was continuing to discharge his 
father's duty. 
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The Kapuwatta feast was first instituted with the building of a 
new mosque in 1886 and there are "traditional" rights to provide the 
ghee rice on a particular night and these rights are both jealously 
guarded and universally recognized. The provision of rice for the 
community demonstrates publicly the family's current social and 
financial standing. Further, from the point of view of the family 
itself, to give rice to the village is an act of religiously valued 
generosity (zakat) which is a means of guaranteeing that social and 
financial position in the future. 
Zakat ("taken to mean "purification" from the verb zaka which 
signifies "to thrive", "to be wholesome", "to be pure"). The 
giving up of a portion of the wealth one may possess, in 
excess of what is needed for sustenance, to "purify" or 
legitimize what one retains (Glasse, 1989: 430). 
There is, of course, some shift in the list of donors as family 
fortunes wax and wane but places forfeited are not easily won back. 
The donors for the mosque feasts can be read, quite literally, as a 
statement of current village rank. It is the duty of the wealthy to 
provide food for the feast and thus hierarchy, in this instance, may 
be read as asserting an ultimate egalitarian value. 
The ghee rice that is provided for the first eight (or ten) evenings 
of the feast is prepared by the donor household and delivered to the 
mosque for distribution during the mowlood recital. This ghee rice 
is always cooked by men, (often hired for the purpose), on a 
temporary fireplace constructed in the garden of the donor's 
household, thus constituting a male domestic hearth. elt is the task 
of women, (both household and hired) to scrape all the coconuts in 
order to provide the coconut milk that is required for the rice. 
Generally the male head of the household, the donor of that 
evening's feast will put the "first shatti" (the first pot of rice) , 
or "pour the first milk" (paal uthinga), in this way symbolically 
signing his own cooking of the evening's feast. To have an elderly 
person pour the milk or 'put the rice', additionally increases the 
family's baraka, here interpreted as prosperity. In this context 
where men never cook at all and where kitchens are entirely the 
preserve of women, the "cooking" of food by men is highly 
significant. On this occasion it is they who "nurture" the village 
with food through the aegis of the mosque. 
8 Ritual cooking by males has been noted in the context of Tamil 
ponkal by Good (1983: 232), and by Kapferer amongst the Sinhalese 
(1983). 
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On the final two evenings of the mowlood recitals the focus shifts 
to the mosque and the feast is prepared there, on specially prepared 
hearths within the grounds, by a team of professional cooks. 9 The 
feast becomes far more elaborate on the last two evenings. On the 
penultimate night there is a village feast with ghee rice and five 
traditional curries prepared from food donated to the mosque by the 
people of the village itself. The curries provided are always 
identical at every feast ; ash plantain and brinjal, potato, dahl, 
achari (a type of uncooked chutney cured with lime juice), and beef 
curry. The donated bulls will be sacrificially killed on land 
immediately outside the mosque grounds, as the prohibitions against 
the taking of life in the haram area extend to the grounds of the 
mosque. 
No individual or kin-group may intrude upon the rights to provide 
food on the final two evenings. The donors are villagers and 
supporters and they may donate bulls, foodstuffs or money, but no one 
person or group is held to be the donor. All donations in the 
context of a feast are regarded as niyaath or nershey and express the 
payment of vows made earlier by individuals. " 
At this point, on the ninth night, village identity becomes 
incorporated in the mosque, and the hearth is that of the mosque. 
While this evening's feast is a village affair, the final evening, 
the occasion of The Grand Feast is open to all Muslims. The crowds 
in attendance are large and van-loads of people from Colombo, Galle, 
These are Muslim men who cook professionally, usually on a 
part-time basis, throughout the research area. Cooking is not their 
only employment nor is it an occupation determined by caste. They 
cook for village feasts, marriage, home-coming and circumcision 
feasts. 
io Niyaath is from the Persian niyaz meaning "blessed food" 
(Gaborieau, 1984: 246) . The term nershey is less commonly used locally, but is most likely a derivative of a Dravidian term, similar to the 
term necca, used in Kerala. "Necc means the act of taking a vow; it 
is a Malayalam word derived from the Dravidian root ner, a word with 
several meanings including "truth" and "agreement". Several variants 
of the word clearly express the concept of a commitment to worship 
and make offerings, at a mosque or to a non-Muslim deity, if prayers 
are granted" (Dale and Menon, 1978: 525) . Locally there is little if any 
propitiation of non-Muslim deities. I observed one family that took 
their new bus to Kataragama to ensure it"s safety - an act commonly 
seen amongst the Sinhalese. I heard of one other occasion on which 
a Muslim family had a Sinhalese exorcist perform a minor exorcism for 
them in which he cut limes to ward off demonic attention. Limes are 
considered purifying by both communities. 
176 
Matara and elsewhere stop at the households of their friends and 
relatives before the men move off to the mosque. The ghee rice and 
the curries have been prepared in enormous quantities and much of 
it is then placed into woven coconut-palm baskets lined with leaves. 
These baskets which are intended for consumption in the surrounding 
households are sold to all comers for a minimum of twenty Rupees. The 
palm leaf baskets are prepared in the same way as the sabans for the 
men. Each has rice and five curries and they are consumed in all the 
households by the women and children. On the penultimate evening the 
village as a whole consumes a ritual feast prepared on the mosque 
hearth by the men. The relations between mosque and village are 
clearly expressed in the pattern of this feast, where the mosque is 
constitutive of both; the households where the women eat and the male 
community which eats within the mosque building and in the grounds. 
On the final evening in the Grand Feast the village as a whole, 
through the agency of the mosque provides food for, and celebrates 
its relation to, the wider Muslim community. The feast structure, 
taken in its entirety is a progressive reconstitution of the ummah 
within the egalitarian ideal of Islam. The feast both recognizes the 
established social order, and at the same time overcomes the inherent 
tensions within it, through its reconstitutive egalitarian ritual. 
The entire feast structure may be read as a comprehensive statement 
of village identity; an identity which has two levels. First there 
is a village identity in the sense of a bounded entity, clearly 
distinguished from the wider world. The second sense of village 
identity refers to the village as a corporate entity; one which 
realizes its correct internal ordering through the structure of the 
feast. The first sense is already clear. I have pointed out above 
that the identity of the village is condensed within the meaning of 
the mosque, and in the annual mosque feast the village as an entity 
plays host to the wider Islamic community. The second sense, the 
village as a corporate entity, is more problematic. The village 
realizes its correct internal ordering through the logic of the feast 
structure. The feast structure has a logic which increasingly 
intensifies the relations between the villagers and the mosque and 
moves the mosque into dominant relation with the village. It also, 
at the same time, essays a transformation within the village; a 
movement from a community located in space around its village mosque 
but internally divided by forces of stratification, to a community 
which is completely united in space and time through the ritual of 
the annual mosque feast. 
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This transformative logic operates on a number of levels 
concurrently and in all of them it is incorporative. The first and 
most obvious is the ideology of ritual commensality in the feast 
which is taken-for-granted by the Muslim community as signifying 
their egalitarian practice. The communal sharing of a common meal is 
clearly a ritual of incorporation; a ritual in which individual 
Muslims celebrate their membership of a wider Islamic community. The 
second level of incorporation is through the celebration of the 
mowlood itself. The evening recitals of the mowlood present the 
prophet or saint as exemplary figures, models for the community's 
intentions. The mowlood (birthday) which commemorates the death 
of the saint in fact celebrates his "birth" into eternal life (Von 
Grunebaum, 1988; 80) . The 
feast is always linked to a particular saint 
and all the food and offerings are niyaath - redeemed vows. In some 
cases the saint is loosely tied to the identity of the village and 
is a potential subject of, and model for, their religious 
intentions. Their explicit intention through the performance of this 
ritual feast is to reconstitute an Islamic community. 11 A third aspect 
of this incorporative logic concerns the movement of food through the 
village community; a movement which successively incorporates all 
village households into the hearth of the mosque. Cooked food moves 
from a series of different and dominant household hearths into the 
mosque and from there it is distributed to every house. The crescendo 
comes in the final two evenings when uncooked foods and offerings 
from every house are prepared on a mosque hearth. 12 The mosque 
becomes dominant and regenerative - or alternatively it is the 
religious aspect of regeneration which becomes dominant. The 
villagers at this point are condensed within the mosque and the 
mosque has become a house. 
The mosque is metaphorically a male house, unlike the female, 
matrilocal house in which all men live. In a context where 
11 The saint of the Kapuwatta mowlood recital, Suthanul Arifeen 
Seyedna Ahmed Kabeer Rifai, is not the saint interred in their 
shrine. These "lesser" saints are attended to during the feast, but 
by individuals and not through the group mowlood ritual. 
12 There were also donations from much further afield. The 
published accounts for the Kapuwatta Annual Feast of 1984 included 
Muslim donors from Colombo, Galle and Matara, and all of the local 
villages and town areas. Of approximately 700 listed donors, just 
under 10%- were local Sinhalese from the nearby villages of 
Wataragedaramulla, Denypitiya and Mirissagoda. Donations totalled 
more than 50,000 Rupees and the cost of the feast was 43,000 Rupees. 
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historically Islam and men are conceived to be foreign, and where all 
men remain foreigners in the houses of their wives, the enormous 
significance of this "male house" should not be underestimated. The 
mosque is the house of a foreign Islam, and the location for the 
rituals which celebrate its brotherhood. The mosque hearth must also 
be primarily understood as a generative hearth, as the domestic 
hearth (identified with local wife) is generative of the Muslim 
family. The mosque hearth, through the annual mosque feast, is 
clearly a metaphor of the regeneration of the Islamic ummah. 1' 
It is further possible to argue that the shift from cooked to 
uncooked food marks a transition from a less pure form of food to the 
most pure; an understanding that is culturally viable for Sinhalese 
(Kapferer, 1983: 74), and Tamils in this context. The structure of 
pollution ideology for Muslims is somewhat different and the bars on 
accepting cooked food from others are theoretically not evident. It 
is a possible element however and worth further enquiry. The logic 
behind the shift from cooked to uncooked food is more readily 
explained as an appropriation by the mosque of the regenerative 
power when food is transformed by cooking. 
The combination of rice and coconut milk as milk-rice is understood 
in this cultural context as a combination of male semen (rice) and 
female milk. Sinhalese Buddhists prepare a dish of set rice known as 
kiri-bat, the Muslims a similar one called pacchoru, and Tamil Hindus 
produce a milky-white rice known as ponkal, regarded as "the epitome 
of prosperity" (Good, ibid: 235). These dishes are always served on 
ritual occasions. I am not suggesting that the ghee rice is the same 
dish, because it clearly is not, but it would be unwise to overlook 
the particular combination of male and female elements (rice and 
milk) as one aspect of the meaning of this food in the context of the 
feast. I note again that while the pacchoru of other occasions is 
prepared entirely by women within the household on the everyday 
domestic hearth, this dish is prepared by men on a ritual hearth in 
the household lands. The ghee rice moreover requires the use of males 
to cook and females to provide the coconut milk, and thus combines 
13 This logic is further extended by the fact that the mosque 
hearth, located in the grounds of the mosque, is adjacent to the 
sacred space of the shrine and the haram space of the mosque. The 
male, regenerative mosque hearth is firmly located within a totally 
Islamic order, in sharp yet complementary contrast to the female 
domestic hearth. 
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both male and female labour and male and female food. Cooking (or 
transforming) these elements creates a regenerative food. It is the 
individual households of the donors which are the sites of 
regeneration in the early days of the feast celebrations and the food 
is distributed from the mosque. But in the final days the focus 
shifts radically to the mosque and the uncooked food offerings of 
individuals are transformed on its hearth and it is the mosque which 
emerges as the regenerative heart of the whole Islamic community. 
The fourth and final element of incorporation, is one which creates 
the Islamic individuals who make up the Islamic community, from the 
stratified and divided village. I have stated above that the feast 
structure increasingly intensifies the relations between the 
villagers and the mosque, and places the mosque in dominant relation 
to them. Within the ten day period the donors move from the village 
individuals (those whose importance within the village structure is 
determined largely by their earthly, economic endeavours), to the 
Islamic individuals whose rights to donate the feast of the final two 
evenings are sacrosanct. The initial "nurturance" of the village is 
by a number of wealthy men, kin-groups, and business partners - the 
ideals of successful Muslim men, (as heads of families) who, in 
accordance with their religious belief - provide food for others. At 
this point in the ritual structure these donors begin the process of 
incorporation of the village through their provision of the ghee rice 
which all households consume. Their position here is one of 
dominance, but its meaning is multi-valent. They signify their 
economic dominance in their ability to provide the food, and their 
adherence to Islamic law in their willingness to provide for others. 
But as representatives they also incorporate within themselves their 
families, kin-groups and business interests. Within the village, 
extended kin-groups commonly have several houses standing near each 
other and as donors may incorporate the labour of neighbours in the 
food preparation, the feast appears to cover different areas of the 
village on successive nights. This gives the movement of the feast 
and its orientation to and through the mosque, a spatial element 
within the village which should not be discounted. 
On the final two days however, all donations (niyaaths) are from 
individuals. In the case of the Kapuwatta Feast a list of donors is 
published and each and every person who makes a donation is listed 
individually. ' Thus all members of a single family make individual 
donations and any of the representative characteristics of the 
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dominant donors are stripped from them at this point. This is 
critical. In its ritual practice, Islam does not merely assert an 
ideology of egalitarianism against the stratificatory tensions of 
everyday life, it creates it. 
The logic of the feast structure re-orders the community internally. 
There is a shift in the donors from big individuals within the 
village to all individuals within the masque. The stratified village 
community, whose internal orders are a product of an imperfect social 
world, is, at a high point within the ritual structure, reduced, to 
a collection of individuals, who individually make their offerings 
to the mosque. From this body of newly constituted individuals arises 
the Islamic order which celebrates the feast; males in egalitarian 
relation within the mosque and women in reproductive kin-groups in 
the surrounding households. It is ultimately in the religious 
community of the mosque, that individual autonomy is realized, and 
not within the social orders of family and kin-groups. 
The feasts are clearly complex. They encode statements about village 
identity, about the relationships between the mosque and the village 
and they engage an ideology of egalitarianism in practice. At this 
point I explore the meaning of the mosque in more detail in order to 
discuss egalitarian ideology. As the symbol of both the community 
and the religion itself, the meaning of the mosque as revealed in 
local discourse, symbolically condenses further information about the 
particular egalitarian ideology that is the basis of Islam in 
Southern Sri Lanka. 
Through an analysis of events concerned with four mosques in the 
area it is possible to reveal symbolic, social and political 
dimensions of this egalitarian ideology as it is engaged in 
religious practice by the communities in which the mosques are 
located. There are four quite different events and they take place 
in villages with distinct characteristics but they are all concerned 
with a fundamental Islamic ideology of egalitarianism and religious 
practice. There are two cases where villages elected to establish new 
Jumma Mosques within areas previously associated with another Jumma 
Mosque, and there is a case where the building of a new mosque has 
come to a standstill over the question of who-has the right to build 
it.. The first case that I discuss however, is concerned with the 
opening of a new mosque, and although community concerns with 
egalitarianism are not the critical element of this discussion it 
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provides great insight into the community meaning of a mosque and the 
rituals of its "birth". It indicates precisely to what extent the 
community and its mosque are tied in a dialectical relation of 
regeneration. 
6.2 Wellipitiya - The Ritual Opening of a New Mosque. 
This village had outgrown its original mosque, constructed in 1885, 
and the wealthiest of the local businessmen had organized and funded 
the building of a new mosque, immediately opposite the original. The 
ceremonies of the "Opening Day" began with a ritual consecration of 
the mosque. This was followed by a small feast in the grounds. After 
this the Jumma prayer was held and then in the evening there was a 
large mosque feast. Each of these events which make up the day is 
examined in turn, for the "birth" of a mosque is a highly significant 
occasion, one in which the community interprets for itself the nature 
of the religious world in which they live. 
The opening ceremony takes the form of a dedication or gift to Allah 
and although a simple ritual it achieves the transformation of the 
building from mundane to sacred space. This is paralleled by a shift 
in ownership, of the building and its grounds. It marks the point at 
which this building and the land cease to belong to the donor and his 
family, and become the inalienable property of Allah. The lands of 
the mosque proper will be distinguished from the garden lands in 
which it stands and whose produce may be still divided among members 
of the original family or granted to the mosque in perpetuity. 14 on 
the same day as the new Jumma mosque becomes the new symbol of the 
community, the old mosque across the road "will be broken" and turned 
into a Qur'an Madrasa. This involved breaking the minbar, from which 
the Jumma sermon is preached, and represents a ritual 
"desacralization" process before the building may be put to other 
use. The building still belongs to the religious community, and may 
only be put to religious use. As a Qur'an Madrasa it will however, 
have male and female students within an area that was formerly 
haram, sacred precincts in this case restricted to males. The minbar 
itself is rendered a symbol of the egalitarian male community, and 
the breaking of the minbar effectively signs the new order of this 
building, which is no longer a mosque. 
14 A dispute has arisen in Kapuwatta over the garden lands 
associated with the mosque. 
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At mid-day on a Friday the new mosque stood apparently empty, 
although there were three moulavis inside out of sight. Faintly in 
the distance could be heard the singing of a large crowd of men. 
There were several small girls running around dressed in their 
finest clothes but there were no women in evidence at all. 15 The men 
of the village, together with a large number of visiting men from the 
area made their way along the main road through the village, towards 
the mosque. They were singing a mowlood as they walked, and alerting 
everyone in the village to their presence. Finally they moved through 
the gates of the mosque and assembled outside the main door. The male 
congregation confronted the new mosque building. 
This was an occasion in which religion and religious office were 
stressed through codes of dress. There were a large number of men who 
indicated with their dress that they held some religious office as 
a result of religious study. One old man arrived dressed in an old 
and tattered silver lame cloak, over a heavily embroidered burgundy 
shirt. He was wearing the coiled rope on his head over a cloth , 
15 I have stated that women never eat at the mosque feast, and 
some feast advertisements (Porwai for example) state clearly in large 
print "THE FEAST WILL NOT BE SERVED TO LADIES". They do however 
occasionally slip through the darkness to observe the festivities. 
Kapuwatta is the clear exception here where a crowd of women witness 
the performance of the Rifai Rathib from one side of the mosque. 
The position of pre-pubescent girls stands in marked contrast to the 
position of women. Although they never enter the haram area of the 
mosque itself and they do not eat the feast at the mosque, there is 
no restriction on their attendance at any festivity and they are 
often in evidence, in all their finery, having come along with 
fathers and brothers. During any mosque festivities they will either 
observe proceedings from the doorway, or alternatively, spend the 
time running, shouting and gossiping with their friends outside. A 
good indication to me of the community's idea of the solemnity of an 
occasion, was the level of restriction placed on my position for 
observation of the event. (See Hastrup, 1995: 55 on self as. informant. ) 
The greatest area of sensitivity by far, was the Jumma prayer - the 
daylight, male congregational prayer. My presence within the mosque 
building on all other occasions, was unproblematic, though I was of 
course restricted to the non-haram areas and observed performances 
from the doorway. To my surprise when I enquired I was told that it 
was not necessary for me to cover my head within the mosque; a clear 
statement of my 'otherness'. This particular mosque opening involved 
the consecration of a new mosque and was specifically held to 
coincide with the Jumma prayer. This meant that I had to observe from 
a discreet distance. The mosque donor explained however, that it was 
rather a problem of what "orthodox outsiders" may think, than any 
personal or local objection. 
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after the Arab fashion and people said he was from Galle. 11 When the 
students from the Weligama zawia and takia arrived the crowd parted 
to allow them to move through towards the front. Someone from the 
congregation outside the mosque called out loudly, and three 
turbanned moulavis shortly appeared in the doorway. There was a brief 
series of exchanges between the two parties and then a communal 
recitation of three rakatsl' before the moulavis turned, and the 
congregation followed them into the mosque, some stopping at the hawl 
for ablutions on the way. The men all prayed individually facing the 
qiblah along lines that were already incorporated into the floor 
design. 
This simple series of ritual actions transformed the building from 
mundane to sacred space, subject to ritual prescriptions. This 
highlights the transformative power inherent in Islamic egalitarian 
ideology engaged in religious practice. In stark contrast to a 
Christian ceremony of consecration where an ordained Bishop may 
perform similar rituals by virtue of the power of God already 
invested in him, here the power resides in the male community who 
gift the building to God. The essential elements for Islam are a 
male religious congregation (by definition egalitarian) witnessing 
their contract before Allah. The first three rakats performed 
communally, took place at the door of the mosque. This is significant 
marginal space, and the congregation who were outside facing into the 
mosque, confronted the three moulavis who were inside and facing out 
towards the congregation. At the moment of transformation, during the 
prayers, none of them were facing Mecca. Thus this ritual series of 
actions is not to be interpreted as communal prayer pure and simple. 
They are not discharging their obligatory duties, they stand as a 
male community with each other and God as witness to their intention. 
16 This man was understood by those I spoke to as signing his 
descent from Arabic traders in Galle. There is room for confusion 
with the dress codes however. At a Kapuwatta feast, a man wearing a 
turban, who was obviously not a moulavi, was excitedly pointed out 
to me as someone "from Yemen". He was in fact, from Colombo, and in 
attendance with friends from the village. The wearing of turbans was 
strictly a ceremonial affair. 
17 A rakat is a "cycle of sacred words" from the ritual prayers 
(Glasse, ibid: 329). 
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What it alerts us to is the power of a contract witnessed by a male 
Muslim community. 18 This building has become another mosque. 19 
When the Jumma prayers are completed the men assemble outside in the 
grounds where a stage has been set up and there are addresses by a 
number of speakers. There are five speakers in all but interestingly, 
not one of them is the man who built the mosque and nor does anyone 
refer to his generosity. 20 The Trustee of the Kataragama Mosque, 21 and 
the Director of the South Ceylon Regional Office of the Islamic 
Secretariat related the story of Imam Shafi upon whose teachings the 
Shafi school was founded. Another man told the parable about 
Muhammad's experience when he first-came back after the Mihraj (when 
he was taken to Heaven one night on the back of a magnificent steed - 
al-Buraq). This miraculous event is one which has originary 
ie The power of a contract witnessed by a male congregation is 
striking among the Muslims. it is also the fundamental element of the 
Nikah (marriage) ceremony. This all-male affair, often held some time 
before the "cultural" marriage ceremonial, is regarded as the 
"actual" moment of marriage (see Chapter Eight). 
19 Gilsenan (1982) in his article on "forming and transforming 
space" does not actually discuss the creation of sacred space as I 
have here. He refers rather to the "effects" of sacred space upon 
individuals engaged in feuds within the village. 
20 On the contrary, I had heard much gossip in previous weeks, 
about the fact that he was "buying himself a big name". Everyone 
believed that they knew the cost of the mosque and lands (36 lakh - 
a lakh is one hundred thousand Rupees), and no-one it seemed was 
impressed. Many people were critical of his largesse on this 
occasion, stating that a mosque "half the size" would have been 
sufficient and that he could have used the rest of the money "to help 
people marry their daughters". This is a reference to the ' dowry 
problem', the custom of providing a dowry being a 'pernicious un- 
Islamic practice', and a particular burden for the poor. 
The mosque had been built in what was billed by the architects as 
"the flat roofed Malaysian style", thus marking a departure from the 
usual style which reflects a Middle-Eastern or Mughal influence. It 
does not suggest however, the development of any closer links with 
the local Malay community. It may be argued to be making a symbolic 
connection with another South Asian site of Islamic conversion. Links 
with Malaysia are a facet of local discourse and when celebrating the 
centenary of Baari Arabic College, local Trustees invited a number 
of religious dignitaries from Malaysia (who were ultimately unable 
to attend). Alternatively the significance of the mosque style may 
be as mundane as the fact that the design was drawn up by a Colombo 
Malay, Muslim architect, who works for the firm which recently 
designed the new Parliament House in Kotte. Needless to say, the 
cachet was not greatly commented upon locally. 
21 Al-Haj H. H. A. Gaffar from Galle. The imam of the Kataragama 
mosque is from Weligama. In 1986 a new set of rooms for Muslim 
pilgrims was opened there. 
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significance in the establishment of the religion itself, according 
to local interpretation (Thawfeeq, ibid: 50-52), and is entirely 
apposite on this originary day. On his return, Muhammad explained 
his journey and the fact that he had seen the seven heavens but apart 
from Aboobakr Siddeek, the populace refused to believe him. Intrigued 
by Aboobakr's faith however, they began to question him at length, 
and as he answered all their questions convincingly they also came 
to believe. The central points of the parable stress the 
possibility of miracles and the potential strength of faith. The 
series of speeches concluded with a recounting of Islamic history 
and finally the customary children's competitive Qur'an recitals. 22 
After the morning ritual and the speeches there was food for all who 
had attended. 
The opening of the mosque was explicitly timed to immediately precede 
the Jumma prayer. This timing is entirely consistent with the logic 
that sees the Jumma as "heaven on earth" -a point of conjunction, 
of the mundane and the sacred worlds, and the appropriate occasion 
for the transformation of mundane to sacred space. 
The day of Jum'a is of the hereafter, and not of this world, 
it is a day of light and knowledge, a day of devotion and 
remembrance of God (M. M. Shukri, unpublished thesis, Al-Makri, 
Edinburgh; 95). 
There was widespread attendance by men from all the villages in 
the surrounding area at the Jumma prayer at this mosque on its 
opening day. This signifies an extension of the Jumma to its widest 
possibility in the local area, and an endorsement by all, of the new 
mosque. The evening feast, which followed the pattern I have outlined 
above marked the transition of the mosque into community use. 
The small feast immediately following the morning's ritual, and the 
very first food provided in connection with this mosque was entirely 
different to that usually provided in the context of a mosque feast. 
The bulk of this food (pacchoru [milk-rice], maldive fish sambol and 
rotti), had been prepared by the women and sent along to the mosque 
for distribution. There was also a mutton curry, prepared in the 
grounds by the men. In this cultural context both milk rice and fish 
are to be read as symbols of fertility, with a particular connotation 
of "birth". Both items are included in all aqiqa (head-shaving) and 
22 These Qur'an recitals for boys and girls, are an aspect of 
. many of 
the community's celebrations. 
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naming ceremonies for new Muslim babies, all circumcision households 
(whether a public feast is held or not), and all feasts which 
celebrate the consummation of new marriages. Respectively these 
rituals signify the birth of a new Muslim child, the birth of a newly 
circumcised, therefore marriageable young man at puberty, and the 
birth of a new Muslim marital union. In each case it is a new Muslim 
potential or fertility that is recognized. The rotti signifies a gift 
of female fertility to the mosque. 23 Mutton curry is usually a 
special dish of domestic occasions, and never used in a mosque feast. 
However, on this occasion, this "domestic" dish is prepared by men 
in the grounds of the mosque. Its inclusion here is entirely 
consistent with a logic of birth celebrations. Each new-born child 
should have a goat sacrificed on its behalf on the occasion of its 
agiga. 24 The first feast of the new mosque, must be interpreted as a 
"birth" feast, sharing the specific ritual dishes (in particular 
pacchoru and fish) of all other "births" in the community. In 
addition however, there is the required sacrifice of a goat, and 
preparation of a mutton curry on the mosque hearth, by the men, and 
the gift of rotti prepared on the household hearths of the women. 
In radical distinction to normal mosque feast practice the 
household hearths of the village women are combined in fruitful 
relation with the collective hearth of the men in this first mosque 
feast. This conjunction of foods which are symbolic of fertility and 
male and female reproductive capacity is logically required for the 
"birth" of a new mosque. The first feast is a powerful symbol of 
reproductive village unity and identity, an identity which is 
condensed in the symbol of the new mosque itself. 
6.3 Rapuwatta - Coninun ty Cooperation Builds a New Mosque. 
In this instance a village that had no mosque of its own, built a 
new Jumma mosque and subsequently, established a branch of the Rifai 
27 An extended discussion of the significance of rotti is 
included in Chapter Seven. 
24 This is not a ritual performed by most families in the area, 
but knowledge of the requirement is wide-spread. While the goat on 
this occasion was sacrificed in the morning, the cattle for the 
evening feast were left standing in an adjacent field until after the 
first feast. The cooks then had to work rapidly all afternoon to 
prepare the evening feast. 
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tariqa which was new to the area. 25 In this process they effectively 
re-negotiated their status vis-a-vis the established orthodoxy 
located in Galbokka, and established a distinct village identity from 
Koledande, where they had formerly attended Jumma prayers. 
During the late nineteenth century there was an economic struggle 
going on between the local villages, at the same time as the economy 
of the island itself was transforming. In the research area, 
religious discourse and claims to orthodoxy formed one of the arenas 
in which this struggle took place. I have argued that Kapuwatta 
historically stood in a subordinate relation, in economic and 
religious terms, to other villages in the area. Economic dominance 
is interpreted in part, as religiously legitimated and in local 
practice, economic success is generally followed by increased 
religious observance. Through Kapuwatta's establishment of a 
separate and cohesive identity, condensed within their own Jumma 
mosque, they were able to renegotiate their economic and religious 
relations. 
This village had no mosque at this time and through their engagement 
of an influential and charismatic religious outsider, they succeeded 
in building a Jumma mosque and establishing themselves as 
independently orthodox. The story of the building of the mosque 
highlights a number of themes which appear consistently in the 
history of Islam in the South and West of the island and indicate the 
direction of religious consolidation. Two of these themes are the 
"drawing in" of religious orthodoxy from outside in order to purify 
local religious experience and concomitantly a widespread 
understanding that signs "Middle Eastern" dress and a facility with 
Arabic as clear evidence of religious knowledge. These themes are 
constant metaphors of the understanding of the original arrival of 
the religion with Arab traders. 
In the 1880's a group of Sri Lankan Muslims were attending a 
religious festival in Hyderabad and while there they were very 
impressed with the religious knowledge, and ability to speak and 
write Arabic, of a man they encountered. He was Seyed Mohammed Rifai 
Moulana Kolylad from Androth Island off the coast of Kerala. 
25 Also at this time relatively new to the island. There have 
since been branches of the Rifai tariqa established in Matara, 
Godepitiya, Colombo, and Kandy. 
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As a matter of fact he had such a stately figure and in his 
flowing robes looked every inch an aristocratic Arab and 
everyone thought him to be so (Nalla Koya Thangal, 1985, p. c. ). 
They invited him to travel back to Sri Lanka. This he did and he 
attended the Buhari Feast, the annual religious festival and feast 
at the Beruwela mosque. It was here that he was seen by some men from 
Kapuwatta and Godepitiya who were equally impressed with his 
demeanour, and they invited him to come to Kapuwatta to visit and 
instruct them. In another version of the story it was stated that 
this Seyyed had come to Godepitiya to the Porwai Mosque "to see his 
relation buried in the tomb there". At this time a Kapuwatta man, one 
Noohu Lebbe, was visiting there and he had called to the Seyyed 
(Rifai Moulana) saying "Come Thangal, to Kapuwatta because there are 
Muslims there, but they have no place to pray to Allah". The Thangal 
duly came to Kapuwatta and made a mosque from cadjan (woven coconut 
leaves). He returned a year later to build a small cement mosque. On 
this occasion he brought with him, his elder brother's son 
(nki=nnahan), Seyyed Mohammed Faleel Fookoya Thangal, who was a 
sixteen year old student. Rifai Moulana charged the boy to rebuild 
the mosque and make it bigger as soon as he was able. After Rifai 
Moulana's death, Faleel Fookoya spent many years rebuilding the 
mosque . 
Z6 The mosque that he completed is the current Kapuwatta 
Mohideen Jumma Mosque. He was assisted in the building by Rifai 
Moulana Yoosuf Koya Thangal who later died in Galle, but was buried 
in the Kapuwatta Mosque where his tomb is now in the shrine. 
Seyyed Faleel Fookoya Thangal is locally known as "rice moulana" or 
"ration Moulana" because in order to build the mosque he had each 
of the eighty families in the village keep a small "till". As the 
women cooked each meal they would take measures of rice for each 
member of the household, and at the same time place a measure in the 
till. At the end of each week this rice was taken to the mosque and 
from there it was sold to the wealthy people of the village and the 
money collected was put aside for the building of the mosque. This 
Moulana is remembered well for his single-mindedness and during all 
the periods he spent in Kapuwatta over the years building the 
mosque, he refused to open any letters from home, saying that he did 
not want to be distracted from God's work. This also signs the 
originary nature of his work. 
ze This was between 1913 and 1927. 
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From the time of the initial invitation to the Moulana to come to 
Kapuwatta for the spiritual benefit of the Muslims living there, this 
Androth Island family has established a position of religious 
dominance within this community. 27 Seyyed Mohammed Rifai Moulana, as 
orthodox outsider, was initially responsible for constructing the 
first village Jumma Mosque which gave the village its primary symbol 
of distinct and independent religious identity, no longer encompassed 
by the Galbokka or Koledande Jumma Mosques . 
28 The power and religious 
authority of the Moulana helped to confirm Kapuwatta's identity as 
an independent religious community with its own Jumma mosque. The 
introduction of the Rifai tariqa made it radically distinct. 
This event is also a further elaboration of the metaphor of food, as 
constitutive of relations. This is the fundamental logic which 
underlies the ritual commensality of the mosque feast and which 
appears in a different form in the cases of new mosque constitution. 
The use of daily offerings of household rice to build the communal 
house of prayer is richly symbolic of the community constituting its 
mosque. This concept is regularly elaborated in the structure of 
27 The Androth Island Moulanas are also the spiritual leaders 
of Rifai groups in Colombo, Godepitiya, Matara and Singapore. 
28 In their move into Kapuwatta they disturbed the local 
religious hierarchy. There were a number of Moulana families living 
in the research area (especially in New Street but also in 
Wellipitiya) and they were highly regarded. Prior to this however 
there had been no Moulanas in Kapuwatta. Cited locally as a 
fundamental obstacle to the spread of the Rifai, is the rivalry 
caused when other centres of religious/social power (resident 
moulanas) felt that their status was lowered by the arrival of a new 
and powerfully active Moulana. The Moulanas in New Street and 
wellipitiya apparently organized some opposition but the power 
struggle was short-lived. A challenge was offered to Koya Thangal 
by way of an invitation to a religious discussion and debate. Not one 
to mince his words he declared to his protagonist "When you say 
anything Yes -I will say No. If you say anything No -I will say 
Yes! " With that all the assembled decided that he must be a highly 
educated man and they dispersed without further argument. 
The opposition within Kapuwatta itself was slight but harshly dealt 
with. There are numerous stories of attempts to cross the Moulana all 
of which ended in disaster for the ill-wishers (from cats destroying 
party feasts to a stroke for one man who told the Moulana to shut- 
up! ),. (See also Misra et al, for a discussion of the Lakshadweep 
Thangals expertise in witchcraft 1981: 233). 
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the annual mosque feast, but the very real links between the village 
and the mosque are much more sharply revealed in the case of a new 
mosque. The Kapuwatta case is somewhat different from that of 
Wellipitiya above, where the new mosque was endowed by a single 
wealthy village benefactor, but the association between the realm 
of the domestic and that of the village mosque is again signified 
through the metaphor of food. 
6.4 Maduragoda - Mosque Aesthetics and Religious, Politics 
The members of this out-caste village also chose to build a new Jumma 
mosque and remove themselves from the arena of the Galbokka/New 
Street sphere of influence. This event reveals another element in the 
local discourse on egalitarianism, where villagers chose to both 
assert their distinct identity and underline their own orthodoxy in 
a radical mosque structure. 
The site of the village immediately across the canal from the New 
Street area meant that the old Denypitiya Mosque was used for daily 
prayers, both by the Maduragoda villagers and some of the men from 
New Street for whom it was closer than the central Jumma Mosque. At 
that time the mosque and the associated burial grounds were located 
clearly within the Maduragoda village boundaries, but the new road 
to Akuressa (circa 1940) cut right through the village, splitting 
a third of the land area, from the rest of the village. In 1941, 
a series of disputes arose between the people of Maduragoda and 
members of the majority Muslim community of Galbokka and New Streets, 
over the trusteeship and control of the old Denypitiya mosque. After 
a series of "lockouts", occupations, a robbery and minor brawls, 
events escalated to the point where a man was stabbed and a number 
of court cases followed. As a result of this struggle for control, 
the Waqfs Board confirmed the new Trustees but the Maduragoda people 
obviously felt at that time that they should establish themselves 
independently of outside control and chose to build a new village 
mosque, which was also a Jumma mosque. The space they chose was in 
the heart of that section of the old village that remained undivided 
by the new road. 29 No men from the wider community were likely to 
drop in and offer prayers at this avowedly Ande village mosque. The 
Denypitiya mosque was of course, still available for their use. 
29 The land for the village mosque was donated by the pari-yari. 
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Further, in choosing to make their new village mosque a Jumma mosque 
the villagers declared themselves totally self-sufficient and 
subordinate to no-one. 
All the mosques in the area, whether elaborate or simple, large or 
small, are rectangular buildings with a small niche, mihrab which 
indicates the qiblah (direction of Mecca) and the focus of all 
prayer. In stark contrast the Maduragoda mosque is a five-sided 
building, in which two entire walls are angled to indicate the 
qiblah. Alternatively the mihrab, rather than being a niche in one 
wall, has become the dominating feature of the mosque aesthetic. A 
solution to an ideological contradiction has here been given 
permanent architectural form. 
. Figure 
6a: The Maduragoda Mosque. 
As out-castes, the Ande suffer continually the contradictions of 
their egalitarian religion on the one hand, and their utter 
subordination to the rest of the Muslim community, on the other. Both 
their creativity and the abject clarity of their ideological 
statement to the wider Muslim community must be appreciated, in the 
design of their mosque. Not only do they sign their independence with 
a separate Jumma mosque, but through the orientation of the entire 
mosque towards Mecca, their own orientation to the religion itself, 
and its egalitarian ideology, is given added emphasis. 30 
30 Their commitment to a new orthodoxy may also be observed in 
the new annual feast, instituted with the new mosque. The feast at 
Denypitiya was (and still is) focussed upon the Hassan/Hussain 
mowlood, and is celebrated in Muharram. This feast, in former times 
also incorporated a procession of wooden structures adorned with 
lights, which travelled from this mosque to Kaparatota mosque and 
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The Denypitiya mosque was rebuilt in 1977 immediately opposite the 
village of Maduragoda. It was a very grand affair and located right 
on the new road in a very public space. It was built by the same man 
who built the Wellipitiya mosque above, and he asked the people of 
Maduragoda if they would. sometimes use it for their daily prayers. 31 
They replied that "they had their own mosque and that was enough". 
Their interpretation of his request, was that he wished to place them 
in allegiance to him. Given their total economic dependence on the 
wider community, simply for the chance of employment as out-castes; 
aside from the begging that many of them are forced to resort to, 
their symbolic assertion of distinct identity, carries within it, the 
assertion of the desire for economic and social independence. 
6.5 Galbokka/New Street - Who Builds the New Mosque? 
The capacity of the town's old central Jumma mosque is severely 
stretched during the Jumma prayers these days. A number of years ago 
the community began collecting funds in order to replace this mosque 
with a much bigger one. Building began, and a three sto, 
open-sided, rather flimsy cement structure was erected before funds 
ran out. What was built is not yet suitable for use so the. crowds 
continue to gather in the old mosque and the shell of the intended 
new one stands empty next. door. Apparently the Waqfs Board stepped 
in and asked the Wellipitiya benefactor of the two cases above, if 
he would assist with the completion of the new mosque for the benefit 
of the entire community. It is said that he agreed to do so but had 
found that it was not architecturally feasible to continue with the 
already established structure, and that it would have to be pulled 
returned. (This in essence traversed the section of the coast than 
ran along the entire Bay. ) The structures were ships, horses, and 
commonly an elaborate "cage" -a kudu, according to those who recall 
them. This element of the festivities was locally regarded by some 
as having Hindu overtones and has been dropped within the last 
twenty-five years. (One informant, an educated Moulavi and also a 
moulana, who described himself as a 'young Turk' said that he and 
a friend had made it their business to stamp out the structures. 
Other informants said that the kudu was only dropped because of the 
new electric lines which prevented them from carrying these large 
structures safely on the roads. ) The new feast at Maduragoda is held 
in the month of Rajab, and the Subharn mowlood is recited. This is 
the story of the Prophet himself, the prime exemplar of Islamic life. 
31 He is apparently not regarded as the mosque donor in this 
instance as he only paid for the "enlargement" of the mosque. 
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down and an entirely new building designed by an architect built in 
its place. The community of the mosque however, has rejected this 
offer of assistance since it would involve the destruction of their 
efforts to date. In their understandings, the structure that stands, 
currently unfinished and therefore unused, also stands as a tangible 
symbol of community co-operation and community intentions to provide 
themselves with a new house of prayer. To demolish this would be to 
entirely negate their efforts. A stalemate results. 
It is obvious in this situation that contributing to the building of 
a mosque has a personal significance to those involved. The 
understanding is that a type of merit accrues on account. of deeds 
such as these. To have the wealthy outsider intrude here would place 
him in a relation of symbolic dominance over the oldest and perhaps 
most broadly based section of the Muslim bourgeoisie. This dominance, 
symbolic or otherwise, they will not permit. Having nothing more than 
the shell of a mosque but remaining unsubordinated is the better 
option. They argue that the shell stands as a testament to community 
effort, thus stressing egalitarian ideals. This is not merely a case 
of crying false allegiance to an egalitarian ideal in order to remain 
sovereign; rather, it is critical if they are to maintain relations 
of equivalence vis-a-vis the Wellipitiya man. 
6.6 The Ideology of Egalitarianism. 
Each of the four cases above illustrates certain interpretations of 
the ideology of egalitarianism as it is employed in practice. In the 
case of the new mosque at Wellipitiya the communal participation in 
the rituals which transform the building into a mosque and celebrate 
its "birth" were discussed. One of the most striking elements of the 
ritual was the transformation of the mosque building from mundane 
into sacred space. The very simplicity of the ritual action was a 
clue to the enormous transformative capacity embodied within the male 
egalitarian community. As the body of men confronted the three imams 
within the mosque and prayed across the threshold of the building, 
so their actions and intentions were witnessed by the male religious 
community and the transformation of space was effected. 
The cases of Kapuwatta and Maduragoda, where each village chose to 
separate themselves as a community through the building of a new 
Jumma mosque illustrates clearly the inherent tensions within a 
community which professes an egalitarian ideology and is constantly 
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split by class tensions. In both cases this tension was resolved 
through the construction of a new mosque. The fourth case of the new, 
but as yet unfinished central Jumma mosque'represents a different 
aspect of this tension and one to which no solution has yet been 
found. The situation here is more radical than in either of the two 
village cases discussed above. In each of those cases, a village 
which became dis-satisfied with the current expression of class 
tensions and its own position within the larger Jumma community, was 
able to collaborate as a body and establish a new smaller, but 
independent Jumma mosque. In Kapuwatta for example they actively 
asserted a new religious orthodoxy within the area and with their 
own claims to orthodoxy they were better able to compete in that 
arena of symbolic power which "legitimates" economic success. In 
Maduragoda they made a permanent statement in the aesthetic form of 
their mosque which they radically oriented towards Mecca. In the case 
of the central Jumma mosque which is host to the largest Jumma 
grouping in the area and condenses two village identities within it, 
a single dominant outsider threatens (in effect) to negate their 
independence entirely, and provide them with, and thus symbolically 
dominate them through, a new mosque. An analysis of this "symbolic 
domination" on the part of an outsider is not my immediate concern, 
rather I am interested in the contradictions experienced within the 
community. 
These contradictions, which develop between the ideology of 
egalitarianism and the constant forces of stratification, are 
experienced by individuals in a very powerful and immediate form. The 
contradictions arise in the individual's life in the form of personal 
or family feuds, disputes over the trusteeships or other political 
disagreements. These newly created social distances may be handled 
indefinitely in the wider social milieu where parties may cease to 
contact each other. The situation however becomes problematic within 
the context of the Jumma mosque. One man I knew in the research area, 
of otherwise exemplary religious observance had, as the result of a 
long running family feud, stopped attending the Jumma prayer 
altogether. He explained that if he prayed behind this other man, 
with a "heavy heart", then his own prayers would be invalidated. The 
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intention of the individual is at all times critical within Islamic 
understandings. " 
Gilsenan provides a similar example from Lebanon where two families 
with a history of blood feud, both avoid the Jumma mosque where they 
"would have to "see" each other and could not "pretend not to notice" 
(1993; 167). The sanctuary of the mosque is not inviolable and the 
implication is that these families, should they confront each other 
would be obliged to fight on account of their honour. What is at 
stake for the individual in each example is somewhat different. In 
the second case it is the honour, of the man and of his family. In 
the first it is primarily the invalidation of his prayers and the 
failure to discharge his fundamental obligations as a Muslim that 
represents such an incursion into his integrity as an individual. 
Through the embodiment of the tensions and jealousies, feuds and 
bitterness, often the product of class friction, individuals when 
they confront each other at the Jumma prayer, in egalitarian and 
sacred space, negate each others prayers. The very essence of Islam 
is an individual surrender to God and individual worship. When 
individuals begin to experience their own rivalries and jealousies 
as rendering their worship invalid it is entirely logical that they 
should seek to remedy this situation through the construction of a 
separate mosque. Through the establishment of a separate identity and 
a separate and sacred space they again render their prayers valid and 
their duty done. I am not seeking to reduce class tensions and 
sociological phenomena to the level of individual explanations 
rather I am merely seeking to include individual subjective 
experience as a critical dimension in this particular argument. An 
egalitarian ideology is concerned with a world made up of individuals 
and within its own logic has a tendency to seek explanations at the 
individual level. 
32 The performance of prayers or the completion of the Hajj 
pilgrimage alone is insufficient, the intention must be correct. Thus 
I met many young men who while working in the Middle East had 
completed the Hajj pilgrimage but remained unsure as to whether or 
not it had been accepted, and their duty to "perform the Hajj 
pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime" fulfilled. 
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Chapter Seven : 
Calendrical Ritual. 
The Islamic calendar engages Sri Lankan Muslims in a set of rituals 
which they perform in conjunction with the rest of the Muslim world. 
These calendrical religious practices also reveal the articulation 
of the mosque with the domestic order through communal ritual. An 
examination of the ritual process' of the calendar in the research 
area, highlights aspects of an ideology of individualism hitherto 
undiscussed. This chapter outlines these arguments and examines some 
of the cosmological ideas which underlie them. ' 
7.1 The Calendar. 
The calendar is first and foremost ontological. It maps out a complex 
horizon to Muslim being. The ideology of the Islamic calendar, 
regardless of the extent to which it is stressed, transformed, or 
subordinated to particular cultural contexts, which may have 
calendrical imperatives of their own, remains an undeniable facet 
of universal Islamic life. Muslims the world over fast during Ramazan 
and individuals from a multitude of diverse countries make the Hajj 
pilgrimage to Mecca. The calendar ties the Muslim community together 
in time and its requisite rituals draw individuals and interpretation 
from diverse cultures into the world-wide community of believers. 
The calendar is by its very nature regenerative. The Muslim calendar 
is a lunar calendar and is not tied to agricultural seasons, indeed 
over time it bears no relation to them at all. It is to be expected 
that where cultures are engaged in agricultural production their 
relations to both an agricultural calendar and a Muslim calendar 
would be more complex (see Bourdieu, 1977). Within a community that 
has no agricultural base however, the regenerative aspects of Islamic 
calendrical ritual may be sharpened at the ideological level. This 
I argue is the case in the research area where most Muslims are 
1 These ideas are but a small part of wider arguments 
concerning the cosmological beliefs of Muslims in Sri Lanka and the 
extent to which they reflect both Islamic ideas and elements of 
Buddhist and Hindu myths and logics. There are many examples of 
Muslim myths modelled on earlier Buddhist versions but this analysis 
lies outside the scope of the thesis. 
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traders and in this instance it is clearly the Muslim community 
itself which is regenerated. 2 
The calendar has a complex, lived reality in this cultural context. 
The local feast calendar is made up of the annual mosque feasts which 
always start on the 10th of a particular month and which move in a 
visible cycle throughout the immediate geographical area. Each feast 
identifies a bounded community and draws crowds from the wider area 
and engages them in its structure. The feasts move in a regular and 
pre-ordained progression from one mosque to another, and from one 
community to another. The full calendrical cycle of feasts, is also, 
at the same time, a complete re-constitution of all the individual 
'village' communities in the research area. The individual Muslim 
communities stand in relation to each other, not merely as a result 
of their socio-economic and kinship ties, but because they are bound 
by the one larger local ritual cycle. The next level of calendrical 
observance is universal and local Muslims observe the passing monthly 
rituals (Ashura, Ramazan, the Hajj) along with Muslims all over the 
world. 
Bara'at, the "night of repentance" is one of the minor festivals 
in the Muslim calendar celebrated locally two weeks before Ramazan. 
The ritual itself purifies and internally orders the community as a 
prelude to Ramazan and its passing marks the beginning of a four 
month period of intense ritual activity which culminates in the Feast 
of Sacrifice at the end of the Hajj. It is this four month period of 
the calendrical year which is my focus here. Taken in their entirety 
these rituals; Bara'at, Ramazan (the month of fasting), Id ul-Fitr 
(the feast of breaking the fast) , the Hajj pilgrimage and Id ul-Azha 
(the feast of sacrifice), constitute an elaborate ritual complex 
which is concerned with the annual regeneration of the world-wide 
Islamic community. Their performance orchestrates a series of 
progressive transformations in the community. Initially the rituals 
establish particular local communities as distinct, bounded 
entities, separate from the 'outside' world and finally they convene 
the world-wide ummah and eliminate all differentiation within it. 
This logic of transformation and regeneration moves from the 
2 This is a question worthy of further investigation in the 
Eastern province of the island where the majority of Muslims are 
farmers. 
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(re) constitution of small, local communities to the (re) constitution 
of the worldwide Islamic community that emerges through the annual 
performance of the Hajj in Mecca. 
7.2 Bara'at. 
Celebrated on the 15th of Shaban, nine months after Ashura - the day 
of creation, Bara'at is a night which signs a 'rebirth' of the 
individual Muslim self. Prayers are offered on this night to seek 
repentance (tauba Ar) and Muslims are moved into a state of spiritual 
purity. Informants understand that individuals are accompanied by two 
angels, one at each shoulder, who record all good and bad deeds 
performed. Bara'at is the night when the record of these deeds is 
removed and each person receives a 'clean slate' for the coming 
year. 3 Thus all individuals are moved into a state of purity on this 
night and the community as a whole is purified and oriented anew, 
towards the tenets of Islam. This orientation and the coming of 
Ramazan is expressed most clearly when we consider the ideological 
message that is central to this evening's reflection. 
The Ya Sin Sura (Sura 36) is recited three times in conjunction with 
a special plea for forgiveness (Bara'at du'a). This particular Sura 
is rich with added significance when its calendrical context 
is 
considered. This Sura acknowledges the Qur'an as a revelation 
from 
God, and Muhammad as the last of his prophets sent to admonish 
mankind. In strong language it relates a parable about "the 
companions of the city" who failed to heed the messages of a number 
of previous apostles who had been sent to them with revelations. They 
had mocked the apostles and threatened to stone them, and were 
heedless of the fact that the last apostle was now among them and 
that a day of judgement and accounting was to follow. This Sura is 
considered by some to be the "heart and essence" of the Qur'an 
3 On the eve of the 15th Shaban "religious observances are held 
in many places in the Islamic world in the belief that destinies for 
the coming year are fixed that night( ... )In Arabic 
it is called "the 
Laylat al Bara'ah ("the night of forgiveness"). In Iran and India it 
is called Shab-i-Barat" (Glasse, ibid: 243). Local informants reported 
that this is the night on which God "shakes the tree of life". Those 
whose names are on the leaves that fall will die in the coming year. 
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(Thawfeeq, ibid: 57). 4 There is clear reference within the Sura to the 
coming of Ramazan -a month which is sacred because it contains the 
"Night of Power" (Laylat al-Qadr A) - the "night of revelation" in 
which the Qur'an was first revealed to Muhammad. In reflecting upon 
this ideological statement at the heart of the evening's prayers the 
community establishes itself as cognizant of the wealth of its 
traditions and full of intention to heed the Qur'an .5 In short, it 
establishes a community which will re-enact/reproduce its receipt of 
the divine revelation, its mythology, its history and its religious 
and social code of practice. 
Bara'at signs the impending arrival of Ramazan and its passing 
quickens the pulse of the community whose preparations for the month 
of fasting now begin in earnest. On this day the women of every 
Muslim household spend part of the day making large quantities of 
rotti (bread) on the domestic hearth. This task falls to those 
married women in the house, generally a mother and married daughters 
though sometimes female relatives from other houses will combine 
with them and make a day of it. In the late afternoon these rotti, 
together with quantities of bananas are sent to the mosques, with the 
young men of the household. " That evening enormous crowds of men and 
4 This consideration is completely consistent with an 
ideological position of a peripheral Islamic community whose 
boundaries are perceived as constantly running the risk of being 
breached by outside forces. The Muslims must continually act to make 
their world conform to their theory, and central to their action is 
the reproduction of Islamic ideology. 
5 Ramazan is the holiest month of the year in that it contains 
both the "Night of Power" in which the gift of the Qur'an was first 
revealed and also the Tharavih prayers. Tharavih (for the mere 
asking) are special prayers for each night of Ramazan, each of which 
has specific boons attached. For example if a Muslim completes the 
Tharavih prayers on the first night he "accrues the benefits of 
Allah's forgiveness for all his past sins and will be made the like 
of an innocent baby born that day" (Irshard: 1969: 11-12). If he 
completes the prayers of the 29th night this "makes him the equal of 
those who have fulfilled a thousand acceptable Hajj pilgrimages" 
(ibid, op cit). In total they provide all the gifts of complete 
forgiveness and spiritual rebirth, plus the religious knowledge and 
sanctity of former saints and prophets. These gifts are attainable 
by every individual in the religious community. 
6 Most women sent offerings to several of the nearby mosques but 
at least one woman sent them to all the mosques in the area. The 
latter woman was from a housing estate and lived alone with her 
eight children while her husband worked in a nearby town as a 
'penciller' for a local ' bookie,. As gambling is prohibited in Islam 
(though by no means uncommon), he is engaged in a dangerous 
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boys gather in all the mosques for the sunset prayer (Maghrib) and 
a communal recital of Ya Sin Sura from the Qur I an. Simultaneously the 
women gather in kin groups in their homes and recite the same 
prayers. At the close of prayers in each mosque the imam distributes 
the rotti and bananas to all those present and they take the food 
home to their families. ' 
This simple and eloquent rite hides a wealth of significance in its 
central elements of communal prayer and the sharing of food. 
Initially the most striking feature is the sheer scope of community 
involvement in this particular event. 8 Every individual, every 
household and all mosques are engaged in the single purpose of 
binding the community together. 9 There is no other occasion in the 
occupation and it is possible that all precautions must be taken. 
Apart from the rotti they sent to the mosques, many women had 
other projects in hand this day and an examination of these wider 
practices of rotti distribution revealed other kinship and community 
ties which were called into significance on this occasion. Some of 
the women made up food parcels (including rock salt, eggs, rice and 
biscuits) which they distributed with rotti and bananas directly to 
poorer families in their area. This was understood as linked to the 
practice of alms-giving (zakat) during Ramazan where providing food 
in order that others may be able to fast is recommended. These 
parcels are met with a return gift of lime and turmeric and/or betel 
leaves. Some women sent parcels of rotti and food to the homes of 
their relatives. The women of one of the Moulana families made small 
rotti which they distributed with half bananas and lollies to the 
children in their neighbourhood thus signing their direct obligation 
to nurture the children of the community. At least one of the mosques 
sent rotti to the homes of all the Moulanas in the town thus 
indicating that the Prophet's family should be supported by the 
religious community. 
eI rode past almost every mosque in the area this evening and 
indeed they were all crowded. 
A second factor was its 'taken-for granted' nature. I had 
neither heard of, nor read about Bara'at and in my ignorance had 
been asking people questions about Ramazan and the impending fast. 
On the morning of Bara'at two young-men informed me that the women 
in their houses were "making rotti to send to the mosque". This was 
not a big ritual according to them and they hadn't thought to mention 
it but "all the women would make rotti" and "everyone would pray this 
night" (my emphasis). Bara'at is conspicuous by its absence in the 
ethnographic literature. Mines notes that shab-e-barat is a "kind of 
All Souls day" observed as a community ritual in Northern Tamil Nadu 
(1975: 407). Gaborieau notes that it is a ritual "for the village 
dead" (1984: 247). Although located in the Indian region (Tamil Nadu 
& Nepal) note the contrast with the Sri Lankan ritual which is 
oriented to the living community. Von Grunebaum in his book 
Mihanmadan Festivals (1988) does not mention the ritual at all. 
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ritual calendar which commands this level of participation or in 
which the idea of "the community at prayer" has such an extensive 
reality. 
Through their action of sending rotti to the mosques the women sign 
themselves as nurturing and feeding the community and potentially 
empowering the mosque to overcome the differentiation within it. The 
community is differentiated into numerous distinct households each 
of which is constructed around a woman. Matrilocal residence ensures 
that women constitute the household in a very strong sense. In a 
context where marriages often force a man to change both his village 
and his mosque, women are clearly a potentially divisive force in the 
Islamic community of men centred on the village mosque. When the 
women send rotti to the mosques at Bara'at it is this potentially 
differentiating force that they culturally embody, that they offer 
to the mosques. Through this act the mosques are empowered to 
reconstitute and nurture the undifferentiated egalitarian community, 
the ummah. Significantly, the nurturing on this particular occasion 
is not dependent upon particular kinship relation, the food is 
provided by all women through the agency of the mosque, to the ummah. " 
In this instance it is clear that although women are generally 
excluded from the mosque they are not without relation to it. In this 
ritual they are recognized as the base of the community and its 
reproductive force. Their fertility is problematic however in that 
it continually threatens to divide the community. In the ritual 
redistribution of the rotti by the imam the women's gift of fertility 
is transformed into an act of nurture and incorporation by the 
mosque. In the act of nurturing and feeding the ummah the women offer 
their fertility to the mosque. It is this act which permits the 
subsequent transformative and incorporative action through the 
mosque. 
Bara'at reconstitutes the community, it is at this point each year 
that the ummah achieves a ritual significance. it must be interpreted 
as a clear prelude to the month of Ramazan when the community as a 
whole will endure the rigours of fasting. Its passing marks a clear 
shift in the calendar, a time when the focus of religious and 
communal life is oriented towards the domestic sphere. In the two 
weeks remaining until Ramazan the women of all households undertake 
to clean them thoroughly. This cleaning is understood as a metaphor 
for the spiritual cleaning of the self and is explicitly stated as 
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such by informants who state, "it is pointless to clean your house 
unless your heart is also pure". 
The ritual also inscribes however the symbolic order of relations 
within the community; it bounds the ummah and stresses the ties 
within it. During the evening when the men are in the mosques and 
the women are gathered in kin groups in their households for the 
prayers then it can be seen that the whole village is incorporated 
in an act of prayer and village becomes equivalent to mosque on this 
occasion. Males and females are expressly forbidden from praying 
together in this Islamic context. In everyday practice men pray 
together in the mosque and women pray individually within the home. 
Prayer is an act which defines as separate; men and women, and male 
and female space. The point of unification is the Ka'bah in Mecca 
towards which all Muslims are physically oriented when they pray. " 
The ummah is further demonstrated as dependent upon and emergent 
from the mundane community of kin groups and on this occasion, as 
completely co-extensive with it. The structure of the community is 
outlined; the relations between household and mosque, between mosque 
and household, the correct relations between men and women, and their 
particular and separate relations to the mosque and public religious 
activity. 
Bara'at is concerned with defining and bounding, feeding and 
nurturing, reconstituting and re-orienting the community in 
preparation for the month long ritual fast of Ramazan. Within its 
ritual structure the entire mode of practice ideal to the ummah is 
elaborated. Bara'at itself is the first stage of a ritual complex 
which in its entirety condenses a view of Islamic cosmology. 
7.3 The Calendrical Complex : Bara'at to the Hajj. 
I will present a brief description of the rituals which make up this 
complex in order to demonstrate the transformations and movements of 
successive incorporation that are achieved within the ummah. This 
10 The Ka'bah (lit, "cube") stands in the centre of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca. It is also known as the " 'holy house' (al-bayt al- 
haram) and the 'Ancient house' (al-bayt al-'atiq)" (Glasse, 
ibid: 214). It is worth noting that at this focal point of all Muslim 
prayer, house and mosque are conjoined and that the house (Ka'bah) 
is encompassed by the mosque. 
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movement is in accordance with an egalitarian logic that 
progressively eliminates differentiation within the community. 
" 
As outlined above, during Bara'at all individuals are purified and 
given a clean slate. Further, house-mosque relations are established, 
the local ummah is bounded and constituted, and the ideology of its 
correct internal ordering is clearly defined. Two weeks after Bara'at 
the month of Ramazan begins and all Muslims must fast (ncmbu) between 
the hours of dawn and dusk. Endurance of the month of fasting 
strengthens the community and its faith. 12 
Ramazan is a liminal period when taken for granted religious and 
social life takes on a different ambience. The pace of life changes 
dramatically. for most people. Because the first meal of the day 
(Suhar) must be completed by approximately 4.20am, the women are 
often up to cook around 2am. 13 This is the time of annual leave for 
Muslim schools and many workers take their holidays at this time. The 
houses are thus filled with family members. During the day the 
houses tend to be quiet with people sleeping and reading the Qur'an 
and there is an air of relaxation not normally present. 14 At night, 
11 I have restricted my concern to a brief discussion of the 
transformations within the ummah and the logic of its reproduction. 
The central question for future analysis concerns the egalitarian 
possibility of Islam encoded in its calendrical ritual practice. This 
and other related questions call for a far more detailed and symbolic 
analysis than I am able to attempt here. 
12 Fasting involves not eating or drinking anything at all, even 
swallowing saliva is forbidden. In line with regional cultural 
understandings fasting is believed to 'heat' the body. A particular 
drink kasha-kasha is taken in the evenings to cool the body down. 
13 Most households have a printed Ramazan calendar published by 
one of the local business houses which indicate the fasting times for 
each day of the month. (There is always an extra week of times 
provided for the benefit of women who may not fast while 
menstruating. ) The times are also announced on the radio. In many 
years one or other of the Bawas from Eravur (see Ch 4) may be 
performing the duty of walking through the streets calling people to 
wake up for Suhar before the fast. They then spend the days "busking" 
at houses during the day and collecting alms. Ramazan is an extremely 
lucrative time for them and they spread all over the island for it. 
is Everyone is urged to spend part of the day in private reading 
of the Qur'an and ideally one should complete a reading of the entire 
book in the month. All of the women I observed complied with this and 
many of the men. There are also organized readings after the Tharavih 
prayers held each night and many of the younger men contented 
themselves with performing their reading as part of this public 
recital in thirty parts. 
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by contrast, the pace is unusually festive. For the entire month 
there is a complete 'street scene' which lasts well into the night, 
and which is centered on the street of the central Jumma mosque. It 
is common for the younger men to spend the whole night up socializing 
and eating with friends and to retire to bed after the morning 
prayers. The streets are crowded with men after the Tharavih prayers 
and communal Qur'an recitals. The shops are open very late and while 
some of the older youth set up stalls to sell sherbert or the 
traditional cungee, 15 many a budding entrepreneur has cut his teeth 
selling fruit or sweets, from a bowl outside his house or in the 
streets, during Ramazan. On the last day of the month people look for 
the new moon of Sharwaal which has to be sighted with the naked eye. 
The day following is Id al Fitr - the Feast of Breaking the Fast. 
This is celebrated locally by kindred groups following morning 
communal prayers in the mosque. 16 New clothes are worn and families 
enjoy a day of feasting and visiting relatives. "' 
The Hajj pilgrimage takes place shortly after the end of Ramazan and 
although very few local people have the means to attend, the 
structure of events is followed and the feast at the end of the Hajj 
is celebrated both locally and in Mecca. The Hajj is a ten day 
pilgrimage undertaken in a ritual space in which all pilgrims assume 
the ihram (pilgrim dress) and maintain a state of ritual purity for 
its duration. Pilgrims repeat events from a pre-Islamic past (Hagar Is 
search for water between the hills of Safa and Marwa, the stoning of 
the Great Devil) and they circumambulate the Ka' bah. They participate 
in a set of ritual practices which are outside mundane time, which 
unite them in a common interpretation of religious history, and 
further unite them across time with the exemplars of a Muslim past. 
In one sense the ritual can be argued to be against time - it creates 
is Cungee is a porridge made from rice and meat and it is taken 
soon after the fast is ritually broken with three dates and water, 
in the manner of the Prophet. This appears to be a following of a 
Meccan custom of a wheat and meat soup taken during Ramazan 
(Glasse, ibid: 231). 
16 In Colombo this is the occasion of a large public celebration 
on Galle Face Green. 
17 The new clothes make it effectively the Muslim 'New Year, in 
this cultural context. 
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a collectivity, (the ummah) through a denial of the different 
histories and cultures, in which pilgrims are embedded, and allows 
them to experience a common Muslim past. 
The Hajj takes place in Mecca which is a city barred to non-Muslims. 
All Muslim pilgrims have similar identities and are no longer divided 
by their distinct cultures and languages. They become an integral 
part of the world-wide community of Islam. The Hajj is a ritual which 
eliminates both cultural and gender difference. In radical contrast 
to the practice in other mosques, here men and women may participate 
in the ritual and offer their prayers together. Here at the heart of 
the Muslim world, in a mosque that contains the Ka'bah (the first 
house and the first mosque) male and female may pray together - 
because in this space their individuality is sacrosanct. 
For the duration of the pilgrimage ones hair or nails must not be 
cut, lice or any other creatures must not be killed and sexual 
relations are expressly forbidden and render the pilgrimage null and 
void (Von Grun ebaum, ibid: 27). There is a strict concern with the 
maintenance of bodily boundaries and a state of ritual purity. These 
practices may be seen as establishing and preserving individual 
purity. It is perhaps surprising then that a practice which is held 
in abeyance is the requirement that menstruating women refrain from 
prayers (or touching the Qur'an) because they are in a state of 
impurity. Women may menstruate on the Hajj. Here at the centre of 
Islam their femininity is unproblematic. 18 They are no longer defined 
by their femininity and at this point gender may be argued to no 
longer be a differentiating factor. In the context of the Hajj all 
forms of differentiation are eliminated. The ummah of the Hajj is 
truly egalitarian - this is the ideological epitome of individualism. 
The Hajj ends with a sacrifice - Id al Azha (the Feast of Sacrifice) . 
The sacrifices in Mecca are mirrored by village sacrifice, though on 
a much smaller scale. 19 
18 This only applies to the space of the ritual itself of course. 
Women are not expected to make the pilgrimage without suitable male 
company. 
11 These days in Mecca so many animals are sacrificed that meat 
is flown to nearby countries and distributed to the poor as alms. In 
the research area there were generally three or four people that each 
sacrificed a bull and distributed a proportion of the meat. 
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This ritual complex begins with the women's gift of rotti and bananas 
to the mosque and the prayers of Bara'at. It closes with the animal 
sacrifice of men at the end of the Hajj. Bara'at is clearly a 
transcendent point in the calendar, one which witnesses the annual 
re-birth of the purified and internally ordered Muslim community. 
During Ramazan the ummah is fortified by the fast and all individuals 
have the opportunity to achieve absolute purification and religious 
knowledge through the Tharavih prayers. In the final month of the 
Muslim year, during the Hajj the ummah is redeemed through completion 
of the pilgrimage and the sealing of a contract with God with blood 
sacrifice. This period of the year is critical. All Five Pillars of 
Islam are foregrounded and part of religious practice. It is a pre- 
ordained period of reflection and renewal. 
The regeneration of the ummah, which is also its reproduction, essays 
a logic of egalitarianism. An egalitarianism in which individual 
identity is continually transformed. Identity can be seen to be 
unequivocally constructed through the calendrical rituals. Thus the 
practice of the Islamic ritual calendar actually substantiates Muslim 
individuality; giving it greater and greater substance and definition 
throughout the year, to its highest point which is experienced 
during the Hajj in Mecca. The highest point of individuality is 
located within Islam' s greatest ritual of community. This is a ritual 
point at which all difference has been progressively excised, all 
outsiders are excluded, and the collectivity united at the centre of 
the Muslim world. 
Within this Islamic egalitarian logic male and female stand as 
ontologically distinct; as embodiments of complementary and opposing 
principles which together form a potentially reproductive unity. In 
Sri Lanka where much of the religious ritual practice is concerned 
with the reconstitution and reproduction of the community, women - 
as the embodiment of fertility - are seen as vital to the religious 
process. 
This contrasts with the presentation of women in Islam as somewhat 
peripheral to mosque based religious practice, notwithstanding a constant concern 
with their virtue and fertility. My interest here is to clearly link the ritual activity 
of women with the nurturing power of the mosque. There is, in other words, a 
dimension of mosque based religious practice that engages the power of women 
despite their exclusion from the domain of the mosque itself. 
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7.4 Gender and Cosmology. 
Cosmologies present comprehensive arguments concerning the structure 
of and orientation to the wider cultural world in which people live. 
Fundamental questions addressed by cosmologies are those of fertility 
and reproduction, and conceptions of gender are often a critical 
aspect of those arguments. There are many different ways of 
approaching the question of gender. Here I look at the question of 
gender through an examination of an Islamic cosmology as revealed in 
ritual and calendrical practice amongst Sri Lankan Muslims. 
My first concern is the symbolic structure of male-female relations. 
The constant association of women with valakkam - indigenous custom, 
renders them always both natives and converts and one step removed 
from pure Islamic origins. This stands in contrast to men who are 
conceived to be foreign and Islamic, associated with din - religion, 
and as continually constructing an Islamic context. These contrasting 
ideological conceptions of men and women remain a permanent point 
of tension in the system and the cultural power of women must 
continually be subordinated to an Islamic ideology. This would at 
first sight tend to support the general view of Islam that portrays 
women as external to and excluded from, "orthodox" religious 
practice. My research leads me to suggest an alternative 
interpretation however. In the continual reproduction of the Islamic 
community in the Islamic universe, women are absolutely fundamental. 
Not through a continual subordination of culture to religion or 
nature to culture but through an ontologically inscribed unity 
between men and women that exists at the heart of the Islamic 
cosmology itself. 
In the context of the calendrical cycle the entire Muslim community 
may be observed undergoing transformation and regeneration. The very 
first point of that ritual cycle however was the act of women sending 
rotti to the mosque and this should now be re-examined. 20 Given the 
20 I note here that rotti are not used in any ritual religious 
sense by the Sinhalese Buddhist or Tamil Hindu communities and I 
believe it necessary to look to a wider Islamic world for the 
significance of bread as a communal food. In the Northern Sudan for 
example as Boddy (1982,693) illustrates, the flour and water product 
kisra; a staple food which sustains life is understood as a symbol 
of fertility and of the product of male and female labour. Dates are 
another food which has no local cultural significance, but is used 
symbolically by Muslims. Muslim shops stock them only during Ramazan 
and people use them to break their fast as the Prophet did. 
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cosmology as outlined we see that the offerings at the beginning, by 
women, in an ordered Islamic community are the initial, symbolic act 
in a complex ritual logic. The entire process of successive 
transformations within the ummah, newly reconstituted, begins with 
the gift of female fertility to the mosque, symbolized by the 
offerings of rotti. 
Partaking of food from the mosque is a regular and significant event 
in the Muslim household and the sharing of food symbolizes the ties 
within the Islamic community. Mowloods and feasts are regularly held 
at all the local mosques but Bara'at is markedly different in both 
the type of food and the manner of its distribution. For the duration 
of the Mowlood recitals and on the occasions of the mosque feasts the 
village supports the mosque which then nurtures them. Although women 
may participate peripherally on these occasions, either scraping 
coconuts at home or peeling vegetables to redeem a vow in the grounds 
of the mosque, this is not common, and most importantly they have no 
connection with the cooking. The ghee rice is prepared on male 
hearths on domestic lands or in the grounds of the mosque. on none 
of these occasions are the domestic hearths involved in the provision 
of food and the understanding is that it is the mosque which is 
nurturing the community in all the above cases. The ritual food 
associated with Bara'at however differs radically from the mosque 
feast in that it is prepared by women on the domestic hearth, and 
it is later consumed in the house by the family. The preparation of 
food by the women in the religious context here is rich with 
significance and is the only occasion of the ritual year in which 
they are clearly associated with mosque food. Further it is family 
groups who consume the food, rather than an Islamic community of 
men. Ideologically the distinction is drawn between the Islamic and 
egalitarian brotherhood of the mosque feast and the matrilocal 
family groups of Bara'at which are the reproductive centres of a 
newly purified and reconstituted Islamic community. 
The fact that on this occasion the women prepare the food on the 
domestic hearths, and gift it personally to the mosques marks the 
event as highly significant. The symbolic nurturing of the community 
that is signed in this ritual feeding is far more extensive at 
Bara'at and this is in line with its calendrical context as a 
"re-birth" of the ummah prior to the events of Ramazan and the Hajj. 
On this occasion it is first the community, through the domestic 
hearths of the women who are constitutive of the power of the 
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mosques, then the mosques in turn which are constitutive of the 
ummah. Women as custodians of the domestic hearths offer this 
communal gift of life to the mosques, but in a more particular sense 
I argue that they offer their own embodied power of fertility. At 
this particular moment women stand as metaphors or symbols of the 
myriad families and households which will come to reconstitute the 
ummah. 
It is the women who feed and nurture the community on a day to day 
basis through their cooking on the domestic hearth. The domestic 
hearth constitutes the household and may itself be seen as a symbol 
of the household which eats from it. In this cultural environment 
women own the houses and symbolically may be recognized AS the house. 
Where several sisters with their husbands and children share a 
house the house is differentiated into various families; each 
identified with one woman and one hearth. In a very real sense women 
are the fertile centre of the family and the household. When women 
send rotti to the mosques they do so on behalf of their husbands and 
all their children; they incorporate the family within themselves 
through this act. The Bara'at ritual is more than simply a 
conjunction of the private and public spheres of Islamic life. At 
this point women are metaphors for the house and the domestic sphere, 
not the domestic per se. 21 The fertility gifted to the mosque is 
always an active fertility; it signs a reproductive capacity and the 
women who provide rotti are always married women. Fertility by 
definition deals with the unification of male and female principles. 
Therefore it is appropriate that it is stressed at those moments in 
the community's life when it celebrates "birth" or "calendrical 
regeneration"; the rebirth of the ummah at Bara'at, the birth of a 
new mosque, the conferral of a new Islamic status on an individual 
through the naming of a new baby. 
To briefly summarize my position -I have outlined a view of the 
cosmology which is driven by a regenerative and calendrical logic. 
This logic is seen most explicitly when we trace the transformations 
effected in the ummah through the process of calendrical ritual. Each 
of these transformations is in accordance with a logic of 
egalitarianism and abolition of differentiation. Ultimately they 
create the ummah of the hajj; the ummah at its highest manifestation. 
21 A similar point has been made about Sinhalese women 
(Kapferer, 1983). 
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This ritual process is first set in motion with the advent of the 
Bara'at ritual and a central symbolic element of this is the feeding 
of the community by the women. When the complex as a whole is 
examined it can be seen that the opening and closing rites of the 
complex indicate a shift from the bread provided by women to the meat 
sacrificed by men. Both elements are critical for the continual 
nurturing of the ummah; men and women combine to generate its 
reproductive force. Male and female constitute a unity in Islam at 
the cosmological level and their separation and conjunction at 
various points in the social world must be interpreted with this in 
mind. Male and female are icons in this Islamic understanding and 
their unity is the sacred and regenerative heart of the cosmology 
itself. 
The structure of Islamic cosmology has not been of analytical 
+wo Jp ýc. interest in mostnstudiis bf Muslim communities. Caught within a 
theoretical bind that defines Islamic religious practice as 
dichotomised into either "orthodox" or "folk", scholars have fallen 
prey to two traps. First there has been the tendency to take as 
unproblematic the idea of a universal Islamic ideology; "a unified 
religious tradition" (El Zein, 1977), neither demanding analysis nor 
worthy of investigation. Secondly, and as a result of this, "folk" 
or popular studies, where they have been pursued, are explored as 
deviations from universal norms (a point made by Tapper & Tapper, 
1987). The result has been an overt lack of interest in the 
cosmological understandings of Muslims in varied cultural contexts 
., a CV1- iw . rtrý,. w and 
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explorations of calendrical ritual. In those studies where an 
interest in the cosmology has been pursued the concern has been 
narrowly focused upon the interaction of the "demonic" with the 
human population in possession cases, in contrast to an attempt to 
understand the cosmology as a whole. These studies are limited in 
number and few offer any detailed information on the cosmology. The 
cosmos is often presented simply as a realm, which humans share with 
angels, jinn, shaitans and other lower order spirits. Representations 
of the cosmology are remarkably similar across widely variant 
cultural contexts and when differences are noted to occur this is 
generally, as one would expect, in the lower "demonic" orders, which 
it is argued, more readily reflect the varied cultural grounds where 
Islam has taken root. 
The cosmological world of Muslims in Sri Lanka is inhabited with a 
veritable array of spirits, some of whom they share with the other 
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religions, indicating a clearly dialectical relation between 
religious understandings on this small island. As with Muslims 
elsewhere they believe themselves to be individually accompanied at 
all times by two angels and constantly running the risk of 
encountering myriads of other spirits. These range from the merely 
disconcerting ghosts of suicides which hover around streams and 
crossroads at night, jinn and shaitans - Islamic minor demons, to a 
selection of self reproducing Arabic demons of awful power and 
purpose who may interfere with male and female fertility, Mohini 
Pishashi who is a female version of Vishnu, and Huniyam (the 
Sinhalese Suniyam) who causes the evil eye. Precautions are regularly 
taken against any interference by these spirits, especially for women 
and children who are seen as more vulnerable, but men regularly 
report seeing ghosts at night and I have had several accounts of 
individual men who have encountered some of the more powerful demons. 
Crapanzano (1973) in his study of the Hamadsha takes account of the 
force of the cosmology in everyday life since it is for illnesses 
caused by the jinn that the Hamadsha are called (ibid: 135). The 
Moroccan world is full of spirits with whom Moroccans habitually 
share their existence and occasionally they possess individuals. 
Crapanzano's concern is to reduce this phenomenon to an expression 
of psychological catharsis for young men in a position of submission 
to male parental authority so his analysis reveals nothing of 
cosmological structure. A far better and more recent article by Boddy 
(1988) on her study of the phenomenon of Zar possession in the 
Sudan also outlines a cosmological world and in particular she 
explores the structure of the relations between the Zar and the 
humans they possess. Boddy does at least turn her analysis towards 
discovering the cultural meanings of these relations between the Zar 
and humans but the possession phenomenon doesn't fall within 
specifically religious ritual or throw any light on a particularly 
Islamic view of cosmology. However, beyond these two studies 
concerned with the nature of some of the spirits engaged in human 
possession there appears to be no further interest in the question 
of cosmology at all. 
If the cosmology is represented as having a structure or a logic at 
all it is no more than that of a unilineal movement from base to apex 
through spiritual levels of development. Thus Crapanzano notes that 
jinn are believed to be capable of salvation (ibid: 134) and more 
212 
generally there is an Islamic conception of a possible human 
progression through hierarchical levels of religious understanding 
from shariat; following the laws of Islam, tariqa; following a 
particular sufistic path, to hakkia; the way of the heart when one 
has internalised the inner truths of the Koran, and marifat, the loss 
of self in God. 
I am adding to current debates on Islamic cosmology and my particular 
focus is calendrical ritual. I wish to explore the constant regeneration of the 
ummah through the process of calendrical ritual. 
A further consequence of the "orthodox"/"tolk" dichotomy has been the 
overt linkage of women with folk religion and a tendency to negate 
entirely their engagement in the realm-of religious practice. Tapper 
and Tapper in a recent article on Ritual and Gender in Turkish Islam 
(1987) take up the question of women's religious practice and declare 
that 
an intrinsic relation between gender and religious orthodoxy 
is a characteristic of practiced Islam everywhere, and that 
elucidation of this relation must be central to any 
anthropology of Islam (ibid: 69). 
They argue that discussions of Islam have been too long hampered 
by the tendency to see everything in terms of dichotomies; 
universal/particular, urban/rural, public/private, male/female, 
intellectual/emotional, orthodox/popular. This has led to "a tyranny 
of orthodoxy" (ibid: 70) where men's religious activities have been 
examined in terms of their degree of orthodoxy and where religious 
activities of women have been "dismissed as a priori peripheral to 
those of men"(ibid: 69). This approach they argue, ignores the 
possibility that 
different aspects of the religious system may be the province 
of one sex or. the other, and an understanding of any 
particular Islamic tradition depends on examining both 
(ibid: 70). 
They find that in Turkey where the state has 
limited men's public religious activities, the central mystery 
of salvation is celebrated particularly in the women's mevluds 
(ibid; 69). 
Unstated but implied is that this has been in part a reflection of 
historical circumstances - where the state's oppression of overt 
"orthodox", male religious practice has been met by a corresponding 
shift within the community, in which the religious practices of women 
have increased in popularity and achieved new significance. 
Historical contingencies aside however, they argue that women's 
religious practices and performances may carry a 
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religious load (... ) of greater transcendental importance to 
the community than that borne by men (ibid: 72). 
They conclude that without attention to the religious practices of 
men and women, and the relations between them, it is not possible to 
gain an understanding of Islam in any particular culture, let alone 
attempt cultural comparison. 
Initially I was excited by their call for the examination of the 
intrinsic relation between gender and religious orthodoxy but I feel 
that their argument ultimately falls into the same dichotomy that 
they would seek to overcome. They accept without sufficient 
examination the separation of male and female worship. They perceive 
no essential unity decreed in cosmological understandings. A 
cosmological unity which is evident at the most fundamental level in 
the unity of orientation of prayers to Mecca. Men and women offer 
their prayers in their separate contexts, house and mosque, but they 
achieve a unity in their focus on the Ka'bah; Islam's prime icon, and 
itself understood as a condensation of house and mosque. The ambits 
of men and women are separated within much Islamic practice and this 
is significant in understanding male and female experience - but 
their unity is ontologically given and equally critical in any 
analysis. This apparently universal separation of men and women in 
Islam which leads to the perennial dichotomy in analysis, is a 
reflection of a deeper cosmological understanding. Central to Islamic 
cosmology is an idea of fertility and reproduction. This I argue, is 
a fundamental cosmological principle that is generally overlooked. 
Tapper and Tapper propose to examine the relation between gender and 
religious orthodoxy. They 
insist that an intrinsic relation between gender and religious 
orthodoxy is a characteristic of practised Islam everywhere, 
and that the elucidation of this relation must be central to 
any anthropology of Islam (ibid: 88). 
It emerges in the analysis however, that the concept of gender is 
problematic. They constantly refer to gender defined ambits and 
practices (the sexual division of religious labour), not cultural 
conceptions of gender as ontologically given. Through this limitation 
in their analysis, where they do not explore the meaning of gender, 
they are led to deal always with the separate religious practices of 
men and women, and never their unity. Therefore they reproduce the 
public/private, male/female, dichotomy. The social and religious 
separation of men and women in Islam is a function of a cosmological 
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understanding which sees them as unified in reproductive and 
regenerative practice. 
It is this continual presentation of an apparent dichotomy that my 
own analysis is directed towards overcoming. The ritual of Bara'at, 
in the Sri Lankan Islamic calendrical context is clearly a ritual 
which conjoins 'orthodox' (male/mosque/public) and 'popular' 
(female/domestic/private) practices. It would be possible to argue 
that in terms of the ritual action, the 'popular' practices both 
precede and follow the 'orthodox' practices and simultaneously mirror 
them within the domestic sphere, outside direct mosque control. The 
movement of the evening is house-mosque-house. But this illuminates 
a significant point which is - that the intention of those in the 
'domestic' sphere is to express what they understand very clearly as 
a relation to the mosque and so-called 'orthodox' practices . 
22 There 
is no separation at the analytical level - they are completely 
inter-twined. There is a separation in Islam, expressed in terms of 
gender, but this is located within a grand cosmic schema which has 
a male and female unity at the heart of its regenerative movement. 23 
22 'Orthodox' is invariably a locally defined term, as well as 
an analyst's conceptual bias. 
231t is not sufficient to argue merely that women are 
excluded/secluded from social life, though there is no doubt that 
Muslim women are oppressed both socially and politically in most 
countries. In the ideology of Islam men and women are argued to have 
separate and complementary roles ('they are like each others 
clothing' was the most common local phrase) and this is often used 
to justify their unequal treatment. I take heed of Jeffrey's 
(1979: 22) criticism that to dress the situation up as 'functional 
interdependence' (different but equal) is no justification for purdah 
at the political level. 
There is no denial on my part of the obvious oppression and exclusion 
of Muslim women but I also call for no denial on the part of the 
analyst of the fundamental cosmological systems upon which many of 
these ideologies of gender are based and from which they derive great 
power. Much of the discussion of Muslim women has tended to focus on 
the effect of the ideology of gender on the status of women (Beck & 
Keddie, 1978, see Ortner & Whitehead 1981, on women in general). As 
a result analysts have failed to fully appreciate the nature of the 
female oppression they so wish to document. They have also failed to 
discern the reflection in different cultural contexts, of the male 
and female unity inscribed at the heart of Islam. The cosmology must 
be addressed if one is to talk at all of the symbolic universe of 
Muslims and the basis for their separation by gender. 
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This unity has long been extant in the work of the Muslims 
themselves, but is for no apparent reason ignored by the analysts. 
To speak of creation or manifestation is to speak of 
polarization, of the manifold, of multiplicity whose first 
stage is that primordial polarization between the two 
contending and complementary principles, which are seen 
throughout cosmic manifestation and which in human life appear 
as the male and female sexes. In relation to the Divine Unity 
all multiplicity is a veil... (Nasr, 1980: 67). 
In the last few chapters I have elaborated the position of women in 
relation to locally defined orthodox Islam. Women are consistently 
regarded as less pure than men and more closely linked to culture. 
But male and female unity is proscribed and recognised. In this 
cultural context men are agents of religion but it is women who are 
ultimately agents of community; the fertile ground upon which the 
ummah must rest. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Marriage as a 'Rite of Conversion'. 
The Muslim marriage ritual establishes a union which guarantees 
reproductive continuity and it also asserts symbolically the key 
dimensions of social reality which Muslims understand themselves to 
live. Every marriage is a reflection of the original creation of the 
Moor community when 'Arab traders converted and married local women'. 
Through the ritual itself which creates an original Muslim family, 
male and female are metaphors of a wider social process in which 
religion (din) and culture (valakkam) are brought together in 
dramatic and determinative relation. 
The wedding is a rite of particular interest for it clearly outlines 
the joining together of two families in relationships which are often 
entirely new, and specifically brings two individuals into lifelong 
sexual relation. It is the beginning of a potential new family unit 
with children of its own; this being both a continuation of family 
networks and a change in social and political relations. In its 
process is a statement on the nature of the symbolic world in which 
the marriage takes place. A 'situational analysis' of the rite with 
its interplay of cultural and religious elements will reveal the 
symbolic world of the Muslims as they themselves see it. 
In this chapter I take the ritual and re-explore dimensions of the 
encompassing social and political world which is symbolically 
represented in the rite. There are two levels of meaning to be drawn 
from the following description and analysis of the Muslim wedding. 
The first concerns the wedding as a social, cultural and symbolic 
event. At this level the wedding is an event which illuminates 
cultural and religious ideas through symbols of fertility, 
reproduction and nurture and actions which signify the creation of 
new kin relations. The second level of interpretation concerns the 
rites as ideological statements about the correct internal ordering 
of the Muslim community. Religion stands in hierarchical and 
encompassing relation to culture. The marriage rite clearly essays 
the subordination of the cultural realm to that of the religious. It 
is in this sense and as a metaphor of the origin of the community 
that I argue that marriage should be read as a 'rite of conversion'. 
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8.1 The Muslim House. 
The Muslim house is the hearth of the Muslim family and. the primary 
domain of all Muslim women. Most of the women observe purdah and 
although there are occasions when the women are seen on the streets, 
they are always en route and have no place in the public arena. ' 
Muslim women have a type of "invisibility" in the public domain 
(Gilsenan, 1993: 169). For most women in this area the house is their 
sole locus and house spaces in a sense constitute the 'world of 
women'. It is here that children are nurtured and acquire their 
'taken for granted' world of cultural and religious beliefs and 
practices. The house is the site of all life-cycle rituals (birth, 
male circumcision, marriage, death) and also the location of 
religious performances of mowloods and the fasting during Ramadan. 
The house pulls together the worlds of religion (din) and culture 
(valakkam). Despite the tension between them din and valakkam are 
apprehended as a totality by those that live in the Muslim house. 
Post-marital residence is matrilocal and the rights to the house 
property belong to women. Invariably a daughter is given a share in 
the house as part of her dowry and her parents continue to live there 
as well. 2 A Muslim man is a newcomer to the house at the time of his 
marriage and his position in the house seems to be that of a 
permanent guest; albeit an honoured one. The tenuous position of men 
is reflected in the fact that some fathers are referred to as 
strangers by their children (Yalman, ibid: 287). Alternatively a man 
may refer to his wife as vidi kari - the owner of the house 
I They pull one end of their saris up over their heads 
(mokkada, Yalman, ibid: 3 83) and move quite quickly. There are occasions 
when being out is unavoidable (Doctors visits etc) and if public 
transport is essential then it appears that other people of all 
communities will respect their privacy and not engage them in 
conversation on the streets. There is a small percentage of women 
engaged in work outside their homes but this work is generally in the 
nature of domestic services rendered in other homes, in the company 
of other women. Purdah observance in the town is closely tied to 
class position. 
2 Ideally in this area the first daughter is given "half of the 
house" and the next daughter the second half. The parents hope to 
have managed to acquire a second house by the time subsequent 
daughters must be married. In fact wealth is the determining factor 
and for the most part parents continue to live with their married 
daughters and their unmarried younger sisters. This contrasts with 
the matri-wwrilocal residence of the East coast where within two 
years the married daughter takes full possession of the natal house 
and her parents and (some or all of her) unmarried siblings move to 
another house nearby (McGilvray, 1982: 43). 
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(ibid: 288) or to his wife and daughters as "these people". Given the 
employment patterns, many men work in towns other than their own and 
may return once or twice each month. 3 With the aging of his wife's 
parents and eventually their deaths, a man gradually comes to be a 
powerful force in the house and may eventually control all the 
property associated with it. 4 His power may be shared with the 
husbands of his wife's sisters and if the marriage founders, it will 
be he who will leave while the woman and her children remain. In day 
to day terms however most houses are owned and organized by women 
(sisters) .A man's freedom of movement within the house is restricted 
by the necessity of avoiding his wife's mother and his sisters-in- 
law. The house is primarily the domain of women and men go to 
considerable lengths to stay out of their way. 5 As they grow up in 
their natal homes boys know that they will marry into the houses of 
other women, possibly in other villages or towns. Indeed as both 
marriage and matrilocal residence are universal amongst Muslims they 
have to marry to have somewhere to live. Ideally brothers should help 
marry their sisters by contributing to their dowries before they 
themselves marry. After marriage they will be expected to help marry 
their wife's younger sisters. Brothers are always welcome in the 
homes of their sisters however and maintain the right to eat there. ' 
All Muslim houses in the area have a public/private, division often 
marked with a curtain across the interior door of the front room. In 
general the front room of the house is open to the street and used 
' As an indication of the degree to which husbands become part 
of their wives' households I was intrigued to find that most men do 
their own wishing. Mothers would sometimes wash their son's clothing 
and daughters would occasionally wash for their fathers but in 
general it appeared that adults washed their own clothing. 
° He can never force his wife to sell the house however. 
s Apart from Bourdieu's (1973) indication that Berber men should 
be out of the house during the day, most discussions of Muslim 
households or purdah seem to imply that the onus of avoiding men 
within the household rests entirely on the women. 
6 Yalman argues that the dowry payment achieves a "change in 
allegiance" by the groom (ibid: 303) but in practice these 
relationships vary with the personalities and the circumstances 
involved. There are no hard and fast rules, particularly in the urban 
contexts. 
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to entertain male guests. ' Young males are permitted the run of the 
houses that they visit and are often called upon to run errands for 
the women. After the age of puberty however, even if they are 
relatives they are restricted to the public areas of the house. ' 
Females who visit the house will retire immediately behind the 
curtain to converse with the women; the front room being clearly the 
public domain and reserved for men. If women wish to visit other 
households during the day they will often hire an ox-drawn buggy with 
curtained sides so that they can travel without being seen. At night 
however Muslim women have more freedom since they can slip from one 
house to another through the darkness. Muslim houses tend to be open 
at night and it is a good time for men to visit each other. ' 
The occasion of menarche for young women marks the end of their 
public social life and their subsequent confinement to the domestic 
domain. 10 There is no public celebration of the event and from this 
The degree of compliance with this ideal depends on the 
wealth/class position of the household and its location. The larger 
middle class households always have one or two open rooms in the 
front of the house which are not used by the women during the day. 
In some of the smaller houses on a local housing estate for example, 
there is only one room apart from two bedrooms and a kitchen. Here 
the practice is to place curtains across the front door but tie them 
back, with a second set across the door to the back half of the house 
(second bedroom and kitchen). In this case the front room of the 
house is treated as the woman's domain until guests arrive whereupon 
she will retire to the back of the house as long as they remain. In 
the very poorest village houses where there is only one room, when 
guests arrive the woman will retire outside the back of the house. 
In this case she is 'outside' the house but 'inside' the village. 
s In most cases circumcision occurs between ages 7& 12. In this 
. 
instance puberty is read as 'marriageable' and related boys and 
neighbours were not restricted until about age fifteen. 
This was a major point of contrast between Muslim and 
Sinhalese houses, and Muslim and Sinhalese women. The Sinhalese 
houses tend to be shut up as darkness falls and women tend to stay 
indoors to protect themselves from the attentions of the demonic. 
10 Informants estimate that less than 10% of girls in this area 
continue at school after puberty (but cf ff 18 below). In general 
they were either at a Catholic boarding school in Matara (wealthy 
families) or the daughters of working class families who had recently 
acquired some wealth (a son in the middle East) and were seeking to 
educate their daughters in order to make better marriages. 
220 
point on the woman will no longer pray during menstruation. " At this 
point the outside/inside, public/private dichotomy achieves a stark 
reality for women. They now embody the purdah aesthetic - they are 
virginal, fertile and enclosed. The Muslim house is the locus of that 
fertility. 
'7 
8.2 Marriage Patterns. 
Muslim marriage is ideally isogamous, endogamous and matrilocal. The 
Tamil language and kinship terminology used by the Muslims encodes 
a Dravidian kinship system that reflects a preference for cross- 
cousin marriage. For Tamil speakers male cross-cousins (machan) and 
female cross-cousins (mainee) have terminologically given claims on 
each other as marriage partners and there is a preference for 
marriage on the mother's side. This matrilateral ýa l4 cousin 
marriage is marriage between the children of sisters in which the 
sisters and the children continue to share the house. '2 The Tamil 
kinship terminology also prohibits parallel cousin marriage; these 
individuals call each other brother and sister (nana - elder brother 
[FB/MZ elder son], thambi - younger brother [FB/MZ younger son], 
thatha - elder sister [FB/MZ elder daughter], thangachi - younger 
sister [FB/MZ younger daughter]). Although permitted according to 
Islamic ideology these marriages (nana/thangachi) are regarded as 
somewhat incestuous by others. The employment of Islamic ideology to 
justify parallel-cousin marriage although rare is known to occur 
where wealth or status must be protected. " Marriages between actual 
cross-cousins are not so common though more distant relatives are 
 This is a clear example of Islamisation. It was commonly 
celebrated two generations ago and secluding a young woman with a 
piece of iron to protect her from demons is still common. In mixed 
company an older man joked that a young woman there had been secluded 
with a railway girder! 
12 The term sahalappaddi refers to the bond between two men who 
have married two sisters (Yalman, ibid: 293, ffil) 
13 Informants state that in Chinafort, Panadura and Akurana 
matrilateral parallel-cousin marriage does take place now, whereas 
it didn't previously. When the preservation of wealth or status 
demands it the Islamic possibility over-rides the strictures of the 
Dravidian kinship structure. Moulana status is inherited 
patrilineally and in the South there seemed to be a concern to marry 
Moulana women to other Moulanas. A Moulana informant from the East 
Coast said that most Moulana families there allowed their daughters 
to marry anyone as all the children of the sons would be Moulanas. 
I observed one case of parallel-cousin marriage between the children 
of two sisters who had married two brothers. 
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often marriage partners, with a definite bias towards marriage on the 
mother's side. 
In practice more than half the marriages in the Muslim community 
take place between non-kin. In a predominantly trading community 
this is the most effective way of expanding economic opportunities. 
Men are quite mobile and often work and later marry outside their 
natal area. It appears that maximizing one's wealth possibilities is 
the governing factor, though social class and caste are factors taken 
into consideration. Marriages are almost invariably matrilocal, the 
only exceptions being neolocal residence in some cases and virilocal 
residence where the husband is of much higher status than the wife. 14 
As early as 1888 Ahamadu Bawa argued that "matrimony among the Moors 
of Ceylon is merely a 'matter of money' (ibid. 219) 15. His criticism was 
based on the fact that love and courtship were of no concern but that 
caste and dowry were vital. The fact that dowry is not an Islamic 
custom is widely recognized in the community but few have been able 
to ignore it. " 
I surveyed the frequency of marriages to relatives and non relatives 
in three villages. In each case the sample was 259. of households in 
the village. The results are in the tables below (8. a, 8. b, and 8. c) . 
Various categories of. relatives were elaborated in the survey and 
this included distant relatives on either side of the family with 
details of the precise relationship unknown. All of these categories 
were assessed as relatives for the purposes of the survey. The 
results clearly indicate that Muslims in this area are more likely 
to marry non-relatives and strangers, than relatives of any type or 
distance. This has to be interpreted as the influence of the religion 
on the culture and language. 
1° Virilocal residence, the Middle Eastern preference is 
generally negatively valued in this cultural context. I knew of only 
one case in the research area in which the young wife of a young and 
very wealthy man died and he was urged by his friends to marry again. 
He then married a female relative from a poor family and she came to 
share his house with his children. In this case he was highly 
regarded. 
15 In a paper entitled "The Marriage Customs of the Moors of 
Ceylon" that he read before the Royal Asiatic Society. 
16 The dowry requirement makes it difficult for women from poor 
families to marry (cf ff14 above) and there is not infrequently a 
suggestion that the rich should help endower them. 
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Table 8. a 
KAPUFTATTA Marriage Patterns 
Sample 29 households - 101 marriages 
Male Female Total 
No Relation/Stranger 69% 73% 71% 
Previous Relation 31% 27% 29% 
Table 8. b 
HORAGODA Marriage Patterns 
Sample 20 households - 66 marriages 
Male Female Total 
No Relation/Stranger 55% 56% 56% 
Previous Relation 45% 44% 44% 
Table 8. c 
MADURAGODA Marriage Patterns 
Sample 36 households - 102 marriages 
Male Female Total 
No Relation/Stranger 53% 55% 54% 
Previous Relation 47% 45% 46% 
The figure for marriages to non-relatives in Kapuwatta (71%) is much 
higher than the figures for marriages to non-relatives in Horagoda 
(56%) or Maduragoda (54%) and is probably closer to the norm in the 
research area as a whole. Kapuwatta is a comparatively wealthy 
village where most people these days are engaged in trading 
(particularly textiles) . The majority of Muslims in the research area 
were urban traders and thus could be expected to reflect the patterns 
of marriage in Kapuwatta. Horagoda is an agricultural village and 
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marriages in Maduragoda must be caste endogamous, limiting them to 
Ande enclaves in Galle, Matara and Colombo. Given this requirement 
for caste endogamy and the limited number of possible villages from 
which to select a spouse the Maduragoda figure for marriage to 
strangers is higher than expected. There must be a fairly high 
percentage of marriages to distant kin which doesn't appear here 
because the villagers choose not to recognize it. 17 In Horagoda, a 
rural farming village, the 56% figure for marriage to strangers 
reflects the widely acknowledged land pressures. There is according 
to local opinion, a high tolerance of , love-marriages" and post- 
marital settlement outside the village (neolocal residence) . This 
figure will no doubt increase as the village population continues to 
grow and more young people seek to settle outside the village. The 
total amount of land that can be farmed is limited and in most cases 
the inherited plots can not be further divided and still effectively 
farmed. The land pressures necessitate a relatively stable 
population. 18 
Despite the terminologically given preference for cross-cousin 
marriage we have seen that the majority of marriages are to non- 
relatives. Thus the cross-cousin relationships are not creating 
marriages but on the other hand because of the terminology we find 
that marriage creates cross-cousins. A man who marries a stranger 
wife will address her brother as maChan (MBS FZS) from that point on. 
In this instance the economic relation (marriage) creates the kin 
relation which in turn fosters economic relations. " 
17 Another possibility is that they only trace relatives for a 
few generations where questions of marriage are concerned. This would 
fit with the time it takes to move from the Moula caste to the Nala 
Manichal caste. However I completed a genealogical chart of the 
entire village to a depth of seven generations back to five founding 
ancestors. Obviously this problem requires further research. 
18 This village is notable for its markedly different attitude 
towards female education after puberty and almost all the young women 
complete their "0" Levels and some continue their education outside 
the village when finances permit. The local headmaster is a prime 
factor in this. He insists that education is a good thing and that 
educating the women within the village preserves their purity. A 
number of women from this village attend teacher training college and 
later seek employment as teachers where they often 'fall in love' 
with and marry Muslim men (also teachers in some cases). 
19 It was Malinowski (1930) who first argued that fictive kinship 
(kula partners) fostered the practice of trade and the trading ethic. 
224 
8.3. Marriage Rites. 
The following description and analysis is based on a wedding between 
a local man and a woman from a nearby town. The two families were 
both members of the middle class and had no relation or friendship 
before the wedding arrangements took place, and the initial 
introductions were arranged through a marriage broker. It is 
therefore both relatively elaborate and a representation of, the 
extreme case of wedding ritual where the rite actually joins two 
families together. 20 
The household of the prospective groom consisted of his mother (mna) 
and father Nappa), his elder sister (thatha), her husband (Machan) 
and their daughter and son (Mahal and Mahan) the groom himself 
(mapillai) and his younger brother (thambi). '1 This house will 
eventually pass totally to his sister but even today she runs the 
household entirely as her mother is ailing. The groom's house22 is 
located on a large block of land which contains two other houses 
belonging to his father's two married sisters (maami). 23 The groom's 
father is a relatively wealthy businessman who runs a cycle and 
electrical goods shop in conjunction with his two sons and a number 
of Sinhalese employees. The family decided that they wished to find 
a bride (pon) for the eldest son but they did not want to look among 
their relatives. 
20 The description is based on the one complete set of marriage 
rites that I have witnessed, from the initial soliciting of a 
marriage broker, through the marriage rituals and finally to the 
period shortly after the marriage when the new couple reside for a 
short time in the home of the groom although their permanent place 
of residence will be with the bride and her kin. In general my 
observations were limited to either the wedding or home-coming events 
to which people invited me freely. The Nikah being an all-male 
religious event, my only opportunities to attend were two instances 
where I knew the families well. In one of these cases I was 
restricted to female space and observing with the women from the 
'back of the house' and in the other I observed from the public side 
of the house under 'mosque restrictions' - from the open doorway of 
the room being used, without standing on the haram space. 
21 All terms refer to groom as ego. 
22 This house is the groom's sister's house but for the sake of 
this discussion I will speak of the bride's and groom's houses and 
households. 
23 This is an odd arrangement and I believe that the groom's 
father bought the land and built houses for his sisters there. 
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The bride's father was formerly a headmaster in a nearby town and his 
wife's house stands beside that - of her sister. The bride is the 
eldest child in the family and has a younger brother and two younger 
sisters. It is important that the first marriage contracted by the 
family is a good one so that the other daughters will also be able 
to marry when they are old enough. The two families were unknown to 
each other directly prior to this event though it is likely that in 
each group of relatives there was knowledge of each of the fathers 
given the public nature of their occupations. 
The first step in, arranging a marriage between strangers is 
contacting the broker. Both the fathers in this instance have alerted 
the broker to their needs for a spouse, their respective financial 
and social situations, the groom's prospects and the forthcoming 
dowry. 24 If the broker thinks that he may have a possible match he 
nominates a possible spouse and each of the families then researches 
the other through their own connections. If both parties remain 
interested then the negotiations continue. If either family finds the 
proposed match unsuitable then the cases remain with the broker who 
will suggest new matches. The bride's father is interested and he 
arranges a time to visit with the broker; this is known as mapillai 
parka varai (coming to see the bridegroom). They go to see the groom 
at work in his father's shop and then meet his father at the house 
to discuss the dowry (the gold jewellery, the house and property) 
that will pass to the bride. The groom's family are satisfied with 
the proposed dowry and the character and economic situation of the 
bride's family and they then arrange a day when the groom's female 
relatives will visit to see the bride. 25 The formal visit having been 
agreed to and a date set the groom's older sister paid an unannounced 
call at the house of the bride to see the house and family as they 
really were and not when fully prepared for a formal visit. They 
24 The broker's role is an important one in a situation where as 
many as 70g of the marriages take place among strangers. The stereo- 
type of the broker is of a man who has a pocketful of photos of young 
men on one side and a pocketful of photos of young women in the 
other. 
25 If at this stage the dowry is not sufficient but the woman is 
considered a suitable match then further negotiations about the 
dowry may be entered intp. In this case the dowry was Rs50,000 a 
(half) share of the brides family house (initially they will occupy 
the main bedroom), a bedroom suite, a set of gold jewellery 
consisting of thali, ear-rings, bracelets and necklace and a number 
of saris. 
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asked to speak to the bride's mother and when she came to the door 
said "Where is your daughter? " They then looked around the house. 
This provided the chance to see the bride without her fine clothes 
and also allowed the visitors to check on the general standards of 
the household (what degree of control the young women are subject to 
for instance) 
. 
'6 
This is followed by the formal visit which is referred to as Pon 
parka (bride looking) or nalay pordu (chain to put on). A group of 
the groom's close female kin visited the bride's house bearing 
gifts. 27 The groom's sister led the party into the house and a younger 
sister of the bride sprinkled rose-water on her as she entered the 
gate. The bride's mother greeted everyone with her head covered and 
then put some scented oil on the back of each woman's hand as a 
gesture of welcome. The visiting party were extremely quiet and very 
formal. The bride was not present and a number of her female kin were 
in the kitchen out of view. The bride's mother, MZ and a younger 
(pre-pubertal) sister of the bride served the guests who were offered 
lavish quantities of food and plied with soft-drinks. 28 It was some 
time before the formality of the occasion began to wane despite 
several attempts by the hostess to lighten the atmosphere. After 
coffee the prospective groom's kinswomen saw the bride. She was 
seated alone in a fine sari in the newly furnished bedroom . 
29 The 
bride was sitting with eyes downcast and nervously playing with a 
handkerchief and she was soon in the centre of a group of strangers 
(and potential senior female relatives) who took the opportunity to 
have a good look at her. Her own mother remained in the doorway as 
a mere observer and the party was. controlled by the groom's sister. 
After some time the groom's sister looked around the room to gather 
26 The grooms sister travelled in a car with her FZ and two FZD. 
It was on this occasion that the actual decision was made. The 
groom's father had already approved the match subject to the approval 
of the women in the family. Thawfeeq argues that brides were formerly 
selected by a groom's mother, aunts and elder sisters (ibid: 71). 
2' Grooms sister, M, MZ, FZ, MZD, FZD, ZHZ and small daughters 
of these women. They carried biscuits as gifts to the household and 
his sister carried a gold chain. 
28 I was told that the prospective mother-in-law "feeds 
everyone". There was a conspicuous display of abundance with savoury 
shorteats, sweets, kiribat, banana, cakes, biscuits and wattalapan. 
2' She is thus viewed in the room amongst the furniture and 
clothing that will be part of the dowry. 
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subtle nods of assent and then pulled her sari up to cover her head, 
placed the hanky on the head of the girl and fixed a gold necklace 
around the neck of the bride-to-be. With this act she signed her 
acceptance of the young woman on behalf of her brother and the whole 
kin group. 30 The bride's mother then gave a gold ring each to the 
sister and mother of the groom. 31 The groom's sister then attempted 
to get the bride to respond to gentle jibes and the atmosphere was 
altered slightly as the women encouraged the bride to talk rather 
than remain simply the object of their somewhat daunting observation. 
Eventually she began to smile though she was clearly overwhelmed and 
outnumbered. The fact that the bride's mother remained in the 
doorway suggests that the room itself as a space in the bride's natal 
house and future home of the groom is at this time the property of 
his kinswomen. By their occupation of the room and control of the 
bride they indicate their power in her natal home as her senior 
kinswomen . 
31 
The Nikah is the occasion on which the marriage is formally 
registered and is considered to be the legal marriage. " It is also 
called Shauauldm (engagement) and as a cultural ceremony is concerned 
with defining the new relations between the two social groups. This 
day includes clear religious and customary elements. A group of the 
groom's close male kin and family friends gather at his home. The 
local registrar of Muslim weddings has been alerted and he is there 
30 Women cover their heads in order to pray - or in public. This 
ritual act in which the women cover their heads indoors and in all- 
female company is thus imbued with religious significance. It is 
witnessed by God. 
31 Informants stated that each of these three gifts could have 
been different and that there was no particular significance in the 
items themselves. The gold chain could for instance have been a 
bracelet, a ring, a wristwatch or a gold sovereign on a chain - all 
these however are circular, binding and have some symbolic 
association with the thali - the prime symbol of a woman's wedded 
state. The rings given to the groom's Z and M were reciprocal gifts, 
perhaps 'sealing' a contract between the women. Each of the other 
women present was given a metallic silver tray. 
32 In the vans on the return journey there was much laughter and 
. gossip about the 
bride herself and the state of her household. The 
gifts were passed around and evaluated by everybody in a state of 
great excitement. 
33 The Register is often signed on the wedding day itself. The 
Nikah is concerned with sexual rights and in earlier times wealthy 
people used to delay the Nikah until the bridegroom had entered the 
bride's home (Thawfeeq, ibid: 72). 
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along with a local imam and another moulavi. Inside the house, in a 
large central room with open windows, the couch and the floor beside 
it are covered with carpets with a distinctly Eastern character 
creating a distinct ritual space. 34 The household women and the 
visiting kinswomen are out of sight, many of them engaged in last 
minute preparations for the feast that is to be served, though the 
bulk of the cooking is done by a team of professional male cooks, 
outside, in huge pots standing over fires. 35 A group of the bride's 
male kin arrive en masse and as they arrive her father and brother 
are sprinkled with rosewater. A spokesman from the grooms house calls 
out loudly to them "Why have you all come? " They reply "We want to 
see the bride-groom. " It is only after this that the bridegroom 
appears. The groom is dressed in a new Western suit and is wearing 
a "wedding hat" -a red felt Fez. 36 The principal actors (the imam, 
bride's brother, bridegroom, moulavi, and bride's father, also in a 
red fez) sit on the couch opposite the Registrar's chair. Others sit 
or stand behind. All the men have covered their heads and there are 
no divisions maintained between the two groups; they appear as a 
single community of men and this is underlined when they pray. The 
register (kadutham) is signed and the amount of the dowry 
(stridhanam) and the Mahr (symbolic payment given to the bride) are 
noted. 37 This social contract is witnessed by a male religious 
94 These Middle Eastern/Turkish carpets are generally brought 
back from overseas trips (sometimes from Mecca) and they often 
feature pictures of the Ka'bah or Medina with Arabic phrases from the 
Qur'an as motifs in a decorative border. Their use is restricted to 
special occasions and as such they have the status of ritual items. 
They are regularly used as above or in a rathib where they function 
as a communal prayer mat, creating a bounded ritual space. 
35 There are very few people who actually list their occupation 
as cook, and indeed there would not be sufficient work to support a 
large number of them. It is a part-time occupation for men in need 
of extra income and there are a number of cooking "teams" that 
operate on a fairly regular basis with itinerant workers as needed. 
36 The fez also, is only used on occasions of particular 
importance and not as a general rule for everyday prayers. 
a' The register is signed by the groom and the bride's F, one 
witness on behalf of each family and the Lebbe from the Weligama 
mosque. Dowry as referred to here consists of two elements; the house 
and jewellery (property) given to the bride and the kaikuli (a cash 
sum) which is given to the groom and used to help pay for the 
wedding. The cash is in a small wooden box and after the ceremony is 
handed to the groom's ZH by the bride's F. The Mahr is a gold bangle 
which will match the set of jewellery the bride is having made as 
part of her dowry. Its value alone is Rs5000. This ceremony is 
229 
community and it is a legally binding marriage as far as Sri Lankan 
law is concerned. 38 The bride's brother then presents the groom with 
a silver tray of flowers, sweets, betel leaves and turmeric. 39 Then 
he places a gold ring on the groom's left hand. In return the groom 
gives a ring to the bride's brother. 40 The imam recites a short 
prayer and then the Moulavi takes the bride's father`s hand in his own 
and has him repeat the marriage contract. Then he takes the hand of 
the bridegroom and asks him to repeat it in turn. After a final 
communal prayer the focus of activity broadens from the ritual space 
to a wider social scene and the men take their places at tables where 
the feast is served. 41 
Some members of the bride's party begin to bring into the house large 
trays of fruit and special foods as gifts to the grooms household. 42 
The fruit and pachoru must be understood as symbols of fertility. 
sometimes referred to as sheezana panam (dowry ceremony) . In the case 
of a divorce the kaikuli is not subject to return (Mohan, 1985: 50). 
38 Once it is consummated the marriage is subject to the Muslim 
, marriage code and 
divorce may only be obtained through the Qazi 
court. This particular method of divorce pertains only to Muslim 
marriages and attempts at negotiation and reconciliation are 
mandatory before divorce may be pronounced (by the husband). 
39 The tray of sweets is followed by a cake in the shape of two 
hearts joined together, one pink and one blue and bearing the names 
of the bride and groom. The return cake (purchased in Colombo) was 
in the shape of and decorated as an elaborate basket of flowers. 
This Western innovation symbolises the new union between two young 
people of the middle class. 
40 This ring is for the bride and her brother acts as her agent 
(wali) in this instance. If the bride has no brother her father 
fulfills this role. 
41 There are tables in the groom's house and in the front rooms 
of (FZ) house next door. The house of another FZ is reserved for the 
women. On this occasion everyone is to eat from individual plates. 
This could indicate the separation and tension that still exists 
between the families socially or could merely be a mark of high 
status. The food is still served in Saban but to eat from them 
ritually means sitting in groups on a covered and specially cleaned 
floor in line with the religious significance of the event. The men 
of the two families and their friends therefore dine together but it 
is a social meal. 
42 There are about thirty trays in all, filled with the highest 
quality fruit and in most cases a tray of each. Thus there are trays 
of pineapples, avocado pears, papaya, mangosteens, oranges, limes, 
ambarella, betel, lemons, several types of banana, mangoes, apples, 
grapes etc. The other food included wattalapan, small cakes, pachoru 
(milk-rice) and packets of dry and sweet biscuits. 
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Some of the food is placed on display and after the ceremony it will 
be distributed among all the groom's kin and some will be given to 
the poor. 43 This is the beginning of a cycle of food exchanges between 
the new kin groups. ' 
When the men vacate the main room of the house where the Nikah took 
place the young girls move from the interior of the house to the main 
room to better observe the proceedings. Their absence was required 
by the religious nature of the previous event but now as only the 
social. restrictions. apply the pre-pubertal women have the right to 
move and mix as they please. As only the groom's kinswomen are 
present (this however does include guests), large trays of food are 
prepared to be sent back to the women of the bride's house. This food 
will be distributed among their relatives and close friends and the 
women will not have cooked for this evening. Enormous pots of rice 
and pots of all the curries are sent with wattalapan, bananas and the 
other wedding cake decorated with the names of the couple. This is 
the first exchange of food between the two households and it 
signifies their new kinship links. 44 The bride's family sent gifts 
of whole, pure fruits and in return were given cooked foods. This 
could suggest that bride-givers have lower status than bride-takers, 
even when coupled with matrilocal residence. In this cultural context 
among Tamils and Sinhalese cooked food "is never passed upwards" 
(McGilvray, ibid: 93). Muslims in general do not observe the same 
restrictions on food but there is a tension between the families that 
is yet to be resolved at this point in the proceedings and this 
interpretation is a possibility. The couple are now considered to be 
married though they have not yet seen each other nor will they see 
each other for another two months when the "wedding" takes place. The 
ceremony of the Nikah is a religious and social event with all male 
actors. Their position as controllers of women in this marriage by 
proxy, and the absence of women from the religious side of the event 
are evident. 
41 The groom's kin here includes his ZHZ in Galle and his FB's 
house. 
44 If any major feast were to occur between the Nikah and the 
wedding the families should exchange gifts (Thawfeeq, ibid: 72). 
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On the evening of the wedding members of the groom's party assemble 
at his house. 45 The house, nearby trees and compound are decorated 
with strings of coloured lights and a pandal (throne) has been 
constructed inside. 46 As is customary on these occasions the men 
gather outside and women inside. The pandal is the immediate focus 
of the room in which it stands and chairs have been placed in rows 
facing it and filling the room. The groom takes his place on the 
pandal under the protection of his female kin and his ZH places a 
gold ring on his finger and rubs scented oil on his hands. Then 
another male relative places a gold medallion around his neck and 
again anoints him with scent. 47 Several friends then greet him with 
scent and whisper words of encouragement. 48 The men's greetings are 
followed by those of his Mother and Sister. 
This is a ritual in which the wealth of the respective families is 
on display and the women are wearing all their gold jewellery and 
many imported saris. The groom's ZH carries the thali, a sari and the 
Mahr ready to take to the brides house. The groom's suitcase is 
packed and ready. 49 Just before nine o'clock in the evening the 
45 Weddings in all cultures here involve both a "wedding" and a 
"home-coming". These are two feasts, one hosted at each of the 
bride's and groom's houses. On each night the greatest number of 
guests are from the side hosting the event. Only family and close 
friends on each side attend both feasts. 
46 The pandal is essentially a raised platform covered with pink 
paper, on top of which has been constructed a very elaborate three 
sided backdrop made from foam board carved in relief, backed with 
pink paper and decorated with silver glitter, fernery, concealed 
spotlights and small strings of "fairy lights". 
47 This is reminiscent of the male circumcision rites in which 
the boy is called sunnathu mappillai - circumcision bridegroom. He 
is also placed on a chair in front of his female kin and given 
"wedding" gifts of gold rings and chains by males. Circumcision is 
clearly a male puberty rite which signifies a boys sexual readiness 
and social adulthood. 
68 Traditionally the groom is thought to be in need of advice and 
support on this occasion and there used to be a role for an older man 
from amongst the groomb kin to speak with the groom and advise him 
how to treat his wife, particularly on her wedding night with the 
emphasis on pleasing her rather than rushing her. Contrary to the 
Sinhalese custom, it is not essential that the couple consummate the 
marriage the first night. 
49 It contains saris for his new wife, a sari for her mother, 
cloth lengths for frocks for all her younger sisters and cloth 
lengths for trousers for her father and brother. This symbolically 
indicates that he becomes a provider of cloth for her family. 
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grooms sister's husband takes two bowls; one of coconut milk and 
betel leaves and the other of betel leaves and turmeric water and 
performs alathi by moving them around in a clockwise direction in 
front of the groom. 50 After reciting the Fat iiha with him the moulavi 
will accompany the groom on the journey to the bride's house. 
In structural terms the groom moves from his normal position in life 
onto the ritual and liminal space of the pandal where he is located 
under the protection and observation of his kinswomen. His position 
is endorsed by male kin and friends who ritually greet him here, and 
when the women approach to greet him they cover their heads. Then 
follows the cultural custom of the alathi "blessing" by his 
disbelieving brother-in-law. The groom is then moved into a religious 
frame (under male protection) through his recital of the Fat.. iha. His 
subsequent transfer to the brides house is effected under the 
protection of the moulavi. The assembled company have by now 
distributed themselves in cars (for the principal actors) and buses, 
which have been hired for the occasion, for the trip to the bride's 
house. Men and women travel in separate buses and the buses for the 
women park very close to the house to enable the women to board as 
privately as possible, most of them covering their heads before they 
move outside the house. The auspicious time for the "tying of the 
thali" had been ascertained by the bride's family and the convoy is 
organized to arrive in accordance with this. The convoy vehicles are 
scenes of much merriment and there are great peals of laughter and 
excitement as they erratically speed past one another on the journey. 
On the outskirts of the bride's town there is some rearrangement of 
the order of the cars to ensure that the car of the groom's sister 
(travelling with her FZD, D) is the first to arrive, followed by the 
other women in their buses and then the men. " 
The bride's house has been similarly decorated for the occasion and 
a pandal has been placed in the central room facing rows of chairs 
for the groom's kinswomen and close friends. The bride is escorted 
so Alathi -a ritual action of blessing found commonly in Hindu 
temples. As the groom's ZH performs this he tells me that this is 
against all his personal belief and opinions and that he is 
"following custom". He is thus, at this point, subordinated to 
valakkam. 
si At Muslim events movement is constantly orchestrated to keep 
the gender groups separate. In this instance the women are given the 
opportunity to arrive and enter the house before the men get there. 
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to the pandal on the arms of her father and mother's brother. 
Delivered to this symbolic and liminal space she waits, wearing a 
pale pink, heavily laced Western style gown, face veiled and 
protected by young bridesmaids. Her status is high tonight as she is 
the fertile virgin bride who mediates the economic conjunction of two 
domestic spheres. She is the new owner of half of her natal house and 
will control a great deal of its participation in the market through 
her control of her husband. 
The bride's mother greets the groom's sister and the other women at 
the gate and sprinkles them with rosewater. Someone offers the ritual 
call - "The bridegrooms people are coming. Get up, get up - make room 
for them". The women then take their places confronting the bride, 
and her mother (with her head covered) anoints the groom's sister's 
hand with perfume and then repeats this with all the visiting women. 
The women of the bride's party are in the back of the house but 
outside the men of both groups are mixing well, although there is 
some deference to visitors as far as chairs go. The men therefore 
constitute a common, egalitarian group for the second occasion while 
the women remain separated as distinct groups of kin. 52 When the groom 
arrives he is escorted (along with the moulavi, his F and ZH) by the 
bride's father and brother into the front room of the house, where 
a couch has been covered with an ornate heavy cloth for the occasion. 
He is joined by two close friends and this group recites prayers led 
by the moulavi. The groom is then immediately led by the bride's 
brother to a seat on the pandal beside the bride where he sits with 
eyes downcast. As he is arriving to take his place his sister removes 
the veil (symbolizing purdah) from the bride's face. 57 The bride's 
brother sprinkles the shoes of the groom with rosewater. 5` In return 
the groom places a gold ring on his right forefinger. 55 The groom ties 
52 The extent to which men are associated more closely with 
religion and women with culture is abundantly clear. It is religion 
however which provides the possibility of relation. 
53 This is the first occasion on which the couple have ever seen 
each other, though for the moment neither is looking. 
54 Traditionally he would have washed his feet with rosewater 
(Bawa, ibid: 229). This may be further evidence that wife-takers are 
superior to wife-givers - in this instance with matrilocal residence 
the husband is superior to his brother-in-law (Gabber, 1984: 245). 
ee These two men will henceforth address each other as machan 
(cross-cousin) thus tempering to some degree any inequality. 
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the thali around the neck of the bride. 56 Then he briefly places a 
sari on the bride's head. 57 The groom's sister then performs alathi 
and takes a tray with two small dishes of banana and milk, provided 
by the bride's mother and feeds both bride and groom. 58 The final 
ritual, thala shotti involves taking a tray which has rice, salt, a 
coconut, one or two eggs and some money on a tray and circling it 
over the head of the groom and then the bride. The tray is then given 
to a beggar and this action brings the couple good fortune. 
This concludes those rites which culturally signify the marriage of 
the couple, although the. festivities are not yet completed. During 
this evening's rites, the only two men present are the groom and the 
bride's brother. The other two principal actors are the bride and the 
groom's sister. The 'customary' rites constitute a peer group 
exchange of siblings witnessed by the kinswomen of the groom and thus 
to some degree, accurately reflect the ideology of South Indian 
marriage alliance suggested by the kin terms. In this sense the women 
are clearly to be seen as associated with custom. All of these rites 
have been performed in houses and therefore in the domain of, and 
witnessed by, the women. The religious and overtly male ceremonies 
are distinct from these. 
The groom is called to the front of the house and the bride is called 
to dinner. The feast is served to the women (in the bride's MZ's 
house) and the men (in a shelter erected for the occasion). After 
eating the new couple are together again and surrounded by a smaller 
group of people from the groom's party (married women and young 
unmarried men). Again the bride is alone with her new kinsfolk and 
in her own house and there is a considerable amount of joking about 
the night ahead. 59 The evening concludes with the gift of a large 
56 The thali although a Tamil adornment signifying marriage is 
also imbued by informants with the symbolic significance of its 
crescent shape, and has thus been appropriated to an Islamic life. 
57 In theory she should wear this sari on the following day. 
se One spoon is given to the groom and the rest is fed to the 
bride. The groom is meant to exclaim that it tastes just like his 
mother's milk (Yalman, ibid: 302). 
59 At one point the male friends of the groom, occupied the 
bedroom where they put potato chip packets under the mattress. An 
effective prank, given that the walls in these houses are no more 
than eight feet high, most houses are built without ceilings and the 
rest of the bride's family are lodged in the next room. 
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quantity of feast food which is taken home for the young women on the 
groom's side who have been confined to the house. 
The next day (the home-ccMing) begins with the dispatching of a car 
to the bride's house to collect the groom and bring him home where 
he is the subject of jokes . from female cross-cousins about the 
previous night. The bride's younger brother arrives to invite him to 
lunch and in the early evening two of the groom's kinswomen (FZD and 
MBD) leave to "bring the bride". This evening's public activities are 
a repeat of the previous night but hosted by the groom's family. 60 
As the guests arrive the men gather outside and the women take their 
places inside facing the pandal. 61 When the bride arrives at the front 
of her convoy she is sprinkled with rosewater by one of the young 
girls from the groom's household. Thus the bride is met by one of the 
most junior women of the house at the door in contrast to the grooms 
sister who was met by the most senior woman of the bride house at 
the gate. There is a clear statement here about the relative status 
of the families and the two women within them. The bride is escorted 
to, the pandal by the groom's sister. She again asserts her authority 
over the new bride but she herself has things at stake tonight. The 
bride is on view to their entire social and business circle and "the 
new relationship they have acquired" must do them proud. " In her 
natal house the bride was on display as the epitome of purity and 
fertility and her status within her kin group was markedly increased. 
This is the converse of her position in her husband's house where she 
is on display as impure junior sister. 67 Her marriage allows her in 
60 The guests brought gifts for the household, all of which were 
sets of drinking glasses in cardboard boxes. They will all be sold 
back to local shops within a few days for cash. They are therefore 
clearly in lieu of a cash gift. I observed a similar practice at some 
Sinhalese ceremonies where guests brought a kilo of sugar (value Rs2l/- 
at that time) and these were likewise returned. 
61 The women that arrive in cars are dropped close to the doorway 
but there are many other women who live locally and arrive on foot 
slipping through the darkness. As part of a widely practiced Islamic 
etiquette the men tend to gather on the perimeters of the yard 
leaving the women room to arrive as far as possible, if not entirely 
unnoticed, then certainly under no close scrutiny. 
62 There are a number of local Sinhalese businessmen in 
. attendance and also business people and friends from Colombo. 
63 It is possible that Muslim brides deliberately preserve their 
purity until after this night. 
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a sense to be controlling of her husband's family because they now 
have some of their fortune enmeshed in her household. 
The feast follows the usual pattern and tonight the bride and groom 
eat together watched by the groom's sister and the all the young 
women of his household. Before long, the young men having finished 
eating, arrive to view the proceedings. They engage in much jesting 
at the expense of the bride and groom and to the great amusement of 
themselves and the young women present. 
At mid-morning the next day the groom arrives home again and is 
followed shortly afterwards by a young boy from the bride's house 
(MZS) carrying a brown paper parcel from his mother. The parcel 
contained turmeric, limes and flowers which together signified that 
the marriage had been consummated. 64 The two families must make 
arrangements for the mowlood and feast which celebrate the 
consummation and the beginning of the couple's new life together. It 
is agreed that the valima verundu (bridegroom's feast) will take 
place the next night. 65 This feast is provided by the groom in his 
wife's house. Informants stated that the valima verundu had a 
religious sense but it also has clear customary elements. It is the 
groom's first marketing day after the wedding and he must cover the 
entire cost of the feast. He is also required to purchase a number 
of symbolic items (fish, turmeric, sweets/toffees, a saucepan and a 
spoon) . The mowlood that will be recited is the 
Subuharnan - the life 
story of the prophet. This whole evening is a ritual rehearsal for 
the new couple's joint life witnessed by both their families and 
religiously endorsed by the recital of the mowlood which is both 
practical guide and prayer of thanks. The front' room of the house has 
been ritually washed and prepared for a religious event and the groom 
greets both his wife's father and wife's brother with rosewater as 
they walk into the room. This is a symbolic recognition of the fact 
that half of the house has passed to his wife and that he now 
controls it. They are followed by the male members of the groom's 
family and with the help of the moulavi they recite in Arabic, the 
64 I was told that "In Batticaloa they (Muslims) have to show a 
white sheet with bloodstains to the mother-in-law otherwise she will 
scold". 
65 It is also called mapillai sharpadu (bridegroom's feast), 
wadi-mankay (waist-mango) (Bawa, ibid: 233) and wadi-manga (waist- 
mango) (Thawfeeq, ibid: 74). 
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life story of the Prophet. The essence of this evening's ritual is 
to bless the future, to foreshadow it and endorse the new order with 
the good will of close kin and the blessing of God. 
During the mowlood recital the groom's sister is supervising the 
dressing of the bride in a sari provided by the groom. 66 One of the 
important aspects of the evening is that the bride performs the 
"first serving of the rice". Up until today she has done no work in 
the house since the wedding and they say "she is starting her life 
as a housewife". She serves the rice for the first time wearing the 
new sari that her husband has provided for her; rice that he has 
provided, cooked in a pot and served with a spoon that he has 
purchased. This evening clearly ritualizes the new responsibilities 
and appropriate tasks of husband and wife. All the women cover their 
heads and the new wife spoons several servings of rice into the 
saban, followed by her husband's sister and her mother. Then the 
feast is served. On this occasion fish must be cooked and eaten by 
those present. After the wedding there is a prohibition on eating 
fish in both households until after the mowlood which follows the 
consummation. 67 The men eat first in groups of six and they are 
followed by the women who eat in the same manner. The valima virundu 
marks the ritual joining of the two families in both cultural and 
religious spheres. The men recite a mowlood together and then eat as 
Muslims from common dishes in ritual space. The women also "cook" 
together and ritually share the feast as Muslim women. The new social 
66 I had remarked to the groom's sister at the time of the 
wedding that the bride's family had perhaps gained a son and in sharp 
contrast to my view she had replied with reference to the bride, 
"She's ours now! " Despite the fact that residence is matrilocal she 
did not regard her family as having lost a son. She clearly regarded 
her brother's new wife as subject to her control as a junior 
kinswoman. Her actions on this occasion, in the bride's house and in 
the midst of the bride's family, were totally and publicly in 
accordance with her stated belief. She instructed the bride to put 
on the underskirt and then dressed her in the sari herself. She also 
sent the bride off to brush her hair and when not pleased with her 
efforts instructed her to do it again. Her behaviour was completely 
atypical of her customary attitude and demeanour. 
67 No-one seemed to know the significance of fish. Thawfeeq 
suggests that only chicken and mutton are eaten between the wedding 
and the valima and on this occasion fish must be eaten because it is 
an "everyday food" (ibid: 71). I point out that it is the food item 
that appears at all 'births' in the community and this is the birth 
of a new Muslim reproductive unit. The possibility exists that fish 
is an ambiguous food category - since it does not have to be 
sacrificed it may embody fertility. 
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order is thus endorsed though this evening's feast and rathib. Within 
this religiously endorsed order it is the religion itself that is 
dominant. 
The last wedding rite of major significance is the day after the 
valima verundu when the bride comes to lunch at the groom's sister's 
house and spends her first day as a member of the groom's female kin 
group. This is. day of purely customary practices and may be regarded 
as the establishment of the bride within the female status ranking 
of the groom's kinswomen. She has lunch today with the married women 
of the household as the guest of the groom's sister. 68 The bride is 
both a guest of honour as the new bride of their kinsman and the 
newest junior wife to join the group. Her ambivalent status is 
evident in the treatment she receives. She wears the sari that was 
placed on her head at the wedding but has not attended to the groom' s 
sisters instructions that she should bring along another (ornate, 
imported) sari to change into after the meal. The groom's sister is 
annoyed but seems resigned to it. The table is covered with white 
cloth and laid out with plates of rice, curry, salads, fruits and 
small dishes of wattalapan. The bride is invited to sit down near one 
end of the table and is offered a chair covered in a white cloth by 
the sister of the groom. She sits down, only to discover what 
everyone else knew all along - that the chair is broken. Covering her 
face with embarrassment she struggles to get back on her feet as 
everyone around her laughs with delight. Then she is offered a glass 
of water on a silver tray. She takes it eagerly, in order to separate 
herself from the chaos of a moment ago and regain her composure, but 
discovers as she tries to drink that it is a trick glass of water. 
The younger women are very keen to observe her reactions to each of 
these pranks and struggle to get a clear view of her expression on 
each occasion. The first seating is reserved for the married women 
and the bride's family and the party chatters freely while they wait 
for the bride to discover yet another joke at her expense. Soon 
enough she reaches for the wattalapan and on wondering what it is 
that is resisting her spoon discovers a huge piece of meat has been 
hidden in the bottom of the dish. By this time she seems to expect 
it and laughs along with everyone else. When the younger unmarried 
6e She is accompanied by her mother (who leaves her to fend for 
herself), her younger sisters (who immediately go off to play with 
the other pre-pubescent household women) and the groom who 
disappears. 
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women take their turn at the table the bride has her first 
opportunity to "spend time" as a member of the group and not on 
display. In the late afternoon her father arrives to the front room 
of the house, the younger women retreat towards the back of the house 
and her family become visiting relatives for the first time. The 
young couple spend two nights before they return to the bride's home. 
The first Friday after the wedding the groom must greet the bride's 
mother with a salaam. Friday is the day of the Jumma prayer and the 
salaam is generally a greeting among men in religious contexts. The 
groom is asserting his authority in his wife's house on religious 
grounds and this action reflects that fact. The Bride is then 
expected to visit her mother-in law (mami - HM/FZ) for lunch and 
bring the food herself. She is thus extending her cultural domain and 
by bringing cooked food could be interpreted as further asserting her 
superiority. The couple once more comes to visit the groom's house 
for two weeks and then they take up permanent residence at the 
bride's. At this point the transfer of the groom is considered fully 
effected and the new relations between the two families are complete 
and ritually endorsed. 
8.4 Ritual Interpretation. 
There are a number of ways to view the marriage rites described above 
which are a combination of cultural and religious elements. The rites 
as a whole reveal the wedding as a social and symbolic event with 
overt references to fertility, reproduction, nurture and the creation 
of new kin relations. The rites also reveal a religious and legal 
contract and definite ideological statements about the correct 
internal ordering of the Muslim community. The wedding is also 
clearly a rite de passage, a dangerous transition for the young 
couple in which they are surrounded by a multitude of norms and 
supernatural supports. However it is also evident that the danger and 
the nature of the transition is markedly different in the case of 
bride and groom; they "follow somewhat different ritual 
paths"(Werbner, 1986: 235). 
All marriages establish unions and are concerned with reproductive 
continuity. They often create entirely new families and alliances and 
as such the negotiation of boundaries is always a source of possible 
danger and a ritual concern. Both bride and groom are transferred 
into liminal states at the beginning of the 'ritual process' as they 
are separated from their former status positions and they remain in 
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a liminal position until they are re-integrated as a new conjugal 
couple. 
The table (8. d) below outlines the five major events that constitute 
the marriage rites and their cultural or religious basis. 
Table 8. d 
THE CENCRAL WEDDING RITES 
Event NIKAH WEDDING HOME- VALIMA BRIDE'S 
CO TG VERUNDU LUNCH 
Venue Groom's Bride's Groom's Bride's Groom's 
Religious Religious Cultural Cultural Religious Cultural 
/Cultural 
Gender Male M&F M&F M&F Female 
Key kadutham Thali Bride Subharnan Playing 
Symbolic dowry milk & displayed mowlood pranks on 
Arts Mahr banana in marketing the bride 
turmeric groom's /fish 
house rice- 
serving 
feast feast feast feast feast 
Actors B&G Male Relatives Relatives B&G Groom's 
Relatives & Friends & Friends Families Kinswomen 
Food Fruit to Feast to Feast to Families 
Exchange G's house G's B's fed by G 
Cooked unmarried unmarried and - 
food to kinswomen kinswomen served by 
B's house Bride 
Movement Groom at Groom Groom Groom Groom 
of the home returns returns installed takes 
Groot home home at Bride to 
Bride's his house 
home to visit 
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In the Muslim marriage in this cultural context however, the position 
of the groom appears to be more precarious and surrounded with 
greater social concern. His transfer from his natal house to the home 
of his bride is accomplished with considerable difficulty and is 
only guaranteed after the consummation. 
The Nikah and the valima verundu are both classified as religious 
events for that is their major emphasis, while the wedding, 
homecoming and the bride's lunch are all categorized as cultural. All 
five occasions include the sharing of a feast by participants and 
reveal the separate realms of men and women. There is a certain 
balance to this central set of rites which moves from the all Muslim 
male religious event of the Nikah to the all female cultural event 
of the bride's lunch. The three central rites engage both male and 
female participants but in their specific gender groups. The wedding 
and the homecoming are celebrated by all communities in the country 
regardless of their residence rules or their religion. They are 
major celebrations where wealth and status are displayed and the 
widest social and kin networks are revealed. The valima is again a 
male and female event but the gender groups here are constituted by 
the immediate family members of bride and groom's kin. The Nikah is 
the wedding from the perspective of Islam; once the contract is 
signed and witnessed by the assembled Muslim males the couple are 
married. The groom does not take up residence in his wife's house 
permanently however until after the consummation and the valima 
verundu which follows. Both the Nikah and the valima are religious 
events and they mark the beginning and end of the groom's ritual 
transformation from temporary -resident in his natal house to 
permanent resident in his wife's house. These events designate the 
beginning and end of 'his ritual path' . When he steps onto the pandal 
in his natal house he is in a liminal position but he is essentially 
placed under the protection of his assembled female kinswomen in his 
sister's house and then blessed by male friends and kin with perfume 
and gifts of gold. As he crosses the threshold of the house he steps 
over a bowl of turmeric water to protect him on his journey into the 
unknown. 69 He is immediately under the protection of a moulavi who 
escorts him to the threshold of the room in the bride's house which 
69 His journey is a metaphor of that of the early Arab traders 
who ventured into the unknown and converted and married local wives 
and took up residence with them. An in-depth study of the 
relationship between engagement in trade and marriage patterns among 
Muslims elsewhere in the country would be instructive. 
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contains the wedding pandal. The bride's brother escorts him from the 
moulavi to the side of the bride. This pandal also is under the 
protection of his kinswomen who have filled the room and the ritual 
action of the wedding is controlled by his sister. He spends the 
nights with the bride but is taken home each morning until after the 
valima verundu. This ritual establishes him as the religious head of 
her household; it is the consummation (not the marriage) which allows 
him the right to reside and exercise authority in her customary 
domain. 
The danger for the bride on the other hand seems to be less 
problematic. The bride is escorted from her new bedroom in her natal 
house to the pandal by her father and mother's brother. She is placed 
there under the protection of young female attendants to await the 
arrival of the groom and his kin. As she remains within her customary 
domain she is safe. Indeed both her status and her power have 
increased dramatically - she is now located in a domain thät she 
controls. As the legal marriage has already taken place her sexuality 
is controlled and she represents no further, danger to her family 
honour. 70 To ensure her fertility turmeric (manjal) has been used in 
the cooking of the feast . 
71 The bride is clearly offered some 
protection but the dangers do not appear to be great. She travels to 
the groom' s home in the company of two of his kinswomen and is seated 
alone on the pandal in front of the assembled women. What protection 
she is offered all comes from the customary and not the religious 
domain. If we examine the ritual path of the bride it is clear that 
the critical period for her, lasts from the Wedding until the 
conclusion of the Bride's lunch. The movement here is from the pandal 
70 Werbner argues that in South Asian conceptions fertility rests 
on "controlled sexuality" and that the wedding "ritual serves to 
place control of this disorderly fertility squarely in the hands of 
men"(ibid: 229). 
71 Turmeric is widely used in Indian weddings and has been 
described as 'auspicious' and sometimes as 'purifying' or 'cooling' 
(Beck, 1969). In the other Nikah I observed which took place at the 
bride's house, as soon as the contract had been signed the tray of 
flowers and turmeric (manjal - yellow) was passed through the curtain 
to the bride's mother who immediately threw it into a rice pounder 
and all the, married women in the family took turns to pound it (M, MZ, M 
married D, MMZ). The sexual symbolism in the rice pounder itself is 
evident and the women covered their heads to perform this action. The 
turmeric was then put aside to be used to cook the feast on the night 
of the wedding. It was to ensure the fertility of the marriage. 
Turmeric is widely held to have antiseptic and purificatory 
properties. 
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in her own home where she is a high status virgin to the day spent 
with the groom's kinswomen as an humiliated junior wife. 
The treatment of the young bride at the hands of her new female kin, 
and the practical joking involved all indicate that there is a great 
degree of tension in the new kinship relations which must be 
negotiated. 72 In this Islamic context the women embody the 
contradictions of status hierarchies among kin. No conflict or 
contradiction is permitted to emerge in the domain between the men 
which is identified as religious. The resolution of this conflict in 
the cultural domain between the women, further reinforces their 
distance from Islam and their identification with culture. " Hierarchy 
is a practice not founded in the legitimacy of the Qur'an and the 
egalitarian brotherhood of Islam; it is a practice founded in culture 
and therefore identified with women. In every event associated with 
the wedding the men have gathered as an undifferentiated group. The 
women on the other hand remained as distinct groups of kinswomen 
until the valima verundu when the consummation was celebrated. This 
religious event and joint family feast which endorsed the new order 
of the households was the prelude to the movement of the bride into 
the groom's female kin-group where the first item of business was the 
negotiation of relative status. As a final point of contrast the 
groom moves from contract to consummation (both celebrated with 
religious events) and the bride moves from the wedding to status 
negotiations (both seen as cultural concerns). The valima verundu 
marks the imposition of new religious authority in the (bride's) 
cultural domain and the bride's lunch installs the bride as a junior 
kinswoman in the groom's cultural domain. It is through religion 
that men establish their dominance in women's houses. The different 
ritual paths taken by the bride and the groom reflect their different 
relation to the religion and to the domestic order. 
72 This is especially strong in the sister-in-law relation 
between the new bride and the sister of the groom who does her best 
to assert her authority (as a senior wife in the kin group) in both 
houses. Eventually of course she will see her brother turn his 
attentions more towards his wife's family and away from her own and 
in the long run the bride will control his attentions and his 
loyalty. 
73 It has its similarities with the "women breed conflict" 
argument identified by Gluckman (1950) among the Zulu where the 
inevitable competition for resources among brothers (on behalf of 
their sons), emerged as witchcraft accusations between the women, 
leaving the ideology of patrilineal solidarity unthreatened. 
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The wedding rites bring both religious and customary elements into 
play and asserts their appropriate relation. Any possible 
contradiction between Islam's patrilineal ideology and matrilocal 
residence is overcome through the ritual. The internal symbolic 
dynamic of the rites constitutes a symbolic analysis of the terms of 
existence in a Muslim reality. This reality specifies the nature of 
male/female relations, the relations between kin, the nature of 
domestic units and their correct articulation into the wider economic 
and political reality. Valakkam is that which is subordinated and 
encompassed to din, as female is to male and dcmestic is to mosque. 
The rites finally reinforce much of the din/valakkam, Arab men/local 
women, dichotomy that characterizes so much of Muslim reality here. 
Marriage is a 'rite of conversion' which is the prime element of the 
reproduction of Southern Sri Lankan Islam. 
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Conclusion: 
Muslims in Southern Sri Lanka live in a world rich with religious and 
cultural meaning. In this thesis I have endeavoured to penetrate and 
illuminate the particular world of a Sri Lankan Muslim community. My 
intention was to document a view of Sri Lankan Islam as Muslims of 
Southern Sri Lanka live it. A guiding concern has been to discuss 
what constitutes Islamic practice in this local context. I have 
argued that attention to the wider cultural and cosmological schemas 
which constitute the horizons of Muslim experience, and within and 
against which they reproduce their Islamic world, is critical. Sri 
Lankan Muslim religious practices and understandings constantly 
engage and reflect those horizons. 
In my efforts to understand Muslim reality and Islamic ideology in 
this community I have examined the daily and calendrical religious 
practices that reproduce the Muslim world. Mosques are the heart of 
the Muslim community, indeed icons of it, and my discussion of the 
feast practices reveals how (bounded and corporate) village identity 
is constituted in the mosque. Whilst mosques may often be 
interpreted as both male and Islamic spaces, the articulation of the 
mosques with the domestic order in this context is clear. Mosques 
symbolize. communities and here communities are based on households 
which are the domains of female kindred: Women have subtle but 
elaborate connections to the mosque and its realm of practice. The 
links between household and mosque are defined by frequent food 
offerings as. part of a calendrical cycle of feasts which nurture and 
reconstitute the ummah. In this cultural context both ritual practice 
and the patterns of mosque organisation reflect the fact that the 
community is the base of the mosque. Men through the religious 
marriage rituals re-constitute households as part of the Islamic 
domain by 'converting' women, and women gift the power of their 
fertility to the mosque and enable the constant renewal of the 
community. The cultural (and hierarchical) world of women 
constitutes, through the aegis of the mosque, the religious (and 
egalitarian) community that is the ummah. 
The cosmological dimension of Islam in any particular context shapes 
both religious ideology and ritual practice. My discussion revealed 
that in Sri Lanka virtually all mosques are attached to the shrines 
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of miraculously revealed middle Eastern saints. The presence of the 
entombed saints acts to sacrify the island's Islamic spaces, and 
places the island centrally within 'Arabic' cosmology as the point 
of man's origin on earth. The presence of the saints further 
establishes the orthodoxy of the. mosques. The myths of the shrines 
in this geographic and cultural region clearly indicate that the 
meanings of Muslim shrine practices can not be fully understood 
outside of their specific ideological contexts. 
I have examined the history of the Muslim community in the island and 
the sedimentation of mythic origins. In the late colonial period 
those myths were employed in a discourse of great political import. 
The economic domination of one group of Muslims was extended and 
legitimated by appeals to an ideology of Arab trading ancestry. The 
history of one became the myth of the many. Historical circumstances 
have led to a particular conception of Islam in the island, one in 
which there stands a contradiction between "foreign men" and "local 
wives". In this Islamic community, men are regarded as religiously 
pure, the agents of an Arabic presence long extant on the island, who 
established Moor communities through the conversion and marriage of 
local women. Further, in a particular conjunction this broader 
historical diversity of the community has become condensed, through 
a totalizing ideology, to a union between Arab men and local Tamil 
women. Women, who within this context are avowedly local and 
indigenous, are regarded as the agents of a local culture. Thus 
structurally the community is consistently represented through a kind 
of dualism which associates men with religion and women with culture. 
Within this dualistic conception men, as agents of Islam, stand in 
dominant and incorporative relation to women, as agents of culture. 
The history of the religion's arrival and penetration into the 
island, is enduringly reflected and continues to have a force in the 
present, through the structuring and interpretation of marriage 
rituals within the community. 
The conceptual dualism in which men are associated with din and 
women with valakkam has been a constant theme of my observations and 
analysis and was demonstrated in. analyses of both religious and 
calendrical rituals and domestic rites of reproduction. It must be 
stressed however, that this dualism is a particular one, borne of a 
particular historical experience and interpretation of the 
introduction of Islam into the island, and incorporated and 
elaborated in symbolic and mythic understandings. It may not be 
247 
reduced, out of its cultural and historical context, to a simple 
opposition between men and women, or alternatively to an opposition 
between religion and culture. In fact this dualism is not strictly 
oppositional at all, relying as it does on the constant conversion 
of one of the elements - women, through the incorporative and 
transforming action of the other element - men. This Muslim community 
creatively orders the unification of male and female in order to 
reproduce itself. 
Much that is specific to the Muslim community of Southern Sri Lanka 
has been outlined here, but although the Muslims appreciate 
dimensions that are culturally and historically unique to them they 
also see themselves as part of a world-wide Muslim community - the 
Islamic ummah. The island of Sri Lanka is incorporated into the wider 
Islamic world on a number of levels. Cosmologically they understand 
the island to be the place where man first set foot on earth and to 
which the tombs of (Middle Eastern) saints will miraculously return. 
Historically they are linked to various countries of the Middle East 
whose traders settled and established Ceylon Moor communities which 
converted to Islam. At the ideological level they share a sacred 
text, beliefs and many practices with Muslims throughout the world. 
Their incorporation into the wider Muslim world however, is most 
significantly achieved through their calendrical ritual practice. 
Indeed, 
,I 
would argue that the wider Muslim world is constituted 
through ritual practice and the ideology of the ummah that is clearly 
essayed in the performance of the Hajj. These links are at the 
ideological rather than the experiential level for the vast majority 
of Muslims in this cultural context but their ritual reality 
establishes their particular community as part of the Islamic world. 
The unity inscribed in calendrical ritual practice should be a focus 
of future anthropological analysis. The delineation of specificity, 
of many and various 'Islams', is crucial to begin to understand 
diverse Muslim realities, but we can too easily overlook the unity 
that is also a fundamental element of embodied Islam. Just as it was 
a mistake to assume that Islam was simply a prescribed set of 
practices, universally applicable and not worthy of analysis, so too 
it would be short-sighted to overlook the possibility of effective 
ritual unity. 
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Anthropologists have analyzed the particularities of Islam in local 
contexts and the dynamic tension internal to Muslim communities 
borne of the contradictions between the cultural reality and the 
Islam of the Shariat. Eickelman (1982) believes we should now explore 
"the middle ground" between "the Islam of all times and places" and 
specific Islam. 
Exploration of this middle ground also facilitates an 
understanding of how the universalistic elements of Islam are 
practically communicated and of how modes of communication 
affect religious universals (Eickelman, ibid: ll). 
Among his suggestions for crucial and as yet insufficiently studied 
topics is 
(T) he pilgrimage to Mecca as a vehicle for disseminating or 
reformulating popular interpretations of Islam, (prior studies 
have concentrated principally upon hajj as a means for 
confirming social status or as a religious rite de passage) 
(Eickelman, 1982: 11). 
I submit that a more important aspect of studying the hajj would be 
to focus on the complex of rituals which culminate in the hajj and 
which define and constitute the various levels of the ummah. There 
is a clear ideology of a world-unity in Islam and what is more, a 
ritual process designed to establish it. At the same time it is clear 
that differentiation is the province and possibility of the mundane 
world. The calendrical rituals of Islam tie the ummah together and 
constantly renew it. But they also, as part of this process, 
progressively eliminate differentiation and constitute individuality 
at a level not possible when bounded by a specific cultural, 
political, and gendered, context. The ideological reality of the 
ummah in Mecca during the Hajj is a statement of both individuality 
and community in their most divinely ordered forms. This is the 
egalitarian possibility of Islam. If it were further explored it may 
prove to be a sharp corrective to some of the current fundamentalist, 
political discourse in Muslim communities. It is also however a more 
effective middle ground than that Eickelman is looking for and it may 
prove to be an anthropology of Islam that is closer to an 'Islamic 
anthropology'. 
In relation to the Divine Unity - all multiplicity is a veil. 
(Nasr, ibid: op cit). 
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Appendix A 
Further Description of the Research Area 
The location of the research was the town area of Weligama and three 
other sites of Muslim villages; Maduragoda, Kapuwatta and Horagoda. 
I include here additional material drawn from the surveys and 
interviews. In Weligama I conducted a survey of businesses in the 
town and the results are discussed fully in Appendix C. In each of 
the other villages I initially collected population data from every 
household in the village. A random sample of 25% of the households 
in each village were then selected and surveyed in depth. Information 
was collected on household income, land holdings, employment 
patterns, household wealth, education levels of men and women, 
marriage and residence patterns, dowries, ethnicity, languages 
spoken, tariqa affiliation, degree of religious observance, 
pilgrimage and shrine practices, attitudes to purdah and any other 
information that the inhabitants cared to reveal. Much of this data 
does not appear in tabulated form but it has shaped my entire 
discussion. 
A. 1 Weligama Traders - Galbokka/New Street 
The Muslims of Weligama today are predominantly a trading population, 
reflecting in their eyes, their Arab trading origins. The earliest 
site of Arab settlement in the town was in Galbokka (Sinhala - stony 
ground, stony hollow, a name which indicates its lack of value to 
agriculturalists). ' This is an area half a mile from the beach and 
the centre of the town's old commercial district. As both the site 
of first settlement and the old trading centre this remains the heart 
of orthodox settlement within the town and the surrounding area. 
Adjacent to Galbokka is New Street (formerly New Moor Street), noted 
by the Portuguese in the tombos compiled in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries (Abeyasinghe, ibid: 131). New Street is 
numerically the second strongest area of Muslim settlement within the 
town and in recent periods of capitalist development has risen to 
challenge the dominance of the Galbokka traders. Beyond New Street 
and across the canal lies Maduragoda. 
' One informant, an Arabic speaker, insisted that Galbokka meant 
"Little Mecca". 
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Figure A-a Weligama Town Area 
At the junction of Galbokka Road, Borala Road, Hettipola Road and 
Station Road, the railway line cuts through the centre of the town, 
linking Weligama with Colombo to the West and Matara to the East. 
This major junction is the location of many of the permanent street- 
sellers, bridging as it does all the town's commercial areas. The 
commercial activity of the town today is located primarily in 
Galbokka and Station Road, with extensions into New Street, Borala 
Road, Hettipola Road and along the Old Galle Road towards the Bus 
Halt. Adjacent to this area between the Railway Station and the Bus 
Halt are the Police Station, Post Office, and two large Government 
Municipal Depots. In 1985 a large supermarket was opened diagonally 
opposite the Bus Halt. 2 
The commercial area of the town is surrounded on four out of five 
sides by areas of predominantly Muslim settlement. A pattern of 
settlement which reflects an historical Muslim domination of 
commercial and market trading in the town. The town's major daily 
vegetable market, where all but one stall-holder is Sinhalese, is 
located in Galbokka. There is a second, smaller market in Station 
Road where the only two occupied stalls house vegetable vendors, and 
immediately next to this is the town's major fish market. There is 
also a weekly pola (market) in Hettipola Road that sells wholesale 
2 Although "Supermarket" is the local term it refers to a 
building which contains some forty individual shops. 
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vegetables along with common household goods. These are clay pots 
used for cooking, woven baskets used for the storage of clothes, 
cooking utensils. coir brooms and woven sleeping mats. All of these 
items, sold at very low prices, are made in domestic industries and 
are required by all householders in the town. The shops in Station 
Road and the smaller surrounding areas are run by both Sinhalese and 
Muslim traders while Galbokka remains a predominantly Muslim trading 
area, with nonetheless a few Sinhalese shops. Within the local 
economy Muslims are chiefly engaged in trade and although a minority 
(23.24%) they control 46.85% of the town's business outlets. 3 
The Muslims have neither sought nor gained extensive representation 
in the various government agencies. 4 The Police Force, Post Office, 
Hospitals, Railways, both bureaucratic and municipal labouring sides 
of the Urban Council and the local banks are all dominated by the 
Sinhalese. ' The local timber and coir industries are also 
predominantly Sinhalese fields of employment. 6 A small number of 
Sinhalese, run Guest Houses near the beach and others are engaged in 
servicing the two Government Rest Houses and one large Tourist Hotel 
In a survey conducted in 1985 it was found that of the total 
of 429 business outlets in the town, 201 (46.85's) were controlled by 
Muslims, 226 (52.68ö) were controlled by Sinhalese and 2 (0.46%) were 
controlled by Tamils. See Appendix C for a full discussion. 
" In 1984 of a total of 10 Urban Council members 2 were Muslims 
(seven UNP - one Muslim and three SLFP - one Muslim). 
5 The Muslims here provide evidence of the lack of regard in 
the Muslim community as a whole, for secular education. In the 
colonial period many of the bureaucratic jobs went to the Sinhalese 
and Tamil Christians with banking in particular being a Tamil 
monopoly. Since the revival period the Sinhalese Buddhist and Tamil 
Hindu populations have been much quicker to take up education and 
accelerate their representation in these fields of employment. This 
issue was taken up in Chapter Two. 
6 The making of coir fibre into coir rope is a small source of 
household income in many of the poorer Sinhalese villages. The only 
Muslim village in which this work was undertaken regularly was 
Maduragoda, the poorest of villages in the area. It is a specifically 
female occupation and is poorly paid at a piece-rate basis by coir 
anudalalis (Sin. businessmen) who provide the raw fibre and collect 
the completed rope. This cottage industry is the scene of much 
exploitation and in particular the inhabitants of one local 
Sinhalese Oli village were consistently paid a much lower rate for 
their work than elsewhere. 
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just outside the town. ' The only area in which the Muslims have found 
significant employment in the Public Sector is as teachers in the 
Muslim schools. Within the Private Sector however, as well as 
pursuing their traditional interests in trade they are well 
represented in the transport industry as owners and drivers of taxis, 
trucks, and the private buses which (along with the buses of the 
Ceylon Transport Board), provide much of the island's extensive 
transport system. 
The traditionally dominant position of the Muslims in trade has 
increasingly been challenged by the Sinhalese in the context of the 
pursuit of laissez-faire economic policies by the United National 
Party (U. N. P. ) Government which came to power in 1970. This has 
involved both the opening up of the island to foreign capital 
investment and development, and attempts by the government to break 
previous Muslim monopolies on particular trades. 8 The change of 
government in 1970 when the U. N. P. trounced the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (S. L. F. P. ) government of Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike brought 
severe consequences for some of Weligama's leading Muslim families. 
The lucrative franchises for the retail dealerships of petrol and 
tobacco are tied to government support and following the change of 
government these franchises were given to loyal Sinhalese U. N. P. 
supporters. 9 Many former supporters, both Sinhalese and Muslim, have 
' Weligama stands beyond the main Tourist belt which runs from 
Negombo, north of Colombo to Galle. After the ethnic riots in 1983 
and the continuing troubles in the North and East from 1984 to the 
present, Tourism has declined considerably and largely been confined 
to the Colombo - Hikkaduwa section of the coast and Kandy in the 
central highlands. Although during my fieldwork period there were 
almost no tourists passing through Weligama the large Tourist hotel, 
which catered almost exclusively to German Tourists on package 
holidays continued to operate for the first year. The hotel is 
located in a small private cove, beyond the western end of the bay 
and its patrons never made the two mile walk into Weligama. Their 
engagement with the local population was limited to the Sinhalese of 
nearby villages who sold them tourist artifacts, and small Sinhalese 
girls who peddled the local lace which has been made here since the 
Portuguese period. 
case. 
8 The establishment of the Ceylon Gem Corporation is a clear 
This party nepotism pervades all aspects of the island's 
political and economic life. A change of government means also a 
change in the holders of many bureaucratic positions, as well as 
positions with major local status, such as those of justices of the 
Peace. The extent to which such nepotism may be taken is indicated 
in the following event. In Weligama prior to 1985 there were a large 
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shifted their support to the U. N. P. in recent times, as the cost of 
doing otherwise is reckoned too great. "' 
Overall the Muslims are a trading population, either employed locally 
or working in other towns in the island. The Sinhalese by contrast 
are heavily represented in the Public Sector but also engaged in the 
fishing industry and increasingly in retail trading. The only rigid 
demarcation of economic activity within the town is found in the sale 
of beef and fish which are only sold by Muslims and Sinhalese 
respectively. All the beef is halal (permitted), being killed by 
Muslims in the ritually prescribed manner, and all fish is caught and 
sold by Sinhalese fishermen. No beef is slaughtered and no fish are 
caught on the Poya or Full-Moon days as their sale is prohibited by 
the laws of this Buddhist country, but in general many Buddhists eat 
beef, and all Muslims may eat fish. " Buddhists will never be 
butchers because of their ideological objections to the taking of any 
life, an orientation which renders butchers low in their eyes. Many 
Sinhalese households though, particularly in the rural areas, will 
rear a calf on the naturally abundant vegetation until it is fully 
grown, and then sell it to a Muslim cattle-dealer who will take it 
to be slaughtered. Muslims on the other hand, may easily be fishermen 
and on the outskirts of Galle there is an entire village of poor 
number of Sinhalese fishermen and their families who had built their 
homes along the beach and resisted all attempts to move them. They 
refused to move until they were provided with land on which to build 
houses. They had stood united on the issue for several years, through 
numerous confrontations with government officials and the courts. 
Following a tidal wave in 1985, in which a woman and a young child 
were swept away and drowned, the government declared that the 
"squatters" must be moved. They were allocated land and small grants 
to build latrines and small loans towards the cost of building new 
houses. These people had been members of both the Karava and Durava 
castes living in the same area. When the new lands were allocated 
however the Karava, who had not wavered in their support of the 
U. N. P. were given new land within the Weligama Urban Council area, 
while the Durava who had supported the S. L. F. P. were re-located 
outside the Urban Council limits and thus disenfranchised in any 
future local elections. When the Durava village was completed, it was 
retrospectively incorporated into the "Village Re-awakening Scheme" 
under the patronage of the then Prime Minister (later President) 
Ranasinghe Premadasa. 
io Access to jobs in the government bureaucracies and the banks 
often depends entirely on a supporting letter from a local M. P. or 
Council Member. 
11 Fish, which expire naturally once removed from water, are not 
required to be sacrificed by Muslims before being eaten and therefore 
it is irrelevant who catches them. 
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Muslim fishermen who use large, flat-bottomed boats, reminiscent of 
dhows, that are completely distinct from the Sinhalese out-rigger 
canoes. 12 In Weligama however, the fishing industry is entirely the 
province of the Sinhalese. The boats lit with kerosene lanterns, put 
to sea at night and return in the early morning with their catch. 
Much of the fish is immediately taken to large open-sided fishing 
sheds on the beach, where it is packed in ice and then transported 
to other centres in the island for sale. Some is set aside for drying 
on the road and the rest is sold in the town in the fish stalls or 
by street sellers. Other street sellers travel throughout the 
surrounding areas on bicycles or on foot, calling out their wares. 
The Muslim community of Weligama sees itself as a trading community. 
This perception is entirely consistent with their actual position of 
trading dominance within the town. I argued in Chapter Three that 
trade has a religious value for Muslims. It is an activity which they 
believe to be religiously endorsed, and it is intricately connected 
with their identity as the descendants of Arab traders. Within the 
small field of the research area I draw your attention to the 
different economic positions of the Weligama traders vis-a-vis the 
other villages nearby. Those Muslims who are engaged in the practice 
of trade are those who can most strongly claim trading traditions, 
and further can most directly establish their links to the Arab 
traders of the past. This is a critical element in the internal 
ranking of the villages, a ranking where class and religious ideology 
combine to assert the absolute dominance of the traders. 
A. 2 Maduragoda - an "out-caste" village. 
Maduragoda lies on the Eastern bank of the canal, across the bridge 
at the end of New Street. This village is extremely poor in 
comparison to others in the area, and is inhabited solely by people 
known as ande (out-caste), a derogatory term. '3 This village, unlike 
other villages in the area has very clear "boundaries" and two 
alternative points of entry, on the one side. This is due to the 
canal on one side, and Sinhalese settlements on two further sides, 
12 There are also in Hambantota large numbers of Muslim Malay 
fishermen who are currently suffering the introduction (through 
Government Settlement schemes) of large numbers of Sinhalese settlers 
also seeking to fish. 
13 The full term was Ande walfawel - depend people. 
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but it also serves to emphasize its closed nature and the low social 
standing of its inhabitants. 14 The village is located next to a small 
settlement of Sinhalese Berava exorcists, who are also low-caste. 
Figure A-b Maduragoda 
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The inhabitants of Maduragoda claim descent from a group of seven 
Muslims who came from Madurai in India, and settled in the Kandyan 
kingdom. 
While they were in Kandy the Sinhalese King's daughter became 
ill and unable to eat, and no-one it seemed, could cure her. 
One of the Muslims, a pari-yari (native physician) offered to 
help and was invited to attempt to cure the girl. He was 
forced to diagnose her illness by feeling a thread, the girl 
herself being kept behind a screen. At first, in an attempt to 
trick him, the thread was tied to a dead cat. He exclaimed 
that there were no signs of life and the thread was then tied 
to the bed itself. He declared that the patient was beyond 
cure and finally having seen through the ruse he was permitted 
to see the girl. He recommended a treatment which cured her, 
and in gratitude the king granted them lands in the kingdom. 
Later, the king demanded that the seven Muslims should carry 
his dholaw (sedan-chair) but three of the Muslims refused. The 
king was extremely angry at this and threatened to kill them. 
The three Muslims then fled the kingdom and came to 
Maduragoda. They were a pari-yari, a talsimar worker (an 
exorcist and maker of talismans), and a beggar or hawker. 
14 The name of the village itself has a certain ambiguity to it 
also. Known to those who live there as Madurapura (Madurai - 
village), it is routinely called Maduragoda (Madurai - place), by 
everyone else in the surrounding area. Yalman (ibid: 77-79) observed 
that a low status village in Terutenne suffered a similar fate with 
a name ending in pitiya (place) rather than gama. Pitiya suggested 
a place where labourers lived (ibid: 78) . In the research by contrast, 
there were many pitiya 's and the inhabitants of nearby Horagoda never 
mentioned any negative connotations attached to the name of their 
village. Whether as an agricultural village - the term goda - place 
was culturally apposite I am not sure. 
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The myth confirms their out-caste status; in this case a status 
applied by the Sinhalese King. The date of the expulsion was 1730 and 
they were banished from the Independent Kandyan Kingdom to the 
maritime Provinces controlled by the Dutch. The King Sri 
Wiraparakrama Narendra Singha however, granted land at Maduragoda to 
one of the Muslims, a pari-yari known as Garibu. '5 
The original founders of the village were the pari-yari, the talsimar 
worker and the beggar /hawker. 16 These three occupations are still 
reflected in current village composition. The majority of villagers 
used to pursue small time hawking. The hawking of trinkets to the 
interior allowed them to participate in a trade which had long been 
the province of the Muslims in the Sinhalese areas (Roberts, 1982: 83). 
The hawking of trinkets is less favoured these days, but petty 
trading interests are pursued in the absence of any other employment 
opportunities. One family has managed to build up a thriving business 
in the collection of "gunny-bags" which others in the village 
collect at piece-rates. " Some of the women, accompanied by their 
children, beg on a regular basis in other villages, visiting a 
particular village on the same day each week. Although they are given 
money by the other Muslims, who feel obliged to give zakat (alms), 
the practice of begging is thoroughly despised. This continued 
practice is an important factor in the low social position of this 
village in the eyes of other Muslims. 18 
ie Given his threat to kill them, the land grant perhaps seems 
incongruous. However, as I pointed out earlier Sinhalese castes were 
determined solely in relation to the King. Thus the king could change 
the duties of a caste (as with the Salagama or Chalias, an Indian 
weaving caste who were ordered to take up cinnamon peeling) or he 
could render a group "out-castes". The banishment of the Muslims from 
the sovereign kingdom should be understood as an action which placed 
them outside its symbolic order, and thus "out-caste" status was a 
form of "social death". 
16 A genealogical chart of the entire village collected in 1985 
ascends to five common ancestors over a period of seven generations, 
adding empirical support to the settlement myth. 
17 Gunny bags are cloth or sisal sacks. 
18 It appears that no-one in this village however, collects the 
government coupons for rice, that many of them would be entitled to. 
When asked about this, villagers replied "that the other Muslims 
wouldn't like it. " Therefore, it is obviously better for the poorer 
Muslims to beg from, and rely upon, the good graces of the wealthy 
members of their own community, than to declare themselves as in 
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The dominant man in the village is a direct descendent of Garibu and 
also a pari-yari. 19 He owns virtually all the land in the village, 
and other families own only the land on which their houses stand, and 
none of the garden lands surrounding them. Recently many of the young 
men in this village have sought employment in the Middle East. As 
they return, and their families seek to build new and bigger houses, 
problems over the land ownership and lack of space may arise. This 
is not in evidence yet. The dominant position of the pari-yari is 
reinforced by the popularity of his medical practice, which is widely 
patronized by both Sinhalese and Muslim patients, and generates 
considerable wealth. 20 His sister's son, who is due to take over the 
business, has completed a Pharmacy degree, and intends to combine 
both traditional and Western allopathic modes of practice. As most 
patients seek remedies from all fields of practice, both 
complementarily and simultaneously, this young man is not only 
"modernizing", but rather consolidating his position of dominance. 31 
There is also currently in the village ,a talsimar worker, a close 
relative of the pari-yari, who will exorcise shaitans (devils) and 
cast spells, for those who are in need of them. He has also completed 
his religious training as a Moulavi. 
I have described the social situation in this village, highlighting 
their poor economic circumstances. In particular they are utterly 
bound to the family of the pari-yari, and entirely constrained by 
their poverty. These factors are born of their historical 
need, vis-a-vis the state. This practice of course, undoubtedly 
serves to perpetuate the idea amongst the Sinhalese, that the Muslims 
are a wealthy community. 
19 The family of the original pari-yari, have continued to 
practice medicine from his time, in a direct line of patrilineal 
descent. A veda parapura (physician genealogy) is prominently 
displayed in his clinic. Garibu started his practice in Maduragoda 
in 1730, his son Babu took over in 1772, and was followed by his son 
Thambi who took over in 1812. Thambi was followed by Wapu Kunchi in 
1835, and his son Pakeer Medeem took over the practice in 1890. 
Pakeer Medeem had four children; Mohamed Sali, Mohamed Ibrahim, 
Mohamed Kassim and Abdul Careem. The youngest son P. M. Abdul Careem, 
the current pari-yari, took over in 1936. 
2° The current pari-yari learnt from his father, but also studied 
under a Buddhist monk from the nearby temple in Piriwella. In his 
eyes this gave him "perfect knowledge" - his own lineage knowledge, 
plus the Buddhist monk's knowledge. He has employed a Sinhalese 
assistant for over twenty years who runs "ethnic interference". 
21 Kapferer (1983) has argued the simultaneous and complementary 
seeking of remedies with relation to the Sinhalese. 
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circumstances which have rendered them "out-castes" and subject to 
land pressures. Their economic and social position is continually 
reinforced by their designated outcaste status and the strict rules 
of endogamy which act to limit their chances of social movement. The 
endogamous marriage rules mean that the Ande from Maduragoda contract 
marriages, either within the village or with other Ande villages in 
Galle, Matara or Beruwela. 22 Caste endogamy is strictly enforced, and 
the rare infringements, severely punished. ' 
A. 3 Kapuwatta -A Rifai village. 24 
Located in the Denypitiya area some three miles from Weligama, this 
village was initially surveyed because of its engagement with the 
Rifai tariqa. There were a total of 867 people in the village of 
whom 857 were Sri Lankan Moors and Muslims. There were six Sinhalese 
Buddhists and four Estate Tamils who were Hindu. 25 
Of the 857 Moors in Kapuwatta, 801 gave their tariqa affiliation as 
Rifai. This is a substantial 93.46%. Research in this village thus 
22 These marriages were predominantly contracted with the people 
of Navinna in Galla or Hotukuda Junction in Matara. 
Z' In one case a local Moula man fell in love with and married 
an. Ande woman and took up residence with her in Maduragoda. As a 
result he was totally ostracized by his own family, almost all of 
whom refused even to attend his funeral. 
24 After living in the central town area for 13 months I moved 
to this village for a further 9 months. 
25 Five of the Sinhalese Buddhists above are members of one 
family running a shop in the village. The other is a female of 40 
years employed as a servant by a Muslim household. All four of the 
Estate Tamils are the Hindu children of Tamil families working in the 
tea estates and all of them are working as servants. One boy of 13 
and a girl of 10 years have been "adopted" by one household. It is 
expected that these children will convert to Islam and become Moulas. 
When they are of marriageable age they can expect the household to 
arrange their marriages to other Moulas. Their "adoption" by the 
Muslim household does not imply in any sense membership of the kin 
group,. rather their position as servants and converts gives them a 
very low status. On the other hand their adoption, does not imply any 
severance of connections with their own families, at least while they 
remain children. In general their very low wages go directly to their 
parents on the estates. The other two children, a boy of 10 and a 
girl of 13 years are similarly employed but have not been adopted. 
(They may quite easily convert also). There is one further Buddhist 
in the town who runs a laundry but he resides in Wellipitiya. The 
Sinhalese Rada caste are traditionally the washer caste, though 
Sinhalese of other castes have sometimes taken it up. There is no 
Muslim equivalent. 
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presented the opportunity to study ecstatic religious practice and 
economic success in conjunction. 26 
The name Kapuwatta, which in Sinhala means "cotton fields" suggests 
the movement of cotton goods rather than the cultivation of cotton 
locally, and certainly today, the largest single occupation in the 
village is work in the textile trade. 27 One informant stated that 
Kapuwatta was the name given by the Sinhalese to the Muslim 
settlement in the Watharamulla area and in this sense the name 
clearly signifies "cloth-village", the place from which the Sinhalese 
acquired their cloth. In the past, the members of this village were 
hawkers who travelled to the interior with pottani (a bundle of 
textiles) on their shoulders. 28 Determining the origins of the 
Kapuwatta Muslim community is more difficult that in the case of 
Maduragoda. Kapuwatta has no ancient history of Muslim settlement, 
although adjacent Koledande is believed to have been settled 700 
years ago, well before the arrival of the Portuguese. There are no 
settlement myths and according to most people "we have always been 
here". Some informants state that "the local Muslims came to Sri 
Lanka on the shoulders of the Salagama". The Salagama (Chalias) were 
a weaving caste from India and were turned to cinnamon peeling by 
both the Kandyan king and the colonial powers. It is possible that 
some of them could have settled here not far from the cinnamon 
gardens of Akuressa. 29 Alternatively the statement may refer to the 
traditional and undisputed practices of hawking trade goods to the 
interior. 
26 There are 22 members of the Qaddirriyya tariqa, 18 members of 
the Shasuliah, 11 of the Jiffriyyia, 1 fell into the category of 
Other/Two or more and 14 who stated that they did not belong to any 
tariqa at all, (total responses 857). In general to state that one 
does not belong to a tariqa implies a clear ideological position that 
does not recognize divisions among Muslims. 
27 There is also a possible significance to the term kap or 
kapa, which is the central pole of Sinhalese village ritual. One 
which "has symbolisms of centre, permanence, fertility and 
prosperity" (Roberts, ibid: 6). 
28 The layout of the village. almost entirely along a central 
road between Koledande (and Akuressa) and Weligama suggest its 
trading base. 
29 Godepitiya, just outside Akuressa is another major Rifai 
site and a very old Muslim settlement. 
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A few other villagers express the view that some Indian Muslims 
called "Ambay" came here on business from Kayalpattanam in Tamil Nadu 
and then married local Sinhalese women. The Ambay or Ambattayo were 
a caste who came from India with the Karava and were barbers to the 
Karava only (Roberts, ibid: 92-93) . 
30 As this community has some ritual 
connections to Kayalpattanam today, it is highly possible that they 
were Indian Muslims or converted Tamil Hindus. 33 The associations with 
cloth trading could possibly also suggest that they were originally 
an Indian Muslim community as could the name Marrikar which was seen 
here in former times. Ultimately there is no clear myth of 
settlement attaching itself to either Indian Muslim or other Indian 
or Tamil origins and perhaps we should assume that origins were 
diverse . 
32 
30 There is also a possibility that this village is a site of 
Salagama conversion. Some informants state "that the (local) Muslims 
came to Sri Lanka on the shoulders of the Salagama". The Salagama 
(Chalias) were an immigrant weaving caste from India pressed into 
service as cinnamon peelers for the Dutch. They became the most 
heavily and bureaucratically controlled group of people in the island 
owing to the importance of the cinnamon crop. They are here located 
not far from the cinnamon gardens of Akuressa and on the old route 
through Koledande. 
31 As I stated earlier no-one is willing to acknowledge openly 
any suggestion that their village is one with a high number of 
converts (MOulas), either recently or in the historical past. There 
are a number of possibilities here. Perhaps Indian Muslims converted 
and married local Sinhalese or Tamil women, or Tamil families 
converted. A mixture of all these possibilities is very likely 
closest to the truth. Certainly it appears that there were a 
reasonable number of Hindus in this village or converts who had 
maintained some Hindu ritual customs until recently. One middle-aged 
informant (whom others identified as being from a Moula family) told 
me of a village curing ritual which villagers employed during his 
childhood. When someone in the village was ill, one member of each 
household would gather at the local Tamarind tree, where they would 
place the patient sitting with his/her back to the tree trunk. Then 
they would collectively cook a pot of rice gruel at the base of the 
tree. The Tamarind as far as I am aware is a tree which has 
significance for Hindus rather than Muslims, although a rice gruel 
is close to a popular Muslim ritual dish in Ramazan - cunjee. 
32 There have been however, recent marriages contracted with men 
from the Middle East, a move which increases both the status and 
purity of the family. A genealogy of this village revealed no family 
relationships beyond three and four generations, a pattern which 
certainly suggests relatively recent migration on the part of all 
inhabitants. - 
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In the earlier days of this century the wealthier of the Muslim. 
villagers owned much of the surrounding lands and held lands as far 
away as Morawaka, Deniyaya and Pittabedara. Many of the Muslims 
obtained their income from hawking the products of the coconut 
estates; copra, coconut oil, coir rope, along with areca nut, to the 
interior areas. All of these trade items were produced by Sinhalese 
labourers. The wealthiest Muslim men of the time all owned large 
coconut estates and bullock driven oil presses and made their money 
in the copra business. " At this time the Muslims say that they 
controlled the local Sinhalese people and physically chastised them 
if they felt it was required. When the Sinhalese were passing Muslims 
they would put their sarongs down, bow their heads and take their 
cloths from their shoulders in deference. " After six in the evening 
no Sinhalese person, labourer or landowner was seen on the streets. 
On the occasions of the Sinhalese New Year the prominent men of the 
village would visit Sinhalese homes to make the first (auspicious) 
gifts of money. During the 1915 riots the Kapuwatta mosque was 
protected by a Sinhalese headman but the nearby Koledande mosque was 
destroyed. 
Figure A-c Kapuwatta 
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33 Kapuwatta stands in very close proximity to a Sinhalese Oli 
village. The Oli are locally associated with oil selling, though they 
now make much of their income from making coir rope. 
" This was part of the standard code of caste deference 
behaviour that functioned among the Sinhalese and Tamils themselves. 
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As late as 1912 in Kapuwatta there were an estimated eighty houses 
in the village of which more than fifty were made of clay. All of 
these homes were destroyed in a flood when the river was unable to 
drain the flood waters and the water level stood at ten feet above 
the village's central muddy track. When the houses were rebuilt only 
twenty-five remained constructed of clay. In 1916 another equally 
devastating flood occurred, isolating the villagers for days and 
destroying all the clay houses. From this point all houses were made 
of brick. In the research period there were a total of 136 houses in 
the village including a few of clay. However although the number of 
houses had grown considerably the amount of land held by villagers 
had been reduced. This is attributed to the period after 1956 and the 
rule of S. W. R. D. Bandaraniake when much of the land was sold/given 
to the Sinhalese. 35 Now the village is surrounded by Sinhalese homes 
on all sides and the Muslims find it impossible to purchase land from 
Sinhalese landholders nearby. 36 
Historically the big traders were all located in Galbokka, and it 
appears likely that Kapuwatta stood in subordinate relation to nearby 
Galbokka, as far less wealthy and possibly economically dependent. 
At the time Kapuwatta Muslims were religiously dependent upon 
Koledande, where they worshipped in the Jumma mosque; a relation that 
is still seen in the burial of Kapuwatta Muslims in the grounds of 
this mosque. There is no evidence about Koledande's economic standing 
at the time, apart from the fact that it was located between Weligama 
and the road to Galle, which was a major centre. Kapuwatta was 
clearly not an important area of Muslim settlement as it did not, at 
this time, have a village mosque. if they were originally an Indian 
as Before this all the land up to the Denypitiya Junction and to 
Koledande fell within the village precincts as well as two miles 
towards the interior. 
36 This problem exists for some in the village but other families 
have moved to Colombo to run their businesses and left their homes 
standing empty, returning only occasionally to pluck the coconuts. 
Of a total of 136 houses in the village, 113 were currently occupied. 
One house belonged to a Buddhist family and 22 were uninhabited at 
the time. Many houses are occupied by extended family groups. Because 
of the matrilocal residence after marriage there is often more than 
a single family to a house, (parents plus one or more married 
daughters). A total of 47 houses were occupied by single families, 
41 by two families, 18 by three families and 7 by four family groups. 
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Muslim community, there is no doubt that they stood subordinately on 
those grounds also. Kapuwatta's relations to Galbokka were certainly 
the most important from a purely commercial and developmental point 
of view. The wealthiest men were in the copra trade and held large 
coconut estates and other villagers were engaged in petty trade, 
hawking coconut products or exchanging cloth for areca nut. The 
cloth traders would have had to deal with larger Muslim traders in 
either Galle or Galbokka in Weligama. There is still an extensive 
interest in the textile trade in this village. " Nowadays there are 
some who regularly take vans to Jaffna and sell baby-suits, socks and 
bonnets which are knitted in nylon thread, in knitting machines, in 
small scale domestic industries. 
As the survey data below indicates, employment as a trader or in the 
textile industry is the most common occupation. Men are far more 
likely to be employed than women with the dramatic exception of 
employment abroad as a guest worker in the Middle East. in this 
instance males and females have relative employment rates of 50%. 
Kapuwatta was a relatively wealthy village, particularly in 
comparison to Maduragoda (where poverty was endemic) and Horagoda 
where land pressures and lack of available employment were a problem. 
There were however household5who lived in poor conditions here also. 
Close to 25% of the households surveyed had no toilet facilities and 
no electricity available. Sixty-six per cent of the households owned 
brick houses of several rooms with tiled roo-'S electricity, piped 
water and good toilet facilities. All but two houses however had 
their own wells. In this village the water table is high and the 
quality of the water is excellent. 
" The parameters of the textile trade in the area range from 
extensive connections into Second Cross Street in the Pettah 
(Colombo) to regular selling trips of Jaffna. Historically all the 
cloth was from India and even now the local market is not big and 
local cloth is not highly regarded in comparison to that of cotton 
cloth from India or cotton-polyester cloth from Japan. Saris from 
India, the Middle East and Singapore all command greater interest and 
cachet than the local product. (One exception is a Dutch Burgher 
operation in Colombo which exports 90% of its cloth). Import duties 
are high are reportedly smuggling is still rife in the textile trade. 
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Table A. 3-138 
EMPLOYMENT In KAPU'TTTA - (male & female) 30 households 
Trade Textile Labour Teacher Other Abroad 
MALE 23 14 11 5 9 8 
FEMALE - 1 1 2 - 8 
TOTAL 23 15 12 7 9 16 
Table A. 3-2 
Household Annual Income - Kapuwatta (30 Households) 
Annual Income in Rupees Households % of Total 
0- 10,000/- 6 20% 
10,000/- - 50,000/- 11 36.6%- 
50,000/- - 100,000/- 6 20 
100,000/- - 200,000/- 4 13.31; 
200,000/- 400,000/- 1 3.3%- 
400,000/- - 600,000/- 2 6.6`"; 
TOTAL 30 99.8% 
The house garden is the land on which the house itself stands. It is 
not necessarily used to produce food or additional income but is a 
very clear reflection of wealth nonetheless. Most of the villages in 
this area exist within coconut lands and at the very least to have 
access to coconut trees saves a considerable expense as coconut 
milk is vital to so many curries and household dishes, the husks are 
used to scrub pots and also to provide fuel for cooking fires. 
Sometimes house gardens permit the growth of coffee beans which may 
be harvested and sold but in Kapuwatta house gardens contain only 
38 This table of employment covers all workers employed outside 
the home and includes a high proportion who are employed outside the 
village. Many males work elsewhere in the island and return home 
weekly or monthly as circumstances permit. Textiles includes both men 
who run small cottage industries and ten young men who work as sales 
assistants in textile shops as far afield as Galle, Colombo and 
Dickwella. Not all the teachers work in Kapuwatta. Other includes a 
Policeman, Muazzin, Lawyer, Bank Clerk, Electrician, Painter, 
Watchmaker, and contrasts strongly with the same category in other 
villages. Here there is a far higher technical and professional 
component. In the Abroad category two males are qualified as a 
Surveyor and an Accountant and both are employed in their 
professional capacity. 
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coconuts and casual labour is employed from time to time to pluck 
them. In the table below it is clear however that 60g of the families 
surveyed had no coconut lands at all. 
Table A. 3-3 
House Garden Land holdings - Kapuwatta (30 households) 
Size of Garden # of Houses % of total 
No Land 7 23.3%- 
5-10 perches 6 20% 
10-20 perches 5 16.6% 
20-50 perches 6 20%- 
50-100 perches 4 13.3% 
100 + perches 2 6.6% 
TOTAL 30 99.8% 
Table A. 3-4 
Coconut Land Holdings - Kapuwatta (30 households) 
Acreage # of Households % of Total 
No coconut lands 18 60%- 
0- 1/2 acre 8 26.6%- 
1/2 -1 acre 2 6.6%- 
1-2 acres 1 3.3%- 
40 acres 1 3.3% 
The household which has 40 acres of coconut land has a household head 
who is a coconut dealer. This figure reflects the relatively small 
number of wealthy men still involved in the coconut industry. This 
man shares his 40 acres with his daughter and two sons. 
In the late nineteenth century, during the revivalist period two 
significant events took place in this village. First, there was a 
successful attempt by members of the village to seek the spiritual 
patronage of a religious leader from Androth Island in Kerala. 
Second, there was the establishment of a secular school with Tamil 
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teachers. Both of these events reflect a clear interest in Muslim 
revivalist concerns. 39 In an era of increasing wealth in the village 
owing primarily to a coconut oil boom, leading men sought to 
renegotiate the relative social and political position of the village 
in relation to Galbokka. The arena in which this could take place was 
within the discourse on legitimate religious dominance. Kapuwatta 
sought the spiritual patronage of an outsider who could claim 
religious and ancestral orthodoxy, and who was a skilled Arabic 
speaker. Both factors made him a worthy religious adversary of the 
ulema in Weligama. The town itself of course prided itself on a 
particularly orthodox character, home to Arabic speakers always. °0 
Through his efforts a new village mosque was established here and his 
family have become inextricably linked with religious life and 
development within the village. 41 The very early attempt to establish 
a Tamil medium secular school in the area indicates the thrust of the 
village leadership at the time. While Galbokka relied on its 
tradition of Arabic Colleges the Kapuwatta leadership were clearly 
concerned to modernize. Muslims in Kapuwatta made significant moves 
to reorganize their religious affiliations in order to establish a 
new legitimacy. All of this was undertaken in a revivalist context 
where religious origins and trading had become critical. 
A. 4 Horagoda -A Farming Village. 
This is a small village located between Wellipitiya (5 miles) and 
Godepitiya, near Akuressa (6 miles) In 1986 there were 500 people in 
39 The revival was noted to be a predominantly urban phenomenon, 
yet here there is evidence of its impact in a regional and semi-urban 
environment. 
40 The centenary of Baari College, Weligama, the first Muslim 
religious training college in the island was celebrated during my 
period of fieldwork and the express portrayal of Arabic connections 
and associated orthodoxy were clear. 
41 The somewhat later (1965) establishment of an active Rifai 
Tariqa Association, by this Androth Island family, is taken up in 
a later work. The building of the village mosque is discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
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70 families, the majority of whom were cultivators. The village 
itself is only one square mile in area with most houses strung out 
along both sides of the dirt road that runs through the town. The 
remaining houses are located on small hills on the other side of a 
shallow valley in which paddy is cultivated. 
Figure A-d Horagoda 
The village is surrounded by approximately 75 acres of paddy lands, 
25 acres of cinnamon lands and 10 acres of tea all of which is farmed 
by the villagers though some 40W of it belongs to outsiders. On 
average each family has access to one acre of paddy land. Tables A. 4- 
1 and A. 4-2 on the following two pages indicate the size of the paddy 
holdings and the location of the owner or tenant farmer. Of a total 
of 62.0 acres of paddy covered by the survey, 41.9's is 
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Table A. 4-1 Horagoda Paddy Lands - Muslim Owners & Cultivat 
Horagoda Owner Cultivator 
Plot No Acreage Owner M tenant Stenant 
P4 0.5 X 
P11 0.5 X 
P12 1.0 X 
P13 1.0 X 
P14 0.5 X 
P15 0.5 X 
P16 0.5 X 
P17 0.5 X 
P18 1.0 X 
P19 1.0 X 
P20 1.0 X 
P21 1.0 X 
P22 0.25 X 
P23 1.5 X 
P25 0.75 X 
P26 1.0 X 
P27 1.0 X 
P28 1.0 X 
P32 1.5 X 
P37 2.0 X 
P39 1.5 X 
P40 1.0 X 
P41 1.0 X 
P42 1.0 X 
P46 0.5 X 
TOTAL 22.5 13.5 6.0 3.0 
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Table A. 4-2 Horagoda Paddy Lands - Non-Muslim Owners & Cultivators 
Horagoda Sinhalese Cultivator 
Plot No. Acreage Owner M tenant S tenant 
P5 1.0 x 
P9 1.5 X 
P29 1.0 X 
P30 1.0 X 
P33 1.0 X 
P43 6.0 X 
P44 3.0 X 
P45 unknown 
P47 0.5 X (c. lab) 
Medawatte (Sinhalese) Owner M tenant S tenant 
P6 4.75 X 
P24 2.0 x 
Wellipitiya (Muslim) Owner M tenant S tenant 
P1 1.0 x 
P10 1.5 X 
Weligama (Muslim) Owner M tenant S tenant 
P2 4.5 X 
P8 1.5 X 
P36 2.0 X 
P38 1.5 X 
Galle (Muslim) Owner M tenant S tenant 
P3 1.25 X 
P35 1.5 X 
Matara (Muslim) Owner M tenant S tenant 
P31 1.5 X 
P34 1.5 X 
TOTAL 39.5 12.5 8.0 19.0 
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Table A. 4-3 Horagoda High Land Holdings 
Horagoda High Land Holdings 
Plot# Owner Acres Crop Description 
L1 M Home Garden 
L2 M 4.0 Cinnamon 
L3 S 2.0 Tea 
L4 M Home Garden 
L5 M 2.0 Tea 
L6 M 3.0 Cinnamon 
L7 M Home Garden 
L8 S 1.0 Cinnamon 
19 S Home Garden 
L10 M 1.5 Tea 
L11 S 0.75 Tea 
L12 M 1.5 Tea 
L13 S Kunadasa Estate - Tea 
L13A S 11.0 Koraheligoda Estate - Rubber 
L14 S Coconut/Other 
L15 M Home Garden 
L16 M Home Garden/Tea 
L17 M Home Garden 
L18 M 10.0 Cinnamon 
L19 M 1.0 Rubber 
L20 M 1.25 Tea 
L21 S 4.5 Tea 
L22 S - 
L23 M Home Garden 
L24 M 0.75 Cinnamon 
L25 S Home Garden 
L26 S 8.0 Rubber Estate 
L27 Market/School/Health 
L28 M Cinnamon 
L29 S Koraheligoda Estate - Tea 
L30 S Home Garden 
273 
Horagoda High Land Holdings 
L31 M 1.0 Tea 
L32 32 x 40 acres Land Settlement Scheme 
cultivated by the Muslim or Sinhalese owner (26 acres), 22.6% is 
cultivated by Muslim tenants (14 acres) and 35.4% is cultivated by 
Sinhalese tenants (22 acres) . 
42 Horagoda is linked into Poruwa 
(Porwai) and Akuressa most closely, but as is evident in the above 
tables there are also patron-client relations with landowners in 
Weligama, Wellipitiya, Medawatte, Galle and Matara. There is a large 
government tea estate to the South-east of the village which employs 
predominantly Sinhalese labourers many of whom live in an adjacent 
village. 43 The general pattern of employment is a combination of 
farming and petty trade, where-ever the opportunity presents itself. 
Unemployment however, is a particular problem here. During my 
fieldwork period there were some 40 - 50 villagers working in the 
Middle East all of whom reportedly obtained their positions through 
the one Muslim agency in Colombo. These were both married and 
unmarried people, predominantly women, and several others had 
obtained their passports and submitted applications to go. 
The village has a large number of seasonal labourers, some of whom 
are constantly unemployed. There is consequently a very heavy tea 
kadde (shop) social scene at the tea kaddes in the main street. Many 
of the men spent a good part of their days here at one or another of 
them. There is a popular 'bucket shop' where bets are placed on 
42 The fact that 40% of the surveyed paddy lands (62 of a total 
of approximately 75 acres) are owned by outsiders indicates that land 
is at a premium in this agricultural village. Of the 24.5 acres owned 
by outsiders 6.0 acres are farmed by their Weligama owner and the 
remaining are let to tenants. 
43 There are three houses near the centre of the village but off 
the main road, which are used by Sinhalese people, at least two of 
whom are prostitutes. Their clientele is both Muslim and Sinhalese 
and customarily transactions take place in the adjacent forests for 
an unbelievably small fee (Rs2 - Rs3). The inhabitants of these 
three houses are related to each other and to the inhabitants of a 
fourth house who are Muslims. One of the women converted to Islam on 
the occasion of her marriage and she and her (prostitute) daughter 
denied any relationship between them when we interviewed them. There 
was only one other convert that I found in the village - an older man 
whose parents died when he was young and whose sisters were unable 
to look after him. 
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English and European race meetings. This feature of village life is 
attributed by most to the fact that unemployment is such a problem. 
This shop is run by a Muslim and is patronized by both Muslim and 
Sinhalese. Gambling is acknowledged as un-Islamic and tolerated.. 
Those Muslims who can will engage in a little cattle-dealing with the 
Sinhalese further inland, taking the animals to the Muslim butchers 
for slaughter. Some men manage to find casual employment during the 
harvesting and planting seasons, but in many cases the farmers 
themselves co-operate to perform these activities, leaving little 
chance for casual employment. Paddy agriculture also predetermines 
a certain amount of unity and cooperation since it is regarded as 
essential that all planting is undertaken within the same period and 
that no fields are left fallow. The latter is to counter the effect 
of pests and weeds breeding in the fallow fields and escaping to 
those nearby. Planting also of course is structured in terms of 
seasons and harvests. The seasonal and intermittent nature of 
agricultural work permits an itinerant trading occupation on the side 
and many farmers seek to pursue opportunities for petty trade. 
Historically the village is believed to have been settled by Muslim 
traders forced to flee from the Portuguese on the Southern coast. In 
the sixteenth century King Rajasingan (Senarathan) ruled Rai-gam 
Korale (Ruhun) from Deundra (Dondra). There were many Muslims settled 
in Dondra with mosques and Ziyarams (tombs). Many of these Muslims 
were fishermen, cultivators and hawkers. After a Sinhala-Muslim 
communal riot began the Muslims were chased away. They settled in 
Kirinde, Meyalle, Kalutara, Dickwella, Godepitiya and Horagoda. The 
Horagoda settlement was founded by two males who were called by the 
Sinhalese "Loku Rale" and "Poddy Rale". 44 They moved into an area 
adjacent to the Sinhalese and both men converted and married 
Sinhalese women. The villagers built a mosque of clay and sticks 
(adobe) in the nineteenth century and during the Sinhala Muslim riots 
of 1915 it was destroyed by the Sinhalese. After the riots the 
British government provided the money to rebuild the mosque in stone. 
44 Rale is a term of respect- Big mister and little mister or 
Big Muslim and Little Muslim, according to informants. 
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There is a shrine in the mosque to a popular Indian saint "Nagore 
Andehai". 45 
In this village my concern was to establish what differences occurred 
between farming and urban Muslim communities. What was most 
significant was the far greater stress on education within this 
village. This was most striking in the case of young women who here 
almost as a norm, completed their secondary education to "0" Level 
standard and some went on further to become teachers. This stands in 
radical contrast to Weligama urban area where all informants 
estimated that 90t of girls ceased schooling at puberty. The factors 
cited here to account for the different attitude to female purdah and 
education were invariably to do with land pressures. Paddy lands 
cannot be continually divided up beyond a certain size and still be 
effectively farmed. Thus there were great pressures for many of the 
village children to seek employment outside the village, and within 
the village there was a certain level of unemployment and a 
commitment to piecemeal work in a number of families. All of the 
young women who could, were attempting to get to the Middle East to 
improve their lot. The idea was to build a house and furnish it to 
the point where attracting a non-farming husband employed elsewhere 
was a definite possibility. There was also a greater tolerance of 
'love-marriages' in this village. Several of the young women had 
undertaken teacher training at nearby Alutgama where a female 
teacher training college had been established. 46 They had 
subsequently taken teaching jobs in Matara and nearby. Here they 
report that they have the opportunity to meet and contract marriages 
with other teachers and thus re-locate themselves outside the village 
by essentially living (neo-locally) outside the parental house. 
There have been a number of long and treacherous disputes over land 
with the local Sinhalese. Some of the Muslims having inherited a 
share of paddy land, but engaged in trading, or married elsewhere, 
45 During a visit to the Maldives he visited Adam's Peak, 
Horagoda, Galle and Kirinde in Sri Lanka. In this case he is not 
actually buried in the shrine, rather it marks a place that he 
visited. 
46 The male training college had been built at Addalachenai in 
the E. P. interestingly. 
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have let their land to Sinhalese farmers. In the subsequent 
generation when a new owner inherits, or buys, the land, and wants 
to remove a Sinhalese farmer, severe physical violence is often the 
result. "' 
Many of the Sinhalese are employed in the nearby tea and rubber 
plantations but I found no evidence of any Muslim employment in this 
area. The Sinhalese women are of course free to work plucking tea, 
whereas Muslim women may not, but it seemed that none of the Muslim 
men, despite very high unemployment, had managed to secure work 
there. This is possibly a further instance of the traditional 
government support for, and Sinhalese engagement in, the government 
sector but it was not an issue I took up at the time. 48 
Links with the Sinhalese community are much more evident in Horagoda 
than in the other villages. There is a far greater influence of 
Sinhalese custom observable in the puberty rite where rabans are 
still beaten in some households. I enquired about any religious 
rituals associated with planting and was told that as each plant is 
planted they utter "Bismillah" and that at the time of harvest the 
first grains are taken to the mosque. In the previous generation they 
used to make a small "govia" (Sin - farmer) from the rice sheafs and 
place it inside the paddy heap to protect it. This practice has died 
out within the last generation, indicating further stripping away of 
Sinhalese cultural elements from the Muslim life. 
47 Apparently when anyone buys or sells any land that has been 
leased the lease-holders have inalienable rights for as long as they 
wish. These rights were automatically conferred in the past, not 
applied for. In one case a dispute arose after the sale of land 
between two Muslim brothers, one of whom then wanted to farm his own 
land. (An instance of farming a smaller piece of land being 
unprofitable - this brother bought out his sibling to acquire a piece 
of paddy land that was adequate. The Sinhalese lease-holders were not 
willing to hand over the land and a court case ensued. The Muslim 
farmer was attacked by the Sinhalese lease-holders and had acid 
thrown in his face and half of his skull horribly smashed in with an 
iron bar. His face remains badly scarred and his skull radically mis- 
shapen as a result of this cruel injury. 
48 See Chapter Two and Appendix C for further reference to this 
matter. 
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Appendix B 
The Question of Caste. 
Sinhalese society is internally divided into castes and this is 
reflected in the pattern of settlement within the town where specific 
areas are predominantly inhabited by members of the one caste. This 
caste-specific settlement was not entirely rigid, in my view, 
particularly in the central town area but was the rule in the 
villages surrounding the town. The Sinhalese castes in the area were 
the Goyigama (cultivators), Karava (fishing caste), Durava 
(carpenters, toddy tappers and formerly warriors), Navandana 
(goldsmiths/artisans), Rada (washing caste), 01i (dancers/ 
astrologers), Badahala (potters), and Berava (exorcists). 49 
Individuals from many of these castes were not engaged in following 
their traditional occupations, in particular the Goyigama, many of 
whom had turned to trading or were employed within the government 
bureaucracies. Many of the Durava had turned to fishing and a few 
of the Goyigama and Karava had become "entrepreneurial exorcists", 
relying heavily on poorly rewarded Berava ritual expertise. In one 
case a non-Rada woman had taken up the ritual duties of the washer 
caste, and some of the Navandana had become mechanics. The potters, 
who lived in a distinct village on the Western edge of the town were 
still engaged in the production of traditional household pots and a 
version of "tourist" pottery sold to pilgrims en route to Kataragama. 
The Oli, in another distinct village beyond the Eastern side of town 
had turned from oil production to the making of coir rope and many 
of the Berava still followed their traditional occupation. In general 
it seemed that the lower the caste, the more rigid were the residence 
rules, and far fewer the opportunities for an entrepreneurial shift 
away from caste-specific duties. In particular the Berava complained 
that they found it impossible to acquire land outside their village 
as no-one would sell it to them. The caste society continues to exist 
with a very real force in today's class society and continually 
impedes the movement of members of the lower castes into financially 
rewarding employment. Therefore it is the higher castes (Goyigama and. 
Karava) who have largely entered into the trading arena. The 
" This list was garnered purely from my observations and is not 
intended as exhaustive. See Ryan (1953) Leach (1979) Yalman (ibid) and 
McGilvray (1973,1974,1982) for detailed discussion of caste in Sri 
Lanka. 
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Sinhalese lower castes have barely managed to commercialize their 
traditional fields of employment. Caste reinforces class. 
The existence of a traditional link between particular occupation and 
caste, is not a dominant feature of Muslim caste in Sri Lanka. Yet 
low caste ranking inhibits. the movement of the poorest sections of 
the Muslim population into the arena of economic opportunity, as it 
does with the Sinhalese. There are five ranked "castes" among the 
Muslims, and all are represented in this area, but in vastly 
different proportions. The vast majority of the Muslims in the 
research area are Nala Manichal (the descendants of Arab traders). 
There are few Moulas (new converts), one Osta (barber) family, 
approximately fifteen Moulana families and one Ande village. 50 The 
settlement patterns of the first four groups are always theoretically 
mixed, their actual distribution reflecting only historical 
circumstance. It is only the "out-caste" Ande who are prohibited from 
residing in the context of the other groups and live always in caste 
enclaves. Despite the use of the term shazi (caste) I have stated 
that these are not to be taken as castes in a Dumontian (1980) sense, 
and should be understood as ranked groups. However the fact that a 
social ranking exists, begins my theoretical discussion. The Muslim 
caste groups are primarily endogamous but commensality is not 
restricted as with the Hindu and Sinhalese caste systems. 
The Moulanas are the direct patrilineal descendants of the Prophet's 
daughter Fatima, and son-in-law, Ali. They are the highest ranking 
group. They stand in relation to "the persons of holy descent" of 
Swat (Barth, 1960: 115), the Ashraf Saiyids and Shaiks of Uttar 
Pradesh, (Dumont, ibid: 207) and the Thangals found among the Moplahs 
so McGilvray (1989) notes the existence among East Coast Muslims 
of "a small elite of Maulanas" and "a small, endogamous, stigmatised 
group of Osta barber-circumcisers who resemble a low caste". Yet he 
argues that the Moors of the East Coast "lack caste distinctions", 
although there are some "vestiges of possible caste-related hierarchy 
among Moorish matriclans.. (T)oday the Moors are proud of their 
egalitarian religion and their common bond as Muslims" 
(ibid: 195, ffl). 
McGilvray (ibid) makes no mention of the Ande on the East Coast, and 
Yalman (1971) doesn't cite their existence in the Central highlands. 
As far as I am aware this caste only exists in the South-west coastal 
area from Colombo to Matara. This is not definite however as many 
Muslims are reluctant to discuss (and more reluctant to publish), the 
existence of caste, as it conflicts with egalitarian ideology. 
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(Mappilas) in Kerala (D' Souza, 1978: 44) and the Laccadives (Forbes, 
ibid, Dube, ibid) . In each of these social contexts it is the 
descendants of the Prophet who constitute the highest ranking group. 
Within the research area Moulanas are all Ceylon Moors. Although 
they hold the highest religious ranking they do not constitute a 
particularly wealthy group. 51 Many of them are in fact teachers, 
rather than, wealthy traders. As people of the Prophet's family 
(Quraish) however, they are entitled to everyone's respect. Some of 
them are highly regarded for their religious knowledge, but this is 
strictly viewed as an individual matter and they are granted no moral 
or religious authority by virtue of their position. The Moulana 
families live predominantly in Galbokka and New Street, a factor 
which again reinforces the orthodoxy of this area vis-a-vis the 
surrounding villages, but there is at least one old and large family 
in Wellipitiya. 52 As the Prophet's blood is traced (post Fatima), 
patrilineally, the Moulana men who marry exogamously, will have 
children who are Moulanas, but the women who marry exogamously will 
not. 53 In Weligama considerable effort is expended in arranging 
endogamous marriages for Moulana women, a factor that indicates 
greater concern with the purity of the blood line and with bilateral 
kinship. This contrasts with the East coast Moulanas who are often 
si There is one notable exception to this, a man who made his 
fortune in gem trading. 
5z In theory each of the Moulana families should hold a document 
called a silsila (chain), tracing their direct descent from Muhammad 
through his daughter Fatima. Only one family produced such a document 
which traced their ancestry back to Adam. Several of the Moulana 
families expressed doubts about the authenticity of other families. 
In particular it was stated that some of the Wellipitiya Moulanas, 
were in fact the original servants of Moulanas (therefore Moulas), 
and not true Moulanas (cf below). 
51 Moulana women are known locally by the honorific kanne which 
means virgin, and they generally maintain the strictest rules of 
purdah, in accordance with their high religious status. The use of 
the term kanne - virgin has a definite connotation of fertility. A 
point of contrast with the Sinhalese hierarchical system is that at 
puberty Sinhalese girls are understood to lose their virginity; 
virginity signifying wholeness and auspiciousness. In the contrasting 
Muslim egalitarian system, a girl at puberty is understood to become 
a virgin, virginity here signifying fertility and reproductive 
potential. See Boddy 1982 for an elaborate Sudanese argument on the 
social construction of virginity (fertility). 
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content to let their women marry exogamously. In this case it is the 
men alone who continually reproduce the Moulana group. 
The vast majority of Muslims in the area are nala manichal ("good 
people"), the second highest group. "' They are also all Ceylon Moors, 
and the majority of them are engaged in some form of trade. Their 
marriages are for the most part endogamous and in the cases of 
exogamy, all marriages are hypergamous. Within this area many 
marriages are between non-kin and arranged through the services of 
a marriage broker. Great effort is made to match prospective spouses 
for wealth and social position. In these marriages therefore, caste 
endogamy protects social rank and caste, rather than kin-group. 
The third group, the Ostas, are the only group who are identified 
with a traditional hereditary occupation, and one which carries an 
inferior status. 55 On the East coast they are a "stigmatised" group 
(McGilvray, 1989: 95)and the only group that may be seen "as a caste 
in a formal sense" (McGilvray, 1973: 6). The Osta (naswan) are the only 
"service" caste for Muslims and they perform all the female 
circumcisions and around fifty percent of the male circumcisions in 
the area. 56 This is the only service that Muslims ritually require. 
sa On the East coast they are nallaarkal, McGilvray, 1973: 6. 
ss They argue that they are now known by the term Naswan to show 
that they are above other people. 
56 Male circumcision is ideally, a ritualized and public affair, 
the size of the celebration reflecting the wealth of the household. 
The boy is known as sunnath mappilai (circumcision bridegroom) and 
parts of the ceremonial resemble the ritual treatment of the 
bridegroom. Circumcision is therefore a male puberty rite, 
celebrating the attainment of fertile Muslim adulthood. Boys are 
circumcised between the ages of eight and eleven and this is 
performed either by the Osta in the traditional manner in the home, 
or alternatively with a local anaesthetic in a Doctor's surgery. 
Wealth is a prime consideration in determining the extent of the 
celebration and therefore the manner of circumcision. For the poorer 
families the cheapest option is the doctorb surgery but often the 
cost of this (the cost of surgery plus hiring a taxi from Galle) is 
prohibitive, and as sons get older becomes a major financial worry. 
Some of the Muslim public charities (Y. M. M. A. for example) regularly 
set aside the money for a large number of young men to be circumcised 
at once. Thus circumcision celebrations for males are an indicator 
of class position. 
Female circumcision is by contrast, a private domestic affair, 
performed by a female Osta, seven or nine days after birth, when the 
baby's head is shaved (agiga). Female "circumcision" in this area is 
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In contrast to Hindu and Sinhalese castes, where washer and barber 
castes are required to take on pollution, there is no overt 
suggestion that circumcising is a polluting activity. 57 It is a 
religious requirement, the term sunnath suggesting both "custom" and 
"approved by the Prophet" (Glasse, ibid: 381). Thus the task may also 
be performed by doctors. There is almost certainly however, in this 
cultural context, an implicit understanding that barbering is a "low" 
if not explicitly polluting activity. There is one Osta family in the 
area, living in Galbokka, who state that they are related to all 
other Ostas in Sri Lanka. This indicates that marriages for the Osta 
are strictly endogamous. One male and one female from this family 
(brother and sister), were still working as circumcisers, and the 
male ran a full-time barber-saloon also, where he dressed wounds as 
well as cut hair and shaved clients. The ritual labour of these two 
was sufficient to service the entire community's needs. The children 
in the family have all taken up other employment, and do not intend 
to work as circumcisers, as income from this traditional occupation 
is deemed insufficient. 58 This group originally undertook the 
purificatory washing of corpses before burial but this task has since 
been left to the Ande out-castes - the lowest group. 59 
primarily symbolic, entailing the extraction of a single drop of 
blood from the clitoral hood. Female circumcision is accompanied by 
a few ritual dishes of food. The celebration in this case is the new 
baby's Muslim status, as the purpose of the circumcision itself is 
widely held to be to "curb her sexual appetite" rather than purify 
her in a religious sense. Female circumcision is believed to be a 
religious act, though most people will state that it is not in the 
Qur'an, but is followed by custom. 
57 All Muslims however, regularly bury any nail parings or 
removed body hair. In the context of the baby's head-shaving the hair 
is explicitly removed because it has been polluted by contact with 
the mother's birth canal and is placed in a small bowl of turmeric 
water when removed by the Osta. It s weight "in silver" is 
symbolically given to the Osta in the form of a small coin which is 
also placed in the bowl. 
58 In 1986 the female Osta could expect twenty Rupees plus a 
ritual gift of food, for her services from a middle class 
household. Her brother would get between Rs50/- and RslOO/- and would 
be entitled to one of the sabans from the feast. 
59 There is no explicit ideology of death pollution and no 
ideological requirement within Islam for this task to be performed 
by a ritual specialist. 
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The fourth group are the Moulas, recently converted Muslims (from 
Arabic mawla - the client of an Arab with second class status). They 
generally retain their lower status for about three generations, 
after which time they slide into the nala manichal group. This is not 
ever stated as an explicit facet of the ideology, rather it reflects 
the length of peoples memories. Moulas also marry endogamously. If 
he is particularly wealthy a Moula male will have no trouble finding 
a spouse amongst the poorer women of the nala manichal group. Very 
few Moulas will openly state that they are so, but others will 
readily identify them. Some social ostracism is attached to a 
marriage contracted with this group and there may be subsequent 
difficulty in finding spouses for the children of such marriages. 
However it is true that if a comparatively wealthy male of the nala 
manichal group marries a newly converted Sinhalese woman then the 
social cost will not be great. With large dowries for his daughters 
he will have no problems marrying them to other nala manichal. All 
the cases of Moula marriage that I heard of were those that involved 
Muslim males and converted wives. "' I heard of no case in which a 
Muslim woman married a converted man. Hypergamy is again the issue 
and patrilineal bloodlines are at stake. An additional problem for 
the Moula group, is that many Moulas actually are converted through 
the process of being the servants of wealthy Muslim families. " 
The fifth group are known as Ande walfawel (depend living) or ande 
62 manichal (depend people). The Ande are an out-caste group with a 
60 One young man who had, due to his father's early death, become 
the head of the family and its chief economic support, arranged to 
marry a Moula woman, the daughter of a converted Hindu. He went ahead 
with his plans despite the vigorous objections of his mother and 
sisters. He argued that the Moula/Nala Manichal distinction made no 
difference to him, the idea of castes was against the religion and 
what was more, his own family had only converted from Hinduism six 
generations ago. 
61 The children of Indian Tamil plantation workers are 'adopted' 
as servants and subsequently raised as Muslims. These children are 
moulas; they are not formally educated but the Muslim family assumes 
the responsibility of marrying them. 
62 The term Ande is not polite and never used when a member of the 
group is present. 
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high number of beggars. All Ande marriages are endogamous and there 
is a higher than usual tendency to find a spouse from another village 
and very few marriages take place between two people who already live 
there. The low status of this group is commonly attributed to the 
fact that begging is such a common practice here and is regarded by 
all Muslims as un-Islamic. Significantly their low class-status (and 
grinding poverty), and Indian origins are never referred to. 
The question of caste in a Muslim egalitarian community presents an 
apparent contradiction and indeed is a constant point of tension 
within the community. I have argued that this ranking is not to be 
read as "caste", nor the system as a "caste-system" along the lines 
of Dumont's (ibid) argument concerning Hindu caste; a system 
structured around an internal hierarchical relation borne of the 
opposition of pure and impure. In fact if we examine the caste groups 
of the South coast Muslims they do not immediately suggest the 
operation of a system based on a common principle at all. As Barth 
argues for the Sunni Pathans of Swat, there is 
no ritual system in terms of which the groups are compared or 
ordered with respect to one another (ibid: 115). 
The Swat Pathans however are grouped largely by occupation whereas 
in Weligama there is no immediately apparent logic which applies to 
all the groups. The various groups seem to find their raison d'etre 
in a number of different principles (ethnicity, conversion, 
occupation) and this suggests an historical conglomeration of groups 
whose internal ranking may be derived perhaps from class processes . 
6' 
Is this nothing more than a transformation of the Hindu model of 
caste which has arisen within a community located in the pan-Indian 
region? There is a principle which becomes evident however when we 
examine the movement within the groups and the question of hypergamy 
and the ideology of blood. This is a particular religious 
construction which determines the status of the group in relation to 
its distance from the Prophet himself. 
"Caste" ranking may be viewed as basically one principle related to 
a conception of patrilineal descent. Yalman argued that caste 
required bilateral descent, even if the local kinship structure was 
63 See Kolenda (1978: 23-36) for a similar argument about the origins 
of caste in India. 
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patrilineal or matrilineal. In the Muslim case, it is implicit that 
notions of bilateral descent are important - since there is a 
tendency towards endogamy among the stratified groups. However, it 
is also evident that descent through males is the determining, or 
superior religious value. The groups are ranked according to the 
quality of male, Islamic blood - that is distance from its 
(ancestral) origin. Three of the groups Moulanas (I), Nala Manichal 
(II) and Moulas (IV) are ordered on a continuum with reference to 
their Islamic rank. First the people of the Prophet's family, 
followed by those who trace their origins to the lands of the Middle 
east through Arab traders and claim long-standing belief in Islam. 
The converted group owe their lower status (IV) to their recent 
conversion to the religion (either 'adopted' servants or former Hindu 
or Buddhist wives of nala manichal). The Osta group are believed to 
be Muslims of long-standing but they are from India (possibly Kerala) 
and in India their occupation was that of a low caste. Their endogamy 
has prevented them from becoming Nala Manichal. The Ande (V) are out- 
castes (banished from the Kandyan kingdom and"with South Indian 
origins maintained in their myth of origin) who have until recently 
all followed an occupation which has been outlawed by Islam. " 
The higher the rank, the closer in substantive terms to the Islamic 
source - Muhammad himself. Thus the relationship between Islam, 
saintly blood, and patrilineal descent form one principle. Endogamy 
reinforces the group boundaries and protects blood purity. By 
continually marrying within the group one reproduces ones 
'Islamicness'. This is proved by the eventual possibility of 
"hypergamy" by some of the Moulas, after sufficiently building up 
enough Islamic blood. They can increase their Muslim purity and the 
concentration of "sacred" Muslim blood, within a group, through 
marriage. This is a real increase in substance, so much so that the 
Moula can became a Nala Manichal. This is ideologically impossible 
in an hierarchical caste system, precisely because caste purity does 
not rest, basically, on the quantity and quality of substance, but 
almost solely on relations. A Hindu person cannot increase in purity 
64 A further speculative point but in line with the logic . 
is the 
fact that the Osta (if they prove to be from Kerala) will rate higher 
than the Ande from Madurai due to the earlier conversion of that area 
(Southwest coast) and the fact that it had an earlier involvement with 
Arab traders and the Arab world. 
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during life, this is certainly true of caste status and purity. 
Endogamy in the Hindu caste system is a practice aimed at maintaining 
purity and difference, not at increasing purity and Islamic identity. 
(The latter is just not possible in caste). 
Therefore we are alerted to a fundamental point about Muslim ' caste' 
or this particular Muslim 'caste system' . There are fundamental 
differences in the constitution of the individual in hierarchical and 
egalitarian systems. The individual within the egalitarian system is 
capable of self-transformation. By this I do not mean a change in 
caste status, (always a social but not an ideological possibility 
within the pan-Indian system), but a radical transformation of the 
self. 
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Appendix C 
Muslim Dominance of Trade. 
In a survey conducted in 1985 it was found that of a total of 429 
business outlets in the town, 201 (46.85%) were controlled by 
Muslims, 226 (52.68k) were controlled by Sinhalese and 2 (0.46%) were 
controlled by Tamils. 65 Business outlets were divided into five 
categories according to their size. These categories ranged from (A) 
stall, (B) small business, (C) average business, (D) large business, 
and (E) industry. 66 
The picture of Muslim dominance is further strengthened when we 
consider the relative percentages of those controlling the smallest 
and largest outlets. In the smallest category (A - stalls), of a 
total of eleven stalls, only one stall (9.09%) was run by Muslims, 
one (9.09%) was run by Tamils and nine (81.81%) were run by 
Sinhalese. In contrast to this, in the largest category (E - 
industry), of a total of six industries, five (83.33%) were run by 
Muslims and only one (16.665. -)'run by Sinhalese. In the intervening 
categories the relative percentages are outlined in Table C. I. 
65 This survey was explicitly concerned with shops and stalls of 
a permanent nature and did not include any of the Sinhalese or 
Muslim, itinerant door to door hawkers of fish, vegetables, household 
items, sweets and trinkets. It further did not include the vegetable 
stall-holders in either the central market (approx 12 stalls) or the 
smaller market (2 stalls), of whom all but one were Sinhalese. Also 
excluded was the town's fishing industry which is entirely in the 
hands of the Sinhalese. Taking these considerations into account, my 
results diminish to some extent the picture of Sinhalese economic 
engagement within the town. However the survey is an accurate 
indication of the respective percentages of Sinhalese and Muslim 
populations engaged in all other wholesale and retail trade. 
66 A stall (A) was either a small roadside operation which was 
generally housed in a wooden shelter or a market stall. A small 
business (B) was housed in a small shop and in most cases serviced 
by a single employee (or the owner) at any one time. An average 
business (C) was housed in a larger shop and required two or more 
employees. A large business generally had several employees under the 
direction of a manager and was housed in a large and well-provisioned 
shop. The category (E) Industry refers to a business which was 
oriented towards wholesale operations and which reflected 
substantial capital investment in machinery, (i. e. a rice or spice 
mill operation, a lumber operation or a knitting operation) even 
though the latter functioned as a cottage industry with women doing 
"outwork". 
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Table C. l 
Business Ownership by Ethnic Group. 
Business Size Total No Muslim Sinhalese Tamil 
A Stall 11 9.09% 81.81% 9.09% 
B Small 67 43.28% 56.71% - 
C Average 272 48.52% 51.1% 0.36%- 
D Large 73 46.57% 53.42% - 
E Industry 6 83.33% 16.66% - 
When businesses were further classified as to their type the 
dominance of either Muslims or Sinhalese in particular trades became 
apparent. In particular the Muslims dominated the highly lucrative Gem 
(Jewellery) and Textile trades. 67 
There were a total of 22 jewellery outlets which provided the gold 
ear-rings, necklaces, (thali -a marriage ornament of Tamil Hindu and 
Muslim women), bracelets and rings which are an essential feature of 
the puberty and marriage rituals of both the Muslims and Sinhalese 
and form part of the dowry of all young women. Twenty of these 
(90.90%) are run by Muslims while only two (9.09%) are run by 
Sinhalese. The gem and jewellery trade has been a traditional Muslim 
67 The owners of a number of businesses (66) were asked to give 
an estimate of their weekly takings. While some were reluctant to do 
so, for taxation reasons, the results clearly indicate that the 
highest returns are to be found in the Gem trade. 
Weekly Takings: 66 Businesses in Weligama. 
Business Questioned No Response Rs 5000 or less, Rs 6-30,000 
Grocery 35 13 (37%) 22 (631) - 
Textiles 15 3 (20%) 9 (60%) 3 (20%) 
Hardware 83 (37.5%) 3 (37%. 5) 2 (25%) 
Gems 83 (37.5%) 2 (25%) 3 (37.5%) 
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monopoly and this is reflected in Weligama where although the Muslims 
are a minority they control the major part of this trade. 68 
0 
In the textile trade also, the Muslims clearly dominate though not 
to such a striking degree. There were a total of 38 textile shops and 
26 (68.42%) of these were run by Muslims and 12 (41.57%) were run by 
Sinhalese. In contrast to this there were a far greater number of 
Sinhalese than Muslim tailors. There were 19 tailoring businesses in 
the town and the Muslims ran only 2 (10.52%) and the Sinhalese ran 
17 (89.47%). The clothing worn by both Muslims and Sinhalese in the 
town is virtually the same. All Muslim and Sinhalese married women 
wear saris (although only Muslim women pull part of the sari length 
up to cover their heads), and all the men wear shirts made by the 
local tailors, and sarongs. 69 The only significant distinction is 
found in the clothing'of unmarried women. Very young girls of both 
communities groups are commonly clothed in dresses available from all 
the textile shops. However while young Sinhalese women continue to 
wear dresses after puberty, young Muslim women as they approach 
puberty begin to wear long trousers with their white school uniforms. 
After puberty when the vast majority of young Muslim women are 
confined to their houses they wear the long narrow trousers and 
dresses known as salwar or punjabi suits and the churidars (shawls) 
68 Most of the gem and jewellery shops in Weligama deal primarily 
in gold jewellery rather than gems. This contrasts with the Galle 
Fort area for instance where many of the Muslim gem traders are 
almost wholly engaged in the polishing, grading and sale of sapphires 
and rubies and other semi-precious stones. The owners of the Weligama 
stores however see themselves as Gem Traders, engaged in a trade 
which has symbolic significance and links them clearly to the 
original Arab traders who came to the island for its gems and spices. 
The majority of the gem and jewellery shops are located in the 
Galbokka area, a fact which underlines both the Muslim dominance of 
this trade and through its symbolic significance to Muslims, the 
status of this area as the heart of orthodox Muslim settlement within 
the town. 
69 Both Sinhalese and Muslim men commonly wear and exhibit a 
preference for white sarongs, particularly on formal occasions. There 
are however distinct ethnic preferences expressed in the patterns of 
the coloured sarongs worn by the men on a day to day basis. In 
particular the batik patterned sarongs were rarely worn by the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims were reported to express a preference for 
smaller checked patterns. 
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with which they cover their breasts . 
70 Thus although both groups 
require equally textile shops and the services of tailors, the 
Muslims dominate the purely trading side of community clothing needs 
and the Sinhalese dominate the service side. 
This distinction between the trading and service sides of different 
areas of the economy is again reflected in the respective engagement 
of Muslims and Sinhalese in the health field. There are eight 
pharmacies in the town which supply a vast array of Western 
allopathic drugs, available over the counter and including a number 
that have been banned in the West. "' There are a total of eight 
pharmacies in the town and 5 (62.55. -) are in Muslim hands and 3 
(37.5%) are controlled by Sinhalese. On the other hand in the 
Doctor/Ayurvedic/Apothecary, professional service side of this 
field, of a total of 15 outlets there are four (26.6%) outlets in 
Muslim hands and 11 (73.33%) operated by Sinhalese. ' In the case of 
70 Muslim women of the last generation, began to wear saris in 
the home when they reached puberty, but this is now reserved until 
marriage. In fact many of today's young women will continue to wear 
their salwar and punjabi suits around the house after marriage as 
they claim they are more comfortable. Sinhalese women also may be 
seen wearing dresses after marriage, but this was in my observation 
confined to the poorer sections of the community and restricted to 
household and every-day wear, never on ritual occasions. 
71 The birth control agent Depo-Provera is an example. Although 
all drugs are available without prescription, many customers arrive 
with small "prescriptions" supplied by their doctors and the 
pharmacists commonly label the small envelopes of pills or bottles 
of linctus with the name of the patient and the dosage instructions. 
Formal pharmaceutical training is available but there is no official 
requirement for a "pharmacist" to undertake any formal training 
before opening and running a pharmacy. Pharmacies also carry a 
sizeable range of grocery items as well. 
72 There are no Western trained Muslim doctors in the town and 
the Muslim women either patronise a Sinhalese female doctor locally, 
or travel to Matara. A government hospital located at the far Western 
end of the town is available to both communities, and recently a new 
maternity hospital, for both communities, was established in 
Galbokka. Formerly there were three government mid-wives in the town 
who took care of the majority of births but a trend towards hospital 
births and the establishment of the maternity hospital has decreased 
the need for them. One of these mid-wives, a Sinhalese Christian 
woman, who was formerly responsible for the primarily Muslim Galbokka 
and New Street areas, continued to operate on a private basis, 
visiting new mother and child in the home and administering the 
ritual herbal bath that Muslim women take on the 40th day after 
parturition. 
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the "Fancy Goods" or Gift shops; sellers of glass and ceramic ware, 
the Muslims again held a dominant position. Of a total of 16 shops 
there were 11 (68.75%) owned by Muslims and 5 (31.25%) owned by 
Sinhalese. 
Overall, the largest number of businesses were connected with the 
grocery trade and included grocery stores, vegetable and fruit 
outlets, grinding mills, wholesale grocery outlets and butchers. Of 
a total of 153 grocery outlets the Muslims controlled 71 (46.40%), 
Tamils one outlet (0.65%) and the Sinhalese 81 (52.94%). This 
indicates that a certain proportion of the Sinhalese majority 
purchase their groceries from Muslim tradesmen. Included in this 
category were 22 'Hotels' (restaurants) , which sell both hot food and 
"lunch-packets". Many of those who are working in Weligama but who 
live elsewhere on the island, and large numbers of people travelling 
through the town, regularly dine in these establishments. Fourteen 
Hotels were run by Muslims (63.63%) and only eight by Sinhalese 
(36.36%), a figure which reflects an extensive Sinhalese patronage 
of Muslim establishments and a lack of Sinhalese objections to eating 
food cooked by Muslims. " 
The Hardware industry is the only field in which both groups are 
equally represented with each group running 12 outlets (50%) each. 
Hardware in this instance refers to building materials, cement and 
roofing tiles, timber and ironworks. The Sinhalese are the only 
professional builders in the town and are employed to build the 
houses of the Muslims also. Many of the poorer Muslims however 
undertake to build their own homes, (particularly if they have 
recently returned from the Middle East) and commonly, quite major 
household repairs and house-painting are undertaken by the 
householders themselves. Two of these hardware outlets are timber 
stores and one is run by a Muslim who employs an entirely Sinhalese 
" There is clearly no caste factor evident here in taking food 
from another group. Muslims in the island would also be happy to eat 
in establishments run by Sinhalese (and Tamils) since they know that 
all beef in the island is killed by Muslims and is therefore halal. 
Locally the Muslims had a reputation as better cooks, a fact which 
is probably related to their tendency to consume more meat than the 
Sinhalese, and generally a more expensive diet. 
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labour force. 74 This traditional interest of the Sinhalese in the 
timber industry is reflected in the ownership of furniture stores 
where five are run by Sinhalese with only one in the hands of a 
Muslim. In the Electrical business also their respective 
representation is almost even, with eight shops owned by Muslims and 
seven by Sinhalese. This category of outlets included the retail sale 
of radios, cassettes, and electrical household goods. One further 
outlet recharged the car batteries used in many homes as their only 
source of electricity. 
I have drawn a loose distinction between the participation of Muslims 
and Sinhalese, in the purely entrepreneurial and the service sides, 
of trading activity within the local economy. The Muslims are far 
more likely to be engaged in the purely entrepreneurial activity 
while the Sinhalese are represented in both sides. In the Motor 
industry there are five Garages or Mechanical Service centres and 
four are run by Sinhalese while only one is run by a Muslim. Yet in 
the case of the three Spare Parts shops for tyres, Tractor Parts and 
Motor Parts, two are owned by Muslims and one by Sinhalese. In the 
case of the Printing shops within the town, where the obligatory 
sets of wedding invitations and cards that are used by both 
communities are printed, the ownership reflects the actual 
proportions of the population. Of a total of four printers three are 
Sinhalese and only one is Muslim. In the case of the cycle shops 
also, the Muslims were in a dominant position. With bicycles 
constituting the town's most important form of personal transport 
there were a total of 15 shops. The Muslims owned 11 (73.33%) of them 
and the Sinhalese owned 4 (26.66%). 
This distinction between trade and professional service reflects 
three distinct but related factors. The first is a traditional Muslim 
preference for trade itself; the second is the traditionally caste 
based structure of Sinhalese society; and the third, which emerges 
from the second is, specific community needs. There are three funeral 
parlours in the town catering exclusively to the Sinhalese 
population, while the Muslims bury their dead quickly and through the 
aegis of the mosque. Both laundries in the town are also owned and 
74 The Sinhalese Durava caste, who are well represented in the 
town traditionally work with coconut trees and in the lumber 
business. 
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run by the Sinhalese although they cater to a mixed clientele. I am 
not aware if these people are members of the traditional Sinhalese 
Rada (washers) caste but it is quite likely. 75 
Members of both communities have displayed a certain aptitude for 
entrepreneurial activity and there are increasing numbers of 
Sinhalese engaged in trading within the town. Thus in the case of 
Kapuwatta for instance, an entirely Muslim village, there is a 
laundry which is owned and operated by a Sinhalese man from nearby 
Horagoda. In Weligama there are five Picture Framers who do 
comparatively little picture framing but sell small posters of the 
Buddha and a vast array of Gods in the Sinhalese and Hindu pantheons. 
Almost every Buddhist household has a few of these posters in the 
house, often located by a small household altar where a lamp is lit 
for household worship. The three largest of these businesses are 
owned by Sinhalese but the two smallest are run by Muslims and have 
a clientele which is 99g Sinhalese. 76 
A further aspect of the town's economy which is of great significance 
is the extent of government support which is offered to the local 
Sinhalese population. There are a number of government Co-operatives 
in the town all of which are exclusively in the hands of the 
Sinhalese. There are seven grocery co-operatives which operate as 
retail outlets and the venue for redeeming the rice coupons which 
75 There is a Rada village located at the Western end of town in 
an area renowned for its pure water and where there is a large 
communal well used by people of the town for bathing. People of this 
village take in washing on a routine basis as well as providing the 
piriwatta or pure cloths required by the Sinhalese for ritual 
purposes, such as puberty and exorcisms (Russell, p. c. ). There is 
no similar Muslim requirement for ritually pure cloth predicated on 
the action of ritual/caste specialists. Pure cloths in a Muslim 
household are purified simply by washing them as water itself is the 
purificatory agent. 
76 Muslims have strong ideological objections to any attempts to 
objectify Allah or the Prophet Muhammad. A few of the most orthodox 
within the town extend this to objectification in general, and ban 
photographs of people and the watching of television. This position 
however has almost no common support, with most people considering 
this interpretation unwarranted and untenable. Photographs of women 
who are in purdah however, are not shown to anybody who would not 
have the right to see his woman in person. In their houses Muslims 
will often display ornate calendars. with pictures of the Ka'bah in 
Mecca, or small posters of Arabic verses from the Qur'an but the 
latter are generally found in the Muslim bookshops. 
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many of the poorer families depend on. " There are also two Co- 
operative textile shops, one Co-operative Pharmacy, one Co-operative 
hardware store and one Government Training school for tailors. These 
outlets have all been included in the data above, and they act to 
inflate Sinhalese participation in the respective percentages of 
trade, as indications of ethnic entrepreneurial engagement. 
Another field where the coalition of Sinhalese government and 
Sinhalese entrepreneurial activity is strikingly evident is the 
Gambling economy. There were two specific areas of gambling; one was 
the private sector Betting shops (known as Bucket shops), where it 
was possible to place bets on the horse-races in Singapore and the 
Middle East, and the other were the outlets for the Government run 
Lotteries. There were a total of 14 outlets for the horse-racing bets 
and of these nine (64.281) were run by Muslims and five (35.71%) run 
by Sinhalese. All ten outlets for the Government Lotteries were run 
by Sinhalese. The patronage of both Lottery and Betting outlets was 
overwhelmingly Sinhalese. 78 
The Structure of Trade. 
Given the interspersed nature of ethnic settlement throughout the 
town area and the location of the market and commercial area in the 
centre, all businesses (with the exception of specialist outlets, 
funeral parlours, butchers, betting outlets) report a mixed 
clientele. This is no doubt due in part, to the fact that all shops 
in any particular category, carry the same basic range of goods. 
Prices may vary a little from one shop to another but owners are 
careful not to be too competitive by dropping their prices 
drastically. When a young Muslim man opened a new pharmacy in Station 
Road, between another two already established (one Muslim and one 
Sinhalese) he was very careful to line up his prices exactly with 
" They are supplied from the large Co-operative store, located 
near the Railway Station which has a storage capacity of ten metric 
tonnes and at the time generally carried a stock of five tonnes 
valued at five million Rupees. 
78 Two Muslim Betting shops run by Muslims reported that their 
patronage was 80t Sinhalese/20t Muslim and 90% Sinhalese/l0% Muslim 
respectively. Several informants reported that gambling was 
prohibited by Islam but this clearly did not extend to conducting a 
business based on the gambling tendencies of others. This is another 
area in which Muslim participation in the local economy is purely 
entrepreneurial. 
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those of the other two. 79 There are never any sales of any 
description, nor any conception of shifting stock, in fact the 
reverse principle applies. During the periods of Sinhalese New Year 
and Ramazan, when everybody who can afford it seeks to acquire a new 
set of clothing, the prices are uniformly raised. 
A similar situation may be observed in the cases of some of the 
smaller gem and jewellery shops which also function as antique shops 
selling old coins and jewellery. There is an almost non-existent 
local market for the latter goods and merchants would hope to sell 
these items either to foreign tourists or visiting Sinhalese and 
Muslim collectors. With the collapse of the tourist market 
(particularly in this area) the chances of sales were almost nil. 
Despite this situation however the merchant would rather wait for a 
"big killing" that attempt to sell more goods at lower prices. in 
many cases these smaller shops formed only part of a family's 
economic interests. Given the very low economic returns in such 
ventures it is evident that their significance to the families 
involved rests in the activity rather than the returns of such a 
trade. Many Muslims who are employed in day-time jobs (teaching for 
example) or who have retired, will seek to have a small shop that 
they open at night, or some form of business that they operate from 
79 He also employed a Sinhalese pharmacy assistant from the 
nearby Sinhalese pharmacy at the request of its owner. 
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home. 80 If the opportunity to trade ever presents itself a Muslim will 
invariably take it up. 
The ideal employment-history of a young Muslim male in this area, is 
a period of employment as a salesman in another merchant's shop, 
followed by the establishment of his own business. Alternatively he 
may become a textile hawker, travelling and selling textiles in the 
van of a textile merchant, who himself runs a large textile store or 
has a domestic industry making socks and baby-clothes. If the family 
is already well established in business he may first find employment 
in the family business and later take it over, or establish another 
outlet, with financial assistance from his father. This however, 
depends very much on the size of the original family business, and 
the number of sons in a family. There were many instances where the 
father ran a small business in the town and where the son found 
employment elsewhere in the island, returning home once a week, or 
in most cases, once a month. 
In each trade, more than 5O of the merchants had first been employed 
as salesmen or hawkers in the same field of business, though not the 
same shop. However in the percentages of those listed as initially 
engaged in other trades, there were two textile merchants, who had 
been employed in other fields before entering the textile trade, 
whose fathers were textile merchants. Two of the grocery merchants 
80 One man who had lived in quite meagre circumstances with his 
large family in a cadjan (coconut thatch) hut had sought to support 
them on his salary as a bus conductor for the Ceylon Transport Board. 
When his sons grew up two of them managed to spend extended periods 
of time employed in the Middle East. They bought land and built a 
large new family home and furnished it complete with television and 
video. Then the eldest son bought more land nearby and built and 
furnished a new home for himself and his wife. As she is a graduate, 
employed as a teacher in a school some distance away, and as he 
remains temporarily in the Middle East, neither of them currently 
live there. The daughter of the family also contracted an excellent 
marriage to a Colombo man who had also spent time working in the 
Middle East. The family then bought a private bus and employed a 
driver, and hoped to supplement their family income from this 
lucrative source. When the father retired he opened a very small shop 
in a hut near his home, to service a nearby housing estate. The 
younger women of the extended household spent some time each week 
packing coffee into small plastic packets for sale there. The 
youngest son has since found employment in the Middle East. There is 
no need for the father to work as a trader and the returns from his 
small business are undoubtedly small. However, having retired, and 
with his sons doing so well, he is now finally in a position to 
pursue a life of trade. 
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had been teachers initially, turning to the grocery trade upon 
retirement. One of the gem merchants also who had no previous 
employment history had been set up in the gem business by his father 
who was previously a textile merchant, and who had now come to work 
with his son as a gem trader. 
Table C. 2 
Muslim Traders Previous Occupations 
Trade No. Same Trade Other Trade No Prev Emp N/A 
Grocery 25 52% 369. 8% 8% 
Textiles 12 75% 25% - - 
Gems 6 50% 16.6% 33.3% - 
On the occasion of his marriage a young man may take over his wife's 
father's business, on a few occasions having married the owner's 
daughter. In more cases though it appeared that the young man would 
inherit his own father's business, though there was one instance in 
which a man inherited his Mother's Brothers business. 81 
Sinhalese-Muslim relations within the town are for the most part 
cordial and the Muslims have not generally sought extensive 
representation on the Urban Council, leaving control of local 
politics in the hands of the Sinhalese. There are numerous ways in 
which the communities are dependent upon one another. Two of these 
mentioned above are the provision of meat and fish within the town. 
With only two jewellery shops in Sinhalese hands most gem businesses 
report a Sinhalese clientele in excess of 50'E (some as high as 90%). 
The employment of a Sinhalese member of staff in a predominantly 
Muslim business and vice versa is not uncommon. 
8' In the Muslim society of Weligama the houses belong to the 
women and form an essential part of a daughter's dowry upon marriage, 
along with (in the case of wealthier families) a considerable cash 
payment and items of gold jewellery. The business interests of a 
family however are handed from father to son. 
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Households too, often depend on Sinhalese specializations in the 
fields of house-building and also coconut plucking. In the purely 
trading field however where Muslims and Sinhalese are in direct 
competition frictions sometimes do arise. I have cited above the 
extensive government support offered to sections of the Sinhalese 
community through the total Sinhalese control of the Co-operative and 
Lottery outlets. There are also some who believe that the agencies 
of the government directly seek to subvert a traditional Muslim 
dominance of trade within the town and increase, by unfair means the 
extent of Sinhalese participation. One Muslim informant was quite 
vocal on this issue and stated that .. 
"Earlier all the wholesale business was in the hands of the 
Muslims in Weligama. In the last twenty years however, it has 
decreased rapidly. I think that there is a group which helps 
the Sinhalese to buy Muslim shops, or it may be the Urban 
Council or government banks which helps them to do it. If, due 
to poverty, Muslims let their shops to a Sinhalese business, 
they find it extremely difficult to get them back. The 
Sinhalese don't pay any rent to the Muslims directly but pay 
five or seven Rupees a month to the Urban Council. There are 
numerous cases like this and the Police and the government 
agencies consistently protect this Sinhalese denial of Muslim 
rights. " 
With regard to Weligama itself I heard no similar Sinhalese complaint 
with regard to the Muslim domination of business within the town but 
there was a general Sinhalese perception that the Muslims were a 
wealthy community. In nearby Ahangama however, a Sinhalese stall- 
holder in the market area reported that they had "kept the Muslims 
out of Ahangama. " 
There is a clear distinction between Muslim dominance of the purely 
entrepreneurial side of business within the town and a Sinhalese 
dominance in the professional service side of the economy. This 
situation is not static and the Sinhalese are increasingly engaged 
in the entrepreneurial side as well. However the reverse is not the 
case, we do not find Muslims moving into the service sector in 
significant numbers. The basis of this distinction may be traced on 
the one hand, to the Sinhalese caste system, and on other, to the far 
earlier entrance of the Muslims into the trading economy. The 
continued Muslim preference to engage wherever possible in the 
practice of trade reflects the ideological value of living the life 
of a trader. 
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adat 
adatrecht 
alathi 
Allawiyia 
alim 
ande 
aqiqa 
ar 
avaru 
awliya 
Asar 
azan 
Badahala 
badda 
Bara'at 
baraka 
Berava 
binna 
boddhisatva 
custom 
Indonesian customary laws 
ritual act of blessing (Hindu) 
a tariqa / Sufi order 
religious scholar (p1. ulema) 
outcaste 
head-shaving 
vow 
residential wards 
saints (plural lit - friend or 
patron, singular - wali) 
mid-afternoon prayer period 
the call to prayer 
Sinhalese potters caste 
caste based system of 
public service 
Islamic ritual on the 
15"' Shaban 
grace 
Sinhalese exorcist caste 
matrilocal marriage 
Sinhalese 
Buddha to be 
cadjan 
cadju 
cartazes 
chonahan 
chammankaran 
churidar 
Culuvamsa 
cungee 
dalada 
Dalada Maligawa 
debiha 
4ega 
dholaw 
din 
diyadada 
diyadedum 
Durava 
fäqir 
fi}tiha 
g6a 
gämmaduva 
goda 
Goyigama 
gbvia 
govikula 
gundraS 
hadjiar 
woven coconut thatch 
cashew 
Portuguese bills of 
permission to trade 
Ceylon Moor 
Coast Moor 
shawl 
one of the Sinhalese 
chronicles of kingship 
rice gruel 
Buddha's tooth 
Temple of the Tooth 
fulfillment of vow 
patrilocal marriage 
Sinhalese 
sedan-chair 
religion 
water taxes 
water taxes 
Sinhalese caste 
(carpenters/ toddy-tappers) 
holy man / lit. "a poor man" 
opening verse of Qur'an 
village 
village ceremonial 
place 
Sinhalese cultivating caste 
farmer 
highest caste in Kandyan 
kingdom 
Maldivian barque 
(sailing vessel) 
one who has completed the i 
ý 
hafiz 
hay 
Hakkia 
halal 
Halara 
haram 
hawl 
Id ul-Fitr 
Id ul-Azha 
`ifrit 
ihram 
imam 
Isha 
jamath / jamaat 
Jaziratul Yaqut 
Jumma 
kadutham 
kafan 
kaikuli 
kalifa / khalifah 
Kalimah 
kanduri 
kanne 
kapa 
karamat 
Karava 
khateeb /khatib 
khattam 
lShutbah 
kiri-pol 
Koya 
kelkali 
15udu 
kulappaaduthal 
ippaaddupavar 
ti 
Lpi Bandaras 
Läylat al-Qadr 
lebbe / lebbes 
19 keliya 
Luhar 
maChan 
nýadhhab 
madrasa 
Maghrib 
Maha 
mäha-pillai 
mahal 
mähan 
pilgrimage to Mecca 
one who has memorized 
the Qur'an 
Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca 
a tariqa 
permitted 
rathib of the Shasuliah tariqa 
sacred / forbidden 
pool of water for ablutions 
the feast of breaking the fast 
the feast of sacrifice 
demon / jinn 
pilgrim dress 
prayer-leader 
evening prayer period 
council / electorate 
Island of Rubies - 
Arabic term for Ceylon 
Friday 
marriage register 
burial cloth 
cash sum given to the groom 
a spiritual successor 
profession of faith /lit. "the word" 
mosque feast 
virgin - honourific used 
for Moulana women 
central pole of village ritual 
miracle / "acts of generosity" 
Sinhalese fishing caste 
preacher 
funeral prayers 
sermon 
milk coconut 
highest caste in 
Lakshadweep Islands 
stick-fighting / martial art 
ceremonial structure 
ritual washing of corpse 
corpse washers 
East coast matrilineal' clan. 
Muslims from Karachi coast 
"Night of Power" 
preacher, and an honourific 
stick-fighting / martial art 
mid-day prayer period 
cross cousin (male) 
school of jurisprudence 
Qur'an school 
sunset prayer period 
agricultural season - 
Sept to Jan 
great accountant/ great child 
daughter 
son 
Mahavamsa 
mahr 
mainee 
Malayalam 
Malayali 
Maluri 
mani 
Manik Ganga 
manjal 
Mapillai 
Mappilla 
marrakkalaha 
marrakar 
one of the Sinhalese 
chronicles of kingship 
symbolic payment given to 
the bride by groom 
cross cousin (female) 
language of Kerala 
adjective from Malayalam 
Lakshadweep Islands caste 
type of pearl found in Ceylon 
Gem River 
turmeric 
bridegroom 
a person from the Kerala area 
Moors 
Moors 
marikkars Mappilas from the Kerala coast 
marumahan elder brother's son 
nurumakkathayam customary laws in 
masjid 
mawsim 
Melacheri 
Lakshadweep islands 
mosque 
fixed season 
Lakshadweep Islands 
lowest caste 
mihrab niche indicating direction 
of Mecca 
minbar pulpit 
miswak (mishwak) tooth-brush made from 
mizan 
mokkada 
moudin 
moula 
moulana 
moulavi 
moulavia 
mowlood 
muazzin 
mudalali 
mudaliperuva 
muhamoodi 
mukaru 
murid 
mutkuda 
a frayed twig 
balance scale represented 
by two wooden boards 
to veil with the end of a sari 
(muazzin) calls the faithful 
to prayer 
convert to Islam 
(Ar. Mawla - client) 
descendent of the Prophet 
religious scholar (male) 
religious scholar (female) 
recital / story of the Prophet 
or a Muslim saint 
calls the faithful to prayer 
businessman 
high bureaucrats 
one of seven cloths used 
to wrap a Muslim corpse 
Muslim gem miners 
disciple 
Sinhalese king's 
pearl umbrella 
nalla manichal good people/ Muslim caste 
nallaarkal Osta - barber caste 
namad-ge prayer house 
namaz prayer 
nana elder brother 
Naqshabandia a tariqa 
naswan Osta - barber caste 
nershey offering which fulfills an 
earlier vow 
Nikah signing of the marriage 
niyaath 
niyaz 
nombu 
OR 
Osta 
paal 
pacchoru 
palli 
palli-koodam 
palliya-jamaat 
pandal 
pan-yan 
pavadai 
perahera 
pesantiren 
pettah 
pir 
piriwatta 
pola 
pon 
ponkal / pongal 
pooran kudi 
pottani 
Qaddirria 
Qazi 
qiblah 
qutb 
Rada 
rajakariya 
Rajavaliya 
rakat 
Ramazan 
rathib 
Rifai / Rifai'iyya 
saban 
saddai 
sahalappaddi 
salat 
samadhi 
sattunamkaras 
sampan 
sanyasi 
Sarandib 
saum 
)-RBb 
contract 
offering which fulfils 
an earlier vow 
blessed food (Persian) 
fasting 
Sinhalese caste 
(dancers/ astrologers) 
Muslim barber caste 
milk 
milk rice 
mosque 
Qur'an school 
(lit, mosque-school) 
mosque council 
throne 
native physician 
one of seven cloths used 
to wrap a Muslim corpse 
procession 
Qur'an schools (Malay) 
bazaar 
saint 
pure cloth 
market 
bride 
milk rice 
centipede flag 
(used at Kalmunai mosque) 
bundle of textiles 
Qadiriyyah -a tariqa - 
Sufi order 
religious courts 
direction of Mecca 
axis / pole 
Sinhalese washer caste 
system of compulsory 
service to the king 
one of the Sinhalese 
chronicles of kingship 
cycle of sacred words 
month of fasting (Ramadan) 
recital of saints life-story 
a tariqa / Sufi order 
large ritual bowl 
three of seven cloths used 
to wrap a Muslim corpse 
bond between two men who 
have married sisters 
prayer 
deep meditative trance 
Coast Moor 
boat 
Hindu renouncer 
island of Sri Lanka 
fasting 
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